',.t >*/ 







1 iwll|(|||i!l»j'il";i ;;■ 



iiliiiiSii:'''.:;:' 




iiijihu:;.:,':,,: 
;1.:;) !■: ! •'!!!! 

"*iii!''itiii!',;"'''' 



«; is isi> 



THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 



THE 



ci- 



ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

A STUDY TN THE HISTORY 
OF DEFINITION 



BY 



WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, Ph.D., D.D. 

ROOSEVELT PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE UNION 
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY. NEW YORK 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER^S SONS 

1902 



THF LIBRARY OF; 
CONGRESS, ; 

^>'V. u 1962 

|Ci.4S(£V»«)0Ca No. 



^-^V 



Copyright, 1902 
By Charles Scribner's Sons 



Published^ November^ /go2 



UNIVERSITY PRESS • JOHN WILSON 
AND SON • CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A. 



TO 

MY WIFE 

IN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF 

THE WISE, PATIENT, AND SYMPATHETIC COUNSEL 

TO WHICH IT OWES SO MUCH 



€\}is Etttle Folxime 



UNDERTAKEN AT HER SUGGESTION AND 

COMPLETED WITH HER HELP 

IS AFFECTIONATELY 

INSCRIBED 



PEEFACE 

The purpose of the following essay is less ambitious 
than the title may seem to imply. It is not my inten- 
tion to add another to the many attempts to define 
Christianity, but rather to analyze the problem involved 
in such a definition, and to give an account of the more 
important attempts which have been made to solve it. 
As the sub-title indicates, what is here offered is simply 
a study in the history of definition. But as all progress 
is based upon an accurate knowledge of the past, it is 
hoped that this survey of recent definitions may prove 
not without its value in assisting others as they ap- 
proach the more difficult task. 

In view of the largeness of the theme, it has not 
seemed wise to attempt any general bibliography. The 
works found most helpful have been mentioned in the 
notes ; and in the chapters on Schleiermacher, on Hegel, 
and on Kitschl, where the importance of the subject 
seemed to require it, the literature has been cited at 
some length. It is needless to say that the lists given 
make no claim to be exhaustive. 



viii PREFACE 



I 



While recognizing my indebtedness to many friends 
for stimulus and suggestion, I desire to express my 
special thanks to my colleague, Professor George William 
Knox, D.D., for his valuable counsel and criticism. 

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN. 

Union Theological Seminary. 
September, 1902. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

PAGE 

The Problem 1 

1. The Importance of a Scientific Definition of Christianity . 1 

2. What is Involved in the Scientific Definition of Christianity 5 

3. Historic Conceptions of the Absolute in their Bearing 

upon the Definition of Christianity 13 

CHAPTER n 

The Ancient Church 43 

1. The Apprehension of the Problem 44 

2. The Answer of Paul 47 

3. The Answer of the Letter to the Hebrews 51 

4. The Answer of the Letter of Barnabas 54 

5. The Catholic Conception of Christianity 59 

6. Anticipations of a more Historical View in the Middle 

Ages 74 

CHAPTER III 

The Reformation 85 

1. The Revival of the Question 85 

2. The Answer of the Reformers, Illustrated in the Case of 

Zwingli's De Vera et Falsa Religione 87 

3. The Conception of Christianity in early Protestant The- 

ology 94 



X CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 

PAGE 

The Beginnings of Modern Theology 112 

1. The Rise of the Critical Philosophy 112 

2. The Awakening of the Historical Spirit 124 

3. Retrospect. The Conception of Christianity in the 

Writers of the Eighteenth Century 130 

CHAPTER V 

The Definition of Schleiermacher 154 

1. Life and Theological Activity 154 

2. Schleiermacher's View of Religion 159 

3. Schleiermacher's Definition of Christianity 168 

CHAPTER VI 

Hegelian Definitions 186 

1. The Hegehan System 186 

2. Hegel's View of Religion 192 

3. Hegel's Conception of Christianity 201 

4. The Disciples of Hegel 207 

5. Other Speculative Definitions 216 

6. Neo-Hegelianism. John and Edward Caird . . . . 220 



CHAPTER Vn 

RiTSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 223 

1. The Antecedents of the Theology of Ritschl 223 

2. Ritschl's View of Religion 235 

3. Ritschl's Definition of Christianity 240 

4. The Ritschlian Apologetic 253 

5. The School of Ritschl 264 



CONTENTS xi 



CHAPTER VIII 

PAOB 

Retrospect and Prospect 288 

1. Present State of the Question 288 

2. The Contribution of Philosophy. Christianity as the Ab- 

solute ReKgion, the Goal of Religious Progress . . . 290 

3. The Contribution of History. Christianity as a Historic 

Religion, the Progressive Realization of the Supremacy 

of Christ 295 

4. Conclusion. Significance of the Results attained . . . 309 



THE 

ESSENCE OF CHEISTIANITY 

CHAPTER I 

THE PROBLEM 

In the chapters that follow, it is proposed to study 
the history of the attempt to define Christianity, and to 
record the more important definitions to which this 
attempt has given rise. The theme is historical. But 
history is a broad field, and the traveller who enters it 
without compass or guide may easily go astray. There 
are many senses in which the question. What is Chris- 
tianity ? may be asked, and our study will be profitable 
in proportion to the definiteness with which we conceive 
the problem with whose answers we shall have to do. 
It is such clearness of thought that this opening chapter 
is designed to promote. 

1. The Importance of a Scientific Definition of 
Christianity. 

If it be asked what is the object of a definition of 
Christianity, the answer can be given in a word. It is 
a scientific conception of the Christian religion. The 
goal of all science is definition. With the recognition 



2 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of this need, and the effort to satisfy it, the scientific 
spirit is born. As the ability to think clearly, accu- 
rately, and exhaustively marks the difference between 
knowledge which is merely general and popular and 
that which is strictly scientific, so the ability to gather 
the results of such clear thinking into phrases which 
are concise and luminous is the measure of the useful- 
ness and permanence of the conclusions which have been 
reached. To refuse to define, whatever the cause — 
whether the attempt be deemed needless because of 
the familiarity of the object, or regarded as im- 
possible because of its complexity — is to renounce 
the possibility of knowledge as science conceives it. 
In the case of any object, therefore, to record its 
successive definitions is to write the history of its 
science. 

This being the case, the subject proposed for the 
following essay has much more than an antiquarian 
interest. In studying the historic definitions of Chris- 
tianity, we are really retracing the rise and progress of 
the effort to conceive Christianity scientifically. What- 
ever may be one's attitude to the Christian religion, 
this is a topic of unusual interest. No one who desires 
to understand the drama of human life in its complete- 
ness can ignore an influence of such far-reaching impor- 
tance. But the difficulty of the theme matches its 
interest. When one considers the antiquity of Chris- 
tianity; the length and variety of its history; the 
many-sidedness of its relations; the widely different 
forms which it has assumed, and is still assuming ; the 
great influence which it has exerted, and still exerts, 



THE PROBLEM 3 

upon the lives and fortunes of individuals, and upon 
the progress of civilization as a whole; its close con- 
tact with and constant reaction upon the allied fields of 
literature, philosophy, ethics, and art; the tender and 
intimate associations with which it is interwoven — it 
becomes apparent that the effort to define so complex 
and many-sided a phenomenon must be as difficult as 
it is fascinating. How much shall we include in our 
survey? Where change is so constant, how shall we 
distinguish between what is transient and temporary, 
and what is permanent and abiding? Out of the 
thousand characteristics forcing themselves upon our 
attention, how pick out the few which are essential and 
determining? The familiarity of the subject adds to 
its difficulty. It is not easy to judge impartially that 
which is so much a part of one's life as is the case of 
Christianity with many of its students. Often we find 
men ignoring the question altogether, as too simple to 
need answer. What is Christianity ? Why, every one 
knows that. What you and I and the next man have 
been brought up to believe and practise about God and 
religion. Under the circumstances it is instructive to 
discover the causes which, after many centuries of 
neglect, have brought this problem once more into the 
forefront of human thought, and to follow the steps 
by which our students of religious philosophy and of 
comparative religion have sought to bring order out of 
the chaos of confused ideas which they found serving 
as an apology for definition. 

But the interest which gathers about the definition 
of Christianity is not merely intellectual. Religious 



4 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

interests also are at stake. To the conviction of many 
of its adherents, the Christian religion occupies a wholly 
exceptional position. It is not merely one among other 
religions, like Buddhism or Mohammedanism. It is 
the absolute religion. It rests upon a divine revela- 
tion of unique character, and claims an authority which 
men dispute at their peril. The truths which it pro- 
claims, the life which it imparts, have more than passing 
significance. They have to do with eternal realities, 
and bear directly upon the highest welfare of man. If 
ever clear thinking is important, it is important here. 
Practical interests turn upon our ability to give a cor- 
rect definition. Not merely the scholar but the man on 
the street needs to know what Christianity is, that he 
may be able to order his conduct accordingly. 

It is the combination of this extraordinary claim with 
a changing history which renders the problem of the 
definition of Christianity at once so fascinating and so 
perplexing. Here we have a religion which claims 
absoluteness, which offers itself in the midst of a 
world abounding in half truths and inadequacies as the 
perfect and final solution of the problem of life, and 
which yet, when closely studied, proves itself to be 
the subject of a historic development in which it has 
successively assumed the most various forms. Study 
these forms, and you find that they differ one from 
another so widely that it seems almost impossible to 
discover any common principle. The representatives 
of each reproach the others with serious departure from 
the truth, and find in the adherents of Mohammed or 
of Gautama positions scarcely more repugnant to their 



THE PROBLEM 5 

religious sense than those held by men who are in name 
at least their fellow-Christians. For the man who is 
content to take his stand within one of these smaller 
bodies, and adopt without question whatever it may 
regard as essential, the definition of Christianity will 
have no difficulties. But when one tries to gain an 
impartial view of the whole, and seeks a definition 
which shall be really scientific, the matter is by no 
means so simple. It becomes important, therefore, to 
consider with some care what such a definition involves. 

2. What is Involved in the Scientific Definition of 
Christianity, 

The difficulty of defining may be well illustrated in 
the case of the word " definition " itself. What do we 
mean by a scientific definition? Suppose we say that 
it is the effort to express as clearly and concisely as 
possible what are the essential qualities of any object of 
knowledge as distinct from those that are accidental. 
This seems simple enough, but as soon as it is closely 
examined it is seen to plunge us into a very mare's-nest 
of metaphysical puzzles. Essence, quality, accident, 
object are words which have been the battle-grounds of 
the philosophers ever since philosophy began. What 
do we mean by the essence of a thing as distinct from 
its accidents? How shall we distinguish among the 
different qualities some as being more important than 
others ? How penetrate back of our subjective appre- 
hension to the nature of the thing at all ? 

Out of these perplexities we may find a way of escape 



6 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

sufficiently broad for our present necessities by calling 
attention to the essentially subjective character of all 
definition. Without raising any of the vexed questions 
as to the difference between substance and attribute, or 
the real existence of things as distinct from our sub- 
jective apprehension of them, we may recognize clearly 
that everything which presents itself as an object of 
knowledge at all presents itself as the possessor of 
countless qualities by which it is at once linked to and 
separated from other objects of knowledge. A strictly 
exhaustive definition — that is to say, a definition which 
should include all about the object which could con- 
ceivably be known — would have to take in all these 
qualities from the most abstract to the most concrete. 
But it is evident that such an enumeration, even if 
possible, would be valueless. It would give us too 
much. All sense of proportion and of relative value 
would be lost. It would be impossible to see the forest 
because of the number of the trees. If we are to have 
a definition which shall be of any practical use we 
must distinguish between qualities and qualities, and, 
like the boy in the fable with the jar of plums, be 
willing to sacrifice some that we may be able to enjoy 
the others. 

What, then, is the principle which determines the 
selection ? As Professor James ^ has well shown, it is 
essentially subjective; in other words, it is found in 
the interest and the need of the man who defines. In 

1 Psychology, 11. p. 35 sq. What Professor James in this passage 
asserts of reasoning, applies a fortiori to the definition which is the basis 
of all reasoning. 



THE PROBLEM 7 

defining any object, we pick out those particular quali- 
ties for which at the time we happen to have use, and 
ignore the rest. This explains the difference in defini- 
tions with which we are so constantly confronted. Ask 
a schoolboy, an artist, and a scientist to define apeach, 
and you will get as many different answers. To the 
first the distinctive quality of the peach is its sweet- 
ness, to the second its beauty, to the third its place in 
the vegetable kingdom. And so on through indefinite 
variations. Each of these definitions will be true as far 
as it goes, but partial. It emphasizes that in the object 
in which the one who is defining happens to be inter- 
ested at the time, and passes over everything else. 

A scientific definition differs from the definitions of 
common life simply in the greater thoroughness with 
which it sets about its task, and the wider point of 
view which determines its perspective. We may group 
the most important qualities in such a definition 
under the three heads of exhaustiveness, accuracy, 
and universality. A scientific definition is exhaustive 
in the sense that it is based upon the widest possible 
induction of facts. It includes, not all the qualities 
(for that as we have seen is impossible), but all the 
distinctive qualities of its object; the qualities which 
set that particular thing apart from others as having a 
character of its own. It is further accurate. It is 
based upon a careful as well as a wide observation, and 
seeks as far as possible to avoid the errors which are 
the natural result of hasty or careless generalization. 
Again, it is universal, by which is meant that the point 
of view from which it is constructed is, so far as pes- 



8 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

sible, that of man as man. However legitimate and 
precious may be the individual interests which gather 
about particular objects, the man of science must ignore 
them, that he may indicate the permanent qualities 
which abide in the midst of change, and which make 
their appeal to humanity as such. 

But when all is said, it remains true that the interest 
which determines a scientific definition is as subjective 
as that of the schoolboy to whom an orange is simply a 
round yellow object good to eat. That which explains 
the choice of certain qualities rather than others in a 
scientific definition is the fact that they appeal to cer- 
tain permanent human interests and answer questions 
which man as man cannot but ask. Back of the 
elaborate structure of modern science, often hidden 
under abstractions unintelligible to the ordinary man, 
yet never wholly absent, is this living human interest 
— the desire to know, to understand, that one may feel 
and act. Let the time come when this shall cease to 
be the case, and the entire edifice which has been 
erected with such painstaking labor will fall to the 
ground.^ 

1 It is hardly necesssary to say that, in taking this position it is far 
from our intention to deny the objective basis of the qualities which we 
are constrained in so subjective a fashion to recognize. The question as 
to the real nature of the objects of knowledge lies entirely apart from the 
line of thought which we have been following, and may be differently 
answered by men who agree in the general position here set forth. As a 
matter of fact, so far from the subjective considerations to which we have 
called attention imperilling the objective foundation of our knowledge, 
they seem to require an ontological basis far richer and more many- 
sided than it has often been the fashion of philosophers to recognize. 
To say that I decide from subjective grounds to which of many im- 
pressions forcing themselves upon me I shall give attention is a very 



THE PROBLEM 9 

The bearing of all this upon the matter with which 
we are immediately concerned is obvious. In seeking 
a scientific definition of Christianity, we are not obliged 
to ignore the subjective considerations which play so 
large a role in the history of religion, that we may 
transport ourselves into some objective world of purely 
disinterested knowledge. Such an attitude, even if 
possible, would defeat its own end. For it would 
disregard those qualities of Christianity, in which its 
distinctive character historically consists. Science does 
not create; it observes and reports; and a definition 
of Christianity which would be scientifically valid 
must make place for the feelings of hope and of fear, 
of awe and of mystery, of love and of loyalty which 
have been characteristic of the Christian religion from 
the first. 

Nor in taking this position do we mean simply to 
assert that the student of Christianity should recognize 
the Christian experience as a factor to be reckoned with 
in his definition, without feeling any personal interest 
in its significance or validity. Sympathy is the key to 
knowledge in all departments of life. Even in the 
branches of science which we call natural, such as 
physics or chemistry, a keen sense of the possible value 

different thing from saving that I am the creator of my own impressions. 
Here the facts of the social life interpose an emphatic veto. The agree- 
ment of many men in common judgments naturally points to an objective 
basis for knowledge quite independent of the individual apprehension. 
All that we are here concerned to maintain is the fact that subjective 
considerations do enter into the making of our definitions — even our 
scientific definitions — and hence that there can be no adequate discus- 
sion of such a theme as now engages us which ignores the part they 
play. 



10 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

and meaning of even the most unpromising phenome- 
non is the condition of insight. No branch of science 
can progress without the use of the constructive imagi- 
nation, and the constructive imagination is only another 
name for a sense of universal values in individual 
things. The higher in the scale of values we go, and 
the more personal and individual become the interests 
at stake, the greater is the necessity for such sympa- 
thetic insight, based upon experience. Without the 
art sense, the effort to construct a definition of art 
would be ludicrous. No less certainly doomed to fail- 
ure is the attempt at a scientific treatment of Chris- 
tianity by a man destitute of the religious experience. 
Only through this experience is it possible to gain an 
insight into the particular values and meanings which 
theological terms are meant to express. So far, then, 
from the Christian experience incapacitating a man for 
making a scientific definition of Christianity, it is the 
indispensable condition of success in the attempt. 

But if the religious experience does not necessarily 
disqualify a man for the scientific study of Christianity, 
it must be admitted that it has its peculiar temptations 
and dangers. There is a sacredness about the religious 
life which casts a halo about all that it touches. The 
individual tends necessarily to identify his own experi- 
ence with the whole of the religious life, and to judge 
others by their agreement or disagreement with his 
subjective standard. Where this is the case, a scien- 
tific estimate is impossible. For science, as we have 
seen, deals with the universal, and tries to discover 
and to describe those insights and values which abide 



THE PROBLEM 11 

through the changing centuries and make their appeal 
to man as man. The success of a scientific definition 
of Christianity is therefore to be judged by its ability 
to meet such a universal test; to express, in terms 
recognized as valid by large bodies of men, that which 
successive generations of Christians have found distinc- 
tive in the religion of Christ. 

It cannot be too often insisted that the Christianity of 
which alone science is able to take cognizance is a 
historic religion. It began at a definite time and 
place. It has passed through certain specific stages 
and undergone certain definite changes. It occupies 
to-day a distinctive place in the religious life and 
thought of man. It is this historic religion and no 
other which science recognizes, and which it seeks to 
define. If any one chooses to construct a religion of 
his own out of his individual feelings and imaginings, 
and baptize it Christianity, he is of course at liberty 
to do so. But by the fact of so doing he removes him- 
self from the sphere of objective realities in which the 
present discussion moves. Science, we repeat, deals 
with universal judgments. The experience of the 
individual may help him to understand historic Chris- 
tianity ; it cannot serve as a substitute for it, or relieve 
him of the necessity of facing the difficulties and 
answering the questions which a study of historic 
Christianity presents. 

If we survey the chief historic definitions of Chris- 
tianity, we find that it is at this point that they are 
most defective. Each individual or generation or 
church picks out that feature in historic Christianity 



12 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

which seems to him or to it the most important, and 
affirms it as if it were the whole. When inconsistent 
or contradictory phenomena are pointed out, they are 
either ignored, or attributed to misunderstanding or to 
corruption. True Christianity, which is identified with 
the particular views of the individual or church in 
question, is represented as a constant, from which all 
departures are to be counted heretical variations. So 
far as such a position is defended by rational arguments, 
or by the appeal to considerations grounded in the 
nature of the religious experience, and so open to be 
tested by each man for himself, it may be regarded as 
scientifically legitimate, and the only question to be 
decided is whether the grounds adduced in any par- 
ticular case are really valid. But when, as is often 
the case, appeal is made to the authority conceived to 
reside in Christianity as supernatural, to override intel- 
lectual opposition, the scientific standpoint is aban- 
doned, and the attempt to the history of which this 
essay is devoted is given up. 

There can be no question that this unwillingness to 
submit the claim of Christianity to the tests recognized 
in other departments of life has greatly hindered the 
scientific understanding of it. It is easy to understand 
the causes of this unwillingness. The authority which 
belongs to the absolute religion has seemed incompat- 
ible with the openness of mind which is characteristic 
of the scientific point of view. The purpose of revela- 
tion has been assumed to be to supplement the weak- 
ness of human reason, and to furnish an infallible 
certainty not possible in any other way. Growth, 



THE PROBLEM 13 

progress, change of any kind has seemed inconsistent 
with the dignity of a revealed religion, and the Chris- 
tianity of any age — whether as expressed in church, 
Bible, or individual religious experience — has been 
uncritically identified with that of the past and of the 
future. Roma locuta est ; causa finita est has been the 
mood in which our question has been too often ap- 
proached by Protestant as well as by Catholic. 

In view of this fact, of which history gives abun- 
dant illustration, it becomes a fair question whether a 
scientific definition, such as that of which we are in 
search, is compatible with the Christian claim to be the 
absolute religion. The issue thus raised is so funda- 
mental that it is necessary to face it frankly. It will 
make a great difference in our study if we are obliged 
to exclude from our category of scientific definitions 
all which proceed on the basis of the absoluteness of 
Christianity. In determining whether this be so or 
not we shall be greatly helped by knowing what history 
has to tell us of the meaning of the word. 

3. Historic Conceptions of the Absolute in Their Bearing 
upon the Definition of Christianity, 

The word " Absolute " has had an eventful history. 
Few terms have been the centre of more long-continued 
and determined controversy. None has assumed in the 
course of the centuries more varying and even contra- 
dictory meanings. To some philosophers it has a 
purely negative significance. To others it is the most 
positive of conceptions. Mr. Spencer defines it as the 



14 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

unrelated. To the philosopher of Hegelian sympathies, 
on the other hand, it is the home and the ground of all 
possible relations. Ritschl would banish it utterly from 
the vocabulary of religion. To Kaftan, it gives the 
formula for the knowledge of God in every spiritual 
faith. A little reflection, however, shows that beneath 
these divergent interpretations, there is a common ele- 
ment which gives them unity. 

Common to the word in all its uses is the element 
of finality. When we reach the absolute, whether in 
thought or life, we come to the end. With the relative 
we may argue and adjust matters. By shifting our 
point of view we may gain new light and begin over 
again. With the absolute, this is impossible. Here 
we reach an ultimate fact which admits no question, 
allows no argument, and about whose colossal and 
inevitable bulk, no by-path offers a way of escape. 
This character of finality appears in our familiar 
speech. When I say my mind is absolutely made up, 
I mean that I have reached an irrevocable decision — 
one which it is useless to question and which no 
argument can shake. So when I speak of an absolute 
standard, I mean one which admits of no dispute, one 
whose authority no reasonable man can deny, and the 
appeal to which must therefore be final. In like 
manner, when the philosopher speaks of the Absolute, 
he indicates that point in the explanation of things 
where thought stops, because it can go no further. In 
the region of the finite and relative, we press back from 
one cause to another in an endless series. But when 
we reach the Absolute the series is broken. Here is 



THE PROBLEM 15 

the ultimate reality, the final principle, the bottom fact 
of the universe, back of which it is impossible to go. 

Starting with this general idea of the Absolute as 
the ultimate reality, we pass on to consider more in 
detail the different conceptions which men have formed 
of its nature. We may group these for convenience 
under three heads, which for want of better names we 
may call respectively, the ontological, the mathematical, 
and the psychological. The titles are not chosen as 
strictly accurate but as roughly descriptive. As a 
matter of fact, the first and the third are by no means 
exclusive, a view of the Absolute being possible which 
shall be at once ontological and psychological.^ 

1. By ontological conceptions we mean such as are 
the outgrowth of the older uncritical realism which is 
characteristic of philosophy in its pre-Kantian stages. 
Here the Absolute is conceived as a reality independent 
of, and sharply contrasted with, all relative or finite 
existence ; a being supernatural in nature, and as such 
belonging to a different world from the realm of second 
causes which we call nature ; yet touching it at points 
many or few, and capable, under proper conditions, of 
becoming in a true sense an object of human knowledge. 
The view thus described differs from the mathematical 
view in that its conception of the Absolute is positive, 
not negative. Its ultimate is a reality which, however 
far removed from the world of ordinary experience, is 
yet in a true sense an object of knowledge, and a cause 

1 In the larger sense, all views which ground knowledge in objective 
reality are ontological. The word is here used in a restricted sense to 
denote that form of realism which ignores the subjective conditions of 
knowledge. 



16 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of effects. It differs from the psychological view in 
that it finds the essence of the Absolute in its contrast 
to the finite, and, in its efforts to explain and defend 
it, looks with suspicion upon all considerations which 
are subjective in their nature. 

2. By mathematical conceptions we mean such as 
conceive the Absolute negatively, after the analogy of 
the mathematical infinite; which see in it, not a definite 
reality which can be known and which may be felt as a 
cause of effects, but simply a concept of limitation — 
the mark of the boundary of our knowledge. Accord- 
ing to this view, however much we may learn, we can 
never attain to a knowledge of the Absolute. For the 
Absolute by definition is unrelated. It is that which 
lies beyond; the boundless, limitless, unfathomable 
somewhat lying outside experience, toward which we 
are forever pressing, but unto which we can never at- 
tain. It may call forth feelings of awe, or reverence, 
or longing, as things mysterious and unapproachable 
are apt to do, but it does not admit closer contact. 
The Absolute is in its very nature unknowable. 

3. By psychological conceptions finally we mean 
such as seek to combine a positive conception of the 
Absolute with a critical foundation in the processes of 
human knowledge. To those who hold this point of 
view, the Absolute is not something which lies outside 
the world of human experience and reveals itself only 
at rare moments and by supernatural means. It is 
present as an element in all experience; the ultimate 
reality which is the basis of all life, and which gives 
unity and meaning to the world. As such it surpasses 



THE PROBLEM 17 

man's power perfectly to comprehend. The only way 
to attain a complete knowledge of it would be to com- 
pass within one's own soul all finite experience. But 
it does not follow, as advocates of the mathematical 
view claim, that it is strictly unknowable. Through 
our finite human experience, imperfect though it be, we 
may attain to a real, though limited, knowledge of 
the divine, and gain understanding of the nature and 
purposes of the being upon whom the universe depends. 
But this knowledge is not to be gained, as the adherents 
of the older ontological view maintain, by putting our- 
selves outside of experience, and trying to construct a 
being with qualities diametrically opposed to our own, 
but rather by seeking to understand experience, and to 
determine, in the midst of the infinite variety which it 
contains, what are the qualities and purposes which 
alone have permanent meaning and worth. When we 
have discovered these, we shall have attained a knowl- 
edge of the Absolute. 

On this common basis, there is ample room for dif- 
ferences of construction. One may be distrustful of 
speculation, technically so called, and accepting the 
Kantian dualism of the theoretical and the practical 
reason, confine man's knowledge of the Absolute to the 
realm of the conscience or of the religious feeling. Or, 
one may favor a bolder procedure, claiming for the 
intellect the same rights which others grant to the con- 
science, and, on the basis of the needs and longings 
of the whole man, rising to a conception of the ultimate 
reality which shall include all sides of life, and show 
itself master of as broad a territory as that assigned 

2 



18 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

to the Absolute in the most daring flights of the old 
ontology. But, whether more or less sceptical in their 
speculative views, all thinkers who adopt the psycho- 
logical view are at one in this, that they win their con- 
ception of the Absolute from the facts of common 
experience, find God in the human soul, and rely for 
the proof of their propositions upon the success with 
which they satisfy the rational, the moral, and the 
emotional needs of man. 

It is clear that when we speak of the absoluteness 
of Christianity, it makes a great difference in which 
of these three senses we use the term. The man who 
holds the ontological view will follow a very di:fferent 
method, and reach a very different conclusion from him 
whose viewpoint is psychological. While, if we adopt 
the mathematical view, the very idea of an absolute 
religion becomes a contradiction in terms. This funda- 
mental difference of viewpoint has a practical bearing 
upon the problem which now engages us. We may 
illustrate by considering the different ways in which 
the three parties approach the definition of Christianity. 

To those who take the ontological view, the abso- 
luteness of Christianity centres in its miraculous fea- 
tures. As the Absolute, by hypothesis, belongs to a 
higher world than that of ordinary finite existence, it 
can only manifest itself to man in extraordinary ways. 
From this point of view the supernatural character of 
Christianity must lie at the heart of any definition of it. 
Whether we call it the religion of revelation, to distin- 
guish it from those whose truths have been gained 
without any supernatural aid, or the true religion, to 



THE PROBLEM 19 

distinguish it from such as are false or imperfect, or 
the absolute religion to separate it from those which, 
however lofty and admirable, are yet partial and tempo- 
rary, is all one. In each case the characteristics which 
are emphasized by the ordinary student, and by which 
he seeks to classify it, if not ignored, fall into the 
background. The essence of Christianity is its abso- 
luteness, and the essence of absoluteness lies in the 
fact that it lifts its subject above the standards which 
obtain in the ordinary walks of life. We find abundant 
illustrations of this view both in the theology of Cathol- 
icism and of Protestantism. 

To begin with the former : according to traditional 
Catholic theology, true Christianity and the church 
Catholic are one and the same. God, who is the 
absolute reality, has set in the world an institution 
through which, and through which alone, men, other- 
wise ignorant and sinful, may have access to Himself. 
This institution is many-sided. It includes doctrines 
by which the truth of God is revealed, sacraments 
through which the grace of God is mediated, ministers 
in whom the authority of God is incarnate, and who 
are charged to watch over the flock committed to their 
care, and to see to it that they do not stray from truth 
and duty. As a supernatural institution, the church 
belongs to a higher world than that of our common 
experience, and is not subject to the standards which 
govern the rest of human thought and. life. This 
does not mean that her claims are irrational. For the 
God who gave the church is also the author of nature, 
and between His works there can be no contradiction. 



20 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

But it means that they lie beyond the realm to which 
unaided reason can attain. As the absolute authority, 
the demands of the church must be met with humble 
submission, quite irrespective of their appeal to the 
individual reason or conscience. Only after such com- 
plete surrender, including intellect and will alike, can 
one hope to attain a knowledge of the Christian 
mysteries. Credo ut intelligam. Faith must precede 
knowledge. And faith, to the Catholic, means an act 
of the will in which, at the bidding of an external 
authority, a man accepts truths and conforms to prac- 
tices, the reason for which he cannot understand. 

Much the same view is taken by many Protestants 
of the Bible. According to traditional Protestant 
theology, the absoluteness of Christianity consists in 
the possession of a body of divine truth, supernaturally 
revealed and preserved in an inspired book, the Bible, 
whose infallible record is a guarantee against error, 
and the final court of appeal in the case of any dispute. 
By this it is not meant, of course, to affirm that Chris- 
tianity is merely a body of doctrines. To the most 
dogmatic of seventeenth century theologians, Chris- 
tianity is much more than this. It is a divine life as 
well as an inspired teaching, and it is embodied in an 
institution which, no less unqualifiedly than the church 
Catholic, claims for itself divine sanction. But it is 
meant that if we seek definitely to locate the absolute- 
ness of Christianity; to discover what it is, which 
gives it its unique authority and justifies its extraor- 
dinary claims, it must be found in the possession of 
the supernatural revelation contained in the Bible. 



THE PROBLEM 21 

Divine as may be the Christian life (and to Protestant 
as well as to Catholic regeneration and sanctification 
are the supernatural work of the Holy Ghost), it is yet 
imperfect in the best of Christians. No believer, how- 
ever far he may be advanced in the Christian graces, 
can turn to his fellow and say, " In me you behold true 
Christianity in its purity." Nor is the church as a 
whole in better case. Great as may be its authority, 
the divines of Westminster admit that as an institution, 
human as well as divine, it contains in its purest repre- 
sentatives some admixture of error. ^ Its councils may 
err, and many of them have erred. To the decisions 
of none of them can we turn with confidence as giving 
us Christianity, pure and undefiled. The test by 
which we determine absolute truth lies back of these 
in the divine revelation we call the Bible. Here we 
have in its perfection the deposit of divine truth, the 
standard by which all that calls itself Christian must 
stand or fall. And to this standard, when any ques- 
tion arises, every Christian has the right, and it is his 
duty, to appeal for himself. 

In spite of the great differences between these two 
answers their points of contact are obvious. Both rest 
upon the same philosophical foundation, and move in 
the same world of thought. This becomes apparent as 
soon as we glance at the arguments which are adduced 
in their support. In both cases internal evidence is 
ignored, and the truth or falsehood of the position taken, 
so far as the world at large is concerned, is made to rest 
upon grounds external to the nature of Christianity. 

1 Cf . West. Conf. XXV. 2 ; xxx. 2, with xxv, 5. 



22 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

The clearest statement of tlie official Catholic apolo- 
getic is given by the Vatican Council. ^ To the ques- 
tion whether there is any rational test by which the 
Catholic claim may be tested, and the absoluteness of 
Christianity rationally, that is, scientifically, estab- 
lished, the fathers of the Council answer in the affirma- 
tive. There is such a test, and it is to be found in 
prophecy and miracle. For the individual Christian, 
the supernatural witness of the Holy Ghost, which he 
experiences in his own soul, may suffice. But for men 
at large, other evidence is needed. Out of regard for 
the feebleness of human reason God has therefore added 
to the supernatural evidence of Christian experience the 
rational evidence of miracle and prophecy, that by this 
most manifest proof the authority of the church may be 
abundantly attested to the dullest intelligence. 

According to this line of reasoning, the rational proof 
of the divine nature of Christianity is not to be found 
in its own intrinsic qualities, but in certain external 
marks added thereto, as a seal is added to a document 
to certify to the genuineness of a handwriting, of whose 
author we were else ignorant. In the apologetic of 
Christianity internal evidence plays no part. There is, 
to be sure, a witness of the Holy Spirit to the individual 
soul. But this, as a private and personal experience, 
is not open to men in general, and cannot be made 
— as indeed Catholic theologians do not make it — the 
basis of a scientific argument. It belongs to the very 
conception of the Absolute which it is sought to prove 

1 Dogmatic Decrees, chap. iii. quoted in Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, 
Vol. II. p. 242 sq. 



THE PROBLEM 23 

that its rational evidence cannot be found within itself. 
What is needed is an authority which is independent 
of reason, and which, if need be, can override its 
demands. How, then, can reason sit as judge upon 
that before which it is its duty to bow? Clearly the 
only evidence which is here in place is external, 
and scientific proof, if possible at all, can only be by 
indirection. 1 

1 What we have just given is the official apologetic of Catholicism. 
In practice the procedure admits of indefinite variation, according to the 
special situation in which the apologist may find himself placed. Thus 
we find Catholics, like Father Hecker, freely using internal evidence in 
support of the claims of their church. Only one must be careful not to 
lean too hard on reason, and stumble at those points in Catholic doctrine 
or practice which seem to the individual unfit. To do this is to violate 
the Catholic principle of submission, and may easily imperil one's own 
soul. Again, we find Catholics talking pleasantly of the harmony be- 
tween religion and science, and using for their own purposes such of the 
results of modern scientific research as lend themselves to the support or 
illustration of the truths they wish to defend. Only, in case of a differ- 
ence between science and tradition, it is the former which must yield. 
Among the functions of the church Catholic, none is more important than 
this, of setting bounds to human research and saying to the presumptuous 
prophets of an overbold science, " Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." 
Still again, we find frank recognition of the evils which show themselves 
so painfully in many who claim and exercise high authority in the church 
Catholic. Catholic apologists are ready to grant you that a pope may 
sin. But that makes him no less vicar of Christ, and he who questions 
his authority does so at his peril. Or still again — to shift our point of 
illustration — to those who point out that the teachings of the church 
have altered with the centuries, so that that which was once allowed is 
now forbidden, or vice versa, it is frankly admitted that, though in itself 
unchanging and infallible, Catholic truth is but gradually revealed. The 
distinction is made between dogma which does not change, and the 
definition of it which is ever changing to meet the changing needs of 
men. The church possesses absolute truth, and has done so from the 
first. But she does not always make it known. There is many a question 
to which men crave an answer as to which, because it has not yet been 
defined, the pope is as ignorant as the humblest Christian of his flock. 



24 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Exactly the same line of reasoning is followed by 
many Protestants. Substitute the Bible for the church, 
and the statement of the Vatican Council will serve as 
an excellent syllabus of the line of argument set forth 
in more than one text-book of Protestant apologetics. 
To the latter as to the former, the final test of the truth 
of Christianity for the individual is the appeal which it 
makes to his own soul. It is the inward work of the 
Holy Spirit, "bearing witness by and with the Word" 
in the heart of the believer, by which alone he receives 
"full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth 
and divine authority thereof.^ But this experience, 
being of a strictly individual character, is not fitted 
in Protestantism any more than in Catholicism, to be 
made the basis of a scientific proof of universal validity. 
And so we find the Protestant apologist, in exactly 
the same fashion as his Catholic predecessor, seeking 
support for his position in the external arguments of 
prophecy and miracle. As the Catholic appeals for his 
sanction for the divine authority of the church to the 
extraordinary attestation which accompanies its en- 
trance into the world, so the Protestant in the case of 
the Bible. In neither case is the evidence upon which 
the defence rests grounded in the nature of that which 

What the future may have in store, in the way of new definition, is known 
only to God. Thus in various ways we find Catholic teachers shaping 
their arguments to meet the demands of the changing situation, so far as 
it can be done without giving up the fundamental principles upon which 
the structure of their faith is built. But whatever the variations of their 
position, they never abandon the contention that Christianity, as a super- 
natural institution, is raised above the standards which govern the rest of 
thought and life, and must be judged by canons of its own. 
1 West. Conf. i. 5. 



THE PROBLEM 25 

it is designed to support. In both the proof is purely 
external. 1 

Without at this point raising the question whether 
the argument from miracle is really able to secure the 



1 An excellent example of this view is found in Dean Mansel's famous 
Bampton Lectures on the Limits of Religious Thought (5th ed. London, 
1867). Here the rejection of the internal evidence for Christianity is 
carried to an extreme. Mansel admits that man may judge as to the 
evidences of revelation. But when it comes to the content of revelation, 
moral and intellectual considerations alike fail. Conscience is as little to 
be trusted as reason. When once God has spoken, however irrational, 
or even unethical his requirements may seem, the only duty for man is 
instant submission (cf. especially pp. 145-148 ; Preface, pp. xviii, xix). 

As a matter of fact, few Protestant theologians have been content to 
abide by this restriction. Taking its history as a whole. Protestantism 
has made much larger use of the internal evidence than Catholicism. 
Where the Vatican Council confines the rational evidence of revelation to 
miracle and prophecy, the Westminster Confession insists upon the 
inherent qualities of Scripture as " arguments whereby it doth abundantly 
evidence itself to be the word of God " (i. 5). The doctrine of the 
■witness of the Holy Spirit, with its recognition of the supreme rights of 
Christian experience, easily opens the door to the admission of this 
evidence, and the Biblical principle points in the same direction. The 
qualifications by which Catholicism limits its appeal to human reason do 
not obtain in Protestantism. Hence we find theologians of many schools 
interpreting the principles of the Reformation in such a way as to admit 
of a truly scientific apologetic. The uniqueness of Christianity is found in 
its possession of qualities appealing to the highest in man, and the proof of 
its absoluteness is sought by showing the completeness with which, on all 
sides of man's nature, it answers his questions, meets his needs, and satisfies 
his longings. With this general line of reasoning we shall have to do in 
another connection. Here it is sufficient to remark that, whatever its 
merits, it involves an abandonment of the principles with which we are 
here alone concerned, and makes it necessary to class those who practise 
it among the adherents of a different method. That which interests ua 
here is not Protestant apologetic in general, but that particular type of it, 
which, starting from the older ontological conception of the Absolute 
inherited from Catholicism, agrees with the latter in basing its rational 
argument for Christianity upon the purely external evidences of prophecy 
and miracle. 



^6 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

universal assent which its advocates claim, it remains 
to inquire how far, granting its validity, it is able to 
give us the scientific definition of which we are in 
search. Here our answer must be an unfavorable one, 
and that on grounds very different from those which 
are commonly assigned. 

In order to establish the scientific character of any 
definition, we have seen that two things are necessary. 
It must be universal, and it must be definite. That is 
to say, in the first place, the standard to which appeal 
is made must be one which is open to men in general, 
and not simply private or esoteric ; and, in the second 
place, the qualities in which the distinctive character of 
the object is found must be stated with such clearness 
and precision as practically to admit the application of 
the test. If, then, it is a question of defining Chris- 
tianity we must be able to show, first, that the standard 
to which we appeal is really one which admits a univer- 
sal application, and secondly, that our definition is 
sufficiently clear and unambiguous to enable the test to 
be made. Is this possible in the present case ? 

Criticisms of what may be called the dogmatic con- 
ception of Christianity ^ are commonly based upon the 
first of these grounds. It is claimed that the super- 
natural evidence to which appeal is made is something 
of which science knows nothing, and which a large 
proportion of reasonable men reject. On the testi- 
mony of its own advocates religion is isolated from the 

1 We use the phrase as a convenient designation for all definitions, 
whether Catholic or Protestant, which take their departure from the 
ontological view of the Absolute. 



THE PROBLEM 27 

rest of human life, and confined to a transcendent realm 
to which only the select company of the initiated pos- 
sess the key. To talk of a scientific definition under 
such circumstances is to misuse words. 

This argument, though plausible, fails to stand the 
test of serious examination. If universal assent at any 
particular time be the test of scientific truth, then 
science in every form is impossible. Not all men are 
in possession of the evidence, nor are all competent by 
habit and training to judge it even when presented. 
All that can reasonably be asked is that there should 
be no inherent obstacle in the way ; that the evidence 
be open to him who is willing to take the trouble to 
qualify himself to approach it, and that in the case of 
those best fitted to make the test, actual agreement 
should have been reached. In the case of a definition 
of Christianity, therefore, all that needs to be shown 
is that the evidence is open to all men who choose to 
fulfil the conditions. 

This is, in fact, what the advocates of the dogmatic 
view claim. The Christian apologist, whether Catholic 
' or Protestant, is well aware that all men do not recog- 
nize the force of his evidence. But he maintains that 
good reasons can be given for their failure. Many 
causes are responsible, some intellectual, some moral. 
When these are removed, as through the results of 
Christian instruction and contact is constantly being 
done, the expected recognition follows. With the 
steady growth of the Christian church and the conse- 
quent extension of the Christian experience, the num- 
ber of men who are open to the Christian evidences is 



28 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

continually increasing, and it is only a question of time 
when the universal assent which science demands shall 
be reached. 

We are not now concerned to inquire whether this 
hope is well founded. That is a matter which can only 
be determined by experience. One may take as un- 
favorable a view as one pleases of what is likely to be 
the outcome of such an experiment. Our present con- 
tention is simply that, so far as universal consent is 
concerned, there is nothing in the dogmatic conception 
of Christianity to render a scientific definition a priori 
impossible. 1 

The real difficulty with the dogmatic conception of 
Christianity lies elsewhere. The trouble is not with 
the court of appeal, but with the use to be made of it 
when it is found. Definitions based upon the ontologi- 
cal conception fail because they are unable to express 
their conception of Christianity in sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous terms to admit of a scientific test, even 
before judges of their own choosing. This may seem 
a curious charge to bring. Indefiniteness is not usually 
thought to be the besetting sin of the dogmatist. When 
he is criticized, it is commonly for over rather than for 
under definition. Yet the two points are not so incon- 
sistent as a superficial judgment might conclude. Too 

1 An exception must of course be made in the case of all theories 
which deny the possibility of a universal Christian experience. If, as in 
some forms of historic Calvinism, God be thought of as arbitrarily with- 
holding from a part of mankind the knowledge of those facts concerning 
Himself upon which right thinking depends, it is not possible to appeal 
to any universally accepted standard, and a scientific definition of Chris- 
tianity is therefore out of the question. 



THE PROBLEM 29 

great detail may be as confusing as too little. It is the 
disposition, common to Catholic and Protestant alike, 
to extend the absoluteness of Christianity over the 
widest possible territory which is the parent of the 

I indefiniteness of which we complain. True Chris- 

i tianity, we are told, is what the church teaches or 
what the Scriptures reveal. But what does the church 
teach? How far does the Biblical revelation extend? 
Here we find differences of opinion. The exegetes 
agree as little as the doctors. Nor is there anything 
either in the churchly or in the Biblical principle which 
of itself enables us to decide between them. That 
which in theory is claimed as the chief merit of each, 

! its supernatural character, proves in practice its fatal 
weakness. The Absolute knows no difference of value 
or of degree. Yet without the recognition of such 
differences, how is it possible to secure the definiteness 

I which is essential to scientific definition ? ^ 

No doubt this indefiniteness is more apparent in the 
former case than in the latter. Here the vastness of 
the territory opens up a field for misunderstanding 

'; which is little less than appalling. It was not a Prot- 
estant controversialist, but her own great teacher, who 
said of the Catholic church that she was a corpus per- 
mixtum, containing within her capacious bosom both 

^ The lack of proportion thus criticized is admirably described by 
Phillips Brooks in his Essay on Orthodoxy. We quote a few sentences 
from the lengthy extract given by Dr. AUen in his Life (II, p. 491). 
"In the truths which it holds (orthodoxy) loses discrimination and 
delicate sense of values, holding them not for their truth so much as for 
their use or their safety ; it gives them a rude and general identity, and 
misses the subtle difference which makes each truth separate from every 



30 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the good and the evil, the false and the true.^ Strange 
bed-fellows have found themselves united by the tradi- 
tion principle. To harmonize all the material which 
has received Catholic sanction would be an impossible 
task. If we are bidden to look to the decisions of the 
church, it is only to be met by new perplexities, for 
the councils themselves do not agree; or, what comes 
to the same thing for our present purpose, honest men 
have not yet been able to discover their agreement. 
The official definitions themselves need defining. When 
this has been done, there remains the task of reconcil- 
ing the new dogma with the old; while still beyond 
crowds a circle of questions, more or less vital, upon 
which no decision has been reached. Thus we find 
that one who takes refuge from the strife of the schools 
in the bosom of the church Catholic, does not escape 
from uncertainties. 2 If we wish a clear definition of 

other. Orthodoxy deals in coarse averages. It makes of the world of 
truth a sort of dollar store, wherein a few things are rated below their 
real value for the sake of making a host of other things pass for more 
than they are worth." What we are particularly interested in here is not 
so much the fact as the reason for it. It belongs to the very nature of 
the Absolute in which this temper of mind finds its ultimate reality that 
it should ignore those subjective and personal elements in which differ- 
ences of value reside. 

1 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, iii. 32. 

2 An excellent illustration is to be found in the often-quoted passage 
from Cardinal Newman's Apologia (London, 1890, p. 238 sq.), in which 
he describes the state of his mind since entering the Roman church. The 
certainty in which he there represents himself as rejoicing is simply the 
clear perception that certainty is impossible. It is the peace which 
follows the abandonment of a hopeless quest. His answer to those who 
object to the doctrines of the church as unbelievable is their removal from 
the realm to which rational tests apply. Catholic doctrine, he tells us, 
deals not with phenomena but with substance. And substance is " what 
no one on earth knows anything about" (p. 240). Armed with this 



THE PROBLEM 31 

essential Christianity, we must seek our answer else- 
where. 

Nor is it otherwise with the Biblical principle. No 
doubt Holy Scripture furnishes a standard at once more 
definite and more manageable than tradition. But 
when it comes to defining essential Christianity, we 
find that its acceptance does not deliver us from uncer- 
tainty. The Bible is a large book. It extends over 
many centuries, and includes the most diverse matters. 
As to the meaning and relative importance of much 
j that it contains interpreters are not agreed. The 
Westminster Confession bids us distinguish, within the 
teaching of Scripture, between certain weighty matters 
essential to salvation, and others less important about 
which good men may differ without peril. ^ But when 
we try to carry out this distinction in practice we find 
that it is by no means easy. What is essential, and 
what is unessential ? This is the very point on which 
we find the widest difference of opinion. Here the 

principle of " invincible ignorance," it is easy for him to accept the most 
mysterious dogmas, sure that no assault of human reason can penetrate 
to the inaccessible fortress witliin which they have withdrawn themselves 
for refuge. Does one object that trausubstantiation is not true, since he 
has seen the bread, and its qualities remain unchanged ? The Catholic 
doctrine " does not say that the phenomena go ; on the contrary, it saya 
that they remain ; nor does it say that the same phenomena are in several 
places at once. It deals with what no one on earth knows anything about, 
the material substances themselves. And, in like manner, of that 
majestic article of the Anglican as well as of the Catholic creed, — the 
doctrine of the Trinity in Unity. What do I know of the Essence of the 
Divine Being ? I know that my abstract idea of three is simply incom- 
patible with my idea of one ; but when I come to the question of concrete 
fact, I have no means of proving that there is not a sense in which one 
and three can equally be predicated of the Incommunicable God." 
1 i. 6, 7. 



32 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Biblical principle fails us. For this simply asserts the 
infallible authority of all that Scripture contains, leav- 
ing each man free to interpret his authority as best he 
may. Calvinist and Arminian, churchman and indi- 
vidualist, rationalist and mystic, each appeals to the 
book in support of his own peculiar view of Chris- 
tianity, and condemns those who differ from him as un- 
biblical. It would seem, then, that if we are to gain a 
satisfactory answer to our question some more definite 
test must be found. 

Thus in both its great historic forms the dogmatic 
position proves itself unsatisfactory. The philosophical 
basis on which it rests is a realism which antedates the 
results of modern critical study. Its Absolute suggests 
problems rather than solves them. Judged on its own 
merits without prejudice, it is unable to give us a defi- 
nition which, by reason of its clearness, conciseness, and 
general acceptance is worthy to be called scientific.^ 

With the other two methods of approaching our 
problem we may deal more briefly. However different 
the conclusions to which they come, they move in the 
same general world of thought, and the question at 

1 It is hardly necessary to state that in thus criticizing the ontological 
conception of Christianity, we are far from denying the scientific value of 
the work done by many of those who have shared this view. The great 
theologians, Catholic and Protestant alike, have not been content with 
such general conceptions of Christianity as we have indicated. They 
have sought to discover on the basis of reason, history, and experience 
what were the distinctive features of their religion, and have set them 
forth and defended them with a clearness worthy of all praise. Our 
present contention is simply that so far as they have been successful in 
accomplishing their aim, it has been by ignoring the indefinite standards 
which are all that their philosophy allows, and seeking the definition of 
Christianity along other and less ambiguous lines. 



THE PROBLEM 33 

issue between them admits of being very simply stated. 
Both the advocates of the mathematical and the psy- 
chological views are convinced that if the distinctive 
character of Christianity is to be found at all, it must 
be sought in the positive qualities which characterize it 
as a historic religion, and which are to be determined 
by the same methods of comparison which science 
employs in all other departments of research. The 
question is simply whether or no this inductive method 
is compatible with the recognition of the absoluteness 
of Christianity in any sense. Those who hold the 
mathematical view deny this ; those who take the psy- 
chological view affirm it. The question, as we shall 
see, resolves itself into this: whether the conception 
of the Absolute is purely negative, or whether it has a 
positive significance which justifies its use in scientific 
discussion. 

To those who take the former view, any attempt to 
conceive of the Absolute positively involves a contra- 
diction in terms. As the ultimate reality, it lies back 
of experience, as the unapproachable goal, both of 
thought and of aspiration. It has its psychological 
foundation, as a necessary concept of the mind. And 
it may even be granted a certain objective reality, in 
that it is a fact that our finite and limited experience is 
set in the midst of the great ocean of the infinite. But 
— so far as we are concerned — the function of this 
unknown reality is purely negative. It is, as we have 
already seen, a concept of limitation ; the mark of the 
boundary of our knowledge. So far as the latter ad- 
vances, it recedes. Nor can any conceivable increase 

3 



34 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of experience bring man to a positive knowledge of the 
infinite. Even if, with Mr. Spencer, we conceive this 
unfathomed region as the home of some mysterious 
being upon whom our finite universe depends, we are 
no whit better off. For of the nature of this mysterious 
something we can form no conception. The Absolute 
in all its forms is by definition unknowable. 

It is clear that from this point of view an absolute 
religion is out of the question. On all sides of life, 
moral, intellectual, aesthetic, religious, man is shut up 
to the sphere of the relative. From our limited sub- 
jective point of view, we may compare things as better 
or worse, more or less true, more or less beautiful ; but 
the distinctions have only relative validity, and are 
constantly being superseded and corrected by an en- 
larging experience. The several religions are natural 
phenomena in which, under the differing conditions in 
which he has found himself, and with more or less 
crudity and imperfection, man has endeavored at once 
to express and to deepen his sense of the mystery and 
the wonder of life. So far as they attempt positive 
interpretation they are all alike superstitious and inade- 
quate ; yet this does not hinder them from performing 
a useful function in human life. They are necessary 
steps in the evolution of humanity, and form an outlet 
for natural instincts which cannot but seek expression. 
To pick out one from the number of these partial and 
inadequate religions in order to raise it to a position 
of absolute supremacy is to be guilty of the greatest 
inconsistency. 

We find those who take this position differing widely 



THE PROBLEM 35 

in their positive estimate of Christianity. One regards 
it as a mere superstition, all the more dangerous be- 
cause of its great age and many-sided associations; 
an enemy against which all right-minded men ought to 
unite in making war, and which in time is destined to 
be utterly overthrown and destroyed, in order to make 
way for the irreligion which is to be the religion of the 
future. Another recognizes in it the highest flower of 
human genius, sees in its doctrines symbols of profound 
spiritual truth, and cheerfully admits the extraordinary 
part which it has played in the betterment of society 
and the elevation of the race. Some even go so far 
as to bow reverently before its founder as the best and 
purest of the sons of men, and gladly unite with those 
who frequent its churches in the worship of that mys- 
terious being whose counsels are unsearchable and His 
ways past finding out. But whatever may be the par- 
ticular attitude taken to Christianity, it can never 
include the element of finality which absoluteness 
involves. Beautiful and helpful though it may be, 
Christianity is only a stage in the religious history of 
humanity, destined in time to be superseded by another, 
more helpful and more beautiful. 

The weakness of this position lies in its exaggeration. 
It seizes upon one meaning of the term Absolute, and 
emphasizes it to the exclusion of others equally legiti- 
mate. What the advocates of the mathematical view 
tell us of the part played by the sense of mystery in 
religion is entirely in place, and no one is more ready to 
recognize it than the Christian. It is true that God is 
greater than our thought, and that all our knowledge is 



36 THE ESSENCE OE CHRISTIANITY 

set in the midst of a vast ocean of ignorance. Against 
all dogmatic efforts to stretch our knowledge beyond 
its proper limits the agnostic protest is in place. We 
need to be called down from the transcendental realm 
where theology has often made its home, and to be set 
to the more fruitful task of studying experience that 
we may learn what it has to teach us. 

But it is a mistake to think that in coming back to 
experience we take leave of the Absolute. This com- 
mon opinion rests on a failure to understand the real 
meaning of the term. By the Absolute we mean the 
ultimate reality, that in which thought and aspiration 
rest. This may be a positive conception as well as a 
negative one. Experience is full of ultimates. Force, 
law, reason, beauty, duty, personality, love; all of 
these are general conceptions in which thought may 
rest, and which, therefore, it is open to man to conceive 
as absolute. This is the truth for which the psycho- 
logical view stands. 

When, therefore, the advocates of the mathematical 
view tell us that an absolute religion is a contradiction 
in terms, we answer that we are not speaking about the 
same thing. They are thinking of that side of God 
which by definition can never be known. We are 
thinking of God, so far as He manifests Himself to 
human thought and experience. The Absolute which 
we seek to know is that which is absolute for us. We 
wish to discover, if possible, what that principle is 
which, so far as human experience goes, is final. To 
say that this is impossible is to prejudge a priori that 
which can only be determined as a result of experiment. 



THE PROBLEM 37 

It is to rule out of court with a single stroke of the pen 
the entire enterprise upon which philosophy has been 
embarked from the beginning of time. 

For what is philosophy, if it be not the search for 
the Absolute? In all its forms, from Anaxagoras to 
Hegel, it is the effort to discover what is the ultimate 
reality in the universe, and to define its nature in the 
simplest and clearest terms. Prove to man that this 
attempt is foredoomed to fail, and you cut the nerve of 
philosophic thought. At the basis of all large specu- 
lative endeavor lies a faith in the rationality of the 
world; and this, when properly understood, is only a 
different form of stating the knowability of the Abso- 
lute. To say that this is a rational world is to say 
that the ultimate principles by which it is governed lie 
within the reach of human reason. Even philosophers 
theoretically the most sceptical show by their practice 
that they share this faith. Thus Mr. Spencer, in the 
very same breath in which he speaks of the Absolute 
as unknowable, declares that it is cause and force, ^ and 
proceeds to set it about all manner of indispensable 
work in his universe. Even to say that the Absolute 
is unknowable implies the previous possession of a final 
standard of knowledge, and, so far forth, a positive 
acquaintance with the ultimate reality. Let a man try 
to think at all, and he will find it simply impossible 
to avoid a conception, more or less positive, of the 
Absolute. As he studies the universe and is drawn 
more and more under the spell of its wondrous unity 
and order, man feels himself in the presence of a single 

1 First Principles (New York, 1888) pp. 157, 171. 



38 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

all-comprehending principle, and he cannot but believe 
that as he penetrates more deeply into the nature and 
meaning of life, he is at the same time coming to 
understand the nature of the supreme being who is its 
cause. Modern philosophy differs from ancient, not in 
the object of its search, but in its clearer perception of 
the difficulties in the way, and in its franker recogni- 
tion of the subjective conditions through conformity to 
which alone success is possible. 

What we have called the psychological conception of 
the Absolute is simply the new view of God which is 
the result of this conviction. It is the view which 
finds God in His world rather than outside of it; and 
seeks to gain an insight into the nature of the ultimate 
reality through the discovery of the permanent elements 
in the experience of man. 

Approaching the problem in this spirit, we see at 
once that the Absolute may have two very different 
meanings according to our point of view. In the nar- 
rower sense, it denotes that principle which is final for 
the individual man. Each of us has his own standard, 
more or less clear and definite, his own conception, 
more or less crude, of the ultimate reality ; in a word, 
his own Absolute. These several standards differ 
among themselves, and the reconciliation and overcom- 
ing of their differences is the problem of philosophy. 
The philosophic standpoint differs from that of the 
individual in that it attempts to rise above the various 
petty and local considerations by which each man's 
opinion is more or less determined to a region of truly 
universal judgments. The Absolute of philosophy is 



THE PROBLEM 39 

won by abstracting from the several judgments of indi- 
viduals all that is accidental and temporary. It is that 
principle or standard which is valid for man as man. 

Applying these principles to our matter of the abso- 
lute religion, we see their bearing at once. By the 
absolute religion we mean a religion which is valid for 
man as man ; one which meets every essential religious 
need, and satisfies every permanent religious instinct, 
and which, because it does this, does not need to be 
altered or superseded. Such a religion, if it could be 
found, would realize the idea of the absolute religion. 
The question of the absoluteness of Christianity in the 
philosophical sense is the question whether as a matter 
of fact Christianity can be shown to possess these 
characteristics. 

In endeavoring to answer this question two points 
need to be considered ; first, that of the abstract possi- 
bility of such a religion, and secondly, that of the 
method of its proof. 

The first admits of a very short answer. Whatever 
one may think of the likelihood or unlikelihood of such 
a religion as a matter of fact, no reasonable man can 
deny its possibility. Among the various alternatives 
which the future presents, it is at least conceivable 
that it may include a religion which, by the richness 
and many-sidedness with which it meets the religious 
needs of man in general, shall prove itself, from the 
human standpoint with which we have here alone to 
do, ultimate. 

Granting the possibility of such a religion, how is 
its existence to be proved? Here it is evident that the 



40 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

appeal to history must be final. From the point of 
view of the individual man, his own religious experi- 
ence may be sufficient. But so long as good men differ 
there is need of an appeal to some wider standard. 
Clearly in this case the only way in which the absolute 
religion could justify its claim would be for it to show 
itself absolute in fact. If its claim is a valid one, we 
should expect to find it drawing to itself the good and 
wise of all ages and races; to see them owning its 
supremacy, and winning out of its abundance unfailing 
supply for their deepest needs. Not until this victo- 
rious progress had reached its completion, and we 
beheld all men organized into a great brotherhood 
under the shelter of a single faith, would it be possible 
to speak of a proof of the absoluteness of any religion, 
which should be in the strict sense scientific. 

But in the meantime, while the process is incomplete, 
what then ? Are we shut up to uncertainties ? Must 
we wait till the end of time before we make up our 
minds ? Or if, discouraged by the shortness of our life, 
compared with the vast stage upon which the mighty 
drama is to be played out, we make a premature choice, 
must it be at the peril of our scientific standing ? This 
is not the attitude which men take in other departments 
of life. The student of physical science is not deterred 
by the fact that his induction is not complete, from 
making his theory as to the ultimate reality which we 
call matter. Nor does the fact that his predecessors 
have made mistakes shake his faith that the problem 
may ultimately be solved, and that his work may have 
a share in bringing about the solution. Each new 



THE PROBLEM 41 

statement, if founded upon honest study of the facts, 
brings the goal nearer, and narrows the range of inquiry 
within which the final solution is to be sought. In like 
manner of the ultimate religious problems. If there 
be a God, more and more clearly revealing Himself in 
the religious life of man, the effort to understand His 
revelation, and to determine wherein its distinctive 
features consist, cannot be hopeless. Especially must 
this be the case with those men who have found in 
some particular historic faith the key to the world 
problem, and the solution of the mystery of the indi- 
vidual human life. Possessed of such convictions, they 
are constrained to express them with all the clearness 
of which they are master, to relate them to other forms 
of thought and life, and to discover, and so far as may 
be to remove, the difficulties which have thus far kept 
others of their fellow men from so inspiring and uplift- 
ing an insight. Surely, if the absolute religion is ever 
to win the universal recognition which is its right, it 
must be through some such process as this. 

Upon this problem some of the finest minds of Chris- 
tendom have been at work for more than a century. 
Rejecting the dilemma presented to them both by the 
dogmatist and the agnostic, they have sought to show 
that on purely scientific grounds it is possible to main- 
tain the finality of Christianity. Various influences 
have combined to lead them to this conviction. On 
the intellectual side, there is the belief that the idea of 
the Absolute is too deeply inwrought into human life 
and thought to be ignored, together with the resulting 
desire to gain a conception of it which shall avoid the 



4^ THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

crass dualism of ordinary dogmatic theology, with its 
sharp antithesis between the natural and the super- 
natural. On the religious side, there is the conviction 
that Christianity stands for truths too lofty, and expe- 
riences too precious, to be put on a par with those 
of any other religion, however worthy, together with 
the resulting desire to find some way to express this 
uniqueness, which shall not do violence to the intel- 
lectual standards which govern the rest of life. But 
whatever the special interest which leads to the en- 
deavor, they agree in striving to justify the claim of 
Christianity to a unique position by calling attention to 
certain definite characteristics which separate it from 
all other known religions. Or, to put the matter in 
another form, they attempt a scientific definition of 
Christianity which shall include its absoluteness. 

This being the case, the subject with which the 
present essay deals becomes of the highest importance. 
The history of the attempt to define Christianity scien- 
tifically is at the same time the history of the effort to 
determine what are the permanent elements in historic 
Christianity which justify its absolute claim. The two 
things stand or fall together. If we cannot discover 
what Christianity is, it is hopeless to try to defend it. 



II 

I 



I 



CHAPTER II 

THE ANCIENT CHURCH 

In the technical sense the problem of the definition of 
Christianity is a modern one. It is one of the fruits 
of the scientific spirit, and its entire history may be com- 
pressed within the limits of a single century. But none 
of our present problems, however recent in its modern 
phrasing, is without its antecedents in the past. Long 
before men had mastered the methods of science, as we 
conceive it, they had asked questions as to the nature 
of Christianity, and sought to distinguish it from other 
forms of religion. Two such periods of questioning 
may be specially noted : — the first, that of the birth of 
Christianity, when the problem was to distinguish the 
new religion from the mother stock from which it was 
sprung ; the second, that of the Reformation, when, for 
a Christianity grown corrupt and base, men sought 
to substitute a new religion, worthy of the name falsely 
usurped by the old. A brief review of the results 
reached in the two periods will prove, not merely inter- 
esting in itself, but the indispensable background 
against which to set the more modern statement of the 
problem. 



44 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

1. The Apprehension of the Prohlem. 

To the early disciples Christianity presented itself as 
essentially a reformed Judaism.^ Jesus declared that 
He was not come to destroy but to fulfil (Matt. v. 17). 
He Himself observed the Jewish law (Matt, xxiii. 3), ap- 
pealed to the Jewish Scriptures (Luke iv. 21), and 
claimed to be the Messiah for whom His fellow-country- 
men looked (Matt. xxvi. 64). Even after His death the 
contact with the mother religion remained unbroken.^ 
The temple was the gathering-place for the Jerusalem 
Christians (Acts ii. 46 ; iii. 1 ; xxi. 26), and in remoter 
regions the Synagogue was the point of departure for the 
growing Christian propaganda (Acts xiv. 1 and often). 
The idea that there might be a Gentile Christianity free 
from the law, and with traditions and habits of its own, 
won its way slowly, and only after bitter opposition (Acts 
XV. 1; Gal. ii.). Even Paul recognized the peculiar 
prerogatives of his fellow-countrymen (Rom. ix. 4), 
and strove with a special zeal to win them to the service 
of a Christ, who was theirs not only according to the 
flesh but according to the promise (Rom. ix. 5-8 ; 1 
Cor. ix. 20 ; Rom. x. 1). It is not strange, therefore, 
that we find Romans like Gallio (Acts xviii. 12 sg.) ignor- 
ing the difference between Judaism and Christianit}^ 

1 Cf. Acts i. 6, and in general tlie picture given of early Christianity 
in the discourses in Acts. Strong indirect evidence is afforded by the 
strenuous opposition with which Paul's preaching was met on the part of 
an influential section of the church. Cf . especially Gal. i. and ii. 

2 On the nature of primitive Christianity cf. McGiffert, Apostolic Age, 
pp. 37-112; Stevens, Theology of the New Testament, p. 259 sq.; Gould, 
Biblical Theology of the New Testament, pp. 54, 55, and literature there 
cited ; Holtzmann, NeutestamentUche Theologie, I. p. 349 sq. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 45 

and seeing in the latter only a corruption or variation of 
the former.^ 

And yet the new religion, however modest in its be- 
ginnings, bore hidden in its bosom a principle of its 
own. Jesus was more than a reformed Jew. He was 
the founder of a universal religion.^ Little by little 

1 The first clear recognition of Christianity as a distinct religion meets 
us about the time of the Neronian persecution. Tacitus {Annals, xv. 44), 
distinguishes Christians from Jews as a separate sect, though he evidently 
knows very little about them. The same is true of Suetonius ( Vita Ne- 
ronis, xvi.), where Christianity is designated byname as " superstitio nova 
ac malefica." Yet, if we take the famous passage in the Vita Claudii 
{" JudcBos impuhore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Roma expulit," xxv.) as 
referring to Christ, it would seem to show that the distinction was not 
always maintained. In Pliny's day the independence of the Christians is 
already clearly marked {Letters, x. 96). 

2 The question as to Jesus' view of the future of His Gospel has been 
much debated recently. On the whole the consensus of the best opinion 
is in favor of the view that He distinctly contemplated a breach with the 
existing Jewish religion similar to that which was actually brought about 
by Paul. Some scholars (e. g. Holtzmann, Neutestamenthche Theologie, 
I. p. 130 sq.) hold that He only came to this view gradually, as the impos- 
sibility of realizing a universal religion in Judaism made itself clearly 
felt ; but the fact itself seems too plain to be denied. 

As bearing on this question are to be noted : 

(a) Jesus' freedom in handling the Old Testament, as well as the 
various rabbinic interpretations which had grown up about it (e. g. Matt. 
V. 38, 39 ; Matt. xix. 8 ; Mark vii. 15). 

(6) His consciousness of the great contrast between His Kingdom and 
the older dispensation (e. g. Matt. ix. 16, 17, the new wine, and the old wine- 
skins, the new patch and the old garment ; Matt. xi. 11 ; Luke vii. 28 : He 
that is but little in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the 
Baptist). 

(c) His attitude to those who stood outside of Judaism (e. g. the Sa- 
maritan, Luke xvii. 17-19; the Syrophoenician, Matt. xv. 21-28; the 
Roman, Matt. viii. 10-13). His test was moral and spiritual, and therefore 
universally applicable. 

{d) His distinct anticipation of the end of Judaism (the prophecy of 
the destruction of the temple, Mark xiii. and parallels). 

(e) Perhaps the clearest expression of Jesus' sense of the newness of 



46 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the revolutionary character of His teachings made itself 
felt, and the bonds which united His disciples to their 
brethren of an older dispensation were strained to the 
breaking. The New Testament shows us a Chris- 
tianity slowly coming to self-consciousness.^ The pro- 
cess was an uneven one, more rapid in some places 
than in others, yet everywhere as inevitable as the tide 
in its rise. In Antioch the separation of the new sect 
first expressed itself in a name. " And the disciples 
were called Christians first in Antioch" (Acts xi. 26). 
Christians — Christ men, followers and disciples of 
Jesus who claimed to be the Christ — this is the word 
with which the definition of Christianity begins.^ The 
breach is made, and it only remains to study its nature, 
and to map it out upon the spiritual chart. This is the 
task upon which we find Christian teachers engaged 
within twenty years after the death of the Master. 

Wherein consists the newness of Christianity ? What 
is the principle which differentiates it from the Jewish 

His Gospel is given in connection with the institution of the Lord's Sup- 
per, the new covenant taking the place of the old (Luke xxii. 20 ; Matt, 
xxvi. 28; Mark xiv. 24; 1 Cor. xi. 25). 

On Jesus' relation to Judaism, cf. Wendt, Lehre Jesu, II. pp. 329-356, 
Eng. tr. II. pp. 1-35 ; Holtzmann, Neutestamentliche Theologie, II. pp. 130- 
160 ; Stevens, Theology of the New Testament, pp. 17-26 ; McGiffert, Apos- 
tolic Age, pp. 25-27 ; Gould, Biblical Theology of the New Testament, p. 27 
sq. ; Bruce, Kingdom of God, pp. 63-84 ; Gilbert, The Revelation of Jesus, 
chap. i. Special monographs on Jesus' relation to the Jewish law are : 
Macintosh, Christ and the Jewish Law, 1886 ; Schiirer, Die Predigt Jesu 
Christi in ihrem Verhdltniss zum alten Testament und zum Judentum, 1882 ; 
Bousset, Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum, 1892; Jacob, 
Jesu Stellung zum mosaischen Gesetz, 1893. Cf. also the monographs on 
the Kingdom of God by Issel, SchmoUer, J. Weiss, et al. 

1 Cf. Stevens, Theology of the New Testament, p. 259. 

* Cf. Encyclopoedia Biblica, art. on " Name of Christian/' 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 47 

religion with wliich it has so much in common? To 
this question we find not one answer, but many. We 
may select as typical three examples : 1, the answer of 
Paul ; 2, the answer of the Epistle to the Hebrews ; 3, 
the answer of the Epistle to Barnabas. Along one or 
other of the paths blazed by these pioneers the later 
development has run. 

2. The Answer of Paul} 

Of the three the answer of Paul is the most radical.^ 
None apprehended more clearly than he the contrast 
between Christianity and all preceding forms of religion. 
Heartily as he recognized the supernatural character of 
the Jewish rehgion (Rom. ix. 4, 5), loyally as he accepted 
its Scriptures as the revelation of God (Rom. iii. 2 ; cf . ix. 
4), to him it was as impotent to realize the divine ideal as 
the Gentile rehgion upon which it was wont to look down. 
Of our modern classification based on the distinction be- 
tween the natural and the supernatural he knows nothing. 
Instead of classifying Judaism and Christianity together 
as supernatural rehgions over against all forms of natural 
rehgion, as was the fashion not long ago in our apolo- 

1 On the theology of Paul, consult McGiffert, Apostolic Age, p. \\3 sq.; 
Gould, Biblical Theology of the New Testament, p. 58 sq. ; Holtzmann, 
Neutestamentliche Theologie, 11. pp. 1-225, especially pp. 214-218 ; Stevens, 
Pauline Theology, p. 160 sq. ; Cone, Paul, the Man, the Missionary, and the 
Teacher, p. 179 sq. ; Pfleiderer, Paulinismus 2, p. 79 sq., p. 293 sq. ; Menegoz, 
La Peche et la Redemption d'apres S. Paul (1882); Bruce, St. Paul's 
Conception of Christianity (1894); Sabatier, L'Apotre Paul, p. 287 sg.; 
Harnack, Wesen des Christentums, p. 110 sq., Eng, tr., p. 176 sq.; also the 
article on Salvation, in Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, Vol. IV. 

2 /. e. theoretically. Practically (in its attitude toward Judaism as a 
historic religion) Barnabas i-s the most radical. 



48 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

getic literature, he draws the line of cleavage elsewhere. 
Christianity, as the religion of grace, is contrasted with 
all others, whether natural or supernatural, as religions 
of law (Rom. iii. 19-30). The newness of Christianity 
consists in the fact that through Jesus Christ its founder 
there has been introduced into the world a new divine 
principle, a power of God unto salvation, realizing the 
ideal of divine sonship as no preceding religion has been 
able to do (1 Cor. i. 23-31 ; Kom. viii., especially verses 
14-16; Gal. iii. 1-5; iv. 5-7; v. 22-24).^ 

1 The Pauline theology is so many sided that no complete statement 
can here be attempted. Those features which seem to have the most 
direct bearing upon the present discussion are as follows : 

(a) To Paul Christianity means primarily' the possession of a new 
spiritual life, whose marks are righteousness, sonship (i.e. filial trust), 
love, freedom. This life is due to union with Christ, or, to put it in 
another form, to the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, which again is 
mediated by faith. 

(6) In contrast to this, the life of the unredeemed is described as a 
state of death, of enmity with God, and of bondage to the flesh, whose 
inevitable end is total destruction. 

(c) This new life is made possible through the incarnation, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ, the heavenly man, the second Adam, who is 
identified, especially in the later Epistles, with the creative and sustaining 
principle in the universe. While in God's purpose from the first, re- 
demption is realized historically at a definite point of time, through the 
incarnation of the Christ, which thus becomes the turning-point of human 
history, 

{d) The significance of the historic Christ consists partly in the fact 
that He reveals the mystery of God's purpose, hitherto unknown, partly 
in the fact that He makes possible its accomplishment by overcoming sin 
through His death and resurrection. 

(e) Yet the work of Christ is not fully accomplished during His earthly 
life for (1) there remains some sin in the individual, only to be overcome 
at the Parousia, when the flesh shall be utterly destroyed ; and (2) there 
is to be a progressive growth of the kingdom on earth through the con- 
version of Gentiles and Jews, till the number of the elect is made up. Cf. 
especially Paul's philosophy of history in Rom. ix.-xi. 

Thus it appears that Paul not only has a clear conception of Christianity 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 49 

This does not mean, of course, that Paul denies a 
preparation for Christianity in the past. For all its 
newness, it does not come into the world unannounced. 
Through promise and prophecy God has lighted up the 
darkness of pre-Christian history, pointing the way to 
better days to come (Rom. iii. 21 ; iv. 3 ; of. verse 6 ; ix. 4, 
25, 29, 33 ; xi. 26 ; 1 Cor. ii. 9 ; 2 Cor. vi. 2 ; Gal. iii. 8). He 
has so made men that, apart from Christ, they groan 
in bondage, feeling themselves made for better things 
than of themselves they have power to realize (Rom. vii.). 
In some, as in Abraham, the Spirit of Christ gives fore- 
tastes of the true life of faith, revealing a better principle 
than that of law (Rom. iv. 1 ; cf. 1 Cor. x. 4 ; Gal. iii. 
6-9). But in general the religious preparation of the 
world is negative rather than positive.^ The substance 

as a historic religion, but of the historic Christ as the centre of Christi- 
anity. Cf. on this latter point Holtzmann, op. cit. II. p. 217. 

^ It is interesting to study Paul's view of the religious preparation of 
the world for Christ. Sharply as he makes the contrast between Christ 
(by which he means the historic Christ) and all that precedes (Rom, xvi. 
25, 26; 2 Cor. iii. 6; Gal. iv. 4; Eph. i. 9, 10; iii. 5; Col. i. 26), he yet 
recognizes various lines of preparation. There is 

(1) An eternal purpose, which includes the specific choice of some men, 
and runs through all history. 

(2) A definite revelation in the form of promise and prophecy of the 
Christ to come. This antedates the law, and is wrought into it (circum- 
cision a seal of Abraham's faith before the law). 

(3) A nature capable of receiving Christ and restless without Him. 
This appears from Rom. vii. 

(4) The entire legal dispensation as a negative preparation for Christ. 

(5) An actual participation in the person of Abraham of the righteous- 
ness of faith, 

(6) Back of all is the activity of the pre-existent Christ. Cf. esp. 
1 Cor, viii. 6 ; x, 3, 4. 

In view of these facts we must be careful not to exaggerate the nega- 

4 



50 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of all the religions, Jewish as well as Gentile, is a legal 
righteousness as unattainable as it is lofty (Rom. iii. 19, 
20). Wherever it is found, law is but a schoolmaster 
to bring men to Christ (Gal. iii. 24), a revelation of 
need rather than a power able to satisfy need. Only 
when we rise to the heights of a true philosophy, and 
see all things in their large relations, do we perceive that 
law too has its divine function as part of the great 
process by which God is training mankind for the higher 
life of the kingdom of God (Gal. iii. 23-iv. 7 ; Rom. 
ix.-xi). Looked at from this point of view, as the end 
for which the universe exists, Christianity is to Paul 
as old as the creation (Eph. i. 9, 10 ; Col. i. 17). But 
as a historic religion contrasted with others it is wholly 
new (Gal. iv. 4). 

It is not possible here, nor is it necessary, to enter 
into the theology of Paul. Interesting as are the ques- 
tions which may be raised as to the meaning of justifica- 
tion by faith, as to the nature of Christ's person, and 
the significance of His atonement, their answers do 
not affect the substance of Paul's teaching, so far as 
it alone concerns us here. To Paul, we repeat, the new- 
ness of Christianity consists in the fact that through 
Christ there has entered into the world a new power, able 
to realize, and progressively realizing, in men that life 

tive features in Paul's view of the pre-Christian preparation. Side by 
side with the law and the current legalistic religion (Judaism, Gal. i. 14), 
in which he had been trained, there was the wider positive preparation, 
which included not merely the promise, but also some foretastes in 
experience, on the part of chosen individuals, of God's fatherly and 
forgiving grace. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 51 

of filial dependence upon God in holiness and love which 
is at once the ideal of religion and the end for which the 
world exists. Sharing this life, one becomes possessor 
here and now of a new divine nature (2 Cor. v. 17), and 
the glories still to be revealed in the future are only the 
outworking of spiritual principles and forces alreadj^ 
active in present Christian experience (Rom. viii. 11). 
Thus the absoluteness of Christianity to Paul centres 
in the person of its founder. In Him is revealed the 
mystery of God which had been hidden from the foun- 
dation of the world (Rom. xvi. 25 ; Eph. iii. 5) ; through 
Him is realized the purpose of God in the creation of a 
spiritual society, whose bond of union is the possession 
of a divine life like that of Christ (Rom. viii. ; 1 Cor. 
xii. 12 sq. ', Eph. iv.). 



3. The Answer of the Letter to the Hebrews?- 

The writer to the Hebrews also emphasizes the new- 
ness of Christianity (viii. 6 ; xii. 24). To him, as to 
Paul, there is a sharp contrast between Judaism and 
Christianity (i. 1, 2). But, unlike Paul, he makes the 
contrast, not between the positive and the negative, but 
between the partial and the complete (viii. 1-13 ; ix. 
23; x. 1). What the institutions of Israel imperfectly 

^ On the theology of Hebrews, consult McGiffert, Apostolic Age, p. 463 
sq.\ Menegoz, La Theologie de I'J^pitre aux Hehreux ; Riehm, Der Lehr- 
hegriff des Hehrderhriefs ; Westcott, The Epistle to the Hebrews; Stevens, 
Theology of the New Testament, p. 483 sq., especially p. 490 sq. ; Gould, 
Biblical Theology of the New Testament, p. 160 57.; and especially Holtz- 
mann, Neutestamentliche Theologie, II, pp. 281-308. 



62 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

shadowed forth (viii. 5), that Christ has clearly revealed. 
He is the fulfilment of which they were the prophecy, 
the completion of which they were the beginning.^ So 
far as they went, they were right (v. 4) ; and so far as 
they went, they were effective (ix. 13). They offered 
a genuine even though a limited salvation. They could 
and did purify from ceremonial defilement (ix. 10, 13) ; 
but for sin they could not atone (ix. 9). Hence the 
need of Christ, the great High Priest (iv. 14), the 
author of an eternal salvation (v. 9), the one in whom 
all the hopes of the past are realized and all its long- 
ings satisfied (iv. 14-16). To the writer to the Hebrews 
the newness of Christianity consists in the fact that 
it provides this perfect Saviour (v. 9 ; cf . verse 2 ; 
vii. 16), and the absoluteness of Christianity is found 
in the perfection of the salvation which He brings 
(ii. 3 ; ix. 12) ; the fact that after Christ there remains 
no higher principle still to be revealed (vi. 4-8; 
vii. 28; ix. 12, 26, "once for all"; x. 10,12; x. 26; 
xiii. 8) .2 

1 Cf. Holtzmann, op. cit. p. 300. "Letzteres (das Werk des Christus) 
besteht einfach in Herstellung und Verwirklichung dessen, was durch 
die Schattenbilder der alttest. Siihnanstalt angedeudet war, und die 
Beweiskraft der ganzen Argumentation reicht genau ebenso weit, als die 
Ueberzeugung von der gottlichen Herkunft des mosaiscben Opfercultus 
(cf. ix. 22), von der siihnenden Kraft des Opferblutes, und von der 
typischen Bedeutung des Opferrituals reicbt," etc. 

2 The conception of Christianity in the Letter to the Hebrews differs 
from that of Paul in several important particulars. Perhaps the most 
noticeable is the greater stress laid upon the eschatological. To its author 
salvation lies wholly in the future, as a prize to be won through faith- 
fulness and obedience. The element of mystic union with Christ on 
which Paul lays so much stress is not emphasized. Hope rather than 
experience is the dominant note of the letter. Faith is trust in God's 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 53 

It is clear that, in spite of all differences of detail, the 
answers of both Paul and the writer to the Hebrews 
belong to the same general class. Both regard Chris- 
tianity as a distinctly new religion. Both see in it a 
higher stage in the religious history of mankind. Both 
connect the advance with the person and work of its 
founder. For both the absoluteness of Christianity 
centres in the person of Christ.^ 

promise rather than vital union with the present Christ. Christ is 
Saviour because 

(a) He reveals God's will as the prophets did not (i. 1, 2). 

(h) He makes the one perfect sacrifice for sin (x. 12 ; vii. 28; ix. 12), 
But especially because 

(c) Through the incarnation, with its brotherhood in temptation and 
suffering, He has become master of the world to come (ii. 5), and therefore 
can assure those who come to God through Him, the great High Priest, of 
eternal salvation (v. 9). 

In answer to the question what is the relation of the new covenant to 
the old, the writer answers with Paul 

(1) In God's purpose it antedates it (Melchizedek). 

(2) The old is given to typify and to foreshadow it (cf . viii. 5 ; x. 1 , 
the law a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the 
things). The writer here conceives of the law more narrowly than Paul, 
as the Mosaic ceremonial law, and regards it as having a function which 
is positive as well as negative. 

To the author of Hebrews, as to Paul, Christianity centres in the his- 
toric Christ. As to the fate of those before Christ, the writer does not 
speak clearly, though iv. 6 would seem to imply that they were responsi- 
ble for their failure. 

1 The same is true in substance of the other great type of thought 
contained within the New Testament — the Johannine. In spite of the 
many points of similarity which may be pointed out between the treat- 
ment of the Old Testament in the Fourth Gospel, and that of the Letter 
of Barnabas (Cf. Holtzmann, op. cit. II. p. 356), it is yet true that in the 
main point at issue, John stands with Paul and Hebrews rather than 
with Barnabas. Not only does he contrast Christianity with all preceding 
revelations of God as the absolute religion (i. 17), but he recognizes 
an earlier if less perfect working, of the Logos in history (Prologue), 
and expressly admits the divine authority and special prerogatives of 



54 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Very different is it with another class of answers. 
In these Christianity is regarded simply as the republi- 
cation or explanation of a religion already fully revealed, 
but misunderstood. Christ is conceived less as a saviour 
than as a teacher, and a teacher of old truths at that. 
We may take the Letter of Barnabas as type of this 
class. 



4. The Answer of the Letter of Barnabas?- 

The Letter of Barnabas is specially interesting because 
it is a definite discussion of the problem now under 
consideration. Its theme is the relation of Christianity 
to Judaism,^ its practical aim to show what attitude 
Christians ought to take toward their former co-religion- 

the Jewish religion (iv. 22). He agrees further with Paul and the writer 
to the Hebrews in the great importance which he attaches to the incarna- 
tion, and. in his constant emphasis upon the true humanity of Christ. But 
a discussion of the Johannine theology lies beyond our present purpose. 

Cf . Holtzmann, op. cit. II. p. 354 sq. ; Stevens, Johannine Theology ; 
McGifFert, Apostolic Age, p. 487 sq. ; Reuss, Histoire de la Theologie 
Chretienne, II. p. 418 sq. 

1 On Barnabas, cf. the editions of Gebhardt and Harnack (Patrum 
Apostolicorum opera I. Ft. II. Lipsiae, 1878) ; Funk (Tubingen, 1887); and 
Lightfoot and Harmer (Apostolic Fathers, London, 1891). Earlier edi- 
tions by Miiller (Leipzig, 1869) ; Hilgenfeld (1866, 1877 2) ; and Cunning- 
ham (London, 1877). 

Translations in the Ante-Nicene Fathers (ed. Coxe), Vol. I. p. 137 
sq. ; and in Lightfoot and Harmer, op. cit. p. 269 sq. 

Cf. also Milligan in Smith and Wace, Dictionary of Christian Biography, 
I. p. 260 ; Harnack in Herzog, Heal Encyhlopddie^, II. p. 410 sq. ; Light- 
foot, Epistle of Clement, II. p. 503 sq. ; Volter in Jahr. filr prot. Theol., 
1888, p. 106 sq.; Harnack, Geschichte der alt-chrisl. Litt. I. p. 58 sq.; 
Chronologie, I. p. 410; J. Weiss, Der Barnahashrief Berlin, 1888. 

For the earlier Bibliography, see Gebhardt and Harnack, op. cit. p. xl. 

2 Cf. chaps, ii.-iv. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 55 

ists.^ In his treatment of both these questions the 
author goes a way of his own.^ 

To Barnabas there is no difference in principle be- 
tween the religion of Christ and that of the Old Testa- 
ment. They differ neither in kind nor in degree. There 
is but one religion, the Christian. It is a spiritual re- 
ligion (iv. 11), without forms and ceremonies, without 
temple (xvi. 1) or sacrifices (ii. 4) ; a religion of obe- 
dience and sonship (iv. 9, 11 ; vi. 11), in hope of the 
promised salvation (vi. 9, 19) which Christ, the divine 
Saviour, who has abolished death by His sacrifice 
(v. 6), shall one day reveal. This spiritual religion, 
we repeat, the Old Testament clearly reveals, not 
merely in its essential principles, but in its details 
(chaps, vi.-xvi.). But the Jews, because of their 
sin (xiv. 1), and also in fulfilment of the divine pur- 
pose (xiii.), did not understand the Old Testament. ^ 
They misinterpreted its teachings, did not conform to 
its precepts, and hence failed to enjoy its blessings. 
They took literally the precepts of the ceremonial law 
which required a spiritual {i.e. allegorical) interpreta- 

1 Cf. iii. 6. Yet note that the danger which the author has in mind 
is chiefly theoretical. It is that of a misunderstanding of the nature of 
the Christian law, rather than such an abandonment as threatens the 
Galatians to whom Paul writes. 

^ On the novelty of Barnabas' treatment, see Harnack, in Herzog, op. 
cit. p. 413, "Das AT — und das ist an sich noch nichts auffallendes — 
wird dem geschichtlichen Boden voUig entzogen, und als ein allein den 
Christen gehoriges Buch betrachtet : aber die konsequente Durchfiihrung 
des Gedankens, die jiidische Verwertung des AT sei eine vom Teufel 
eingegebene Verdrehung desselben gewesen, ist dem Verfasser eigentiim- 
lich." Cf. Chronologie, I. p. 413. 

^ X. 12: " But whence should they perceive or understand these 
tilings'? " 



56 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Hon} Hence the Old Testament remained a sealed book 
in their hands until Christ came. The purpose of His 
coming was to disclose the meaning which had hitherto 
been obscured, to show that the Jewish claim to the 
possession of a divine covenant was a false one (iv. ; 
xiii. ; xiv.), and to transfer to His true people (the 
Christians) the blessings which are rightfully theirs 
(iv. 6 ; xiv. 4).^ 

It is clear that, in spite of superficial resemblances, 
this view of Christianity differs radically from both of 
those which we have been considering. To both Paul 
and the writer to the Hebrews, Christianity represents 
a distinctly higher stage in the development of religion. 
In both it succeeds true but imperfect forms. Both, 
therefore, have to face the question. What is the new 
which Christianity brings, and what is its relation 

1 The letter is devoted to showing this in detail. Cf. the case of the 
sacrifices (ii.), fasts (iii.), circumcision (ix.), unclean meats (x.), Sabbath 
(xv.), temple (xvi.). 

2 In his article on Barnabas in Herzog, op. cit., p. 413, Harnack gives a 
favorable estimate of the Christianity of our letter. He goes so far as to 
say that no one of the Apostolic Fathers understood Paul's doctrine of sal- 
vation as well as Barnabas. With all recognition of the genuinely Paul- 
ine elements contained in his teaching (e.g. Christianity a spiritual 
religion of obedience and sonship ; Christ not only teacher but saviour ; 
recognition of the positive significance of Christ's death in bringing about 
salvation ; Christians new creatures in Him, a spiritual temple in which 
God dwells, etc.), we cannot help feeling that it is easy to exaggerate the 
points of similarity. The truths to which we have referred are rather 
relics of an earlier type of thought preserved through reverence than in- 
tegral elements in the author's own world of thought. Both the wide out- 
look and the historic sense of Paul are gone. Christianity is primarily 
law, not gospel; and salvation, which lies in the future, is conditioned 
upon obedience and may be lost. Here the letter is much closer to He- 
brews than to Paul. But in the main point which here alone concerns us 
it differs from both. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 67 

to the old? This problem does not exist for Barna- 
bas. By his uncritical identification of Christianity 
and (true) Judaism, and his denial to the latter in its 
historic forms of the relative right which both Paul and 
the author of Hebrews admit, he sweeps away all diffi- 
culties, and presents Christianit}^ as the one true religion 
in absolute contrast to all preceding forms of religion 
as false. The elements of growth and progress so 
prominent in the teaching of the great apostle — it 
may be added, in the teaching of our Lord Himself — 
are overlooked or denied ; and so the true significance 
of Christianity, as a historic religion, is obscured. There 
is but one religion, the Christian, which has existed 
unchanged from the beginning. The absoluteness of 
Christianity is the absoluteness of all divine truth, which, 
just because it is divine, is eternal and unchanging. 

If we ask for the explanation of so strange a miscon- 
ception meeting us thus early in Christian history, ^ 
it is not easy to give the answer. Doubtless many 
causes had their influence. The absence of the historic 
spirit which is so characteristic of the entire period with 
which we have to do, and which vitiates so much of the 
interpretation of exegetes otherwise learned and sincere ; 
the self-consciousness of a church grown strong enough 
to stand upon its own feet, and arrogantly asserting its 
superior right to the Jewish Scriptures over those from 
whom it had first received them ; above all, the idea, 
deep rooted in the philosophy of the time and the source 
of many errors, of God as the unchanging one, the Ab- 

1 The date of Barnabas is disputed. Lightfoot dates it early (between 
70 and 79); Harnack {Chronologie) late (about 130). 



68 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

solute, whose utterance is ever the same ^ — all these 
causes, doubtless, with others less easy to recognize, 
worked together to bring the author to a position so far 
removed, both in justice and charity, from that of the 
earliest Christian teachers. But whatever the cause, the 
effect was disastrous. A view of Christianity so unhis- 
torical could not but be the parent of many errors, and 
so indeed it proved. 

The three answers which we have thus briefly passed 
in review are typical of the chief methods of treatment 
which meet us in the later history. On the one hand, 
we have the effort to conceive Christianity as a historic 
religion, and to reconcile belief in its absoluteness with 
a recognition of the relative right of other, though im- 
perfect, forms. This in turn may take two forms, 
according as the religious preparation for Christianity 
is conceived (with Paul) as mainly negative, and Christ 
is thought of as having introduced into the world a type 
of religion which did not exist before, or as stress is laid 
(with the Letter to the Hebrews) on the positive 
elements in the pre-Christian preparation, and Christian- 
ity thought of as the completion and fulfilment of a 
religious ideal already partially, though imperfectly, 
known. On the other hand, we have the uncritical 
identification of historic Christianity with all true 
religion, and the denial of any right, even a relative one, 

1 Lightfoot {Clement, II. p. 504) calls attention to the Alexandrianism 
of the Epistle. While the speculative interest is subordinated to the prac- 
tical, the world of thought out of which the letter comes is that familiar 
to the philosophical schools of Alexandria. For a later illustration, cf . 
Engelhardt, Christentum Justins, p. 253, and references, especially p. 255, 
" Justin lebt and webt," etc. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 69 

in other forms of faith. Where this is the case, instead 
of the historical method of Paul and the author of 
Hebrews, who seek to show the superiority of Chris- 
tianity by comparing it in detail with earlier forms of 
religion, we have the affirmation of its absoluteness on 
a priori grounds, as an inference from the divine per- 
fection, and the consequent denial of all elements of 
growth or progress in divine revelation. It is this 
latter method which has become characteristic of the 
type of thought which we know as Catholicism. 

5. The Catholic Conception of Christianity, 

One of the most striking facts in Christian history is 
the early disappearance of the Pauline conception of 
Christianity. With the growth of the Catholic church, 
and its assumption of authority and infallibility, other 
influences become controlling. The letters of Paul are 
canonized, but their teaching is misinterpreted or over- 
looked.^ The view of Christianity which meets us in 
the writings of the Catholic Fathers tends more and 
more to follow the lines of the Letter of Barnabas .^ 
There is but one religion, the Christian, which has 
existed unchanged from the beginning. The nature 
of this religion Christ and His apostles have clearly 

1 On the traces of Paulinisra in the early church, cf . Harnack in Zeit- 
schrift fWr Theologie und Kirche, I. ** Geschichte der Lehre von der Selig- 
keit allein durch den Glauhen in der alten Kirche." 

2 Barnabas is here used simply as a representative of the tendency 
which ignores the difference between the Old Testament and Christianity, 

^1 and carries back the latter to the beginning of things. This view is 
consistent with great variety of treatment in detail. 



60 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

revealed, and over it the church through her bishops 
and unchanging tradition stands guard. Whatever 
the church is and teaches, that is apostolic, eternal, 
Christian. The elements of growth and progress 
implied both in Paul and in the Letter to the Hebrews 
are lost sight of, and, what is worse, the significance of 
the historic Christ is obscured. To be a Christian means 
no longer to be a disciple of Christ, a partaker of the 
divine life which He imparts, but a son of mother 
church, dependent upon her for forgiveness and salva- 
tion, accepting as Christian whatever she has made 
known. Even so spiritual a man as Augustine is 
powerless to resist this conception of Christianity. 

It does not fall within the scope of this essay to 
follow the rise of the Catholic conception in detail. 
Harnack has traced the steps in his Dogmengeschichte^^ 
and it is not necessary to reproduce them here. The 
process was a gradual one, and marked by many sur- 
vivals and inconsistencies. Among the writers of the 
second and third and even of the fourth centuries we 
still find much freedom in the treatment of Christianity. 
Not only does the positive conception vary ,2 but the 
relation of Christianity to Judaism is very differently 
conceived. The chief points of view represented are 
the following : — 

1. That which regards Christianity as something 

1 Pt, I. Bk. II. chaps, i.-iii. Cf. also Loofs, Dogmengesckichte, p. 74 
sq.; McGiffert, Primitive and Catholic Christianity, New York, 1893. 

2 Compare the realistic theology of Irenffius and the school of Asia 
Minor with the type of thought represented by Justin and the Apologists ; 
or again, the Chiliasm of TertuUian with the spiritual eschatology of the 
Alexandrines. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 61 

absolutely new, and, with historical Judaism, rejects the 
Old Testament itself {e.g. Marcion and the Gnostics). 

2. That which identifies Christianity and true Judaism, 
regarding the former as going back to the creation, and 
claiming the prophets and lawgivers of Israel as 
Christian teachers (so Justin, and the Apologists in 
general). 

3. That which recognizes the divine revelation to 
Israel, yet regards it as belonging to a preparatory and 
lower dispensation {e.g. Irenseus). 

4. That which regards historic Christianity itself as 
j but a passing stage in divine revelation destined at last 
i to be outgrown and superseded (e. g. Origen). 

1 1. In Gnosticism 1 we have the contrast between 
I Christianity and all preceding forms of religion expressed 
in the strongest terms. The God of the Old Testament, 
! or Demiurge, is distinguished from the Supreme Being 
t who has revealed Himself in Christ, and the authority 
I of the Jewish Scriptures is rejected. If we would learn 
what is Christian, we must seek our information from 
the tradition of the apostles, preserved partly in the 
writings which bear their names, partly in the esoteric 
teacliing of their disciples. It would carry us too far 
to enter into the details of the various Gnostic systems. 
I Here it is sufficient to say that, for all their fantastic 
exaggeration, they represent a serious attempt to do 
justice to the uniqueness of Christianity as a historic 
:religion.2 This is equally true of Marcion, in whose 

1 On Gnosticism, cf. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, Pt. I. Bk. I. chap. iv. 
* Cf. Piinjer, History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion, Eng. tr., 
.!>. 11 sq. 



62 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

sharp contrast between the Old Testament and the New, 
we find at once a reminiscence and an exaggeration of 
Paulinism.i 

2. Justin's 2 view of Christianity has many resem- 
blances to that of Barnabas. Salvation is used in a 
purely eschatological sense. The great significance of 
revelation lies in the fact that it discloses the conditions 
upon the fulfilment of which salvation depends. Such 
revelation was given not merely by Christ, and by the 
Old Testament prophets who foretold His coming, but 
also by the Greek philosophers, who performed a similar 
function among the Gentiles.^ The operation of the 
Logos is universal, and those who have lived according 
to His teachings (as, for example, Socrates, Heraclitus, 
and many others) are Christians, even though they have 
been reputed atheists.* As to the question why Christ's 
coming was necessary, since the teaching of prophets and 
philosophers was sufficient, for salvation without Him, 
Justin has no clear answer. Engelhardt holds that the 
only answer consistent with his premises would be 
that the appearance of Christ sealed the truth of the 
prophets' words, and so gave them an authority which 
they could not else have obtained. Through Christ the 
Jewish Scriptures become in the strict sense Christian 
writings. Yet, in spite of his liigh estimate of the Old 
Testament, Justin has as little appreciation as Barnabas 
of the place held by the Jewish religion in the history 

^ On Marcion, cf. Harnack, op. cit. Pt. I. Bk. I. chap. v. 
'^ On Justin, cf. Engelhardt, Das Christentum Justins (Erlangen, 1878), 
especially pp. 167 sq. ; 210 sq. ; 245 sq. 
8 ApoL I. 20, 44. 
4 Apol I. 46 ; II. 10. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 63 

of redemption. So far as the Mosaic law is true, it is 
identical with Christ's teaching in the New Covenant. 
So far as it contains temporary and external precepts 
(e. g. circumcision, Sabbaths, feasts, etc.), it was given 
because of the hardness of the Jews' hearts, to mark 
the fact that they are not really the true people of God.^ 
It follows from the unchangeableness of God that His 
teaching is ever the same.^ Yet there is this difference 
between Christ and all earher teachers, that in Him the 
whole Logos became incarnate, which gives to His teach- 
ing a completeness and finality which theirs had not.^ 

A like unfavorable view of the Jewish religion meets 
us in the epistle to Diognetus, where it is maintained 
that the entire sacrificial system was a mistake. The 
same is true of the other ceremonial provisions of the 
Jewish law (e.g. the distinction of meats, the Sabbath, 
circumcision, fasting, new moons, etc.), all of which 
are " ridiculous and unworthy of notice." * 

Later apologists simply identify Christian doctrine 
with the teaching of the Old Testament, and see in the 
superior antiquity of the latter over the writings of the 
Greek philosophers a proof that the " Christian philos- 
ophy " is more ancient than that of the Greeks.^ 

1 Cf. Dialogue, 16, 19. 

2 Cf. Engelhardt, op. cit. p. 253. 
8 Apol II. 10. 

* Cf. chaps, iii. and iv. 

s So Tatian, Oratio, 31, Moses more ancient than Homer; cf. 40; 
Theophilus, Ad Autolycum, III. 9, the Christian law in the Old Testament ; 
20, the superior antiquity of Moses ; and of the prophets, 23, 26, and 
especially 29, " the antiquity of the prophetical writings and the divinity 
of our doctrine." 

An interesting exception to this unhistorical method is found in Aris- 



64 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

3. Of all the Catholic Fathers Irenaeus ^ most clearly 
apprehended the question, What is new in Christianity ? 
This was forced upon him by the Gnostic rejection of 
the Old Testament. In his answer to the question, he 
shows in a most interesting way at once his dependence 
upon Paul and his departure from his teaching. 

According to Irenseus, there were several distinct 
covenants made by God. His estimate of their number 
varies. Sometimes he reckons four (Adam, Noah, 
[Abraham], Moses, Christ) ; more often only two. He 
regards the study of the differences between these as a 
legitimate subject for churchly (i. e. orthodox) Gnosis.^ 
There is both agreement and difference. Yet the differ- 
ence is only relative, since the two are " of the same 
nature." ^ 

If we ask more particularly wherein consists the su- 
periority of the New Covenant, we find several advan- 
tages. In the first place it is universal.* Again, it 
includes a purification of the moral law revealed in the 
Decalogue, and its separation from the ceremonial ele- 
ments with which it had been united in the Jewish dis- 
pensation.^ Finally, it brings with it the reward for 
which the saints in the Old Testament were obliged to 

tides, one of the earliest of the Apologists. He distinguishes the Jews as 
approaching the truth " more than all the nations, especially in that they 
worship God, and not His works," yet maintains that " nevertheless they 
too erred from true knowledge " (14). 

^ On Irenseus, cf. the careful study of Werner, Der PauUnismus des 
Irenceus (in Texte und Untersuchungen, Vol. VI.), especially pp. 179-202 
(Die geschichtUche Stellung des Heilsiverhes Christi). 

2 Contra Haer. I. x. 3. 

5 Eiusdem substantiae, IV. ix. 2. Cf. III. xii. 12. 
* IV. ix. 2. 

6 IV. xiii. 1-4. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 65 

wait.^ All of these are connected with the coming of 
Christ. Asked how he meets the Gnostic objection, 
Quid igitur dominus veniens attulitf He answers, 
Cognoscite, quoniam omnem novitatem attulit semetipsum 
afferens? 

To Irenaeus, as to Paul, the ceremonial law is a school- 
master to bring the Jews to Christ. Yet when we 
examine more closely, the similarity is only external. 
Paul contrasts law and grace ; Irengeus, the ceremonial 
and the moral law. The moral law was revealed to 
Abraham. Moses added the ceremonial law as a tem- 
porary matter because of the hardness of the Jews' 
hearts. Christ did away with ceremonies and restored 
the moral law in its purity as a law of freedom, by 
which henceforth man is to be justified.^ Irenseus 
knows nothing of justification in the Pauline sense ; a 
justification by faith alone, apart from the works of the 
law. As has more than once been remarked of his 
Paulinism, " The hands are the hands of Esau, but the 
voice is the voice of Jacob." * 

1 IV. xxxiv. 1. Cf. Werner, op. cit. p. 186. 

^ Ibid. Cf. Ignatius, .<4rfPAi7. 9. " The priests likewise were good, bat 
better is the high priest, to whom is committed the holy of holies ; for to 
Him alone are committed the hidden things of God ; He Himself being 
the door of the Father through which Abraham and Isaac and Jacob 
enter in, and the Prophets, and the whole Church ; all these things com- 
bine in the unity of God. But the Gospel hath a singular pre-eminence 
in the Advent'of the Saviour, even our Lord Jesus Christ, and His passion 
and resurrection. For the beloved prophets in their preaching pointed to 
Him ; but the Gospel is the completion of immortality." (Lightfoot's tr. 
Apostolic Fathers, 1891). Cf. also Ad Magn., 10, where we find the earli- 
est use of the word xP'o'T'oi'io-^itJs. 

3 IV. xxxiv. 4, vivificatrix lex. 

* Werner, op. cit. p. 202. 

5 



66 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

4. Still a different position is held by Origen.^ Sum- 
ming up in his own person all the tendencies of that 
many-sided age, he weaves them into a unity, which 
is as striking as it is original. Against the Gnostics 
he maintains the importance of historic revelation, and 
defends the Old Testament as one step in the process 
of God's self-communication to man.^ With Irenseus 
he admits that the revelation of Christ is a higher 
stage in that communication.^ But to him Christ 
Himself is not final. However important it may be for 
men to accept Him as Saviour, and to believe the truths 
which He taught, and to which the church in her dogmas 

1 On Origen, besides' the older works of Redepenning and Thomasius, 
cf. Bigg, Christian Platonists of Alexandria (Oxford, 1886), p. 115 sq. ; 
Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, Ft. I. Bk. II. chap. vi. ; Allen, Continuity oj 
Christian Thought (Boston, 1890), chap. i. p. 70 sq.; Denis, De la Philos- 
ophie d'Origene (Paris, 1884). 

2 Origen distinguishes four stages of divine revelation. Three of these 
are past, the law of nature, the law of Moses, and the Gospel. "A 
fourth is still to come. It is the Eternal Gospel." (Bigg, p. 207 and 
note.) In his view of the first two he agrees with his master, Clement. 
(Cf, Strom., I. 5, where we read that *' philosophy was a schoolmaster to 
bring the Hellenic mind, as the law, the Hebrews, to Christ.") Yet as 
compared with Clement he had a less favorable view of what had actually 
been accomplished through the preparatory revelations. This is espe- 
cially noticeable in his estimate of Greek philosophy. Cf. Harnack, Dog- 
mengeschichte 3, Vol. I. p. 605 and note, Eng. tr. II. p. 334. 

3 This is the more remarkable since Origen 's doctrine of a double stan- 
dard would seem to reduce Christ in substance to the level of other 
teachers. It is the distinction of the Gospel, on the one hand from eternal 
truth, on the other from its preparatory stages, which is characteristic in 
Origen's teaching. Cf. Harnack, op. cit. 1. p. 610, " Aber das Neue was I 
weder Celsus noch Porphyrins anerkennen konnten, liegt darin, dass die | 
eine Religion auch in ihrer mythischen Form als einzigartig und gottlich >» 
anerkannt ist, und darauf gedrungen wird, dass alle Menschen, soweit sie f 
nicht zur hochsten Erkenntniss gelangenkonnen, sich dieser mythischen -i 
Religion und keiner anderen zu unterwerfen haben." [[Eng.tr. II, p, 340.]] i 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 67 

bears witness,^ it is a mistake to rest upon these as 
though they were God's last word. As a matter of fact, 
they are but symbols of eternal truths, elementary les- 
sons designed for the help of the many, till through the 
instruction of the divine Logos they have been initiated 
into that Gnosis which is the privilege of the perfect.^ 
Thus side by side with the law and the Gospel, Origen 
recognizes as the supreme revelation of God, a new 
eternal Gospel, and regards historic Christianity itself as 
but a passing stage destined at last to be superseded and 
outgrown.^ 

It is to Origen more than to any other single man 
that the church owed her victory over Gnosticism. 
This was due to the fact that he opposed it not from 
without, by force, but from within, with the subtler 
weapons of understanding and sympathy. It was be- 
cause he had spiritually appropriated the elements of 
truth in Gnosticism that he was ahle to expose its exag- 
geration and error. But here, as so often, the defender 
of the faith proved unable to maintain his own ortho- 
doxy. The church which had profited by the services 
of the great apologist to establish herself upon new 
heights of intellectual security made haste to throw 
down the scaffold by which she had mounted. Origen's 
distinction between historic faith and eternal truth 
proved as unacceptable as the more pronounced dualism 

1 On the place held by the creed in Origen's system, cf. the Introduction 
to the De Principiis. 

^ Cf. Celsus, in. 78; Comm. in Joh. i. 9 (ed. Lommatzsch 1. p. 20). 

* We shall meet the same thought more than once again (e. g. in the 
Middle Ages, in Joachim of Floris, and in Nicholas of Cusa ; in more 
modern times, in Lessing). 



68 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of the Gnostics, and more and more essential Christian- 
ity came to be identified with the existing institutions 
and dogmas of the Catholic church. 

Nor was this all. With the rejection by the church of 
the Gnostic depreciation of the Old Testament, and its 
union with the New as part of a single codex of divine 
revelation, the sense of the relative right and signifi- 
cance of the Jewish economy tended more and more to 
fall into the background. The question so clearly 
raised by Irenseus as to the difference between the Old 
and the New Testaments, and the reason for the superi- 
ority of the second over the first, had less and less inter- 
est for his successors. More and more the view-point 
of Justin and of Barnabas becomes controlling, and 
Christianity, which, in all its essentials is conceived to 
be clearly revealed in the Old Testament, is carried 
back to the very creation of the world. The classical 
illustration of this is to be found in the great text-book 
of Catholic Christianity, Augustine's " City of God." ^ 

The " City of God " is all the more instructive be- 
cause it is in form a historical work. In it Augustine 
proposes to recount the history of the two opposing 
powers which since the beginning of time have contended 

^ On Augustine cf . Harnack, Dogmengeschichte 2, Vol. III. chaps, iii. and 
iv. and especially the note on p. 112 sq. Eng. tr. V. p. 125 sq. The reason 
why the historic Christ plays so small a role in Augustine's doctrine lies in 
the fact "dass Augustin bei allem Fortschritt in der Erkenntniss den 
Fortschritt zur Geschichte doch nicht gemacht hat. Der grosse Psychol- 
oge ist noch blind dafiir gewesen was geschichtliche Entwickelung ist, 
was die Person in der Geschichte leistet, und was die Geschichte der 
Menschheit geleistet hat," (p. 114, Eng. tr. V. p. 126). On Augustine's 
philosophy of history, cf. Flint, History of the Philosophy of History 
(New York, 1894), p. 152 sq. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 69 

for the supremacy of the universe — the City of God 
and the City of Satan. Here, if anywhere, we might ex- 
pect to find a clear recognition of the different stages in 
rehgious development and above all, an indication of the 
distinctive features which have entered into the world 
through Christ. But any such expectation is destined 
to disappointment. The Christianity whose history is 
here recorded knows no progress. From the beginning 
it has existed substantially unchanged. It is defined in 
terms taken from the Old Testament.^ Its members are 
not merely patriarchs and prophets, but also devout 
heathen.'-^ When Christ came its name was changed, 
but its substance remained the same.^ While the neces- 
sity of Clirist's mediation was revealed to the heathen as 
well as to the Jews,* His coming made no real difference 
in the status of men. For us, as for the men of an ear- 
lier dispensation, salvation still lies in the future. The 
city of God is in heaven, not on earth. The church is 
only a faint type of the glories that shall be. In com- 
parison with the Hfe to come, that which we now live is 
" most wretched, be it filled with all blessings of body 
and soul and external things," ^ and our present peace is 
" rather a solace of our misery than the positive enjoy- 
ment of felicity.'' ® 

So far as the positive conception of Christianity is 
concerned we find within Catholicism two great types 

1 xi. 1. 2 xviii. 47. 

2 Retrac. I. xiii. 3 : " Res ipsa quae nunc Christiana religio nuncupatur, 
erat apud antiques, nee defuit ab initio generis humani, quousque ipse 
Christus veniret in carne, unde vera religio, quae iam erat, coepit appellari 
Christiana/' 

* xviii. 47. ^ xix. 20. ^ xix. 27. 



70 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of thought, that of the Greek church and that of the 
Latin. In the former ^ Christianity is conceived physi- 
cally rather than ethically, as a new divine nature, 
immortal and incorruptible, of which one becomes par- 
taker through the sacraments, and by the possession of 
which one is delivered from the corruption of this 
world and assured of a life of endless bliss hereafter.^ 
The great interest in the doctrines of the Trinity and 
the Person of Christ is explained by the fact that they 
centre in the Incarnation; that extraordinary event 
through which this impartation of divine life is con- 
ceived to be accomplished.^ Here we have a reminis- 
cence of the earlier Christian view in which the person 
of the historic Christ is central. Yet in the later 
development, this primitive significance tended more 
and more to be lost. The doctrines are conceived as 
mysteries rising above reason, to be accepted because 
of the testimony of tradition, irrespective of their con- 
tent.* With the growing complexity of dogma, it 
became increasingly difficult for the plain man to under- 
stand its meaning, and the ethical and rational elements 

1 On the conception of Christianity in the Greek church, cf. Harnack, 
Wesen des Christentums, p. 119 sq., Eng. tr. p. 217 sq. and the appropriate 
sections of his Dogmengeschichte ; Dorner, Dogmengeschichte, pp. 221-239 ; 
Kaftan, Wesen des Christentums, p. 359 sq. ; Dogmatik, p. 64 sq. ; Sabatier, 
Philosophie de la Religion, p. 232 sq. 

2 Cf . Ignatius, Ad Eph. 20, " breaking one bread, which is the medicine 
of immortality, and the antidote that we should not die but live forever 
in Jesus Christ." Cf . also Ad Polycarp 2, *' The prize is incorruption and 
life eternal." 

3 This soteriological interest is especially apparent in Athanasius. 

* A good illustration is to be found in the fate of the Antioch Chris- 
tology, in which a more historical conception of the person of Christ 
succeeded for a time in maintaining itself. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 71 

SO prominent in the earlier theology fall more and more 
into the background.^ Religion resolves itself for 
earnest men into a mystic communion with God mediated 
through the sacraments,^ and in place of the historic 
Christ we have the Catholic church, as a divinely 
appointed institution, set to mediate a supernatural 
salvation to men otherwise helpless and hopeless. 

In Roman Catholicism ^ the significance of the church 
is still further emphasized. Even the dogmas of the 
Trinity and the Incarnation are subordinate to the great 
dogma of the Church. To be a Christian means to be 
a submissive son of mother church, receiving at her 
hand whatever she may be pleased to impart. When 
we look more closely at the salvation thus mediated, 
we note several interesting points of difference. Greater 
stress is laid on the active virtues than is the case with 
the Greek church. To the Latin salvation, which lies 
wholly in the future, is a reward to be won through 
fidelity and obedience. It is not present experience of 
salvation which the church guarantees, but the promise 
of such experience in the future.* With this goes an 
increasing disposition to conceive of salvation in terms 
of law. The church is a legal institution which guar- 
antees rights, and the supreme Christian duty is to dis- 

1 Of. the De Fide Orthodoxa of John of Damascus — the typical 
example of Greek scholasticism. 

2 Cf. Harnack, Dogmengesch'cJite, Pt. II. Bk. I. chap. x. 

* On Roman Catholicism, cf. Harnack, Wesen des Christentums, pp. 
153-167, Eng. tr, p. 246 sq.; and the appropriate sections of his Dog- 
mengeschichte ; Dorner, Dogmengeschichte, pp. 350-394 ; Kaftan, Dogmatik, 
p. 68 sq. 

* Cf. the passages already cited from Augustine's City of God (xix. 
20, 27). 



72 rHE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

cover and to occupy the proper attitude to the final court 
of appeal.^ In general we may say that the intellectual 
elements still so prominent in the Greek conception 
fall into the background, and are replaced by others 
that are ethical. Sin is guilt rather than corruption, 
and salvation forgiveness rather than change of nature.^ 
Yet for Latin no less than for Greek, the sense of 
Christianity as a distinct historical religion is gone. 
Christ Himself is no longer the Jesus of the Synoptics, 
or even the heavenly man of Paul, with whom we 
become one by faith, but the creator of the church, 
through which alone God is to be approached, and 
which, as we have seen from Augustine's " City of God," 
goes back to the beginning of things. 

It is true that on this common basis we find widely 
different views. Some writers still emphasize the ethical 
elements of Christianity. Others lay chief stress upon 
the sacraments with their mysterious efficacy. To some 
Christianity is a new law ; to others it is a divine life, 
of which man becomes a partaker through ecclesiastical 
mediation. Into the churchly conception, many elements 
of apostolic teaching are taken up, and in forms more 
or less distorted and inadequate, handed down as seeds 
of new life for the future. Add to this the ceaseless 
change which is the accompaniment of all growth, even 
if its subject be the church Catholic, and you find that 
the content of that which men call Christianity varies 

^ This appears notably in connection with the penitential discipline. 
The entire system of indulgences is built upon this conception of the 
church as a legal institution. 

2 Here the influence of Augustine is epoch-making. Cf. Harnack, 
Dogmengeschichte\ Vol. III. p. 183 sq., Eng. tr. V. p. 203. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH * 73 

from age to age. It comes to include submission to 
the pope, pilgrimages, worship of saints, Mariolatry, 
indulgences. It expresses its ideals in the monastery 
and the hermitage. It claims authority, not spiritual 
merely, but temporal, through the pope, Christ's vice- 
gerent on earth. Yet, through all this ceaseless flow 
of change one permanent conception runs. Christianity 
is the absolute religion; unchanging, eternal, to be 
judged by no human standard, to be questioned by men 
at their peril, claiming and exercising through divine 
prerogative an unlimited authority over the hearts, the 
intellects, and the consciences of men. 

At the root of both these conceptions lies a view of 
God as the Absolute which isolates Him from the world, 
as a purely transcendent being, and as such conceives 
Him as raised above the laws of human thought and ex- 
perience, only to be known through the supernatural 
revelation which He has been pleased to impart to His 
church.^ Where this is the case, it is impossible to 
relate Christianity rationally to other forms of human 
thought and life. Between it and all other sides of 
human experience there is a great gulf fixed. ^ 

Fortunately not all who accepted the Catholic theory 
carried it to its logical consequences. Both in the Greek 
church and in the Latin we find men, who, while 
accepting the churchly principle, seek to conceive of 
Christianity in a manner at once more rational and more 
spiritual. Such are Athanasius, Basil, and the Gregories 

1 Harnack, Dogmengeschickte,^ lEL p. 112, note, Eng. tr. V. p. 125 sq.; 
II. p. 116 sq. Eng. tr. III. p. 241. 

* Hence the importance of the mystic type of piety in Catholicism. 



74 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

among the Greeks, and Augustine among the Latins. 
All of these seek to relate Christianity to other forms of 
human experience, and defend its pecuhar doctrines by 
showing their analogy with other and more familiar 
truths.^ Especially significant is the service of Augus- 
tine, who by his emphasis upon the personal religious 
experience recalls many elements in the teaching of the 
great apostle, and proves a fountain of helpful and in- 
spiring influence for the future. 

6. Anticipations of a more Historical View in the 
Middle Ages, 

The view of Christianity which has been described as 
characteristic of Latin Catholicism maintained itself sub- 
stantially unchanged throughout the Middle Ages. We 
search the pages of the great schoolmen in vain for any 
evidence that they apprehended the historical questions 
which engage our present interest. Here and there in 
some obscure corner of a great Summa, we find a remi- 
niscence of an earlier and better view. Thus in the 
midst of St. Thomas' discussion of the divine law, we 
suddenly come upon a modest section in which the 
question is proposed whether the new law (^. e. the 
Christian) is different from the old {i. e, that of Moses), 
and if so, in what respect.^ But such passages are few 
and far between, and the hints which they contain are 
not followed out to any fruitful issue. It is true that 
we find in the same Summa a discussion of the question 

1 Cf . for example, Augustine's discussion of the Trinity. 

2 Summa, Qucestio 107. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 75 

whether there should be but one religion or many, and 
find to our surprise that our author expresses himself as 
of the latter opinion.^ But the surprise vanishes when 
we reahze that the religions of which he speaks are not 
historic faiths, but the various methods or disciphnes 
which have been devised by men for the cultivation of 
the spiritual life. Within the one Catholic church many 
different methods of religious worship and culture may 
find a home, but outside of Catholicism there can be no 
religion.2 

Yet there were not wanting influences even within 
the Middle Ages which tended to prepare the way for 
a more historical conception. First and foremost, 
though only indirect in its influence, was the growing 
spirit of rationalism which was the result of the revived 
interest in letters.^ Add to this the contact with other 

1 QucesU'o 188 : "De differentia religionum." 

2 No doubt in practice many of the mediaeval theologians were better 
than their theory. The Christ whose familiar human features seemed 
lost under the elaborate structure of Catholic dogma found a refuge in 
the devotional literature of the church. In the pages of the great mystics 
of the Middle Ages the historic Jesus still lives, and contemplation of 
His willing sufferings becomes one of the chief means for the cultivation 
and discipline of the spiritual life. If one would grow in Christian 
experience, one must study the Imitation of Christ. But this practical 
recognition of the historic Jesus is not worked out to its theoretical 
consequences, even by the mystics themselves. 

2 This shows itself not merely in such attempts to rationalize the great 
Christian dogmas as we meet with in connection with Anselm's treatment 
of the Being of God and of the Trinity, but also in the recognition of the 
possibility of a natural knowledge of God by reason apart from supernat- 
ural revelation. Here the adoption of the Aristotelian philosophy by the 
church proved momentous. The distinction between articuli puri et mixti, 
while designed to magnify the contrast between reason and revelation, 
was really a recognition of their points of contact, and, in however arti- 
ficial and unhistorical a way, set Christianity against the background of 



76 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

religions, notably with Mohammedanism, brought about 
by the crusades,^ and you have the conditions out of 
which an appreciation of our question, " What is the 
distinctive feature of Christianity as a historic religion?" 
might easily grow. Three distinct types of thought 
make themselves manifest, each of which demands a 
passing reference. There is first the tendency to 
rationalize Christian truth, magnifying the points of 
contact between Christianity and other religions, and 
seeing in the former, after the fashion of the later 
deists, simply a republication or purification of the 
religion of nature. We may take Abelard as representa- 
tive of this type.2 There is, further, the effort to explain 
the superiority of Christianity by pointing to its historic 
place in the religious training of mankind. If we con- 
ceive of revelation, with Lessing, as a divine educa- 
tion of the race, the religion of Israel may be regarded 
as an elementary stage, destined in time to be super- 

an earlier and wider revelation of God, and in so far forth, served to 
prepare the way for a more historical conception. 

On this whole subject, cf. Renter, Geschichte der religiosen Aufkldrung 
im Mittelalter, 2 vols., Berlin, 1875. 

1 Cf. Renter, II. p. 24 sq., and especially p. 31 sq. In Averroeism, the 
church came into contact with a sceptical philosophy of the highest ability 
and attractiveness (cf. Reuter II. p. 49 ; Piinjer, History of the Christian 
Philosophy of Religion, Eng. tr. p. 39 sq.), and the records show that it was 
not without a profound influence both in Christian and Jewish circles 
(Reuter, II. p. 49 ; pp. 136-179). The friendly intercourse between Chris- 
tians and Moslems reached its culmination in the brilliant circles which 
gathered at the court of the second Frederick (1212-50. Cf. Reuter, II. 
p. 253 sq.), and the sceptical spirit which it fostered found its boldest 
expression in the celebrated word, first uttered by Simon of Tournay 
(c. 1200), concerning the three impostors, Moses, Christ, and Mohammed. 

i^ 1079-1142. Cf. Reuter, I. p. 185 sq.; Piinjer, op. cit. p. 36 sq.\ 
Weber, History of Philosophy, p. 222 sq. 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 77 

seded by the more perfect truth of Christianity. This 
view, suggested by the religious discussions wliich grew 
out of contact with Mohammedanism, is represented by 
William of Auvergne.^ Finally, we have the revival of 
the older Origenistic view, according to which all his- 
torical religions are but passing phases, destined in 
time to be outgrown, and Christianity itself, though 
doubtless the highest thus far, is contrasted with the 
perfect and final Gospel still to be revealed. We may 
take Nicholas of Cusa ^ as representative of this view, 
which in the earlier Middle Ages finds fanciful expres- 
sion in the Eternal Gospel of Joachim of Floris 
(died 1202).3 

Abelard's views are set forth, partly in his Introduc- 
tion to Theology, partly in his remarkable Dialogue 
between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian.* In read- 
ing his cool, umimpassioned sentences, with their exalted 
estimate of the Greek philosophy, and their denial of 
any essential novelty in Christianity, we seem to be 
breathing the air of the eighteenth century. So Leibnitz 
might have written, or Rousseau, or one of the English 
deists. As the Old Testament was the divine revela- 
tion to the Jews, so philosophy to the Greeks. If there 
is any historical dependence, it is on the side of the 

1 Bishop of Paris in the first half of the thirteenth century. Died 
1249. Cf. Renter, 11. p. 107 sq. ; Piinjer, p. 42. 

2 1404-1464. Cf. Plinjer, pp. 66-89. 

8 On Joachim cf. Renter, II. p. 191 sq. ; Piinjer, p. 44 sq. 

* Introductio ad Theologiam (Op. ed, Victor Cousin, Vol, II.) ; Petri 
Ahodardi Dialogus inter philosophian, Judceum at Christianum. Cf. also his 
Theologia Christiana. In what follows we confess our indebtedness to the 
admirable discussion of Reuter (I. p. 185 sq. ) where references and quo- 
tations may be found in full. 



78 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

former.^ Prophets and apostles took their teaching 
from the writings of the philosophers, ^ who were them- 
selves inspired of God.^ Whatever is contained in the 
Christian Gospel the Greeks had anticipated; not 
merely the unity of God, but His Trinity.* Even the 
incarnation they had anticipated, foreseeing it in pro- 
phetic vision, as truly as the seers of Israel.^ What, 
then, one might well ask, remained for Christianity? 
Simply this : to spread abroad through humanity at 
large the knowledge which had hitherto been the pos- 
session of the few ; " to popularize what had thus far 
been scientific ; in short, to translate the esoteric doc- 
trines of the schools into language which should be 
simple and intelhgible to common men." ^ This was 
the happy work of the founder of Christianity and His 
disciples. In their teachings we find an authoritative 

1 Keuter, I. p. 186 and references, note 5, " Quem etiam per gentilem 
feminam id est Sibyllam multo apertius quam per omnes prophetas vati- 
cinatum viderint." 

2 Intro, ad Theol. p. 62. " Quis enim nesciat et in Moj'se et in 
prophetarum voluminibus quaedam assumta de gentilium libris." 

3 Intro, p. 22. '* Quam quidem divina inspiratio et per prophetas Judaeis 
et per philosophos gentilibus dignata est revelare." Cf. Weber, History of 
Philosophy, p. 224. " Shall we people hell with men whose lives and 
teachings are truly evangelical and apostolic in their perfection, and differ 
in nothing or in'very little from the Christian religion 1 " 

* Intro, pp. 36-40. Often in the Theologia Christiana. Renter, I. p. 
188, note 14 and references ; "Weber, p. 225. 

s Renter, p. 188 and references. 

6 Reuter, p. 190. " Lediglich die Erweiterung dea Wissenschaftlichen 
zum Popularen, das Umgestalten des bis dahin verhaltnissmassig Esote- 
rischen in das allgemein Verstandliche, die Entschrankung der Kenntniss 
der schon daseienden Wahrheit war die segensreiche That des Stifters 
des Christentums und seiner Apostel." 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 79 

republication of the religion of nature ^ — this and 
nothing more. 

Very different is the view of William of Auvergne.^ 
So far from lowering Christianity to the level of the 
other religions, it is his chief effort to demonstrate its 
superiority over them. His aim is apologetic, and the 
occasion of his treatise, the doubts which the question- 
ings of such men as Abelard and Roger Bacon ^ had 
raised as to the truth and rightful authority of the Chris- 
tian church. These doubts William seeks to resolve, 
not by an a priori construction of the true religion after 
the manner practised somewhat later by Raymond of 
Lully,* but through historical comparison, by showing 
the place held by Christianity among the religions of 
mankind. According to his teaching, all history is a 
divine education of the race, in which one lesson follows 

1 This is also the teaching of the Dialogue. While the Christian claims 
superiority for his religion, this reduces in substance to two points : ( 1 ) 
The purification and reassertion of the natural moral law which had been 
obscured by the external precepts of Judaism. (2) The addition of the 
hope of immortality as a motive influencing men to its fulfilment. (Migne, 
1664). Even the Jew sees in the Mosaic law simply a device to secure the 
more effective fulfilment of the requirements of the law of nature. 
(Migne, 1623). " Etsi concederemus nunc quoque more priorum sancto- 
rum homines salvari posse sola naturalis lege, absque videlicet circum- 
cisione aut caeteris legis scriptae carnalibus observantiis, uon tamen haec 
superflua adjuncta esse concedendum est, sed plurimum utilitatis habere 
ad amplificandam vel tutius muniendam religionem, et' ad malitiam 
amplius reprimendam." 

2 Cf. Renter, II. p. 107 sq., where may be found a full account of 
William's views. 

8 1214-1294. While somewhat later than William, he is mentioned here 
as the foremost representative of the tendency whose effects the former 
combats. On the teachings of Roger Bacon, cf. Renter, II. p. 67 sq. 
where the similarity of his views to those of Abelard is clearly shown. 

* 1234-1315. Cf. Reuter, II. p. 94 sq. 



I 

80 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY \ 

another according to the capacity of the recipient.^ The 
Old Testament is but an elementary book, useful for its 
time, but destined to be outgrown.^ So the very di£S- 
culties which it contains — difficulties which apparently 
in William's time were keenly felt by thoughtful men, 
Jews as well as Christians — are, properly understood, 
evidences of its divine origin.^ Read it for what it is, 
a text-book of elementary morality made up of simple 
precepts to be received upon authority, and its signifi- 
cance as revelation can be defended. Claim for it more 
than this ; seek in it the perfect and final religion, and 
no amount of allegorizing can save it.* 

But what of Islam ? Here is another religion, which 
claims authority, and which, on the face of it, is a more 
dangerous rival than Judaism. William recognizes its 
importance, is even willing to admit the relative truth 

1 Cf. Reuter, II. p. 107 sq. 

2 See his Tractatus de fide et legihus. Renter, 11. p. 332 (xxvi. note 
1), where full quotations are given. " Comparatione timoris qui utique 
puerilis est, et elementarius seu alphabetarins, ut ita dicamus, sapientia, 
ipsa dilectio honorabilis est." 

8 Reuter, II. p. 109. "Man irrt, wenn man meint dass dasjenige, was 
darin Aufgeklarten als anstossig, als Satzung der Willkiihr erscheint, von 
jenem mit gleichen Empfindungen gehort oder gelesen worden ware. . . 
Mag das immerhin ein nicht befriedigendes genannt werden, es war doch 
auf der religionsgeschichtlichen Stufe, welche das alte Volk Israel nach 
Gottes Willen niemals iiberschreiten sollte, ein beziehungsweise genii- 
gendes, ein weit richtigeres als das der neueren Juden, welche, weil sie in 
einer ganz anderen Lage sich befinden, den Werth und die Bestimmnng 
der Gesetze verkennen miissen." 

* Reuter, II. p. 109. " Nichts ware unhistorischer als denselben die 
Ausiibung der allegorischen Interpretation zuzuschreiben. Dass diese 
berechtigt sei, da von ist weder in der Thora eine Spur zu finden, noch in 
den Propheten. Aber auch die Christen haben darauf zu verzichten : sie 
bediirfen einer so gewaltsamen Methode nicht um sich mit dem Alten 
Testamente auseinanderzusetzen." 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 81 

for which it stands.^ But on the whole it is not to 
be seriously considered. It is a retrogression from 
Christianity, and in due time is destined to be super- 
seded and overthrown.2 

With Judaism and Mohammedanism William con- 
trasts Christianity as the perfect and final religion.^ 
Here alone we find realized the two conditions of a 
strictly universal religion ; the permanence which comes 
from simple yet unchanging doctrines, the variety which 
allows the freest play to the changing capacity of the 
individual. In the Catholic church there is room for 
every virtue and for every gift, for the simple believer 
as well as for the most learned sage. Uniting thus in 
itself both progress and permanence, Christianity shows 
itself to be the final religion.* 

1 William recognizes that the conditions in the Byzantine Empire were 
such as to explain the rapid spread of monotheism, even under Moham- 
medan leadership. Keuter, II. p. 110 and references. 

2 Keuter, 11. p. 110. "Aber so gewiss der Islam eine Bedeutung hat, 
so ist diese doch eine voriibergehende. Die spatere Zukunft wird eine 
andere Weltkarte zeigen als die Gegenwart, weissagt der Autor." 

3 Renter, II. p. 109 sq. and notes, p. 333. Christianity is the religion 
in which we see not only the fulfilment of all the Old Testament 
prophecies, but also the completion of ethics by the addition, to the 
original requirements of the natural law, of Christ's new commandment 
of lore. " Evangelica igitur honestas utramque continet, naturalem scili- 
cet, quae est veteris legis moralitas, et gratuitam, quae propria est 
evangelica superadditio et complementum." 

* Renter, II. p. 111. " Die Einheit der Religion und die Mannichfa- 
tigkeit der Individualitaten miissen demnach mit einander ausgeglichen 
werden, was offenbar nur dann geschehen kann, wenn in der Universal- 
religion selbst ein Unwandelbares und ein Wandelbares zugleich darge- 
boten wird. Und das kann, meint Wilhelm von Auvergne, nur das 
katholische Christentum leisten. Die Glaubensartikel desselben sind, 
was Zahl und Formulirung betriff t, Jedem fassbar und doch so beschaffen, 
»dass sie von Jedem auf eigenthiimliche Weise geglaubt werden konnen." 

6 



82 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

With William's positive proof of Christianity we need 
not here concern ourselves. It is unsatisfactory enough. 
When he comes to the crux of his argument, the rational 
considerations upon which he has thus far leaned fail 
him, and he falls back upon supernatural revelation as 
the one sure support of faith. Those only who bow in 
submission before God's authority as revealed in the 
church can know of William's doctrine whether it be 
true.^ 

Both Abelard and William of Auvergne, though 
separated by more than a century, belong to the golden 
age of scholasticism. Nicholas of Cusa,^ whom we have 
chosen as our third representative, marks its close. 
Born at the dawn of the fifteenth century (1401) and 
living into its third quarter (1464), we feel in him the 
stirring of the new day. In his remarkable work, " De 
Pace sive Concordantia Fidei Dialogus," we have an 
anticipation of the Parliament of Religions which is all 
the more extraordinary as coming from one who was him- 
self both a cardinal and a bishop. *' Grieved by the 
horrors which had been practised from religious zeal at 
the taking of Constantinople, a devout man sees himself 
raised in the spirit to the heavenly council, where the 
departed souls, under the presidency of the Almighty, 
resolve upon a union of their religions in order that a 
permanent religious peace may prevail." ^ This union 

1 Renter, II. p. 112, and references. 

2 Cf. Piinjer, op. cit. p. 66 sq. Also F. A. Scharpff, Der Cardinal 
und Bischof Nicolaus von Cusa als Reformator in Kir che, Reich, und Philos- 
ophie des 15ten Jahrhunderts, Tubingen, 1871. 

^ Piinjer, p. 81. It is interesting to notice that the discussion is opened 
by the Word, and that among those who take part are the apostles Peter 



THE ANCIENT CHURCH 83 

is grounded upon the agreement found among them in 
spite of all their differences, and, in order that it may be 
clearly manifested, an intelligent representative of every 
nation is raised to heaven in order to take part in the 
council. The aim of the discussion is determined to 
be ''the reduction of the diversity of the religions to 
the one orthodox faith." Among those who take part 
in this remarkable congress are a Greek, an Italian, an 
Arabian, an Indian, a Chaldean, a Jew, a Scythian, a 
Gaul, a Persian, a Syrian, a Spaniard, a Turk, a German, 
a Tartar, an Armenian, a Bohemian, and an Englishman. 
The doctrines of Christianity are so explained as to 
appear conformable to the principles of universal reason, 
and the longed for agreement is brought about to the 
satisfaction of all. 

It might seem as if in all this we had simply a repeti- 
tion on a larger scale and with modern improvements of 
the principles advocated by Abelard in his earlier 
Dialogue. But Nicholas is not without appreciation of 
the diversities of the religions as well. In his work, 
"De Cribratione Alchoran,"i he distinguishes four 
stages in the development of religion, through which it 
approaches the highest truth. The first and lowest is the 
religion . of nature, which rests " upon the knowledge 
of God which we can obtain by our natural powers." 
This is succeeded by the law and the prophets, the Old 
Testament religion, to which, as a third stage, follows 

and Paul. The former explains the Christological doctrines ; the latter 
expounds justification by faith, and defends the Koman doctrine of the 
sacraments. 

1 Cf . Piinjer, p. 84. The purpose of the book is " to establish the truth 
of Christianity, even out of the Koran." 



84 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the way of grace, which is Christianity. But even this 
is not the final stage of religion, for even the most 
perfect Christian looks for a time when "in complete 
union with God, we shall know Him without mediation, 
entirely as He is, wholly enjoy Him without hmit, and 
find in this enjoyment a happiness which will still all 
our longings forever." ^ In thus contrasting historical 
Christianity, with its churchly mediation, with the 
eternal religion of immediate vision still to be revealed, 
Nicholas returns to a thought already anticipated by 
Origen, and destined to find new expression three 
centuries later in Lessing's " Education of the Human 
Race. " 

1 Piinjer, ibid. 



CHAPTER III 

THE EEFOEMATION 

1. The Revival of the Question, 

The second time that the question as to the nature 
of Christianity was forced upon the church as a whole 
was at the Reformation, in connection with the contro- 
versy with Rome. When the reformers broke with 
what was then historic Christianity, they were forced to 
give a reason for their conduct. The standards which 
had hitherto been accepted without question by every 
one were now subjected to a rigorous scrutiny. And 
for the first time in more than fifteen centuries, over a 
wide area, and with all the zest of a new discovery, 
men asked themselves the question what it meant to be 
a Christian. 

Here again, as in the early days of Christianity, 
the break with the older forms was a gradual one. 
Nothing was further from the mind of Luther and his 
friends than to form a new church. As the apostles 
began as devout Jews, and thought of Christianity first 
as a reformed Judaism, so the reformers had no other 
purpose in view than to bring about a reformed Cathol- 
icism. Their controversy with the older faith was at 
first in matters of detail, and chiefly of a practical 
nature. Only gradually were they made aware, by the 



86 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

slow logic of events, of a difference of principle so 
radical as to demand separate organization and expres- 
sion. The discovery that Protestantism stood for a 
distinct type of the religious life came to them as a 
painful surprise. Yet, however slowly and unwillingly, 
to this conviction they were forced at last. And with 
the knowledge came the necessity for self-examination 
and self-defence. At the basis of all the Protestant 
apologetic in its controversy with Catholicism, as of the 
older Christian apologetic in its debate with Judaism, 
lies the question, What is Christianity ? 

Yet the new situation was not without its distinc- 
tive features. With the reformers, unlike the apos- 
tles, it was not the question of a religion wholly new. 
There was already a religion claiming the name of 
Christian; a religion hoary with age, rich in asso- 
ciations, weighty with traditions, powerful in organiza- 
tion. The task of the reformers, as they conceived it, 
was not to win the right of a new faith side by side 
with the old, but to wrest from the grasp of a mighty 
rival a name falsely usurped and grossly abused. When 
they asked the question, What is Christianity ? they 
were not seeking the marks which separated Christianity 
as one historic religion from others, but a principle by 
which they might distinguish from a historic Chris- 
tianity grown corrupt and false the true Christianity 
which alone was worthy of the name. The different form 
of the question is not without importance. We shall 
realize its significance as we study the answer given by 
Zwingli in his famous tract, " On the Nature of True 
and False Religion." 



THE REFORMATION 87 



2. The Answer of the Reformers Illustrated in the Case 
of ZwingWs Be Vera et Falsa Beligione,^ 

Zwingli has sometimes been praised as the one re- 
former who has forestalled our modern question as to 
the nature of religion. The praise is misplaced. It is 
true that he puts the conception of religion in the fore- 
front of his thinking. But he uses the term in a much 
narrower sense than is customary to-day. ^ Whereas our 
modern students of comparative religion think of a 
universal endowment or capacity of man, a religious 
instinct, of which the several historic religions are more 
or less perfect expressions, to Zwingli, as to Barnabas 
before him, there is but one true religion, which is 
Christianity; all others are false. ^ The questions, 

1 On Zwingli's life cf . Stahelin, Huldreich Zwingli : sein Leben und 
TFVr/ten, 2 vols. 1895, 1897 ; Jackson, Huldreich Zwingli, ^ew York, 1901. 
On his theology, Baur, Zwingli' s Theologie, ihr Werden und ihr 
System, Halle, 1885 (cf. especially II. pp. 785-803, for a summary of 
Zwingli's theological system); Sigwart, Ulrich Zwingli, Stuttgart, 1855, 
Piinjer, History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion, p. 145 sq.; 
Foster, F. H., " Zwingli's theology, philosophy, and ethics," in Jackson's 
life of Zwingli, p. 365 sq. In what follows the references are to the 
complete edition of Zwingli's works by Schuler and Schulthess, Turin, 
1832. 

2 Cf. Baur, ZwinglVs Theologie, I. p. 393. " Wenn nun Zwingli sagt, 
dass von hier ans, namlich dass Gott dem verzweifelnden Menschen bei- 
springt, um ihm zu helfen, die Religion oder Frommigkeit ihren Ur sprung 
genommen habe, so ist klar, dass er, wenn er von Religion iiberhaupt 
redet, nicht nach moderner religions-philosophischer Methode einen 
abstrakten Begriff des religiosen Verhaltnisses aufstellen will, dass er 
vielmehr von der conkreten Thatsache der Gnadenoffenbarung Gottes 
gegen den Menschen ausgeht, um zu seinem Begriff von Religion zu 
gelangen." 

* Yet cf. Baur, I. p. 384, for Zwingli's estimate of God's revelation 
to the Gentiles. He allows them some seeds of truth, though few and 



88 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

What is true religion ? and What is Christianity ? are 
one and the same. When we have found one we have 
found the other. If, then, we would know Zwingli's 
view of the nature of Christianity, we must seek our 
answer in his tract, " On the Nature of True and False 
Religion."! 

Z wingli defines religion as " that system ^ which 
includes the entire piety of Christians, to wit, their 
faith, life, laws, rites, sacraments."^ As true, it is 
derived from the fountain of God's word, and is to be 
distinguished from false religion which is superstition.^ 
Here we note the identification of Christianity with 
true religion to which reference has already been made. 

dark. Those who hare received them have spoiled them through their 
pride. Yet, even were this not the case, it would in no way invalidate 
our contention. It would simply prove that Christianity was, as a matter 
of fact, more wide-spread than some of its adherents have been accustomed 
to conceive. Cf . Piinjer, p. 151 : " The divine revelation is primarily an 
immediate internal illumination by the Holy Spirit of God. This il- 
lumination comes to man in accordance with his nature. . . . On this 
natural illumination is founded the fact that Zwingli is able to recognize 
Christians and believers, even among the heathen, as participating in 
salvation." Also p. 153: " The revelation in the law is therefore in its 
essence quite the same as the universal internal revelation; and it is 
likewise the same as the highest revelation of God in the person of 
Christ." 

1 De vera et falsa religione Commentarius (1625). Opera, ed. Schuler and 
Schulthess, Turin, 1832, Vol. III. p. 145 sq. 

2 " Ratio." Baur translates '* Beziehung," op. cit. I. p. 382. 

8 P. 155. "Nos enim religionem hie accipimus pro ea ratione, quae 
pietatem totam Christianorum, puta fidem, vitam, leges, ritus, sacramenta 
complectitur." 

* P. 155. "Dum autem additione veri et falsi religionem a supersti- 
tione distinguimus, in eum usum fit, ut cum religionem ex veris verbi Dei 
fontibus propinquaverimus, altero veluti poculo superstitionem quoque 
praebeamus." 



ill 



THE REFORMATION 89 

Passing from the name to the reality, he further 
defines true religion as that which cleaves to the one 
true God alone. ^ True piety requires that a man 
should hang upon the lips of the Lord ; ^ false religion 
on the other hand (i, e, Catholicism), is that which 
hears any one else but God. Those who put their trust 
in the creature are not truly pious. To be impious 
means to "receive the word of men as if it were the 
word of God." 3 

Such being the nature of true religion, it is evident 
that it is dateless.* Wherever God speaks and man 
hears, there it is found. As a matter of fact, it began 
in the Garden of Eden, where God first revealed to 
Adam His will and showed him the "unspeakable 
sweetness of the heavenly Father."^ All that the 

1 P. 175. "Vera religio, vel pietas, haec est, quae uni solique Deo 
haeret." 

2 Pp. 175, 176. "Requirit ergo vera pietas, ut ab ore domini pendeat, 
nuUius, praeter sponsi sui, verbum vel audiat vel recipiat." 

^ P. 179. "Falsa religio sive pietas est, ubi alio fiditur quam Deo. . . . 
Impii sunt qui bominis verbum tanquam Dei amplectuntur." 

* Cf. Piinjer, p. 153. "Tbe bigher revelation is distinguished from tbe 
lower only by greater distinctness and certainty." 

^ P. 174. "O miram inedicibilemque coelestis patris suavitatem. 
Eogat ubi sit, qui nisi omnia locaret ubi sunt, nusquam essent ; sed 
propter infelicem hominem interrogat, quo ei culpam suam apertius 
obprobraret : is enim ignorabat ubinam esset. . . . Rogat ergo pater 
coelestis ubinam sit, ut perpetuo memor esset homo quo in loco, in quo 
rerum statu se mitis vocasset Deus. Hinc inquam religio vel potius pietas 
(banc enim inter parentes et liberos, interque Deum et hominem statuunt) 
incunabula coepit. Videbat infelix homo nihil quam iram se comme- 
ruisse : desperat igitur et a Deo f ugit. lam erga impium filium parentis 
pietatem vide ! Accarrit, contumacemque inter temeraria consilia 
opprimit : quod quid est aliud quam pietas erga filium 1 Oritur ergo 
pietas a Deo adeo usque ad hodiernum diem, sed in nostrum usum." 

Cf . the whole passage down to the bottom of p. 175. " Pietas ergo illic 



00 TBE ESSENCE OF CHniSTlANlTY 

subsequent ages have brought of divine grace and 
revelation was already enfolded in that primitive ex- 
perience. True religion, which is Christianity, is as 
old as the creation. 

The similarity to the position of Barnabas is evident. 
The distinction between Judaism and Christianity falls 
to the ground. All that is essential in religion was 
revealed to the Old Testament saints.^ What, then, is 
the need and significance of Christ? 

Zwingli is not without appreciation of the force of 
this question. He follows his section on religion with 
another on Christianity, in which he tries to answer the 
objection that his view of the nature of religion " anni- 
hilates " Christ, and reduces Christianity to a bare 
Jewish monotheism. 2 To this he answers that such an 
objection betrays shocking ignorance as to the nature of 
God, who, whether He be called Father, Son, or Spirit, 

certo esse cognoscitur, ubi studiura est jaxta voluntatem Dei vivendi : 
nam istud absoluta quoque pietas inter parentes ac liberos requirit, ut 
filius asque studeat patri obsequi ac pater prodesse. Iterum, germana 
pietas istic solummodo nascitur, ubi homo non modo deesse sibi multa 
putat, sed adesse penitus nihil videt quo placere deo possit ; contra vero 
creatori patrique suo sic omnia exuberare, ut nemo quicquam apud ilium 
desiderare possit, liberalitatem vero ac erga hominum genus amorem 
tantum, ut nihil cuiquam negari possit. Quod sic testimoniis Scripturae 
firmari potest, ut omnis doctrina tam vetus, quam nova, omnes pli, aliud 
nihil canant, quam nobis nihil adesse, Deo nihil deesse, ab illo nihil 
negari." 

1 P. 187. "Enit ludaeorum synagoga longo tempore fecunda, prius- 
quam Christus carne indueretur; postea vero quam tempus per Deum 
praestitutum iam impletum esset, coepit synagoga sterilescere, et iuven- 
cula ex Gentibus ecclesia, fecunda fieri." 

2 P. 179. " Omnem enim doctrinam nostram ad hoc tendere, ut 
Christum exterminemus, et ludaeorum more, ut unum Deum credimus, 
sic unam solummodo personam omnes ad credendam inducamus.** 



THE REFORMATION 91 

is still but one God.^ If Christ be God, He was present 
in the old dispensation as well as in the new, and 
His presence makes Old Testament as well as New, 
Christian. 

But what is the significance of the historic Christ? Is 
he simply a teacher, reinforcing lessons which had been 
misunderstood or forgotten? Natural as this might 
seem, it is not Zwingli's view. Christ is much more 
than a teacher. He is "the assurance and pledge of 
God's grace " ; ^ the one through whom, as the second 
Adam,^ the atoning Saviour,* our fallen nature is per- 
fectly restored,^ and the ideal of filial dependence upon 
God, already clearly revealed in the Old Testament, but 
imperfectly attained because of sin, is at length fully 
realized.^ Here we find Zwingli, in common with the 
reformers generally, reviving the forgotten connection 

^ Pp. 179, 180. "Nos enim sic Deum agnoscendum amplectendumqne 
docemus, ut sive patrern eum nomines, sive filiurn, sive spiritum sanctum, 
perpetuo tamen eum intelligas qui solus bonus, iustus, sanctus, benignus, 
reliquaque omnia est. . . . Quod igitur aemuli hie dicturi sunt, nos 
hactenus de pietate sic disseruisse, ut salutis per Christum gratiaeque 
nihil meminerimus, frustra cornicabuntur : primum quod omnia non 
simul neque eodem loco dici possunt ; deinde, quod quicquid de animae 
Deique connubio diximus, sic de Christo quoque dictum est, quomodo de 
Deo (Christus enim Deus et homo est) ; postremo quod Dei cognitio natura 
sua Christi cognitionem antecedit." 

2 P. 180. " Est igitur Christus certitude et pignus gratiae Dei." 

3 P. 186, line 23. " Adam posterior." 

* P. 191, line 21. " Redemptionis precium." 

5 Cf. p. 189 sq. for Zwingli's doctrine of the humanity of Christ. 

^ P. 192, " Ridiculum enim fuisset, si is, cui omnia, quae unquam futura 
sunt praesentia perspiciuntur, tanto precio constituisset hominem liberare, 
quam mox ac liberatus esset, passurus fuisset pristinis in vitiis sordescere. 
Annunciat ergo cum primis vitam et mores immutandos esse: Christi- 
anum enim esse nihil est aliud quam noYum hominem novamque creaturam. 



92 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

between the saving power of Christianity and the person 
of its founder. With the writer to the Hebrews he 
sees in Christ the perfect realization of the religious 
ideal ; with Paul, the one who has the power to realize 
it in others. Both together constitute Him the unique 
Saviour. It is singular that so high an estimate of the 
significance of the historic Christ should not have led 
Zwingli to a juster appreciation of the originality of the 
religion to which He gave His name. But in this 
failure, as we shall see, he does stand not alone. ^ 

If we compare Zwingli's answer with that of the 
Catholic church, the points of similarity are obvious. 
Christianity is the absolute religion, and as such eter- 
nal, unchanging. The distinction between Judaism 
and Christianity, so clearly recognized by Paul and the 
writer to the Hebrews, is minimized, if not altogether 
overlooked. In the estimate of Zwingli, there is no 
room within the compass of true religion for differences 
of kind. Religion is either true or false, and, so far as 
true, all religion is the same. Christ was with Adam 
in Eden as truly as with Paul on the Damascus road. 
The sense of novelty, of strangeness, of great new 
truths surpassing in richness all that had gone before ; 
the idea so prominent in the thought of the great apos- 
tle, of mysteries revealed which had been hid from the 
foundation of the world, — all this has vanished. Christ 

1 On the different tendencies in Zwingli's theology, cf. Piinjer, p. 154. 
He contrasts the philosopher and the ecclesiastical theologian, of whom 
the former " sees in Christ only the historical embodiment and the 
personal representation of a universal process, while the latter strives to 
apprehend the person of Christ as of unique and peculiar significance 
in universal history." 



THE REFORMATION 93 

does indeed a work without a parallel, but He is in no 
sense the founder of a new religion. In short the sense 
of Christianity as a historic religion is lacking. From 
this point of view we should have to class Zwingli — 
and in this he is typical of all the reformers — with 
Barnabas rather than with Paul. In his conception of 
Christianity as the absolute religion he is a true son of 
the Catholic church. 

Yet this is only half the truth. The essence of the 
Catholic claim was the denial that Christianity could be 
judged by any human standard. Whatever the church 
taught as Christian, that must be accepted without 
question. Such a position, in view of the complexity 
and variety of ecclesiastical tradition, made any con- 
sistent definition impossible. Under the same name 
found shelter a wide confusion of fluctuating and in- 
consistent ideas and practices, whose only bond of 
union was the fact that they had all alike received the 
sanction, and were all alike embraced within the pale 
of the one Catholic and Apostolic church. In place 
of this indefiniteness, Zwingli puts a single principle, 
clear, definite, consistent. Christianity is the religion 
of filial dependence upon God, revealed in the Scrip- 
tures, realized through Christ. No one has a right to 
the name who does not partake of the experience. 
Whatever may be lacking in this conception, it at least 
betrays a clear apprehension of the problem. It estab- 
lishes a rational test which may serve as a court of 
appeal when differences arise. It gives us a definition 
worthy of the name. 



94 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 



3. The Conception of Christianity in Early Protestant 
Theology. ^ 

The tendency to identify Christianity as such with 
all true religion, and to overlook differences of growth 
or of degree is characteristic of the Protestant reformers 
as a class. It appears both in the Lutheran and in the 
Reformed branch of the church. In spite of differences 
in detail growing out of the theological point of view, 
and the greater or less influence exerted upon the treat- 
ment by exegetical considerations, we find substantial 
agreement in the opinion that Christianity and the 
religion of the Old Testament are in essentials one and 
the same. We may illustrate this in the case of Luther, 
of Melanchthon, and of Calvin.^ 

Luther is emphatic in his recognition of a Christianity 
before Christ.^ Kdstlin declares that "it is very diffi- 

1 On the Protestant conception in general, cf. Harnack, Das Wesen 
des Christentums, p. 167 sg.^ng. tr. p. 268 sq, ; Dogmengeschichte, III. 
p. 691 sq. Eng.tr. VII. p. 168 sg. ; Kaftan, Wesen des Christentums, p. 359 
sq. ; Dogmatik, p. 70 sq. ; Sabatier, Philosophie de la Religion, p. 243 sq. 

Beside the works specially referred to below, the reader may compare 
Dorner, Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie (Miinchen, 1867); Gass, 
Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik (Berlin, 1854), 4 vols. ; Heppe, 
Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im sechzehnten Jahrkundert (Gotha, 
1857), 3 vols. ; Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche (Elberfeld, 
1861); Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche 
(Zurich, 1844), 2 vols. ; Die protestantische Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwick- 
lung innerhalb der reformirten Kirche (Ziirich, 1854), 2 vols. 

2 While no one of the three discusses the subject in any one place with 
the same fulness as Zwingli, their views may be learned with sufficient 
clearness in connection with their treatment of such questions as the 
relation between the two Testaments, the law and the Gospel, etc. 

2 On Luther's theology, cf. Kostlin, Luthers Theologie in ihrer 



THE REFORMATION 95 

cult to draw any sharp line of distinction (in his writ- 
ings) between the condition of those who were saved 
under the new dispensation and that which was possible 
under the old."^ Forgiveness of sins through Christ 
was as efficacious before His death as after it. Justifi- 
cation by faith was an experience common in Old 
Testament times. ^ Not only do we find general proc- 
lamations of grace, but specific prophecies of salvation 
through the incarnation and atonement, " and that not 
in figures but in definite intelligible words." ^ Even 

geschichtlichen EntwicJclung und ihrem inneren Zusammenhange (2d ed. 
Stuttgart, 1883, 2 vols.; Eng. tr. by Hay, Philadelphia, 1897), especially 
the chapter on the relation between the Old and the New Testament 
revelation of salvation (Vol. II. p. 376 sq. ; Eng. tr. 11. p. 359 sq.). The 
following account is largely based upon Kostlin. 

1 II. p. 376, Eng. tr. II. p. 359. " Es ist in der That sehr schwer, 
den Unterschied zwischen dem neutestamentlichen und dem schon vorher 
moglichen Heilstande bei Luther scharf zu fixiren." 

2 Commentary on Galatians j^op. exeg. II. p. 11], Eng. tr. (London, 
1830), p. 242. " So we also which are justified by faith, as were the 
patriarchs, prophets, and all the saints, are not of the works of the law, 
as concerning justification." Cf. p. 210 []op. ex. I. p. 352]]. " Hereof 
it foUoweth that the blessing and faith of Abraham is the same that ours 
is ; that Abraham's Christ is our Christ ; that Christ died as well for the 
sins of Abraham as for us." 

» Kostlin, IL p. 377, Eng. tr. IL p. 360. "Undauch innerhalb der 
Menschheit wird dort nicht bloss Gnade im Allgemeinen verkiindigt, 
sondern bestimmt die Gnade in die Person des kiinftig menschwerdenden, 
sich opfernden Sohnes, und so nicht etwa bloss in Figuren, sondern in 
ausdriicklichen, dem Verstandniss zuganglichen Worten." For specific 
references see Erlangen ed. XVI. 216; op. exeg. I. 241, 249; III. 67 sq. ; 
XL 112. The only difference was that the fathers looked forward to a 
Christ in the future, while we look back upon one already come. Cf. 
Commentary on Galatians Qop. exeg. II. p. 35]], Eng. tr. p. 256. " For 
this knowledge and benefit of Christ to come the saints of the Old 
Testament rejoiced more than we now do when He is so comfortably 
revealed and exhibited unto us." 



96 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the Trinity was revealed to the patriarchs. ^ Moreover, 
as the New Testament had its sacraments of baptism 
and the Lord's Supper, so the old dispensation its 
outward signs of grace in sacrifice and circumcision. 
The last, which corresponds to baptism, was an effec- 
tive means of grace, even little children receiving the 
grace of faith through it.'^^ Even in Paradise we find 
all the essentials of a true church, "" regenerated by the 
Word, and preserved through faith in Christ."^ 

In answer to the question. What is new in the new 
covenant, Luther replies as follows. In the first place, 
there is the free proclamation of the Gospel to all man- 
kind.'^ What under the old dispensation was confined 
to Israel is now freely offered to the Gentiles as well. 
In the second place, there is a clearer revelation of 
truth. Not, indeed, in the sense of the addition of new 
articles, but of the clearer apprehension of those already 
made known. Thus the prophets and patriarchs under- 
stood the Trinity, but the common people did not grasp 
it. And there were truths, such as the supernatural 
conception, which even the prophets themselves did not 
fully understand. Still further, in the Gospel we find 
not merely a general but a specific offer of grace to 
each individual. Thus the possibility of individual 
assurance is greatly increased, and new treasures of 

1 Kostlin, II. p. 378, Eng. tr. II. p. 361, and references (op. ex. I. 
285; V. 51; XI. 112). 

2 Kostlin, II, p. 378, Eng. tr. II. p. 361, and references (op. ex. I. 
315; II. 78 sq.; IV. 75-84). Such a sacramental sign was the rainbow. 

3 Quoted by Kostlin, II. p. 378, Eng. tr. II. p. 362, " haec fuit prima 
ecclesia per verbum regenerata et fide in Christum servata." 

* Kostlin, II. p. 379, Eng. tr. II. p. 362. 



THE REFORMATION 97 

comfort and peace opened to the Christian believer. ^ 
Finally, in the New Testament the blessings are purely 
spiritual. The temporal blessings which God for a time 
vouchsafed to the Old Testament saints are no longer 
needed for us. We live in a kingdom of freedom, and 
are released from all external precept and constraint. 2 
To sum up, in the new covenant we have the full 
realization of the ideal already revealed in the old. 

A like view meets us in Melanchthon. ^ In his 
" Loci Communes " he declares that it is a great mistake 
to distinguish law and Gospel as though the first was 
confined to the Old Testament, while the second was 
peculiar to the New. The truth is that as the law is 
repeated in the New Testament, so the Gospel is antici- 
pated in the Old. There is only one method of salvation, 
namely, the evangelical way of justification by faith, in 
which the fathers of the Old Testament shared as well 
as the saints of the New.* The promise began with 

1 Kostlin, II. p. 379, Eng. tr. II. p. 362, and references (op. ex. XL 
141 ; Erlangen ed. VI. 225 sq. ; op. ex. I. 245 sq. ; Erlangen ed. XL VI. 
269 ; op. ex. IIL 217 sq. ; XL 135 sq. 293). Cf. also VoL I. p. 227. 

2 Kostlin, II. p. 380, Eng. tr. II. p. 363, and references (op. ex. XL 
141 ; IIL 56 ; Erlangen ed. XVIIL 233 sq. ; XIL 49). 

3 See the Loci Communes, ed. Kolde, 2d ed. Erlangen, 1890, 
especially p. 145 sq. "De Evangelio." On Melanchthon's theology, cf. 
Herrlinger, Theologie Melanchthons (Gotha, 1879), especially p. 444 sq. 
where he speaks of Melanchthon's views of church history. We note 
that to Melanchthon, as to Augustine and to Luther, the church was 
founded in Paradise (p. 447 and references). 

* P. 146. " Neque vero ita legem et evangelium tradidit Scriptura, ut 
evangelium id modo putes, quod scripserunt Matthaeus, Marcus, Lucas et 
Johannes, Mosi libros nihil nisi legem ; sed sparsa est evangelii ratio, 
sparsae sunt promissiones in omnes libros veteris ac novi Testamenti. 
Rursum leges etiam sparsae sunt in omnia tum veteris turn novi Testa- 
menti volumina. Nee, ut vulgo putunt, discriminata sunt legis et 

. 7 



98 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Adam at the very dawn of history, and grew more and 
more clear as time went on.^ Where, asks Melanch- 
thon, will you find a clearer statement of the Gospel 
than in Deut. v. 10? 2 

Yet, in spite of their similarity, there is a twofold 
difference between the Testaments. In the first place, 
the promises of the old covenant have to do chiefly 
with external blessings, whereas the new includes "all 
good things."^ In the second place, the Old Testament 
promises are conditioned upon fulfilment of the law, 
while under the New, Christians are free from its exac- 
tions.* Yet the latter difference is only in appearance, 
for Melanchthon makes haste to add that so far as men 
were really justified under the old covenant it was in 
the same way as later believers under the new.^ Thus 

evangelii tempora, qnanquam alias lex, alias evangelium subinde aliter 
revelata sunt, Omne tempus, quod ad mentes nostras attinet, est legis 
atque evangelii tempus. Sicut omnibus temporibus eodem modo homines 
justificati sunt, peccatum per legem ostensum est, gratia per promissionem 
seu evangelium." 

1 P. 147. " Ea prima promissio est, primum evangelium, quo snb- 
levatus Adam concepit certam suae salutis spem adeoque et justificatus 
est." See also above, "qui obscure primum, postea subinde clarius 
revelatus est." 

2 P, 149. " Quid enim magis evangelicum reperias, qnam promissio 
ilia est, qnam spiritus Dei . . . subjecit : Paciens misericordiam, etc." 

3 P. 211 sq. Ego vetus Testamentum voco promissionem rerura cor- 
poralium. . . . Contra novum Testamentum non aliud est, nisi bonorum 
omnium promissio. 

•* Ibid. " Conjunctam cum exactione legis . . . promissio citra legem, 
nuUo justitiarum nostrarum respectu." 

s P. 216. "Ad eum modum fuerunt libri etiam patres ante Christi in- 
carnationem, quotquot spiritum Christi habuere." Cf. Apol. p. 128, 
" Patres . . . gratuitam misericordiam et remissionem peccatorum fide 
accipiebant, sicuti sancti in novo testamento." (Quoted by Heppe, Dog- 
matik des deutschen Protestantismus, II. p. 251). 



Ill 



THE REFORMATION 99 

the great significance of the historic Christ is not so 
much that He brings new blessings as that in Him we 
have the pledge of the fulfilment of all the promises 
already made by God to the men of old.^ 

In later Lutheran dogmatics, ^ the identity of the 
Old and the New Testaments is emphasized to an even 
greater degree. Thus John Gerhard in his "Loci"^ 
declares that "from the time when through the Son of 
God the Gospel promise was first made known in Para- 
dise, the voice of the Gospel has been ever sounding 
in the church through patriarchs and prophets."* 
" Whatsoever prophecies we find in the Old Testament 
concerning the person, office, passion, and resurrection 
of Christ are nothing else than repetitions and declara- 
tions of that first discourse revealed by the Son of God 
in Paradise."^ Nor has anything been added by the 

1 P. 147. " Porro illarum promissionum onmium pignus est Christus, 
quare in eum referendae sunt omnes scripturae promissiones." 

2 On Lutheran dogmatics, cf. Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschen Pro- 
testantismus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert, especially Locus xiv., " De Verbo 
Dei sen de Lege et Evangelio " (II, p. 225 sq.) . Schmid H., Die Dogmatik 
der ev. luth. Kirche, 7th. ed. Giitersloh, especially p. 5 sq. ("De religione"), 
p. 373 ("Lex et evangelium") ; Hase, Hutterus redivivus ; Luthardt, Kom- 
pendium der Dogmatik. 

3 Loci Theologici (in 9 vols, finished 1622). The quotations which 
follow are from the Berlin edition of 186.5. On Gerhard, see Kunze in 
Herzog, Real Encyklopddie,^ V. p. 91 sq., also Troeltsch, Vernunft und 
Offenharung hei Johann Gerhard und Melanchthon, Gottingen, 1891. 

* § 35 (III. p. 158). "Ex eo tempore quo per Pilium Dei prima 
promissio evangelica in paradiso manif esta est, semper sonuit vox evangelii 
in ecclesia per patriarchas ac prophetas repetita ac declarata, proinda 
unum et idem est evangelium, quod non in N demum T natum vel editum, 
sed jam inde a primis lapsi generis humani temporibus promulgatum, pro 
gratia Dei, remissio peccatorum et salus una atque eadem omnibus 
Sanctis annunciata ac oblata fuit." See also § 34. 

5 Ibid. " Quaecunque enim in Scriptis V. T. de persona, officio, 



LgFC. 



100 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

New Testament. Against Bellarmine, Gerhard expressly 
denies that Christ has added anything to the older reve- 
lation either along the lines of law or Gospel. The 
apparent difference between the promises of the two 
Testaments is explained by the figurative language of 
the former and the ambiguity of the terms used,^ and 
to the question whether as mediator (i. e. in his incar- 
nate life) Christ has added any new precept to the 
natural law inscribed upon the mind of man, is answered 
roundly in the negative. ^ 

An excellent statement of the Reformed position ^ is 
to be found in Calvin's " Institutes." * While in general 
agreeing with the view already described, the French 
reformer shows a much clearer sense of the originality 
of Christianity as a historical religion than either 

passione, resurrectione aliisque operibus ac beneficiis Messiae vaticinia 
extant nihil aliud sunt, quam primae illius evangelicae concionis per Filium 
Dei in Paradiso revelatae illustriores repetitiones et declarationes." 

Cf. Brenz in Cat. illus. pp. 17, 18 : *'Haec religio non est recens inventa 
aut de horainibus excogitata et instituta ; sed est statim ab initio huius 
mundi in Paradiso a Deo ipso praedicata et commendata " (quoted in 
Heppe, II. p. 253). Among the arguments for the truth of the Christian 
religion Calov (I, p. 152, quoted by Schmid, p. 6) includes the fact that it 
is not new (non nova est). 

1 § 60, p. 169. 

2 § 66, p. 173. *' Respondemus I. Christus est unus cum Patre et 
Spiritu Sancto Deus, qui legem moralem hominum mentibus insculpsit 
eamque solenniter in Monte Sinai repetivit, quo sensu legislatorera dici 
posse non negamus ; queritur autem hoc loco, an Christus ut mediator 
ideo in mundum venerit, ut novas leges promulgaret 1 quod negamus." 

3 On the view of Christianity in the Reformed Dogmatics, see Heppe, 
Dogmatih der evang. reformh'ten Kirche, Locus xvi. " De foedere gratiae " ; 
Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre der evang. reformirten Kirche, § 71 (II. p. 
106 sq.). 

* The quotations which follow are taken from the translation of the 
Calvin translation society (Edinburgh, 1845). 



THE REFORMATION 101 

Luther or Melanchthon. This is shown at the very 
outset by his definition of the Gospel. "By the 
Gospel," he says, "I understand the clear manifesta- 
tion of the mystery of Christ."^ "I confess, indeed," 
he goes on to add, " that inasmuch as the term Gospel 
is applied by Paul to the doctrine of faith, it includes 
all the promises by which God reconciles men to him- 
self and which occur throughout the law. For Paul 
there opposes faith to those terrors which vex and tor- 
ment the conscience when salvation is sought by means 
of works. Hence it follows, that Gospel, taken in a 
large sense, comprehends the evidences of mercy and 
paternal favor which God bestowed upon the patriarchs. 
Still, by way of excellence, it is applied to the promul- 
gation of the grace manifested in Christ." The Gospel, 
then, has the distinction of being " a new and extraor- 
dinary kind of embassy, by which God fulfilled what He 
had promised, these promises being realized in the per- 
son of His Son. For though believers have at all times 
experienced the truth of Paul's declaration, that 'all the 
promises of God in Him are yea and Amen, ' inasmuch 
as these promises were sealed upon their hearts; yet 
because He hath in His flesh completed all the parts of 
our salvation, this vivid manifestation of realities was 
justly entitled to this new and special distinction. "^ 

Thus Calvin distinguishes the Gospel not merely 
from the law but from earlier gracious revelations of 
God within the Old Testament. Yet he hastens to 
qualify this distinction on the right hand and the left. 
In the first place we must be on our guard against 

1 Bk. II. ix. 2 (I. p. 494). 2 jbid, (p. 495). 



102 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Servetus' error that in Christ "all the promises have 
been fulfilled." Though Christ has "not left any part 
of our salvation incomplete, " it does not follow that " we 
are now put in possession of all the blessings purchased 
by Him."i On the other hand, we must not imagine 
that the Gospel has succeeded the law " in such a sense 
as to introduce a different method of salvation. It 
rather confirms the law and proves that everything 
which it promised is fulfilled. What was shadow, it 
has made substance. When Christ says that the law 
and the prophets were until John, he does not consign 
the fathers to the curse, which, as the slaves of the 
law, they could not escape. He intimates that they 
were only imbued with the rudiments, and remained 
far below the height of the Gospel doctrine. . . . 
Hence we infer, that when the whole law is spoken of, 
the Gospel differs from it only in respect of clearness of 
manifestation. "2 

This general discussion of the Gospel is followed by 
two chapters which treat in considerable detail of the 
resemblances between the Old Testament and the New, 
and their differences. Against Servetus and the Ana- 
baptists, who " think of the people of Israel just as they 
would do of some herd of swine, absurdly imagining 
that the Lord gorged them with temporal blessings 
here, and gave them no hope of a blessed immortality," 
it is to be maintained "that all whom, from the be- 
ginning of the world, God adopted as His peculiar 
people, were taken into covenant with Him on the same 

1 Op. cit. Bk. II. ix. 3 (I. p. 495). 

2 Bk. U. ix. 4(1. p.497). 



THE REFORMATION 103 

conditions and under the same bond of doctrine as 
ourselves."^ 

We have to do, then, with two covenants, the same 
in "reality and substance," but differing in administra- 
tion. ^ They agree first, in the common hope of immor- 
tality ; ^ secondly, in being established by the mercy of 
God;* thirdly, in that "they both had and knew Christ 
the Mediator, by whom they were united to God and made 
capable of receiving His promises."^ They differ first, 
in that, in the old covenant, the heavenly inheritance 
is exhibited under the form of temporal blessings, which 
is not the case in the new ; ^ secondly, in that the Old 
Testament typified Christ under ceremonies which 
exhibited "only the image of truth," the shadow, not 
the substance; whereas the New Testament gives us 

1 Op. cit. Bk. 11. X. 1 (I. p. 501). 

2 Ihid. Bk. II. X. 2 ; xi. 1 (I. pp. 502, 526). 

3 Ihid. Bk. II. X. 2 (I. p. 502). " That temporal opulence and felicity 
was not the goal to which the Jews were invited to aspire, but that they 
were admitted to the hope of immortality, and that assurance of this 
adoption was given by immediate communications, by the law and by 
the prophets." Calvin goes at length into the proof of this point, devot- 
ing to it pp. 502-522. 

* P. 502. " That the covenant by which they were reconciled to the 
Lord was founded on no merits of their own, but solely by the mercy of 
God, who called them." 

^ P. 502, This point, as well as the preceding, seems to Calvin so 
much clearer and less controverted than the first that he dismisses it very 
briefly. Cf. p. 522 sq. 

« Bk. II. xi. 1 (I. p. 526). " The first difference then is, that though, 
in old time, the Lord was pleased to direct the thoughts of His people, 
and raise their minds to the heavenly inheritance, yet, that the hope of it 
might be the better maintained. He held it forth, and, in a manner, gave 
a foretaste of it under earthly blessings, whereas the gift of future life, 
now more clearly and lucidly revealed by the Gospel, leads our minds 
directly to meditate upon it, the inferior mode of exercise formerly era- 
ployed in regard to the Jews being now laid aside." 



104 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

"both the full truth and the entire body";^ thirdly, 
in that the Old Testament is literal, the New spiritual ; ^ 
fourthly, in that the Old Testament is one of bondage, 
the New of liberty,^ and finally, in that the Old is for 
one people only, while the New is for all.* 

As to the objection that the immutability of God 
precludes such differences, he answers that God " adapts 
different forms to different ages, as He knows to be ex- 
pedient to each."^ Asked why God did not give all 
He had to give at first, he replies that this is a matter 
which concerns God's sovereignty, into which it is 
presumptuous for us to inquire.^ 

Comparing the Lutheran and the Keformed posi- 
tions, we find that, while in the main they agree, the 

1 Op. cit. Bk. IL xi. 4 (I. p. 529). 2 Bk. II. xi. 7 (I. p. 533). 

3 Bk. IL xi. 9 (I. p. 535). * Bk. II. xi. 11 (I. p. 537). 

5 Bk. II. xi. 13 (I. p. 540). "If the husbandman prescribes one set 
of duties to his household in winter, and another in summer, we do not 
therefore charge him with fickleness, or think he deviates from the rules 
of good husbandry, which depends on the regular course of nature. . . . 
Why, then, do we charge God with inconstancy when He makes fit and 
congruous arrangements for diversities of times 1 . . . Paul likens the 
Jews to children, and the Christians to grown men (Gal. iv. 1). "What 
irregularity is there in the divine arrangement which confined them to 
the rudiments which were suitable to their age, and trains us by a firmer 
and more manly discipline. The constancy of God is conspicuous in this, 
that He delivered the same doctrine to all ages, and persists in requiring 
that worship of His name which He commanded at the beginning. His 
changing the external form and manner does not show that He is liable to 
change. In so far He has only accommodated Himself to the mutable and 
diversified capacities of men." 

6 Bk. II. xi. 14 (I. p. 541 sg.) : " Who, I ask, can deny the right of 
God to have the free and uncontrolled disposal of His gifts, to select the 
nations which He may be pleased to illuminate, the places which He may be 
pleased to illustrate by the preaching of His word, and the mode and 
measure of progress and success which He may be pleased to give to His 
doctrine 1 " 



THE REFORMATION 105 

latter has a much clearer recognition of the distinctive 
features of Christianity as a historical religion. In 
Calvin's case, this was no doubt due to his conscien- 
tious exegesis, which more than once led him to take 
positions which played havoc with the consistency of 
his system. But quite apart from this, it is in keeping 
with the Reformed principles, which distinguish sharply 
between God and man, and hence gain room for a freer 
recognition of the human element in religion than is 
possible in Lutheranism. As it is characteristic of the 
Reformed doctrine that it makes more earnest with 
the humanity of Christ than is often the case with the 
Lutheran theology,^ so, in like manner, in their treat- 
ment of the history of redemption. Reformed theolo- 
gians have shown a keener appreciation for the varieties 
which have characterized God's dealing with men, than 
has been the case with their brethren of a sister church. ^ 
A familiar illustration of this is to be found in the 
federal theology of Coccejus, in which we have an 
honest, even if not over-successful, attempt to conceive 
the Biblical history as a series of ascending stages of 
divine revelation. ^ 

1 Compare the chapter in the Westminster Confession (viii.), " Of Christ 
the Mediator," with the treatment of the same subject in the formula of 
Concord (viii.). An excellent illustration of the scholasticism in which 
the later Lutheran theology abounds is afforded by the tract of Martin 
Chemnitz on the incarnation {De incarnatione Filii Dei, Berlin, 1865). 

2 For the proof in detail, the reader is referred to the works of Schweizer 
and Heppe, already referred to. 

2 See his Summa Doctrinae de Foedere et Testamento Dei (Opera, 
Vol. VII.). He distinguishes two covenants, one of works, and one of grace, 
and then traces the various steps through which the former has been 
abrogated : 1, by the sin of man; 2, by the covenant of grace ; 3, by the 
promulgation of the New Testament ; 4, by the death of Christ ; and 



106 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Yet when all is said, it remains true that the Cal- 
vinist, as little as the Lutheran, attained to what is 
worthy to be called a truly historical conception of 
Christianity. In the one case as in the other, the point 
of departure is speculative and a priori. The idea of 
the true religion is constructed from Scripture, reason, 
and present experience, and then is carried back in 
principle to the beginning of time.^ 

finally, 5, by His resurrection. In his larger Summa Theologiae, he traces 
the unfolding of the covenant of grace through three great historic stages 
— t. e,, the patriarchal period before the law {ante legem); the legal 
period, or the Old Testament proper {sub lege) ; and the period of the 
Gospel, the New Testament {post legem or sub evangelio). Each of these 
had its peculiar sacraments, through which the grace of God was exhibited. 
Cf. Schweizer, I. p. 103 sg. 

In its later form the covenant theology lost its original historical signifi- 
cance, and became involved in scholastic distinctions. Cf. the discussion 
of the subject in Turret tine's /nsi^e^M^zo (New York, 1847) II. p. 151 sq. " De 
Foedere gratiae et duplici ejusoeconomia in Veteri et Novo Testament©." 
Turrettine's chief concern is to maintain the substantial unity of the 
covenant of grace under both dispensations, against the various heretics 
{{. e. Socinians, Remonstrants, Anabaptists), who sought unduly to 
magnify the differences. Cf. especially Quaestio 5. 

i Schweizer {op. cit. 11. p. 114) considers this ideal construction of 
religion, as distinct from a merely empirical treatment, one of the great 
merits of the Reformed theology. It is impossible, he tells us, to exhibit 
the universal character of Christianity more convincingly than when it is 
conceived as entering the world immediately after the first sin. He 
criticizes Schleiermacher for distinguishing so sharply as he does between 
Christianity and Judaism (cf. I. p. 95. " Dieses Ausgehen vom em- 
pirisch Geschichtlichen ist das Unreformirte bei Schleiermacher '' ). 

No doubt there is a measure of truth in this view. We may admit 
that it is diflScult to conceive of an absolute religion which is not present, 
in germ, at least, from the beginning. But unfortunately the conception, 
which for us resolves the difficulty, had not yet dawned on the horizon of 
the reformers' thought. Not till man had grasped the idea of progress 
through development was it possible to conceive of a religion which 
should be at once historically new, and at the same time as old as the 
creation. 



THE REFORMATION 107 

An instructive illustration of the unhistorical view of 
the later Protestantism is to be found in the Westmin- 
ster doctrine of the covenants.^ The Confession fol- 
lows Paul in distinguishing two great stages or types 
of religion, the legal and the gracious, both divinely 
given, but in purpose and effect sharply contrasted. 
But instead of making the contrast, as does Paul, be- 
tween Adam as the representative of the former class 
and Christ as the representative of the latter, the line 
is drawn between Adam as under the covenant of law, 
and Adam as under the covenant of grace. The entire 
drama of redemption plays itself out within the lifetime 
of the father of humanity. Eden anticipates Nazareth 
and Calvary. Thus it comes to pass that instead of see- 
ing in the religion of Israel, with Paul, a legal institu- 
tion whose purpose is mainly negative, or even a partial 
provision needing later supplement, as does the writer 
to the Hebrews, the Westminster divines see in it a 
gracious economy differing only in unessentials from 
the Gospel of Christ. It is the same covenant which 
runs through Old and New Testaments alike, however 
differently administered. ^ What the new dispensation 

1 An adequate account of the origin and history of the covenant 
theology is still a desideratum in theological literature. It is a character- 
istic feature of the early English Puritanism, appearing in the writings of 
Cartwright, Ball, and Ames in England, as well as of Rollock and Howie 
in Scotland. (Cf. Mitchell, Baird Lectures on the Westminster Confession, 
2d ed. p. 387). Through Ussher (see his Siimme and Substance of the 
Christian Religion), it was embodied in the Irish articles of 1815 (§ 21) ; 
from Ames (see his Medulla Theologiae) it probably passed to Coccejus 
(1603-1669) who is often wrongly spoken of as its founder. On Coccejus, 
see note 3, p. 105. 

2 Cf. West, Conf vii. 6, "There are not, therefore, two covenants 
of grace, differing in substance, but one and the same under various 
dispensations." 



108 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

gives in its simplicity, that the old furnished through 
its types and ceremonies. It is clear that from this 
point of view the significance of Christianity as a his- 
toric religion is overlooked, and the originality of its 
founder, if not denied, is at least seriously minimized.^ 

1 It may be interesting to note in passing the views of the heretics 
whom the Reformers opposed : 

Calvin charges Servetus with regarding the Old Testament promises 
as having to do with temporal blessings only, and denying that the Old 
Testament saints had the hope of immortality {Institutes Bk. II. x. 1, 
Yol. I. p, 501). Similar views seem to have been held in Anabaptist 
circles {ibid. ; cf. also Turrettine, op. cit. " De Foedere Gratiae," Quaestio 5). 

The Socinians made a sharp distinction between the two Testaments, 
Their view of religion was legalistic, and they regarded Christ as a 
legislator who had added to the precepts of the law of Moses certain new 
commandments of His own. Cf. Racovian Catechism, Section V. chap. i. 
" Of the precepts of Christ which He added to the law " (Eng. tr. London, 
1818, p. 173 sq.). Thus to the general command of love which was in- 
cluded in the Old Testament, Christ has added the specific command 
that we "should love Himself also, and thus love God in Him" (p. 181). 
In like manner, to the general command to worship God, we have 
the addition of the specific command to worship Christ (p. 189). 
Unlike the orthodox, who carried the recognition of Christ back into the 
Old Testament, the Socinians made this the distinctive feature of the 
New. 

Arminius also was charged with holding that " it is a matter of doubt, 
whether believers under the Old Testament understood that the legal 
ceremonies were types of Christ and of His benefits " (Works, tr. by 
James Nichols, London, 1828, Vol. II. p. 6. Cf. Turrettine, op, cit.) 
But he himself does not remember that he ever said such a thing. He 
admits saying that " an inquiry not altogether unprofitable might be 
instituted how far the ancient Jews understood the legal ceremonies to 
be types of Christ." Indeed, he wishes his brethren would take upon 
themselves to prove this to him. " Let them make the experiment, and 
they will perceive how difficult an enterprise they have undertaken." 
Arminius himself has an exalted opinion of the originality of Jesus. 
" He was a Teacher far transcending all other teachers, — Moses, the 
prophets, and even the angels themselves, both in the mode of His per- 
ception, and in the excellence of His doctrine." From Him the Christian 
religion gains its name, and this in two ways, both as being its cause, and 



THE REFORMATION 109 

More than one cause doubtless contributed to pro- 
duce this misconception. Generations were still to 
pass before the birth of the historical spirit. However 
great the breach between Catholicism and Protestantism 
even the greatest of the reformers could not wholly 
separate themselves from the influence of the mother 
church. The conception of God as the Absolute, 
far removed above all human reach or understanding, 
changeless, eternal, infinite, incomprehensible, — this 
view, inherited by the older church from the Greek 
philosophy, still exerted its sway over the greatest 
intellect of Protestantism.^ In the white light of the 
infinite there is no room for the apprehension of differ- 
ences of degree. False or true, natural or supernatural, 
finite or infinite, human or divine, profane or Christian : 
these are the sole alternatives to Protestant as to 
Catholic. Even the Biblical principle, at first, through 
its picture of the man Christ Jesus, a means of deliver- 
ance from this dead monotony, tended in time to rein- 
force it. For the Bible is nothing if not a book of 
growth, the record of a long historic training, in which 
men have been led through successive stages into a 
clearer and ever clearer apprehension of God. But 

as being its object. 1, "Because, as the Teacher sent from God, He pre- 
scribed this religion, both by His own voice when He dwelt on earth, and 
by His apostles, whom He sent forth into all the world." 2, " Because the 
same Jesus Christ, the object of this religion according to godliness, is 
now exhibited, and fully or perfectly manifested ; whereas He was formerly 
promised and foretold by Moses and the prophets only as being about 
to come" (p. 333. Cf. also p. 203, "Of the comparison of the law and 
the Gospel"). Here we have a view at once more Biblical and more 
historical than that which meets us in the writings of his opponents. 
1 Cf. note 1, p. 16. 



110 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

once made the subject of a dogma of inspiration, which 
puts all parts of a book so infinitely various upon the 
same pedestal of infallibility, and it loses its signifi- 
cance as a standard. The distinctions which it con- 
tains are overlooked or explained away. The words of 
Moses and of Isaiah are exalted to the same level as 
those of Christ. Thus, as truly if less crudely than in 
the case of Barnabas, the Old Testament is made a 
Christian book, which means not merely that Christ is 
carried back into the Old Testament, and used to 
interpret it, but that the Old Testament is carried 
forward into Christ, and made to interpret Him. A 
new legalism takes the place of the old, and the new 
insight of a Luther and a Zwingli threatens to be lost. 
It is melancholy to note the rapidity with which the 
early simplicity of Protestantism was exchanged for a 
form of religion ever more artificial and complicated. 
Under the shelter of the Biblical principle there grew 
up a new dogma as rigorous and exacting as the old. 
Side by side with the profession of the universal priest- 
hood of believers, there arose a new sacerdotalism no 
less narrow and intolerant than that which had led to 
the earlier revolt. Whatever seemed essential to the 
necessities of the growing church, that — by a logic as 
inexorable in Protestantism as in Catholicism before it 
• — came to be reckoned as part of essential Christianity. 
The more elaborate and complicated the systems, the 
more insistent were their authors that they should be 
reckoned as absolute truth. Thus in Protestantism, 
as in Catholicism before it, the loftiness of the claim 
defeated itself. 



THE REFORMATION 111 

And yet it is easy to exaggerate the parallel. Even in 
its most distorted forms Protestantism included within 
itself principles of self -reformation lacking in the older 
system. By its appeal to the individual reason and 
conscience it invited each man to ask for himself the 
question as to the nature of Christianity. By its 
emphasis upon the individual Christian experience it 
laid stress upon the simpler and more familiar elements 
in religion. The qualities on which it insisted as 
characteristics of true Christianity were as a matter of 
fact distinctive notes of the religion of Christ.^ Above 
all, by its acceptance of the Biblical principle, it pro- 
vided a standard through which, however much it might 
be neutralized by a false exegesis, it was yet possible 
for the sincere searcher to recover those essential truths 
which time and tradition had obscured. Thus when 
the new era dawns, it is on Protestant soil and among 
Protestant thinkers that we must look for the first 
attempts to gain a more adequate, a more historical, in 
a word, a more scientific conception of Christianity. 

1 What has been said in criticism of the unhistorical character of 
early Protestant theology as to its form, is quite consistent with the recog- 
nition of the fact that, in its substance, it is the reaflSrmation of elements 
which are distinctive of the religion of Christ. In its emphasis upon 
filial trust and confidence in God; in its simplicity and spirituality; 
in its ethical strictness ; in its sense of the worth of the individual for 
God ; in its doctrine of the equality of believers in privileges and duties, 
it is, in truth, a revival of primitive Christianity. It is at fault, not in its 
ideal, but in the unhistorical spirit which carries back this ideal into pre- 
Christian conditions, and so fails to recognize the full significance and 
originality of the historic Christ. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE BEGINNINGS OF MODEEN THEOLOGY 

Among the causes which in modern times have led 
to the restatement of our question in a new form, two 
are of special importance. These are first, the rise of 
the critical philosophy, and secondly, the awakening 
of the historical spirit. We shall say a few words of 
each. 

1. The Rise of the Critical Philosophy,^ 

One of the most noticeable features of the entire 
period which we have passed in review is the purely 
objective character of its thought. To Christian phi- 
losophy, from Augustine to Calvin, things, whether 
physical or spiritual, are independent existences, out- 
side of the individual, and unaffected by his thought. 
The part played by subjective processes in the con- 
struction of knowledge is overlooked. Here and there 

1 As the purpose of this section is simply introductory, any extended 
bibliography would be out of place. Keference may, however, be made to 
Edward Caird's Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant, Glasgow, 1877, 
the introduction to which contains an excellent historical review of the 
antecedents of the Kantian philosophy. This is largely omitted from his 
later and fuller work. The Critical Philosophy oflmmanuel Kant, Glasgow, 
1889, 2 vols. The reader may also be referred to J. Royce, The Spirit 
of Modern Philosophy (Boston, 1893), especially chaps, iii. and iy. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 113 

we find a thinker who is puzzled by the problem as to 
the origin of knowledge. But in general what we call 
Erkenntnisstheorie is unknown.^ 

The purely objective character ascribed to reality is 
not confined to individual things. General conceptions 
such as humanity, beauty, goodness, truth, are hypos- 
tatized, and, divorced from the concrete objects through 
which alone they reveal themselves to the apprehension 
of man, are conceived as having their own independent 

1 An exception may be made in the case of tlie later Greek philosophy 
(Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics). Cf. Caird, op. cit. p. 12: "The problem 
of the criterion of truth, which was the subject of so much controversy to 
the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, is simply the problem of knowledge 
in the form which it necessarily takes in all individualistic speculation." 
But the dualism which all assume between knowing and being renders a 
satisfactory solution impossible. It is true that Christianity, by its 
emphasis upon religious experience, seeks to overcome this dualism ; but 
the philosophical language in which its teachings are clothed (cf. for 
example, the idea of the Logos) does not lend itself readily to the expres- 
sion of other than dualistic ideas. Hence we find that " the history of 
dogma is a continual war of logic against the spirit of Christianity " 
(Caird, p. 21). Augustine gives us a classical illustration of this conflict. 
In many respects, he is a man of almost modern spirit, keenly alive to 
the importance of the individual religious experience and apt to describe 
it. There is a very real sense in which he may be called the father of 
modern psychology (on Augustine's services to Erkenntnisstheorie, cf. 
Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, pp. 46-50). Yet, at the same time, as 
churchman, he asserts that the Christian dogmas are completely inde- 
pendent of the individual reason and conscience. In the theology of the 
Middle Ages, this dualism becomes more pronounced. It is the effort of 
the schoolmen to establish the objects of faith upon a basis entirely inde- 
pendent of the individual reason. Nor is the emphasis upon the personal 
religious experience at the Reformation sufficient to modify this general 
point of view. (Cf. Caird, p. 32, on the significance of Luther.) In this 
connection, attention may be called to Calvin's doctrine of the witness of 
the Spirit, as assent to a body of truth entirely independent of the in- 
dividual. (Institutes, Vol. I. chap. vii. pp. 89-96, ed. Cal. Tr. Soc. Cf. 
Westminster Confession, i. 4, 5.) 

8 



114 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

existence in the ideal world. ^ Back of the phenomenal 
universe known to sense, there is a transcendent world 
which is no less real, peopled with the abstractions of 
thought, which are yet conceived to live a life similar 
to that made familiar by the objects of our more ordi- 
nary experience. In spite of the growing tendency to 
scepticism which expresses itself in the various forms 
of nominalism, realism, more or less crude, remains the 
dominant Christian philosophy. ^ 

These characteristics of pre-Kantian thought find 
illustration in the prevailing conception of God. As 
the absolute Being, God exists quite independent of 
all finite things. The contrast between the human and 
the divine is carried to the highest degree. If we 
would rightly conceive the nature of God, we must 
think away all finite limitations, magnify to the utter- 
most extent the remaining perfections, and think of 
the Being who is thus obtained as at once the cause 
and the sovereign of all that is. The attributes in 
which the Being of God most characteristically ex- 
presses Itself are those which are farthest removed from 
our human experience — eternity, infinity, omnipres- 
ence, impassibility, incomprehensibility. Even the 
justice and the love of God are inscrutable ; and before 
the mysterious authority of His sovereign will there is 

1 A good illustration of such a hypostasis is that of the church. The 
whole Catholic doctrine of the infallible authority of the church stands or 
falls with a philosophy which admits such a hypostasis. The best proof of 
this is the effect actually produced on church doctrine and authority by the 
growth of nominalism. Cf. Weber, History of Philosophy , p. 252 sq. 

2 This is true of Augustine (Cf. Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, p. 180); 
Thomas Aquinas (Loofs, p. 262), and Calvin, the representative theologians 
of the ancient church, of the Middle Ages, and of the Reformation. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 115 

no room for question, only for obedience.^ Yet this 
same mysterious incomprehensible Being touches life 
in a thousand ways. He is not only the Creator and 
Preserver of all things; but through His Bible, His 
Church, His Christ He brings His greatness to bear 
directly upon the littleness of the creature, and makes 
it possible for finite men, even here and now, to attain 
to an experience of the Infinite. 

Here we have a conception of God which is at once 
a priori and ontological. A priori^ because its essence 
is made to consist in abstract conceptions divorced from 
experience; ontological, because the absolute Being 
thus obtained is conceived as the supreme reality. 

1 An excellent illustration of this view is found in chap. ii. 2 of the 
Westminster Confession of Faith. "God hath all life, glory, goodness, 
blessedness, in and of himself ; and is alone in and unto himself all-suffi- 
cient, not standing in any need of any creatures which he hath made, nor 
deriving any glory from them, but only manifesting his own glory in, by, 
unto, and upon them : he is the alone fountain of all being, of whom, 
through whom, and to whom are all things; and hath most sovereign 
dominion over them, to do by them, for them, and upon them whatsoever 
himself pleaseth. In his sight all things are open and manifest; his 
knowledge is infinite, infallible, and independent upon the creature, so as 
nothing is to him contingent or uncertain. He is most holy in all his counsels, 
in all his works, and in all his commands. To him is due from angels and 
men, and every other creature whatsoever worship, service, or obedience, 
he is pleased to require of them." Here we have a conception of God 
which magnifies to the highest degree the difference between Him and the 
creature. This conception goes back through Calvin and the schoolmen to 
Augustine, and through him to Plato. 

Within this general ontological conception, we may distinguish the 
Platonic and Aristotelian forms ; the first, emphasizing the idea of sub- 
stance, the second, that of will. We may take Augustine and, later, 
Anselm as representatives of the first class, while Duns Scotus is represen- 
tative of the second. In Thomas Aquinas, as in Calvin, both elements 
are combined. And the same combination is found in the Westminster 
Confession, G^d is both supreme substance and sovereign will. 



116 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

This combination is characteristic of historic Christian 
thought, both Catholic and Protestant. God is at once 
removed from all rational tests known to the creature, 
and yet at the same time is conceived as entering into 
his experience. Every phase of life, every subject of 
thought, even the most secret feelings and desires of 
the human soul are brought under the control of an 
inscrutable authority. Question and denial are alike 
impious.^ 

While Catholic and Protestant, agreeing in this gen- 
eral conception of authority, were disputing as to where 
the voice of God had most clearly uttered itself, a 
modest German philosopher, in his study at Konigs- 
berg, was undermining the foundations upon which 
both alike rested. ^ In the famous " Critique " (1781 ; 2d 

1 Cf. Calvin, Institutes, Book III. xxiii. 2 (Vol. II, p. 562). " The will 
of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which He 
wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of His willing it. 
Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Be- 
cause He pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why He pleased, 
you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, 
and nothing such can be found." Cf. p. 563, where he shows that, while 
God is not lawless, He is not bound to give an account of Himself. 

Yet this same inscrutable God is ever active in experience, witnessing 
to His word, regenerating, sanctifying, etc. We find exactly the same 
combination in the theology of Koman Catholicism. 

2 The literature on Kant is too familiar as well as too voluminous to 
refer to here. A brief but convenient and well-selected bibliography 
of the more important works may be found in "Weber's History of Philos- 
ophy, p. 434. The best book in English is still that of Caird ( The Critical 
Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, 2 vols. London and New York, 1889. The 
earlier work already referred to is still valuable). In what follows the 
works of Kant are cited from Kirchmann's edition in the Philosophische 
Bihliothek, Heidelberg. References to Hartenstein's edition of 1867 sq. 
are added in parentheses. 

Of the facts of Kant's life it is only necessary to recall that he was 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 117 

ed. 1787) which, taking up the question already raised 
by Locke and Hume,^ attempts with a thoroughness 
greater than either a critical analysis of the powers of 
the human intellect, Kant showed conclusively that to 
know is by no means as simple a matter as it had 
hitherto been conceived to be. In knowledge mind 
contributes as much as it receives. The raw material 
of experience is moulded and shaped along certain 
definite lines according to a pattern contained within 

born in 1724 (April 22) and that lie died on Feb. 12, 1804, having spent 
all but nine years of his life in Konigsberg, and those in East Prussia. 
The Critique of Pure Reason was published in 1781, after having been 
twelve years in preparation ; The Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphy- 
ical System in 1783; The Idea for a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan 
Point of View in 1784 ; The Foundation for a Metaphysic of Ethics in 1785. 
The Metaphysical Rudiments of Natural Philosophy in 1786 ; the second 
edition of The Critique of Pure Reason in 1787 ; The Critique of Practical 
Reason in 1788; The Critique of Judgment in 1790; The treatise on Relig- 
ion within the Bounds of Mere Reason in 1793 (2d edition, 1794). For 
this he was censured by the government in 1794. Cf. the documents on 
both sides quoted in Wallace's Kant, pp. 72-74 (Philosophical Classics 
series, Edinburgh and Philadelphia, 1882). 

1 /. e., as to the powers and limits of the human understanding. It is 
interesting to compare the form in which the question is stated by these 
pioneers of Erkenntnisstheorie with that in which it presented itself to 
Kant. Both to Locke and to Hume it is primarily a question of the 
origin of ideas, and is to be answered by observation of the working of 
the mind in experience. To Kant it is a question as to the powers of the 
mind as pure — i. e., apart from all possible experience. The question 
whose answer Hume presupposes, when he says that we can know nothing 
of the powers of the mind save through experiment and observation 
{Treatise on Human Nature, Green's ed. I. p. 308) is the one which Kant 
proposes as the subject for inquiry. Cf. Kritih, Kirchmann's ed. p. 16 
[H. II. p. 8]. By the critique of pure reason Kant understands " eine 
Kritik. . . . nicht der Biicher und Systeme, sondern die des Vernunft- 
mogens iiberhaupt, in Ansehung aller Erkenntnisse, zu denen sie, 
unabhangig von aller Erfahrung, streben mag." Cf. also Caird, I. 
p. 227 sq. 



118 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the mind itself. Space ^ and time;^ substance, cause, 
and the rest; in short, all the categories of thought^ 
are not the purely objective things which they had 
been supposed to be. They are methods of the mind's 
activity, ideal forms imposed by reason upon experience, 
according to an inner law. There is, indeed, as philoso- 
phers before Kant had rightly affirmed, a noumenal 
world back of the world of phenomena. But it cannot 
hold the place either in thought or in life which has 
hitherto been assigned to it. It is a Grenzhegriff — a 
regulative concept, marking the limits of our knowl- 
edge.* It is impossible with our finite faculties to 
attain a knowledge of transcendent realities. For so 
high a task we lack the requisite organ, and must be 
content with the lower world of experience. A rational 

1 For Kant's doctrine of Space, see the Transcendental Aesthetic, § 3, 
p. 76 [H. II. p. 65 sq.l. Negatively, it is not an attribute of things in 
themselves. Positively, it is " nichts anderes als nur die Form aller 
Erscheinungen aiisserer Sinne d. i. die subjective Bedingung der Sinn- 
lichkeit," p. 78 [H. II. p. 66]. 

'^ For Kant's doctrine of Time, ibid. § 4, p. 81 sq. [H. II. p. 69 sqi\ 
Negatively, time has no objective existence. Positively, it is the form of 
the inner sense, and, in addition, '*die formale Bedingung a pnon aller 
Erscheinungen iiberhaupt," p. 84 [H. II. p. 72j. 

On the Aesthetic in general, cf. Caird, I. p. 281 sq. 

3 For Kant's doctrine of the categories, see the Transcendental Analytic, 
p. 109 sq. [H. II. p. 99 sq.] ; also Caird, I. p. 320 sq. 

* Kritik, p. 264 [H. II. p. 250]. " Der Begriff eines Noumenon ist 
also bloss ein Grenzhegriff, um die Anmaassuug der Sinnlichkeit einzu- 
schranken, und also nur von negativem Gebrauche. Er ist aber gleich- 
wohl nicht wilkiirlich erdichtet, sondern hangt mit der Einschrankung der 
Sinnlichkeit zusammen, ohne doch etwas Positives ausser dem Umfange 
derselben setzen zu konnen." 

On Kant's doctrine of the noumenon, cf. in general the Kritik, p. 262 
sq. [H. II. p. 246 sq.l ; also Caird, II. pp. 632-634 ; Watson, Kant and 
His English Critics, chap. x. pp. 289-328 (New York, 1881). 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 119 

demonstration of God, such as earlier philosophers had 
attempted, is therefore out of the question.^ 

The first effect of this line of thought was wholly 
destructive. If even the most familiar objects of every- 
day life cannot be known as they are in themselves, ^ 
much less is this true of God. An absolute which 
enters into experience is a contradiction in terms. 
Thus the conception of God upon which Catholic and 
Protestant alike had confidently built is declared un- 
tenable. The idea, indeed, still remains as a necessary 
concept of the mind. But from thought to reality 
there is no bridge. The Absolute, if existent, is 
unknowable.^ 

1 E.g. Descartes, in his famous ontological proof of the being of God. 
For Kant's criticism of this, as well as of the cosmological and teleologi- 
cal arguments, cf. Kritik, pp. 470-552 [H. II. pp. 451-538], with com- 
ments of Caird, II. p. 102 sq. 

^ Cf. Caird, II. p. 145. " Now, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's 
argument is, that we cannot show the validity of the principles of science 
except in a way that limits them to the sphere of phenomena. To prove 
that they are true of objects is to prove that those objects are not things 
in themselves." 

8 Tor the outcome of Kant's doctrine on its sceptical side, cf. Caird, I. 
p. 278 sq. " If we state the general problem of philosophy in the form in 
which Kant finally stated it, as the problem of ' the possibility of advanc- 
ing by reason from the knowledge of the sensible to that of the super- 
sensible,' the answer of the Critical Philosophy may be shortly summa- 
rized thus. If knowledge of the supersensible is possible, it must be ra- 
tional or a priori knowledge ; for only by an a priori process can we hope 
to deal with that which is beyond all sense. . . . But our a priori percep- 
tions are essentially forms of sense, i. e., they are forms of a matter which 
is essentially a posteriori, and therefore external and alien to the pure in- 
telligence that apprehends it. Hence, neither they nor the matter that 
falls under them can be brought into perfect unity with the mind that 
knows them. The mind is never able to consummate the synthesis of its 
object with itself, and the forms of unity by which it determines sensible 
objects still leave these objects inadequately determined, according to that 



120 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

This was the first effect. But Kant did not stop 
there. What he took away with one hand he gave 
back with the other. If God cannot be found by the 
intellect, He may be reached by the moral consciousness. 
Side by side with the theoretical reason there is a prac- 
tical reason which has as its organ the conscience, in 
which the ultimate convictions of the moral nature 
express themselves with the force of a categorical 
imperative.^ Here is the rightful home of such ideas 
as God, freedom, immortality. Whatever is needed 
for the realization of the moral ideal must be true.^ 
Thus the Absolute denied to reason is given back at 
the behest of conscience.^ 

idea of knowledge which it carries with itself. Hence it is led to make 
the distinction of the noamena it can think from the phenomena it can 
know. But as the former are presented to it in no perception or intuition, 
it is obliged to recognize that it is incapable, so far, at least, as theoretical 
reason is concerned, of rising beyond the problematical existence of the 
noumena or of turning the thought of them into knowledge," 

1 On Kant's ethical theory, cf. Caird, 11. pp. 143 sq. ; also Abbott, 
Kanfs Theory of Ethics (4th ed. London, 1889) ; Schurman, Kantian 
Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution (London, 1881); Adler, "A Critique 
of Kant's Ethics" {Mind, April, 1902, p. 162 sq.). 

2 Cf. Religion, p. 57 [H. VL p. 213], "Denn wenn das moralische 
Gesetz gebietet, wir sollen jetzt bessere Menschen sein, so folgt unum- 
ganglich, wir miJssen es auch konnen." 

3 To be sure, only as a necessary postulate, not as immediately given 
in experience. Cf. Preface to Religion innerhalh der Grenzen des blossen 
Vernunft, Kirchmann's ed. p. 1 sq. especially p. 3 [H. VL p. 163]. " So ist es 
zwar nur eine Idee von einem Objekte, welches die formale Bedingung 
allerZwecke,wie wir si ehaben sollen (diePflicht) und zugleich alles damit 
zusammenstimmende Bedingte aller derjenigen Zwecke, die wir haben 
(die jener ihrer Beobachtung angemessene Gliickseligkeit), zusammen 
vereinigt in sich enthalt, das ist, die Idee eines hochsten Guts in der 
Welt, zu dessen Moglichkeit wir ein hoheres, raoralisches, heiligstes und 
allvermogendes "Wesen annehmen miissen, das allein beide Elemente 
desselben vereinigen kann. . . . Aber, was hier das Vornehraste ist, diese 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 121 

We are not at present interested in the Kantian 
philosophy for its own sake. The question so often 
and so keenly debated, as to the true relation between 
the two poles of Kant's thought, ^ need not detain us 
here. Enough that in the founder of the critical 
philosophy two great streams of thought meet: the 
rationalistic type, represented by Descartes, by Leibnitz, 
and by Spinoza, seeking to interpret reality by eternal 
principles inherent in the nature of reason ; the empiri- 
cal, represented by Locke and Hume, pointing to 
experience as the sole trustworthy source of knowledge, 
and sceptical of all attempts to press back of experience 

Idee geht ans der Moral hervor, und ist nicht die Grundlage derselben." 
Cf. Caird, II. p. 294 ; also his criticism, p. 301 sq. p. 505 sq. Of a religious 
knowledge of God through, the feelings, such as that for which Schleier- 
macher contended, Kant has no conception. As Weber has well said 
{History of Philosophy , p. 466), " The real God of Kant is Freedom in the 
seryice of the ideal/' Cf. the celebrated sentence in the Grundlegung 
zur Metaphysik der Sitten. *' Es ist iiberall nichts in der Welt, ja iiber- 
haupt auch ausser derselben zu denken moglich, was ohne Einschrankung 
f iir gut konnte gehalten werden, als allein ein Outer Wille " [H. IV. p. 10]. 
1 I. e., whether we have to do with a consistent system, of which the 
several parts are essential elements, conceived as such by their author from 
the first ; or whether the later moral doctrine of Kant is a subsequent 
addition, modifying, if not essentially abandoning the principles of his 
earlier teaching. The arguments in favor of the former view have been 
ably presented by Caird, I. p. 228 sq. ; II. p. 141 sq., where, after call- 
ing attention to the apparent dualism of the two former Critiques, he bids 
us remember that " even this dualistic view of the world, by which the 
theoretical and practical life are put in abstract opposition to each other, 
is not Kant's last word. Eor, in the Critique of Judgment, he again at- 
tempts to bring together the two spheres of existence, which hitherto he 
had made it his main aim to separate and oppose.'' Thus the Critique of 
Judgment may be interpreted as the conclusion of an argument, of which 
the Critique of Pure and the Critique of Practical Reason are respectively 
the major and the minor premises. Cf. in this connection the striking 
quotation from the Critique of Practical Reason, given by Stirling, 
Secret of Hegel, p. 61 (quoted on p.l87, note 2. 



122 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTtANtTY 

to things in themselves. This double relationship to 
rationalism on the one hand and empiricism on the 
other forces the critical question into the forefront of 
Kant's thinking; and it is as the father of modern 
criticism that we have here alone to do with him. 

It is not necessary here to follow the development 
of post-Kantian thought. Two sharply contrasted 
tendencies make themselves manifest, each going back 
to the philosopher of Konigsberg, and claiming him as 
father. There is the speculative tendency, represented 
by Hegel ; ^ jealous of the rights of intellect, unwilling 
to be satisfied with the dualism of the critiques, seek- 
ing to win back for the Absolute its old place as the 
central principle of knowledge, gathering into the 
unity of great systems the most diverse elements of 
intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic life. There is, on the 
other hand, the sceptical tendency which culminates in 
positivism; 2 accusing the master of weakness and in- 
consistency in retaining in ethics a conception which 
he had banished from the other sides of life, seeing in 

1 On Hegel's relation to Kant, cf . Weber, p. 450. As illustrating the 
connection between Kant's own teaching and later speculative philosophy, 
Caird's criticisms of the Critique are full of instruction. See also 
Stirling, op. cit. 

2 Positivism is here mentioned simply as the best-known representative 
of that agnostic tendency which historically has been one great outcome of 
the Kantian criticism. Comte himself, in spite of his acknowledgment 
of indebtedness to Kant (see his letter to d'Eichthal of Dec. 10, 1824, 
quoted in Weber, p. 472) had slight acquaintance with his works, and, as 
Caird has shown, very imperfectly understood his theory of knowledge. 
On Comte, see Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte, 1893. 
The direct propagation of the sceptical tendencies of Kant is through the 
movement known as Neo-Kantianism. This, though historically inde- 
pendent of positivism, holds positions in many respects similar. Cf. 
Hoffding, History of Philosophy^ Eng. tr. U. p. 541 ; Weber, p. 584. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 123 

the Absolute in every form a conception as dangerous 
as it is deceptive, an ignis fatuus of the mind, certain 
to lead even the most robust intellect astray, needing 
therefore to be pursued and destroyed with a relentless 
intolerance worthy of Voltaire. Yet both alike, the 
speculative and the agnostic, however widely separated 
in other respects, agree in this : " that there can be no 
true knowledge without a previous investigation of the 
organ of knowledge ; that no attempt to reach a scien- 
tific conception of the universe can be successful which 
ignores the rights of the human mind.^ The fact that 
our modern study of religion deals so largely with 
psychological questions is due primarily to the influence 
of Kant. 2 

1 The importance of Erhenntnisstheorie in the Hegelian philosophy is 
well known. Comte's own theory of knowledge is crude enough. He 
has small patience with those who elaborately determine " the respective 
contributions of the internal and the external in the production of knowl- 
edge." Enough that each contributes its part, that our knowledge is 
subjective and relative, and that it is this limited and subjective knowl- 
edge, with which alone we have to do (cf. the quotation given in Caird, 
p. 69. See, also, on Comte's theory of knowledge, Hoffding, II. p. 351). 
In contrast to the French school, the German Neo-Kantians pay great 
attention to the problem of knowledge (e. g. Diihring. Cf. Hoffding, 
II. p. 554 sq.). 

* It need hardly be said that Kant is here taken simply as the chief 
representative of that great movement, which, beginning with Locke and 
Hume, has so largely transformed our mental life. If any one chooses to 
believe, with Professor James {Philosophical Conceptions and Practical 
Results, p. 23) that the psychological impulse given by the early English 
philosophers might have wrought its beneficent results equally well with- 
out Kant's help, it is impossible to contradict him. Historically it cannot 
be denied that, whether for good or evil, it is through Kant that the new 
point of view became dominant in modern thought ; and of no phase of it 
is this more true than in the case of religion. 



124 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

2, The Awakening of the Historical Spirit, 

Side by side with the philosophical influence which 
we have just described there was at work another, 
which for want of a better name we may call the his- 
torical spirit. By this we mean the effort to conceive 
of life, as a whole and in all its parts, according to 
the principle of growth. History, as the modern man 
conceives it, is the creation of the scientific spirit; 
one of the many fruits of the great intellectual move- 
ment, which, beginning modestly in the researches of a 
few isolated students, has come at last to dominate our 
entire mental life. By the scientific spirit we mean the 
spirit which observes patiently that it may define accu- 
rately; the spirit of minute and exhaustive research, 
which gathers its materials from the widest possible 
field, and extends its investigations over the longest 
periods of time, that it may gain a basis for generaliza- 
tions fitted to serve as a safe point of departure both 
for thought and action. It is the spirit which takes 
nothing on trust, which seeks a reason for everything, 
and which deems no labor too great, and no investiga- 
tion too humble, which shall minister, however remotely, 
to this end. Of this spirit, we repeat, modern history 
is the child. 

It is difficult for us, made familiar from childhood 
with the principle of development, to realize how com- 
paratively recent is this entire point of view. History, 
as the modern man conceives it, is scarcely more than a 
century old.^ Kant himself, for all his critical acumen, 

1 On the beginnings of a philosophical conception of history, of. Flint, 
Historical Philosophy in France (New York, 1894. An earlier work, 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 125 

shared the unhistorical views of his day.i It was 
reserved for his contemporary Herder, in his "Ideen 

Edinburgh, 1874, includes Germany). After tracing the growth of cer- 
tain great ideas which history presupposes (i.e. progress, humanity, 
and freedom), he shows that it is only since the Reformation that these 
have been sufficiently developed to make a really scientific conception 
of history possible. 

In France he makes the beginning with Bodin (1530-1596), the 
greatest political philosopher before Montesquieu (p. 191) — a man, who, 
in his Colloquium Heptaplomeres (written 1593, first published 1841, with 
a German translation by Guhrauer), a treatise curiously modern in 
spirit, brings forward the idea of a "progressive revelation through a 
sequence of wise men, before as well as alongside of the Mosaic, Christian, 
and Mohammedan religions" (Hoffding, op. cit. I. p. 60). Bodin shows 
himself possessed both of the ideas of law and of progress, but the ac- 
count given of his work by Flint (p. 193) shows that he is far removed 
from having a true conception of history, as we understand it to-day. 
Passing to the seventeenth century, we find that Descartes did little for the 
study of history, his interest lying along other lines. Even the eighteenth 
century, for all its interest in historical study, lacks the great idea which 
alone can unlock the secrets of the past. Turgot alone, of its great 
names, has the idea of progress. In Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, it 
is conspicuous by its absence. The age of the Social Contract, and of 
natural religion was not the age which could understand a great histori- 
cal phenomenon like the rise of Christianity. We shall have abundant 
illustration of this as we proceed. 

In Germany the historical movement may be said to begin with 
Lessing (1729-1781) and Herder (1744-1803). A year before his death, 
the former published a little book on The Education of the Human Race, 
in which, with a clearness and beauty of style hitherto unsurpassed, he 
develops the idea of revelation as a progressive training of mankind in 
divine truth. Still more important was the influence of Herder's great 
book, Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791), of which Flint has 
said (Philosophy of History in France and Germany, p. 376), that "as 
regards the philosophy of history, after all that the illustrious chiefs of 
modern German philosophy have done or caused to be done, there is still 
need to go back " to its teachings. With these two books the modern 
view of history may be said to have begun. 

1 On the unhistorical character of Kant's time, cf. Caird, I. p. 69. 
"The individualistic tendencies of the age of enlightenment, which 
separated each man from the unity of the social organism to which he be- 



126 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

zur Geschichte der Menschheit " (1784-91) to point the 
way to a more profound and intelligent conception. 
But, however long delayed, the new insight came at 
last, and with it a flood of light was poured into many 
a dark corner of the past. Under the guidance of the 
principle of development, mysteries thought insoluble 
have been cleared up. Variations or contradictions 
either denied or explained away have fallen easily into 
place as different stages in one and the same process. 
What was at first applied to external objects has been 
transferred to the world of thought. Ideas are seen to 
have a history as well as institutions. Philosophies 
have their genealogy as well as individuals. Nothing 
is stationary. All things are changing. Constitutions, 
traditions, beliefs, habits, systems — all are in a state 
of flux. In the highest things as in the lowest, growth 
is the law of life. 

Once clearly apprehended, it was inevitable that a 
principle so fruitful should receive universal applica- 
tion. What had been tried with success in profane 
history was certain to be attempted in the field of reli- 
gion. If secular constitutions had grown, the law of 
the church had not remained stationary. If philoso- 
phies had changed, the same was true of doctrines. 
Christianity itself, instead of being isolated from its 
environment, as heretofore, was now conceived as but 

longed, separated him from the past out of which his intellectual life had 
grown. ... In this respect Kant shares in the individualistic and unhis- 
torical modes of thought characteristic of his time." Cf ., for example, his 
treatise on Religion, or his Idea for a Universal History in a Cosmopol- 
itan Point of View. It may be noted that he severely criticized Herder's 
views. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 127 

one great step in the divine education of mankind. ^ 
Biblical criticism, coming to the study of Scripture 
with impartial eyes, discovered variations and differ- 
ences which the dogma of inspiration had obscured, and 
sought to retrace the gradual steps through which the 
books we call our Bible have assumed their present 
form. 2 In like manner, historians of doctrine have 
analyzed the process through which the most myste- 
rious dogmas of the faith have grown to be what they 
are.^ Even the Catholic church has not remained 
unaffected by the new light, and, in the person of a 
Newman, has sought to show that the acceptance of the 
principle of development is not inconsistent with the 
recognition of the authority of an infallible church.* 

1 So by Lessing, in his Education of the Human Race. 

2 On the history of the Higher Criticism, cf. Briggs, Introduction to 
the Study of Holy Scripture, chap. xi. p. 247 sq. ; also G. A. Smith, 
Modern Criticism and the preaching of the Old Testament, p. 29 sq. ; Nash, 
The History of the Higher Criticism of the New Testament, New York, 1900. 

Among those who contributed to bring about a more intelligent under- 
standing of the Bible, Herder occupies a conspicuous place. He insisted 
that the Bible was a human book, to be read in the light of its times, and 
with due regard to the differing circumstances out of which its different 
books had arisen. Christ was to him the most human as well as the 
most divine of teachers, and the Gospel which He preached was one of 
the " purest humanity." 

'^ So especially by Baur, in his Lehrhuch der D.ogmengeschichte, and 
his great monographs on the history of the Christian doctrine of Recon- 
ciliation, and of the Trinity and the Incarnation. 

* Cf. his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, and 
especially the fifth chapter of the Apologia, where he distinguishes be- 
tween the doctrine which is stationary and the definition which is chang- 
ing. A good instance of the modern Catholic standpoint is given in 
Hogan's Clerical Studies (Boston, 1898). Cf. especially p. 162 : " Theology, 
then, is progressive, essentially progressive, not after the fashion of the 
physical sciences, but like history and philosophy, upon which it is mainly 



128 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Under the circumstances the question as to the nature 
of Christianity has assumed a new meaning. 

But the influences which have led to a restatement of 
the question have not been wholly internal. Side by 
side with the intellectual movement there has gone a 
material development without parallel. The nineteenth 
century has been an age of exploration as well as of 
research. Vast areas, hitherto unknown or practically 
so, have been brought by commerce into intimate con- 
tact with Western civilization. Christian missions have 
been reborn, and, with their enlarging success, have 
brought Christendom for the first time in many cen- 
turies face to face with the non-Christian religions. 
The facts which had hitherto been disparagingly classed 
together under the single term heathenism, or con- 
structed a priori by theologian and philosopher into the 
framework of an artificial and wholly impossible reli- 
gion of nature,^ have come to be recognized in their 
wonderful variety and complexity as containing both 
more and less than had hitherto been supposed. For 
the first time since the days of the beginnings Chris- 
tianity has been clearly recognized as a historic religion, 
one among many, and the question as to its relation to 
the older forms has become a pressing one. 

Out of the effort to answer this question the science 

built." Cf. also Schell, I)er Katholicismus als Princip des Fortschritts^, 
Wiirzburg, 1897 ; Die neue Zeit und der alte Glaube, 1898. 

1 On the ambiguity of the term natural theology, see Gordon, New 
Epoch for Faith, -p. 110. For a good illustration, compare Locke {Rea- 
sonableness of Christianity, Works, VII. p. 133, natural theology as 
including " the way of atoning the merciful . . . Father ") with West. 
Conf i. 1. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 129 

of Comparative Religion has been born. Taking the 
methods already so fruitfully employed in other branches 
of research, it has sought to apply them to this new and 
most fascinating field. Gathering its materials from 
the widest possible range, it has sought to determine 
what are the characteristics of the religious life as such. 
Ignoring for the moment the marks which separate the 
several religions from one another, it has asked, what 
are the traits common to all ? How distinguish religion 
as a peculiar function of the human spirit from other 
human activities and experiences ? What are the con- 
stant elements which lie back of its varying manifesta- 
tions ? Having thus gained a conception of religion in 
general, it has then gone on to investigate the charac- 
teristics of the several different religions, to trace their 
genesis and history, to study their relations and inter- 
relations, to distinguish their peculiar characteristics, 
and thus, on the basis of an exhaustive comparison, to 
answer the question which most perfectly realizes the 
religious ideal. The Christian apologist, seeking to 
justify the claim of his own religion to a position of 
unique authority, finds himself confronted with a whole 
circle of questions unknown to his predecessors, and 
obliged to shape his answer accordingly. Under the 
circumstances, it is not strange if the question as 
to the nature of Christianity should require radical 
restatement. 



130 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 



3. Retrospect, The Conception of Christianity in the 
Writers of the Eighteenth Century, 

It will help us to appreciate the new world of thought 
in which nineteenth century theology moves, if at this 
point, in order to establish a standard of comparison, we 
pass briefly in review the conceptions of Christianity 
which we find in the great writers on religion and 
philosophy of the eighteenth. ^ In general we may 
distinguish four main tendencies, each of which has its 
typical representative. 

1. There is first the view which regards Christianity 
as a corruption of the true religion, an evil to be op- 
posed, and, if possible, to be destroyed. Voltaire may 
serve as spokesman for this view. 

2. There is the view which identifies Christianity 
with the religion of nature, seeing in it a republication 
or purification of the religion which is open to all men 
by the light of reason, and which they might and should 
have attained even without special revelation. ^ This is 
the view of historic deism, and also in substance of 
Spinoza and of Leibnitz. We may take Kant as its 
classical representative. 

3. There is the view which distinguishes historic 

1 The term ia used somewhat loosely, a few writers (e. g. Spinoza 
and Locke) having been included, whose work falls within the latter part 
of the seventeenth century. 

2 The affinity of this view with that of traditional theology is too appa- 
rent to need comment. In both cases Christianity is identified with the 
content of true religion, wherever found. The only difference is that in 
the one case true religion is thought of as including certain supernatural 
elements, whereas in the other case these are not regarded as essential. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 131 

Christianity from natural religion as constituting a 
higher type. The latter is recognized as a distinct 
form of religion, and as legitimate as far as it goes; 
but it is a lower stage, needing to be supplemented and 
completed by supernatural religion. This is in general 
the view of the more thoughtful apologists of the 
dels tic controversy. It appears in the title of Jeffery's 
celebrated treatise, " Christianity, the perfection of all 
religion, natural and revealed" (1728). It is repre- 
sented in Bishop Butler's famous "Analogy." As to 
the content of revealed religion, there is some difference 
of opinion, but in general it is identified with the con- 
tents of Scripture, its characteristic mark being certain 
supernatural doctrines (i. e. Trinity, incarnation, etc.) 
undiscoverable by reason, though not, according to the 
best apologists, repugnant to it. As supernatural, all 
the doctrines of revealed religion stand on the same 
level of authority, and there is little attempt to dis- 
criminate between them.^ A highly interesting attempt 
at a more scientific conception is given in Locke's 
"Reasonableness of Christianity, " ^ a treatise whose 
eminent sanity, sound exegetical sense and clear appre- 
hension of the question at issue have not yet received 
the recognition they deserve. We may take Locke as 
the representative of our third class. ^ 



1 Yet cf. Jeffery's treatment of Old Testament prophecy, referred to 
by Piinjer, op. cit. p. 353. I regret that I have been unable to consult 
this important work at first hand. 

2 The Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures 
(1695). 

8 Though most of his life falls in the seventeenth century, in spirit he 
belongs with the men of the eighteenth, with whom we here classify him. 



132 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

4. Finally we note the tendency to regard Chris- 
tianity as but one historic stage in the approach to a 
perfect or absolute religion, still to be revealed. This 
view is represented by Lessing in his " Education of the 
Human Race," a treatise whose originality and inde- 
pendence have been much exaggerated, ^ but whose clear 
distinction of historic Christianity from Judaism on the 
one hand, and the final religion on the other, renders it 
worthy of selection as representative of our fourth type. 

These four tendencies cross and recross. Leibnitz, 
to whom Christianity is essentially a natural religion, 
distinguishes clearly between Christ's teaching and that 
of Moses, and regards the former as introducing a dis- 
tinctly higher stage of the religious life.^ Kant, while 
identifying Christianity with the religion of pure reason, 
makes an honest attempt to include within the latter, 
doctrines (e, g. original sin, atonement) which, as a 
matter of fact, are characteristic of historic Chris- 
tianity. ^ Some of the deists had a keen sense for the 
problem presented by the rise of the different historic 
religions (so especially Hume,* and among the earlier 

1 Many of the leading ideas of Lessing's book are anticipated by 
Leibnitz in his Theodic^e, notably the view of Christ as the first trust- 
worthy teacher of immortality. Cf. Preface {Philosophical Works, ed. 
Gerhardt, Berlin, 1885, Vol, VI. p. 26). " Cependant Moyse n'avoit point 
fait entrer dans ses loix la doctrine de I'immortalite des ^mes : elle estoit 
conforme a ses sentimens, elle s'euseignoit de main en main, mais elle 
n'estoit point autorisee d'ane maniere populaire, jusqu'a ce que Jesus- 
Christ leva le voile," etc. With this cf. Lessing : " Und so ward Christus 
der erste zuverlassige, praktische Lehrer der Unsterblichkeit der Seele." 
{Erziehung, § 58). 

3 Ibid. p. 27 : " Jesus-Christ, achevant ce que Moyse avoit commence." 

' Cf. especially Books I. and II. of the Religion. 

* Notably in his treatise on the Natural History of Religion. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 133 

writers Lord Herbert and Shaftesbury). For others 
(e. g, Tindal) it does not exist. Even Herder, for all 
his historic sense, seems to have had no appreciation of 
the relative right of the later forms of historic Chris- 
tianity, and contrasts the religion of Jesus, as that of 
universal humanity, with the "arbitrary doctrines" of 
His successors. 1 

Out of these discussions we see gradually emerging 
the question, What is essential Christianity? Does it 
include all that has come down to us under that name, 
or must it be confined to the teaching of Christ Himself 
as opposed to His disciples ? Here again we find decided 
differences of opinion, some (as Leibnitz, Kant, Herder) 
contrasting Christ's own teaching with that of His dis- 
ciples, and seeing in the latter a corruption of primitive 
Christianity, others (so most apologists) regarding the 
entire contents of the New Testament as belonging 
thereto. Locke takes a middle course, regarding faith 
in Christ as a necessary part of Christianity, but clearly 
distinguishing saving faith as a simple matter, open to 
the unlearned, from the acceptance of such difficult 
doctrines as the Trinity or the atonement. 

In view of the importance of the subject, it may be 
worth while briefly to review the conception of Chris- 
tianity held by each of the four writers whom we have 
selected as typical. 

1 It is a curious fact that Kant, with his individualistic ethics and his 
absence of historic sense, should have had a truer appreciation of the rela- 
tive rights of historic Christianity than Herder. On the reasons for the 
latter's failure, cf. Pfleiderer, Development of Theology in Germany since 
Kant, etc. p. 41. 



134 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

To begin with the most radical : Voltaire ^ met Chris- 
tianity in the form of a corrupt Roman Catholicism. 
Unlike the English deists, who distinguished Jesus' 
own teaching as true Christianity from later corrup- 
tions, he regarded all positive religion as superstitious 
and mistaken.'^ Of Jesus personally he commonly 
speaks with a respect not unmixed with patronage, as 
a good man, a teacher of sound morals, and of universal 
benevolence.^ Like many another sectary,* He pro- 

1 Among the works in which Voltaire discusses the origin of Christi- 
anity are Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers (1767, published anony- 
mously, CEuvres, Paris, 1897, Vol. XXVI. p. 531 sq.) -, Dieu et les 
Hommes, par le docteur Obern, (Euvre Theologique, mais raisonnable, tra- 
duite par Jacques Aimon (1769, CEuvres, XXVIII. p. 129 sq.) ; and the 
articles on Religion and Christianisme in the Dictionnaire Philosophique. 
Cf. also his De la paix perpe'tuelle par le docteur Goodheart (1769, 
CEuvres, XXVIII, p. 103 sq. ) ; Homelie du pasteur Bourn (1768, CEuvres, 

XXVII. p. 227 sq.) and his Epitre a Uranie. 

On Voltaire's views of Christianity, cf. Bungener, Voltaire et son 
Temps (Paris, 1851), Vol. II, p. 254 sq. ; Strauss, Voltaire: seeks Vor- 
trage^, Leipzig, 1870; and Piinjer, History of the Christian Philosophy of 
Religion, Eng. tr. pp. 457, 458. 

2 It is no doubt easy to exaggerate the negative aspect of Voltaire's 
teaching. Stripped of its passion and rhetoric, it has many points of con- 
tact with that of the English deists. Yet in the bitterness of its invective 
against positive religion in all its forms, and in its absence of appreciation 
of the originality and greatness of Jesus, it may well be taken as consti- 
tuting a different type. Hume, with whom it would be most natural to 
compare Voltaire, has little to say directly of Christianity. Yet note liis 
comparison of monotheism ana polytheism, to the disadvantage of the 
former {Natural History of Religion, sec. ix.). 

3 Compare the celebrated passage in the Dictionnaire (art. Religiou), 
where Jesus is represented among the other sages as one who had suffered 
for his loyalty to truth. Also Dieu et les Hommes, chap, xxxiii. (CEuvres, 

XXVIII. p. 200), where Voltaire contends that Jesus was probably a 
teacher of sound morals, and whatever is not consistent with this view in 



. * He more than once compares him to George Fox (e. g. Dieu et les 
Hommes, chap. xxxi.). 



4 
J 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 135 

claimed Himself a prophet, and gathered disciples from 
the lower orders of the people. ^ But He was in no sense 
the founder of a new religion.^ From first to last He 
remained a Jew, following the practices and holding the 
faith of His fathers. The religion we call Christianity 
arose after His death, through a variety of causes, most 
of them discreditable. Chief of these were the frauds 
perpetrated by the disciples of Jesus. ^ At first de- 
ceived by the alleged miracles of their master, they 
became knaves, and maintained themselves by the use 
of forgery on a colossal scale. A show of respectability 
was given the new religion by its alliance with Alexan- 

the Gospels is to be regarded as a forgery ; Homdie, p. 230 : " Jesus f ut 
plus que Juif; il fut homme: il embrassa tous les horames dans sa 
charite'." 

Yet elsewhere he speaks disparagingly of Jesus as an insignificant 
sectary, not sufficiently important to receive mention in the writings of 
contemporary historians, and contrasts him with Mohammed to his disad- 
vantage {Diner, p. 546: " Du moins Mahomet a ecrit et combattu ; et 
Je'sus n'a su ni ecrire ni se defendre. Mahomet avait le courage 
d'Alexandre avec Tesprit de Numa; et votre Jesus a sue sang et eau, 
des qu'il a ete condamne par ses juges "). 

1 Diner, p. 547 : The most probable view of Jesus is " qu'il etait un 
Juif de bonne foi qui voulait se faire valoir aupres du peuple, comme les 
fondateurs des recabites, des essenieus, etc. . . . il est probable qu'il mit 
quelques femmes dans son parti, ainsi que tous ceux qui voulurent etre 
chefs de secte . . ." Cf. p. 546 : "La plus vile canaille, laquelle seule 
embrassa le Christianisme pendant cent annees." 

2 Dictionnaire, art. Religion : When Jesus is asked whether He was put 
to death for teaching a new religion, He denies it, and declares that He 
remained in all things faithful to the Jews' religion. Cf. Dieu et les 
Hommes, pp. 203, 204. In the dialogue between a Christian and a Jew 
recorded in De la Paix Perpeluelle, the Jew claims Jesus as one of his own 
fellow religionists. 

3 Diner, p. 546 : " Voila les fondements de la religion chretienne. 
Vous n'y voyez qu'un tissn des plus plates impostures, faites par la plus 
vile canaille." Cf. Dieu et les Hommes, chap, xxxvi. p. 211 sq. : " Fraudes 
innombrables des Chretiens." 



136 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

drian Platonism.^ By the accession of Constantine it 
had become strong enough boldly to proclaim its true 
character, and to enforce its will, as it has done ever 
since, by persecution and tyranny.^ 

Against this corrupt and dangerous superstition 
Voltaire sets the religion of reason which has but two 
articles, love to God, and love to one's neighbor. ^ If 
any one chooses to call this Christianity, he is at liberty 
to do so, as a concession to common usage ; and worship 
in the name of Jesus may even be allowed. But all 
that has hitherto been characteristic of historic Chris- 
tianity must be taken away.* 

Kant also has a keen sense of the evils of historic 
Christianity,^ but it is consistent with the highest regard 

1 Diner, p. 548 : " II est avere que ses disciples furent tres-obscures 
jusqu'a ce qu'ils eussent rencontres quelques platoniciens dans Alexandria 
qui etayerent les reveries des galileens par les reveries de platon." 

2 Diner, p. 548: " Alors les fripons furent sanguinaires," etc. Cf. 
p. 550 (Christianity the only one of the ancient sects to persecute). 

'^ Homdie, p. 233. Ci. Dictionnaire, art. Religion: "Je le conjura, 
seulement de m'apprendre en quoi consistait la vraie religion. ' Ne vous 
I'ai je pas deja dit 1 Aimez Dieu at votre prochain comme vous-m^me.' " 

* Dieu et les Hommes, chap, xliii. p. 237 sq. : " Nous proposons de con- 
server dans la morale de Jesus tons ce qui est conf orme a la raison univer- 
selle, a celle de tous les grands philosophes de I'antiquite, a celle de tons les 
temps et de tous les lieux, a celle qui doit etre I'eternal lien de toutes les 
societes. Adorons I'Etre supreme par Jesus, puisque la chose est etablie 
ainsi parmi nous. Les cinq lettres qui composent son nom ne sont cer- 
tainement pas un crime. Qu'importe que nous rendions nos hommages k 
I'Etre supreme par Confucius, par Marc-Aurele, par Jesus, on par un 
autre, pourvu que nous soyons justes ? La religion consiste assurement 
dans la vertu, et non dans le fatras impertinent de la theologie. La 
morale vient de Dieu, elle est uniforme partout. La theologie vient des 
hommes, elle est partout differente et ridicule, on I'a dit souvent, et il faut 
le redire toujours." 

^ See especially the long sentence in the Religion beginning *' Wie 
mystische Schwarmereien," etc. Pp. 155-157, Kirchmann's edition [H. VL 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 137 

for the character and teachings of Jesus, in whom he 
sees the founder of the universal church. His view of 
Christianity is given in his treatise on " Religion within 
the Bounds of Mere Reason" (1793). True religion, 
being the outgrowth of ethics, must be such, and such 
only, as each man may construct for himself without 
historic mediation. Kant accordingly proceeds with 
such an a priori construction, which he afterwards fol- 
lows by a comparison with historic Christianity. Thus, 
for example, the truth of original sin lies in the fact 
that we are obliged to posit as the cause of our actual 
sins an intelligible or noumenal choice, antedating 
experience. So, in the case of the atonement and 
justification, the real meaning is to be found in experi- 
ences of the individual moral life. When I turn from 
sin to righteousness, the consequence of my former sin- 
ful acts continues, and the acceptance of these by the 
now righteous self constitutes a sort of innocent suffer- 
ing for the guilty. So the great truths of historic 
Christianity are, as it were, types or parables of various 
aspects of the individual spiritual experience. 

Yet, while in one aspect purely individual, in another 
the ethical ideal leads man to seek union with his fel- 
lows, in order to the building up of his own moral life. 
This is possible practically only through a church, 
which in turn takes for granted historic revelation. 
This is, to be sure, a concession to human weakness, 
since historic faith cannot be required of every man as 

pp. 306-308]. Looking out over the long list of evils and abuses of which 
historic Christianity is so prolific, Kant well can understand how one 
might be moved to utter the Lucretian cry, " Tantum religio potuit suadere 
malorum," 



138 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

can the pure religion of reason.^ Yet experience seems 
to show that practically it cannot be avoided. We 
have thus the contrast between true religion which is 
universal, and the various historic faiths which more or 
less perfectly express or misrepresent it.^ Here is the 
point at which Kant is brought to his estimate of Chris- 
tianity. Christianity, by which he means the religion 
of Jesus, is really the beginning of universal church 
history. Judaism, which is a narrow and external 
faith, scarcely deserves the name of religion. ^ Jesus 
took the essential content of the religion of nature, and, 
associating it with certain simple statutes, became the 
founder of the universal church.* In the Christianity 

1 Religion, p, 129 [H. VI. p. 281] : " Wir haben angemerkt, dass, obzwar 
eine Kirche das wichtigste Merkmal ihrer Wahrheit, namlich das eines 
rechtmassigen Anspruclis auf Allgemeinheit entbehrt, wenn sie sich auf 
einen Offenbarungsglauben, der als historischer. . . . Glaube doch keiner 
allgemeinen iiberzeugenden Mittheilung fahig ist, griindet, dennoch wegen 
des natiirlichen Bediirfnisses aller Menschen zu den hochsten Vernunft- 
begriffen und Griinden immer etwas Sinnlichhaltbares, irgend eine Erfah- 
rnngsbestatigung u. dergl. zu verlangen, . . . irgend ein historischer 
Kirchenglaube, den man auch gemeiniglich schon vor sich findet, miisse 
benutzt werden." Cf. also p. 128 : " Einen besondern Offenbarungsglauben 
. . . der als historisch nimmermehr von Jedermann gefordert werden 
kann." 

2 P. 127 [H. VI. p. 279] : " Es ist nur eine (wahre) Eeligion; aber es 
kann vielerlei Arten des Glaubens geben . . . Es ist daher schicklicher 
(wie es auch wirklich mehr im Gebrauche ist) zu sagen : dieser Mensch 
ist von diesem oder jenem (jiidischen, muhamedanischen, christlichen, 
katholischen, lutherischen) Glauben, als: er ist von dieser oder jener 
Religion." 

3 P. 149 [H. VI. p. 300] : " Das (Judentum) ist eigentlich gar keine 
Religion, sondern bios Vereinigung einer Menge Menschen, die, da sie zu 
einem besondern Stamm gehorten, sich zu einem gemeinen Wesen unter 
bios politischen Gesetzen, mithin nicht zu einer Kirche formten," etc. 

* A universal church can arise only when ecclesiastical faith recognizes 
its dependence upon " the universal, unchangeable, pure faith of religion/' 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 139 

of Jesus, which consists of the highest ethics, reinforced 
by the purest motives, we have "a complete religion 
which can be laid before all men in a form to be grasped 
by their reason and to win their conviction," and which, 
moreover, is illustrated by an example whose normative 
character they cannot but recognize.^ With this Kant 
contrasts later Christianity, as a religion of tradition, 
appealing to history, and including in its requirements 
elements which make no part of true religion. ^ 

This attempt of Kant's is most interesting. Its in- 
adequacy as an account of historic Christianity needs no 
extended demonstration. Not only does he allegorize 
the specific Christian doctrines till their adherents would 
not recognize them, but he completely shifts the centre 
of emphasis, relegating to a subordinate and unimpor- 
tant place that central fact, which to the early disciples 
made out the heart of their religion. As Caird has 
well remarked, his failure to make room within the 
consciousness of man for the consciousness of God as 

and publicly admits the necessity of the agreement of its own teachings 
therewith. P. 148 [H. VI. p. 299]. This actually happened under Jesus, 
in whom we find a complete abandonment of the principles of Judaism, 
and " a complete revolution in the doctrines of faith, based upon an 
entirely new principle." P. 152 [H. VI. p. 203]. Cf. also pp. 188, 189 
[H. VI. pp. 337-339]. 

1 Religion, p. 194 [H. VI. p. 314]. Cf. also p. 152 sq. [H. VI. p. 303] : 
"Aus dem Judentum also . . . erhob sich nun plotzich, obzwar nicht 
unvorbereitet, das Christentum," etc. 

2 Cf. p. 194 59. [H. VI. p. 314] : " Die christliche Religion als gelehrte 
Religion," especially p. 198 [H. VI. p. 346], where Kant speaks of the 
clever procedure of the first Christian missionaries, who, "in order to 
gain access to their people, proclaimed it as a part of reh'gion itself and 
valid everywhere and always that every Christian must become a Jew, 
whose Messiah had come (ein jede Christ musste ein Jude sein, dessen 
Messias gekommen ist)." 



140 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

"the absolute principle of all reality," leads him neces- 
sarily to "reject as mysticism, or as involving the 
negation of moral freedom, that very idea which gives 
its great moral power to Christianity, viz., the idea of 
a real objective mediation, by which the individual is 
raised above himself. Thus he saves his morality at 
the cost of his religion."^ In all this he is typical of a 
wide -spread tendency. Not only the deists, with their 
purely individualistic view of religion ; 2 not only 

1 II. p. 619. The whole passage is instructive. Cf. also p. 623 : 
" Now, the essential characteristic of religion, and especially of the 
Christian religion, lies in this, that it takes as absolute truth what Kant 
regards as a mere type, and calls upon the Christian to renounce as 
inadequate and superficial, the very view of man's moral life which Kant 
treats as absolute truth. In this point of view, we may regard St. Paul's 
epistle to the Romans as the classical exposition of the Christian view 
of spiritual life, in opposition to a view of it closely analogous to the 
Kantian." 

The legalism of Kant's own view appears in his famous definition of 
religion, as *' the recognition of all our duties as divine commands." 
Religion, p. 183 [H. VI. p. 303]. Cf. also p. 201 [H. p. 350] : "Die wahre 
alleinige Religion enthalt nichts, als Gesetze, d. i. solche praktische 
Prinzipien, deren unbedingter Nothwendigkeit wir uns bewusst werden 
konnen, die wir also, als durch reine Yernunft (nicht empirisch) offen- 
bart, anerkennen " ; together with its corollary, p. 204 [H. p. 353] : 
"Alles, was ausser dem guten Lebenswandel der Mensch noch thun zu 
konnen vermeint, um Gott wohlgefallig zu werden, ist blosser Religions- 
wahn und Afterdienst Gottes." 

2 Por a full account of the views of the leading English deists, see Piinjer, 
op. cit. pp. 284-388. He defines deism as " a general movement in the way 
of intellectual inquiry and investigation regarding religion, with the 
tendency to derive all positive religions from one ' natural ' religion " 
(p. 291). A more definite definition, he thinks, can hardly be given, in 
view of the wide variety of treatment which the movement includes. He 
calls special attention to the contrast between historical deism, with its 
strong faith in God's present and constant activity upon the world through 
Providence, and the later dogmatic deism, which denies the latter, and 
regards God as an absentee (pp. 289, 290). 

Historically Piinjer distinguishes three periods in English deism. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 141 
Leibnitz, to whom religion is primarily a matter of 

1, that of the beginnings (Lord Herbert, Sir Thomas Browne, Hobbes 
etc.) ; 2, that of the full development, introduced by Locke, and including 
Toland, Collins, Shaftesbury, Tindal, Chubb, and Morgan; and 3, the 
closing period, represented by Hume. 

The views of the leading deists on our subject may be briefly sum- 
marized as follows : 

Period I. 

Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1648) makes universal consent the 
supreme test of religious truth. By this rule he obtains the following 
five points : 1, There exists a supreme God ; 2, He ought to be wor- 
shipped; 3, Virtue and piety form the main part of His worship; 4, Sins 
must be repented of and expiated ; 5, After this life we receive rewards 
and punishments. The various positive religions arise through corrup- 
tion of this true religion. There is no special treatment of Christianity. 
Cf. Piinjer, p. 294 sq.. 

Sir Thomas Browne (1605-1681) distinguishes between the religion of 
Christ and later Christianity, and shows himself indifferent to the special 
doctrines of the latter. The content of Christ's religion is made extremely 
simple and vague (Piinjer, p. 300 sq.). 

More favorably disposed to ecclesiastical Christianity is Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679). In his Leviathan, he distinguishes: 1, natural 
religion ; 2, natural political religion ; 3, prophetic religion. In the 
former, each man worships God according to reason. In the second, the 
state prescribes things in themselves indifferent as parts of worship, yet 
cannot regulate internal faith, nor require the dishonoring of God. 
Besides these we have prophetic religion which comes to us through the 
Bible. This may give what surpasses reason, but not what contradicts 
it. The proof of Scripture is partly the annunciation of the religion 
already received, partly miracles. The kingdom of God was founded 
by prophetic revelation, and restored by Christ, who promised future 
salvation, and revealed forgiveness and obedience as conditions of 
entrance. The one necessary article of Christian faith is that Jesus is 
the Christ (Cf. especially Leviathan, p. 584 sq,, Works, ed. Moles worth, 
Vol. III.; also Piinjer, p. 306 sq.). 

Period II. 

Of John Locke (1632-1704) we shall speak presently more at length. 
His most important works are his Letters on Toleration (1689-1692), and 
his Reasonableness of Christianity (1895). 

John Toland (1670-1722), in his Christianity not Mysterious (1696), 
distinguishes between the religion of Jesus and later corruptions. 



142 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

public order and prescription, ^ but even Spinoza, in his 

Shaftesbury (1671-1713), discusses the origin of the several historic 
religions. Christianity is not dealt with in detail, yet so far as it goes his 
judgment is favorable. Cf. Piinjer, p, 336. " The purpose of religion 
generally is to awaken in us all moral inclinations and sentiments, and to 
make us more perfect and accomplished in the practice of all duties ; yet 
this is not to be done by a reference to reward and punishment, but by 
the inner relationship between religion and virtue. The Christian 
religion realizes this purpose in the highest degree by implanting an 
all-embracing love." 

Matthew Tindal (1656-1753) in his Christianity as old as the Creation ; 
or, the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature (London, 1730), 
takes the position that true religion is always necessarily the same. It is 
essentially a law prescribing conduct. 

Thomas Chubb (1679-1747) teaches that " Christianity consists ob- 



1 Leibnitz's view of Christianity is set forth most clearly in the preface 
to his Theodice'e (1710). He declares that solid piety, i.e. light and 
virtue, has never been the possession of the many. For most people 
formalities take its place, either of thought or action (i. e. dogmas and 
ceremonies). These are praiseworthy if they serve as a hedge for the 
divine law, to keep off evil, accustom men to good, and render virtue 
familiar. This was the object of Moses, and other sage legislators, and 
above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of the most enlightened religion 
(divin foundateur de la religion la plus pure et la plus eclaire'e). 

The pagans who filled the earth before Christ came had only a single 
kind of formalities, i. e. ceremonies. The Hebrews alone had " public 
dogmas of their religion." They spoke in a very worthy way of the 
" sovereign substance," and one is surprised to find the inhabitants of a 
little canton more enlightened than the rest of mankind. Other wise men 
may have said the same things, but they did not succeed in gaining a 
following, or in making their doctrine a law. Moses, to be sure, did not 
enter the doctrine of immortality among his laws. It was in accord with 
his sentiments ; it was taught from mouth to mouth (de main en main) but 
it did not become authorized in a popular manner till Jesus Christ came. 
He lifted the veil, and without force at His back, taught with all the 
authority of a lawgiver that immortal souls pass into another life where 
they receive the rew^ard of their acts. . . . Thus Christ, drawing the full 
consequences from Moses' teaching, succeeded in making natural re- 
ligion a law, and giving it all the authority of a public dogma. He alone 
did what the philosophers had tried in vain to do, and with the triumph 
of Christianity, the religion of the wise became the religion of the masses. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 143 
"Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,"^ treats of religion as 

jectively in the natural moral law, and subjectively in a submission to it 
that is founded upon conviction" (Piinjer, p. 343). 

Thomas Morgan (d. 1743) takes the position that Christianity contains 
nothing essentially new. He gives us a good deal of criticism of the New 
Testament. Christ is the best teacher of natural religion, and for that 
reason, and that alone, we receive Him, 

Among the many answers to the deistic position we may note that of 
3 eftexj {Christianity, the Perfection of All Religion, Natural and Revealed, 
Loudon, 1728) ; Conybeare {Defence of Revealed Religion, 1732), in which 
he criticizes Tindal for failing to distinguish between the phrases, Law of 
Nature, and Religion of Nature ; and especially Bishop Butler, in his 
famous Analogy (1736). He sees in Christianity the confirmation of 
natural religion, and in addition the statement of certain further truths, 
not discoverable by reason, e. g. the doctrines of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit, as the second and third persons of the Trinity. 

Period III. 

The most important representative of this period is David Hume 
(1711-1776). Li his Natural History of Religion, lie attributes the origin 
of religion to natural causes. He regards polytheism as the original form, 
from which the later monotheism was derived. The latter he criticizes 
unfavorably, specially because of its attitude toward toleration. He 
compares the several historic religions and discusses their attitude toward 
courage, reason, doubt, etc. There is, however, no specific criticism, 
and no attempt to distinguish true Christianity from its later or spurious 
forms. His opinion may perhaps be inferred from the sentence at the 
close of his essay on miracles, in which he says that "even at this day, 
it {i. e. Christianity) cannot be believed by a reasonable person without 
(a miracle)." 

On deism, in addition to the works already referred to, the reader may 
consult John Hunt's Religious Thought in England from the Reformation 
to the end of the Last Century, 3 vols. London, 1870 sq. A full bibliography 
of the deistic literature, in chronological arrangement, is given by E. H. 
Gillett, in his God in Human Thought (New York, 1874, 2 vols.). 

1 Written 1656-1661, published 1670. Spinoza here distinguishes 
between philosophy and religion. The former has to do with knowledge, 
the second with obedience. Content of the Scriptures, Old and New 
alike, is the command of obedience, and the religious value of all dogmas 
is to be tested by their ability to promote this virtue. 

Beside the revelation vouchsafed to the Jewish prophets, Spinoza recog- 



144 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

a matter of precepts and doctrines, a law promulgated 
by some authorized teacher, to be observed by each 
individual as best he may. The remarkable thing about 
Kant is not that he should have failed to understand 
the mystic side of Christianity, but that, in such an age, 
he should have thought the doctrines which express this 
worthy of serious consideration at all. 

From the highly abstract teaching of the philosopher 
of Konigsberg to the sober common sense of Locke is a 
long step. An a priori construction of Christianity is 
the last thing in the mind of this practical English 
gentleman. Finding men about him disputing as to 
the nature of Christianity, and reaching conclusions 
diametrically opposed to one another, he betakes himself 

nizes prophets among the heathen. A still higher degree of revelation 
was communicated to Christ, in whom we may say that the wisdom of 
God has assumed human nature. Yet although Spinoza thus "puts 
Christ far above the Jewish prophets, he recognizes no material difference 
between the revelation of the Old Testament and that of the New. The 
doctrine is the same; only the prophets preached religion before the 
coming of Christ as the law of their country and by virtue of the covenant 
concluded in the time of Moses : whereas the apostles, after the appearing 
of Christ, preached the very same religion as a universal law, and by 
virtue of the sufferings of Christ" (Piinjer, p. 416). Cf. Tract. Theol. 
Polit. chap. xi. p. 134, " Nam hi non vocati sunt ut omnibus nationibus 
praedicarent et prophetarent, sed quibusdam tantum peculiaribus . . . 
At Apostoli vocati sunt, ut omnibus absolute praedicarent omnesque ad 
religionem converterent." Also chap. xii. p. 142 (Both references are to 
Ginsberg's ed. Leipzig, 1877). "Deinde hinc etiam scire possumus, cur 
Biblia in libros Veteris et Novi Testamenti dividantur : videlicet quia ante 
adventum Christi Prophetae religionem praedicare solebant, tanquam 
legem Patriae et ex vi pacti tempore Mosis initi ; post adventum autem 
Christi eandem tanquam legem Catholicam et ex sola vi passionis Christi 
omnibus praedicaverunt Apostoli : at non quod doctrina diversi sint, nee 
quod tanquam syngrapha foederis scripti fuerint, nee denique quod religio 
catholica, quae maxime naturalis est, nova esset, nisi reapectu hominum, 
qui earn non noverant." 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 145 

to the Scriptures to find out the facts. He takes his 
departure from the fall of Adam, since " to understand 
what we are restored to by Jesus Christ, we must con- 
sider what the Scriptures show we lost by Adam." 
"This," he continues, "I thought worthy of a diligent 
and unbiassed search: since I found the two extremes 
that men run into on this point, either on the one hand 
shook the foundations of all religion, or, on the other, 
made Christianity almost nothing: for while some men 
would have all Adam's posterity doomed to eternal, 
infinite punishment, for the transgression of Adam, 
whom millions had never heard of, and no one had 
authorized to transact for him or be his representative; 
this seemed to others so little consistent with the justice 
or goodness of the great and infinite God, that they 
thought there was no redemption necessary, and con- 
sequently, that there was none . . . and so made Jesus 
Christ nothing but the restorer and preacher of pure 
natural religion: thereby doing violence to the whole 
tenour of the New Testament." ^ Here we have a clear 
recognition of our question, What is the element which 
is distinctive of Christianity as a religion? To this 
Locke answers without hesitation. It is the recognition 
of Jesus as the Messiah. ^ This is the one thing which 

1 P. 4, Works, Vol. VII. (London, 1812). 

2 P. 112. " This is the law of that Kingdom, as well as for all man- 
kind; and that law, by which all men shall be judged at the last day. 
Only those who have believed Jesus to be the Messiah, and have taken 
Him to be their King, with a sincere endeavor after righteousness, in 
obeying His law, shall have their past sins not imputed unto them, and 
shall have that faith taken instead of obedience." See also p. 113, "The 
faith required was, to beUeve Jesus to be the Messiah, the Anointed ; who 
had been promised by God to the world ; " p. 17, and especially p. 102. 

10 



146 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

differentiates Christians and Jews, and makes the 
former adherents of a new religion. Other doctrines 
are taught in the Scripture (such, for example, as the 
Trinity), and may belong to historic Christianity in the 
larger sense. Locke will not deny their truth or their 
importance in their place. But they are not necessary 
to the existence of Christianity. A man may doubt 
them and still be a Christian. ^ The Messiahship of 
Jesus alone is the articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesice 
for Christianity. 2 

** Eor that this (i. e. the Messiahship of Jesus) is the sole doctrine pressed 
and required to be believed in the whole tenour of our Saviour's and His 
Apostles' preaching, we have showed through the whole history of the 
evangelists and the Acts. . . . This was the only gospel article of faith 
which was preached to them." To be sure, this is not a substitute for the 
moral law (p. 122), since the acceptance of Christ as Messiah means 
obedience to His requirements, which include the moral law. " Faith and 
repentance, {. e. believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and a good life," go 
together, as " the indispensable conditions of the New Covenant, to be 
performed by all those who would obtain eternal life" (p. 105). 

1 " There be many truths in the Bible, which a good Christian may be 
wholly ignorant of, and so not believe ; which, perhaps, some lay great 
stress on, and call fundamental articles, because they are the distinguishing 
points of their communion" (p. 152). Cf. p. 154, where he denies that the 
epistles are the best place to go, to discover essential Christianity. He 
does not deny " but the great doctrines of the Christian faith are dropt here 
and there, and scattered up and down in them ; " but they are " mixed with 
other truths." We shall find the " great and necessary points best, in the 
preaching of our Saviour and His Apostles, to those who were yet strangers 
and ignorant of the faith." 

2 The idea that the acceptance of Christ as Messiah is the one neces- 
sary article of Christian faith had already been anticipated by Hobbes in 
his Leviathan. Cf. p. 590, *' The unum necessarium, only article of faith, 
which the Scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation, is this, that Jesus 
is the Christ." Locke himself, however, seems to have reached his own 
position independently. He expressly states {Vindication, p. 187) that 
while at first his view " seemed mightily to satisfy my mind, in the reason- 
ableness and plainness of this doctrine," yet " the general silence I had in 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 147 

If you ask Locke further why this should be, he can- 
not answer. It is for God to prescribe, and for us to 
obey. It is enough that He has clearly revealed to us 
that this is His requirement. ^ Those who have not 
received the Christian revelation, God will judge justly 
according to the light they had.^ But for us, who have 

my little reading met with, concerning any such thing, awed me with the 
apprehension of singularity." However on "going on in the gospel his- 
tory, the whole tenour of it made it so clear and risible, that I more won- 
dered that everybody did not see and embrace it, than that I should assent 
to what was so plainly laid down, and so frequently inculcated in holy 
writ, though systems of divinity said nothing of it." Certainly Locke's 
statement is much fuller and abler than anything we find in Hobbes. 

It is interesting to compare with this view of Locke, that the accept- 
ance of Jesus' Messiahship is the fundamental Christian doctrine, Kant's 
reference to the clever device of the first preachers of Christianity, in 
including in their articles of faith, as part of universal religion, every- 
where and always valid, the provision " that every Christian must become 
a Jew whose Messiah had come " {Religion, p. 198 [H. VI. p. 346] ), 

1 To the objection, " That to believe only that Jesus of Nazareth is the 
Messiah is but an historical, and not a justifying or saving faith," he 
answers, " That I allow to the makers of systems and their followers to in- 
vent and use what distinctions they please and to call things by what 
names they think fit ; but I cannot allow to them or to any man an au- 
thority to make a religion for me, or to alter that which God hath re- 
vealed " (p. 101). 

Of. p. 134, " It is enough to justify the fitness of anything to be done 
by resolving it into the ' wisdom of God,' who has done it : though our 
short views and narrow understandings may utterly incapacitate us to 
see that wisdom, and to judge rightly of it." 

2 P. 132. "To this I answer: that God will require of every man, 
'according to what a man hath, and not according to what he hath not.' 
. . . But though there be many, who being strangers to the common- 
wealth of Israel were also strangers to the oracles of God, committed to 
that people ; many to whom the promise of the Messiah never came, and 
so were never in a capacity to believe or reject that revelation ; yet God 
had by the light of reason revealed to all mankind, who would make use 
of that light, that He was good and merciful. The same spark of the 
divine nature and knowledge in man, which, making him a man, showed 
him the law he was under, as a man ; showed him also the way of aton- 



148 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the higher revelation, He requires obedience to its new 
command. Here we see Locke unable to emancipate 
himself from the external and arbitrary conceptions of 
his time. God is a sovereign, whose commands we 
question at our peril, and Christianity a law which He 
has given us to obey. Yet, on the question why the 
religion of Israel was not sufficient, he has a number of 
suggestions to make.^ Judaism was a national religion. 
Jesus broke down the middle wall of partition and 
introduced the universal religion. He brought to man- 
kind at large a clear knowledge of God and of their 
duty. He reformed and simplified worship, brought 
encouragement to virtue through the hope of immor- 
tality, and gave promise of assistance through the Holy 
Spirit. Locke is ready to grant you that individual 
philosophers saw portions of truth, and that mankind 
ought to have perceived it all.^ But as a matter of 
fact they did not, and even on the plane of ethics alone 
no such body of teaching existed as was brought into 
the world by Christ.^ 

ing the merciful, kind, compassionate Author and Father of him and his 
being, when he had transgressed that law." 

1 P. 137. " If it be asked, whether the revelation to the patriarchs by 
Moses did not teach this, and why that was not enough," etc. 

2 P. 135. " The rational and thinking part of mankind, it is true, 
when they sought after Him, they found the one supreme, invisible God ; 
but if they acknowledged and worshipped Him, it was only in their own 
minds. They kept this truth locked up in their own breasts as a secret, 
nor ever durst venture it amongst the people." See also p. 143. " K any 
one shall think to excuse human nature, by laying blame on men's negli- 
gence^ that they did not carry morality to a higher pitch, ... he helps 
not the matter. Be the cause what it will, our Saviour found mankind 
under a corruption of manners and principles, which ages after ages had 
prevailed,and mustbe confessed, was notin a way or tendency to be mended." 

3 " Such a (law of morality) as this, out of the New Testament, I 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 149 

Christianity, then, to Locke, consists in the recogni- 
tion of the authority of Christ as God's representative 
and Messiah, and the belief and practice of the doctrines 
and precepts which He has prescribed. About this 
original core, other doctrines have grown up, such as 
the Trinity, which also belong to Christianity, but are 
not to be regarded as of its essence, or as necessary to 
salvation.^ 

In Lessing we meet a curious combination of the old 
and the new. So far as his positive conception of 
Christianity is concerned, it is as arbitrary and unhis- 
torical as that of Kant himself. Jesus Christ is the 



think the world never had, nor can any one say, is anywhere else to be 
found" (p. 143). 

1 Locke sums np his view most fully on p. 157. " God, out of the in- 
finiteness of His mercy, has dealt with man as a compassionate and tender 
Father. He gave him reason, and with it a law : that could not be other- 
ivise than what reason should dictate : unless we should think, that a rea- 
sonable creature should have an unreasonable law. But, considering the 
frailty of man, apt to run into corruption and misery, He promised a 
Deliverer, whom in His good time He sent ; and then declared to all man- 
kind, that whoever would believe Him to be the Saviour promised, and 
take Him now raised from the dead and constituted the Lord and Judge 
of all men, to be their King and Ruler, should be saved. This is a plain, 
intelligible proposition ; and the all-merciful God seems herein to have 
consulted the poor of this world, and the bulk of mankind. These are 
articles that the labouring and illiterate man can comprehend. This is a 
religion suited to vulgar capacities; and the state of mankind in this 
world, destined to labour and travail. The writers and wranglers in relig- 
ion fill it with niceties, and dress it up with notions, which they make 
necessary and fundamental parts of it ; as if there were no way into the 
church, but through the academy or lyceum. . . . That the poor had the 
gospel preached to them Christ makes a mark, as well as business of His 
mission (Matt. xi. 5). And if the poor have the gospel preached to them, 
it was without doubt such a gospel as the poor could understand, plain 
and intelligible ; and so it was, as we have seen, in the preachings of 
Christ and His Apostles." 



150 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

teacher who adds to the great doctrine of the unity of 
God which Moses had taught, the new dogma of im- 
mortalit}^, and so gives men a higher motive for right 
conduct than they had previously had.^ This is in 
substance the view already set forth by Leibnitz in his 
Theodicde more than eighty years before. But this 
abstract and inadequate conception is set in the frame- 
work of a great idea. It is that of the divine education 
of the human race. It is not that Christ has reasserted 
an unchanging religion of nature, but that He has led 
mankind one step higher in their approach to that " new 
eternal Gospel which is promised us ... in the New 
Testament itself. "^ In God's great schoolbook of time, 
each of the historic religions is a lesson which God has 
given humanity to learn. ^ None of them is final. As 

1 § 58. " TJnd so ward Christus der erste zuverlassige, praktische 
Lehrer der Unsterblichkeit der Seele." 

2 § 86. " Sie wird gewiss kommen, die Zeit eines neuen, ewigen 
Evangeliums, die uns selbst in den Elementarbiichern des Neuen Bundes 
versprochen wird." 

^ As a matter of fact, Lessing applies this conception only to Judaism 
and Christianity, which alone he regards as revealed religions in the 
special sense. The object of revelation is not to impart any truth which 
is above the reach of the natural reason, but " simply to teach man what 
he could have learned for himself, only more quickly and with less effort." 
It may happen that even without revelation man may anticipate much 
divine truth, as bright children pick up knowledge without schooling. 
But on the whole the progress of the race under revelation is more sure, 
and in time the books which record God's teaching of His chosen few be- 
come the schoolbooks of the entire race. The only mistake lies in being 
satisfied with elementary teaching instead of pressing on to new and 
higher truth. Even the New Testament is not final (§ 67). The mys- 
terious doctrines which it contains (Trinity, original sin, atonement) are 
some day to give place to the clearer, simpler statements, to which they 
were designed to lead (§ 76). Even immortality itself will some day 
come to be independent of its foundation in the New Testament (§ 72). 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 151 

Judaism has been superseded by Christianity, so Chris- 
tianity in turn will give place to the new religion that 
shall be. With this conception of humanity as pro- 
gressing through higher and ever higher stages to a 
distant goal, we find ourselves stepping out of the 
abstract world of the eighteenth century into the new 
historical world of the nineteenth. 

Turning back for a moment upon the threshold to 
gain a bird's-eye view of the country we are leaving, 
three characteristics impress themselves upon our atten- 
tion : first, the abstractness of the eighteenth century 
world; secondly, its individualism; thirdly, its ration- 
alism. 

1. It is characteristic of almost all the writers whom 
we have studied that they come to Christianity with 
their own pre-conceived notions, ready to find in it 
so much as may agree with their own views and no 
more. This is true of both sides, the defenders of 
traditional Christianity and its opponents. In this 
Kant is typical. We find little effort really to under- 
stand Christianity as an objective phenomenon pre- 
sented in history, or sympathetically to live oneself into 
its life and spirit, in order to learn, if possible, the secret 
of its power. Locke deserves honorable mention, for 
his effort to gain an objective and unprejudiced opinion 

Thus we see that in spite of his acceptance of the fact of revelation, to 
Lessing, no less than to his contemporaries, the only true religion is 
natural religion, and the position of Nathan, to whom all the historic 
religions are simply forms of the one universal religion of humanity, be- 
comes easily intelligible. 

On Lessing's relation to Christianity, cf. Bertheau, in Herzog, Real 
Encyklopadie,^ VIII. p. 608 sq. ; Dorner, Geschichte der protestantischen 
Theologie (1867), p. 721 sq. ; Piinjer, op. cit. p. 564 sq. 



152 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of Christianity, but he, too, is unable to lift himself 
above the controlling ideas of his age.^ Even in those, 
like Lessing and Herder, in whom we feel the stirring 
of a better day, we find the old abstract ideas too 
tenacious to make their contributions really fruitful for 
the understanding of historic Christianity. 

2. Of the individualism of the eighteenth century 
we have more than once spoken. Nowhere do we find 
any appreciation of the social aspects of the Christian 
Gospel. Here again Kant is typical. To one who is 
able to give a purely individualistic interpretation to 
such a doctrine as original sin, the more profound 
aspects of Christianity must remain a sealed book. 
The brotherhood, both in sin and in salvation, which 
plays so large a role in historic Christianity, is simply 
such as results from the aggregation of isolated indi- 
viduals, each complete in himself. Christ is Example, 
Teacher, Master. But of mediation in any deeper sense 
there is little understanding. Even to those whose 
theology includes such conceptions as incarnation and 
atonement, they are rather additional doctrines to be 
believed on authority, than integral elements in a con- 
sistent theological scheme. To thinkers of all schools, 
orthodox and rationalist alike, Christianity is law, not 
Gospel, and the only question in dispute is as to how 
much that law contains. 

3. We have already anticipated the third feature 
in the eighteenth century world, its rationalism. We 
use the word here in the narrow technical sense, to 
express that view of religion which conceives of it 

1 See note 1, p. 130. 



THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN THEOLOGY 153 

primarily as a system of doctrines or precepts, and has 
no adequate appreciation of its experimental elements. 
Kant is willing to admit that the supernatural may 
exist. But the man who claims to have first-hand 
knowledge of it may be set down as either deceiver or 
deceived.^ That sense of immediate contact with the 
divine which has been characteristic of the great reli- 
gious personalities in all ages is conspicuous by its 
absence. The being of God is established by argument 
of various kinds. Kant believes in Him because His 
existence is necessary to the integrity of his ethical 
system. The apologists, on the other hand, rely on the 
evidence of miracle or prophecy. But neither the one 
nor the other claims to know God by experience. 
Whatever may be His nature, He is not in the world 
but outside of it ; a noumenon, a postulate, a hypoth- 
esis, a Providence — anything but the One in whom we 
live and move and have our being. This is the back- 
ground which we must have constantly before us if 
we would appreciate the new epoch which was dawn- 
ing. Into this cold, abstract, rationalistic world came 
Schleiermacher, with his gospel of the sovereignty of 
the religious feeling. 

1 Religion, p. 229 [H. VI. pp. 376, 377]. "Der Begriff eines iibernat- 
iirliclien Beitritts zu unserem moralischen, obzwar mangelhaften Vermo- 
gen . . . ist transcendent und eine blosse Idee von deren Realitat uns 
keine Erfahrung versichern kann. . . . Allein die Unmoglichkeit davon 
. . . lasst sich doch eben auch nicht beweisen." 



CHAPTER V 

THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER ^ 

1. Life and Theological Activity, 

The father of modern scientific theology is Frederick 
Daniel Ernest Schleiermacher. Born in 1768 in Bres- 

1 The literature on ScUeiermacher is so voluminous that it is possible 
to mention only a few of the more important and helpful works. For the 
older bibliography the reader may be referred to the article by Gass, in 
Herzog, Real Encyklopddie,^ Vol. XIII. p. 570 sq. Much useful information 
is also contained in the bibliographical notes of Bleek's Grundlagen der 
Christologie Schleiermachers (Freiburg, 1898). 

For the life of Schleiermacher, cf. Dilthey, Schleiermachers Leben, 
Vol. I. Berlin, 1870. The autobiography and letters of Schleiermacher 
have been published in four volumes under the title, Aus Schleiermachers 
Leben (Berlin, 1858) ; also translated by Frederica Rowan, under the 
title, The Life of Schleiermacher, as unfolded in his autobiography and 
letters (London, 2 vols. 1860, quoted in what follows as Rowan). His 
correspondence with Gass has been separately edited [Briefwechsel mit J. 
Chr. Gass, Berlin, 1852). Special studies have been published, among 
others, by Baur {Studien und Kritiken, 1859, Heft 3 und 4); Auberlen 
(Schleiermacher : Ein Charakterbild, Basel, 1859) ; Kosack {Schleiermachers 
Jugendleben, Elberfeld, 1861); Baxman (Friedrich Schleiermacher: Sein 
Leben und sein Wirken, Elberfeld, 1868) ; Schenkel {Friedrich Schleier- 
macher : Ein Lebens und Charakterbild, Elberfeld, 1868). The English 
reader may also find brief accounts in the introduction to the 
translation of the Reden by J. Oman (London, 1893) and of the Kurze 
Darstellung, by Farrer (Edinburgh, 1850), to which is prefixed a transla- 
tion of Liicke's Reminiscences of Schleiermacher. 

Among the older works, those of Baur {Die christliche Gnosis, Tiibin- 
gen, 1835, pp. 626-668); Schmid {Ueber Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, 
Leipzig, 1835), Rosenkranz {Kritik der schleiermacherschen Glaubenslehre, 
Konigsberg, 1836), Gess {Ueber sicht iiber das theologische System Dr. Fr. 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 155 

lau, adding to the early training of the Moravian schools 
of Niesky and Barby the scientific education of the 
University of Halle, filling successively positions of 

Schleiermacher , und iiber die Beurtheilungen, wehlxe dasselhe . . , erhalten 
hat, 2(i edition, Reutlingen, 1837); Strauss {Schleiermacher und Daub, 
in Charakteristiken und Kritiken, Leipzig, 1839) ; and Schaller ( For/esun^ren 
iiber Schleiermacher, Halle, 1844) will still be found serviceable. 

Special monographs by Fischer [Die schleiermachersche Trennung der 
Theologie von der Philosophie vgl. mit der spinozischen, in Stud, und Krit. 1848, 
p. 632 sa.) ; Sigwart {Schleiermachers Erkenntnisstheorie undihre Bedeutung 
fur die Glaubenslehre, in Jahr. Jiir deut. TheoL Vol. II. Heft 2) and Zeller 
{Erinnerung an Schleiermachers Lehre von der Personlichkeit Goites, in 
Theol Jahrbucher, 1842, Heft 2). 

Among more recent works we may mention in the order of their 
appearance : 

1. A. Ritschl, Schleiermachers Reden iiber die Religion, und ihre Nach- 
wirkungen aufdie evangelische Kirche Deutschlands, Bonn, 1874. 

2. Lipsius, Schleiermachers Reden, in Jahr. fur prot. Theol. 1875; 
Schleiermacher und die Romantik, " Im neuen Reich," 1876, I. No. 19. 

3. Bender, Schleiermachers Theologie, mit ihren philosophischen Grund- 
lagen dargestellt, Nordlingen, 1876. 

4. O. Ritschl, Schleiermachers Stellung zum Christentum in seinen Reden 
iiber die Religion, Gotha, 1888. Cf. also by the same, Schleiermachers 
Theorie von der Frommigkeit in Theol. Stud. B. Weiss gewidmet, Got- 
tingen, 1897. 

5. Kalthoff, Schleiermachers Vermachtnis an unsere Zeit, Braunschweig, 
1896. 

6. Bleek, Die Grundlagen der Christologie Schleiermachers,- Freiburg, 
1898. 

7. M. Fischer, Schleiermacher : Zum hundertjdhrigen Geddchtnis der 
Reden, Berlin, 1899. 

8. Huber, Die Entwicklung des Religionsbegriffs von Schleiermacher 
(in Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche, hrg. von Bonwetsch 
und Seeberg, VII. 3), Leipzig, 1901. 

Much information may also be gained from the relevant sections of the 
general works of Lichtenberger ( Histoire des Ide'es religieuses en Allemagne, 
II. p. 65 sq.) ; Gass, {Geschichte der prot. Dogmatik, IV. p. 434 sg.) ; Ritschl 
{Recht. und Vers. I. p. 484) ; Pfleiderer (Development of Theology, p. 44 sq. 
and especially p. 103 sq.) ; Frank {Geschichte und Kritik der neneren Theol- 
ogie, t^. b4: sq.) and Kattenbusch {Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl, Giessen, 
1893). 



156 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

commanding influence as preacher and professor, dying, 
at last, in 1834, as professor of theology in Berlin, his 
life was one of unusual breadth and variety of influence. 
A man of encyclopsedic learning,^ equally at home in 
history, classics, philosophy, ethics, and theology, he 
combined with a dialectic genius rare in any age, a reli- 
gious nature of unusual depth and fervor. From the 
devout brethren who had been his earliest teachers he 
had learned to think of religion as a matter of experi- 
ence, rather than of dogma or of rite, and to distinguish 
between theology as theory and the life which it seeks 
to explain. Equally sensitive to influences of the head 
and heart, no man was ever better furnished by nature 
to apprehend the problem we have been discussing, or 
to contribute to its solution. 

Schleiermacher's father, a clergyman of the Reformed 
church, was chaplain of a Silesian regiment. In his 
earlier years he had been infected by the prevailing 
rationalism, but later came under the influence of the 
Moravian brethren, to whose instruction he committed 
his son, sending him in 1783 to school at Niesky, and 
two years later to the gymnasium at Barby. Schleier- 
macher himself was a delicate child. During his resi- 
dence at Barby, he fell into religious doubts as to the 
doctrines of the atonement and of eternal punishment. ^ 
These became so serious as to lead to his withdrawal 
in 1787, in spite of his father's protests, to the Univer- 

1 In one of his letters he expresses the wish " some day to write a 
book about everything," but admits that he shall probably have to post- 
pone this a good many years, as he shall require a long time to gather 
his materials (Rowan, Vol. I, p. 209.). 

* Compare his letter to his father, Jan. 21, 1787, Rowan, I. p. 47. 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 157 

sity of Halle, where he lived with his uncle, Stubenrauch. 
Here he made a special study of philosophy, and laid 
the foundations of that extraordinary learning for 
which he later became famous. After leaving Halle, 
he spent a year with his uncle at Drossen in Neumark. 
He was licensed in 1790, and became tutor in the 
family of Count Dohna of Schlobitten in Prussia, where 
he spent three years. In 1794, after half a year as 
member of Gedike's Seminary in Berlin, and teacher 
in the orphanage of Kornmesser, he was ordained, and 
became an assistant of Pastor Schumann of Landsberg. 
In 1796, he was appointed preacher at the Charity 
Institute at Berlin. Here he came under the influence 
of Schlegel, and of Dorothea Veit, and through them 
entered the social and artistic circles of Berlin, and 
became a part of the romantic movement which was 
then exercising so potent an influence upon the younger 
spirits. In this period falls his commentary on " Lu- 
cinde,"^ and his unfortunate love affair with Eleanore 
Griinow. But he had time for deeper interests as well. 
In 1799 appeared his "Reden liber die Religion"; in 
1800, the "Monologen." In 1802 he removed from 
Berlin to Stolpe, where he became court preacher. 
Here he worked on a translation of Plato, and on an eth- 
ical work.2 In 1804, he became professor extraordinary 
at Halle. He returned to Berlin in 1807, to become 
in the following year preacher at the Dreifaltigheits- 

1 Lucinde was a novel, written by Schlegel, in which he allowed him- 
self a freedom of expression which made him a subject of just criticism. 
Schleiermacher's commentary was written to call attention to the deeper 
purpose of his friend's book. 

2 Kritik oiler hisherigen Sittenlehre, 1803. 



158 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

hirehe. Soon after he married Henriette von Willich, 
the widow of one of his former friends. In 1810, he 
became professor at the University of Berlin; in 1814, 
secretary of the Academy of Sciences. Then followed . 
years full of activity in the university, in public life, 
and in the church, as well as in literary and intellectual 
work. He died on the 12th of February, 1834. 

The theological activity of Schleiermacher centres 
about two questions : " What is Keligion ? " and " What 
is Christianity ? " To the first he addresses himself in 
the "Reden" (1799).i The second is the theme of his 
" Glaubenslehre " (1821).2 A word as to the first will 
prepare us to appreciate the significance of the second. ^ 

1 " Reden iiber die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern." 
First edition, 1799; reprinted with an introduction by Otto, Gottingen, 
1899 ; second edition, considerably revised, 1806. A third edition with ex- 
planatory notes was issued immediately after the appearance of the Glau- 
benslehre, 1821. Fourth edition, practically unchanged, 1831 (reprint with 
introduction by Schwarz, 2d ed. Leipzig, 1880). A critical edition, com- 
paring the variations of the different editions, was issued by Piinjer in 
1879. The references which follow are to Schwarz's edition. A translation 
of the third edition has been made by John Oman, London, 1893. Unless 
otherwise stated, the references in what follows are given to this transla- 
tion. 

2 " Der christliche Glauhe nacli den Grundsazen der evangelischen Kirche 
im Zusammenhange dargestellt" (1821 ; second edition, 1830, 1831). The 
quotations in the following are from the Berlin edition of 1884, in two 
volumes. 

Apart from the Glaubenslehre and the Reden, the most important 
sources for Schleiermacher's view of Christianity are his Sermons (1801), 
the Weihnachtsfeier (1806), a dialogue on the significance of Christ- 
mas, in which his sense of the importance of Christianity as a historic 
religion clearly appears, and especially his Kurze Darstellung des theolo- 
gischen Studiums (1811, 2d ed., with notes, Berlin, 1830. Eng. tr. by 
Farrer, Edinburgh, 1850). 

* The question as to the relation of the Reden to the Glaubenslehre 
has been much discussed. Most scholars find a marked difference of 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 159 



2. Schleiermacher^ s View of Religion. 

The boyhood of Schleiermacher was passed in a period 
- of shallow rationalism. The elaborate system-building 

standpoint, but as to its significance they are not agreed. Otto Ritschl 
(Schleiermackers Stellung zum Christentum in seinen Reden ilber. die Religion. 
Bin Beitrag zur Bhrenrettung Schleiermackers, Gotha, 1878, chap, i.) re- 
gards the apparent difference of view as due to the apologetic purpose 
of the Reden, the author striving as far as possible to put himself 
in the position of the " cultured despisers " whom he seeks to win over. 
The exoteric character of the speeches, so he maintains, forbids us to 
argue as to Schleiermacher's real views. In support of this position it 
may be urged that the sermons which Schleiermacher published in 1801 
show a much more positive view of Christianity than would appear from 
the Reden. To the same effect might be cited Schleiermacher's letter to 
Jacobi, written much later (Rowan, II. p. 280 sq.), in which he says of 
himself that " in point of feeling I am religious and a Christian, and have 
entirely renounced heathenism, or, rather, I have never possessed any." 
Strauss, on the other hand [Charakteristiken und Kritiken, 1839, p. 23), 
emphasizes the contrast between the two works. According to his 
opinion, the Reden were written " out of the consciousness of one who, 
so far as his feeling and thought are concerned, had yet by no means 
definitely taken up his abode within the Christian religion and the church." 
In the • Glaubenslehre, we have the definite abandonment of the earlier, 
freer position of the Reden in the interests of a more narrow conventional 
orthodoxy. To Strauss there is something extremely unpleasant in the 
spectacle of the aged Schleiermacher, in his role of censor, criticizing the 
faults of his own theological youth. 

The truth would seem to lie midway between the two views. Some 
change can hardly be denied. A comparison of the first and second edi- 
tions of the Reden shows a decided advance in the direction of the later 
positions. Comparing the later edition with the Glaubenslehre, as Lipsius 
has done in his careful study of the Reden in the Jahr. fiir prot. Theol. 
for 1875 (p. 314), we find substantial agreement. But even in the first 
edition we find in germ most of the points of view which come to expres- 
sion in the Glaubenslehre. Schleiermacher himself maintains that while 
in form the Reden and the Glaubenslehre are very different and their 
points of departure lie far apart, yet in content they are entirely consistent 
(doch ihrem Inhalt nach vollkommen ineinander mogen auflosen kounen), 
Reden, II. note 5, Eng. tr. p. 105. In the present discussion we shall 
consider the view of religion to which Schleiermacher finally came, Avith- 



160 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of the later Protestantism had issued in a narrow and 
intolerant dogmatism from which thoughtful men re- 
acted more and more. Unable to accept theological 
propositions equally repugnant to reason and to con- 
science, they ended by denying the reality of the 
religious life which they sought to express. Schleier- 
macher, in a passage of rare eloquence and pathos, tells 
us that in his day religion had utterly ceased even to 
interest educated men. So far had it passed out of the 
horizon of their thought, that it was not considered 
worth while even to deny it. And the only feeling 
upon which the Christian apologist, seeking to find a 
point of contact on which to base his appeal, could 
lay hold, was men's contempt. ^ In such an age, and 
before such an audience, Schleiermacher stands forth as 
the prophet of the abiding worth of religion. 

The discourses in which Schleiermacher has expressed 
his view of religion are in no sense systematic treatises. 
They are songs rather than arguments, prose poems, 
glowing with all the enthusiasm of a new discovery, 
and appealing to men with the force which always 
attaches to personal conviction. From the beginning 
to the end but a single note is struck, religion as the 

out endeavoring to trace its development in detail. The reader who 
desires to follow the subject farther is referred to the careful collec- 
tion of material in Huber, Die Entwicklung des Religionsbegriffs hei 
Schleiermacher, (in Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche, hrg. 
von Bonwetsch und Seeberg, Vol. VII.) Leipzig, 1901. 

1 Reden, Schwarz's ed. p. 12, Eng. tr. p. 12. 

With this may be compared the celebrated passage in the introduction 
to Bishop Butler's Analogy (1736). "It has come, I know not how, to be 
taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a 
subject of inquiry ; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious." 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 161 

immediate contact of the soul with God. What you 
call religion, he cries to his hearers, is not really such. 
The dogmas and rites with which you identify it are 
only garments in which for the time it has chanced to 
clothe itself, but which may be thrown aside without 
affecting its nature. ^ Religion is neither doctrine nor > 
ceremony. Religion is experience. It has its home 
below thought, even below conscience, in the emotional 
nature of man.^ Religion is the sense of the infinite in 
the finite.^ It is the feeling of absolute dependence.* 

^ Cf. Reden, p. 14, Eng. tr. p. 14. "You are doubtless acquainted 
with the histories of human follies, and have reviewed the various struc- 
tures of religious doctrine, from the senseless fables of wanton peoples to 
the most refined deism, from the rude superstition of human sacrifice to the 
ill-put-together fragments of metaphysics and ethics, now called purified 
Christianity, and you have found them all without rhyme or reason. I 
am far from wishing to contradict you." 

2 This thought is fully developed in the second discourse on the nature 
of religion, where Schleiermacher contrasts religion with thought and 
action, as feeling. Compare the celebrated passage descriptive of the rise 
of consciousness, that fleeting moment, gone almost before it has come, 
when subject becomes one with object, individual with the whole, in the 
unity of feeling, etc. ; " Wenn ich ihn wenigstens vergleichen diirfte," 
etc., " Did I venture to compare it " (p. 40, Eng. tr. p. 43). 

3 P. 34, Eng. tr. p. 36. " The contemplation of the pious is the im- 
mediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things in and 
through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the 
Eternal. Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives and moves, 
in all growth and change, in all doing and suffering. It is to have life 
and to know life in immediate feehng, only as such an existence in the 
Infinite and Eternal." 

* Cf. Glaubenslehre, § 4, p. 14. "Das gemeinsame aller noch so ver- 
schiedenen Aeusserungen der Frommigkeit, wodurch diese sich zugleich 
von alien andern Gef iihlen unterscheiden, also das sich selbst gleiche Wesen 
der Frommigkeit ist dieses, dass wir uns unsrer selbst als schlechthin 
abhangig, oder, was dasselbe sagen will, als in Beziehung mit Gott 
bewusst sind." The identification of the feeling of absolute dependence 
with the consciousness of relation to God appears here much more clearly 

11 



162 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

There are passages in the "Reden" where the stress 
upon feeling is carried to such an extent that it seems 
to exclude religion from all contact with practical life.^ 
But a more careful reading shows that this is not 
Schleiermacher's true thought. The separation of feel- 
ing from thought and action is possible only logically. ^ 
Practically they are inseparably connected. " To wish 
to have true science or true practice without religion," 
he exclaims, " or to imagine it possessed, is obstinate, 
arrogant delusion and culpable error. . . . What is 
all science, if not the existence of things in you, in 
your reason ? What is all art and culture if not your 
existence in the things to which you give measure, 
form, and order? And how can both come to life in 
you except in so far as there lives immediately in you 

than in the Reden. In the first edition of the latter we find such expres- 
sions as " the heavenly spark which is produced when a holy soul is stirred 
by the Universe." Religion " is reverent attention and submission, in 
childlike passivity, to be stirred and filled by the Universe's immediate 
influences" (quoted in Oman's tr. pp. 276, 277). In later editions God is 
frequently substituted for Universe. In a note to the third edition (p. 23, 
Eng. tr. p. 24), Schleiermacher repels the charge of Pantheism directed 
against his early utterances, and explains the reference to the Universe 
from the fact that it is, " when a man surrenders himself to the Universe " 
that those "pious emotions" rise which " pass immediately into religious 
ideas and views, and into a temperament of surrender to God." (Cf. the 
fuller note, p. 93, Eng. tr. p. 103 ; also Lipsius, op. cit. p. 292 sq.). 

^ E. g. pp. 52, 53, Eng. tr. p. 57, " Lest you should think that I am 
merely quibbling, consider that religion by itself does not urge men to 
activity at all ; " p. 42, Eng. tr. p. 45, " This {i. e. the realm of feeling) is the 
peculiar sphere which I would assign to religion." Cf. also the passage, 
p. 33, Eng. tr. p. 35, beginning, " Um euch also ihren urspriinglichen," 
etc., the true sense of which is, however, obscured in the translation by 
the unhappy rendering of the " vorlaufig " of the original by " once 
for all." 

2 Reden, p. 36, Eng. tr. p. 39. 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 163 

the eternal unity of Reason and Nature, the universal 
existence of all finite things in the Infinite? "^ 

For it must never be forgotten that the religious 
feeling of which Schleiermacher makes so much is not 
the mystic sense of absorption in the Infinite. On the 
contrary, it takes for granted the separate existence of 
the individual, and realizes itself through the contact 
of the self with the infinite variety of the world. ^ The 
Infinite of which we are conscious is not a vague un- 
conditioned, but the infinity of existence in general, as 
it realizes itself through the concrete world of experi- 
ence with its endless richness and variety. ^ It is the 
discovery of the Infinite in the very midst of the finite, 
as that on which it depends, and in which it exists, 
which makes out the essence of the religious life.* 

This strong sense of individuality gives to Schleier- 
macher 's thought its wonderful freshness and attrac- 
tiveness. The religious experience, while at bottom 
fundamentally the same (i. e, as consciousness of 

1 Ihid. p. 37. 

2 Cf . especially pp. 5-8, Eng. tr, pp. 3-7 of the Reden, where the ideal 
religious leader is represented as the man who unites in himself in supreme 
degree the two inherent tendencies of human nature, the self-assertive 
and the dependent. 

3 Cf. Reden, note, p. 93, Eng. tr. p. 103. We cannot be conscious of 
the Infinite " immediately, and through itself," hut only through the 
finite, as " our tendency to postulate and seek a world leads us from 
detail and part to the All and the Whole. Hence sense for the Infinite, 
and the immediate life of the finite in us as it is in the Infinite, are 
one and the same (So ist demnach Sinn fiir das Unendliche, und un- 
mittelbares in uns Leben des Endlichen, wie es im Unendlichen ist, 
eins und dasselbe)." 

* Cf. the beautiful description of the origin of religion (p. 58 sq., 
Eng. tr. p. 63 sq.), in which Schleiermacher describes how God is fonnd 
successiyely in nature, in man, and in history. 



164 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

dependence upon the Infinite), realizes itself in many 
ways, according to the different conditions in which 
the individual may be placed, and the different ways 
in which he may conceive his relation to the Infinite. 
Sometimes this variety is carried to such a point that 
it seems to destroy all possibility of unity. ^ Thus 
Schleiermacher repels the singular notion of one true 
religion with which all others are contrasted as false.^ 
It follows from the idea of religion that it is infinitely 
various ; "not to be comprehended under one form, 
but only under the sum-total of all forms. '' ^ But all 
the forms, the lower as well as the higher, are alike, 
in their place, good. So far from being exclusive, 
"religion is the natural and sworn foe of all narrow- 
mindedness and of all onesidedness." * 

1 Cf. p. 46, Eng. tr. p. 50. The inner unity of the religious life (diese 
innere Einheit der Religiositat) "spreads itself out into a great variety of 
provinces, and again, in each province it contracts itself, and the narrower 
and smaller the province, the more is necessarily excluded as incom- 
patible, and the more included as characteristic. . . . Eeligion thus 
fashions itself with endless variety, down even to the single personality." 
Cf. p. 203, Eng. tr. p. 217, "No one will have his own true and right 
religion, if it is the same for all ; " p. 209, Eng. tr. p. 224, where he urges 
that the man who does not find himself at home in any existing religion 
is bound " to produce a new one within himself (eine neue in sich selbst 
her vorzubrin gen) . " 

2 P. 49, Eng. tr. p. 53. Cf. p. 203, Eng. tr. p. 217, "You are wrong 
therefore, with your universal religion that is natural to all." The same 
thought recurs in the Glaubenslehre, I. p. 39. " Nur dass vertragt sich 
nicht mit unserm Satz (i. e. von der ausschliessenden Vortrefflichkeit 
des Christenthums) dass die christliche Frommigkeit sich wenigstens 
zu den meisten anderen Gestaltungen verhalten soil, wie die wahre zu den 
falschen." Yet cf. the preceding part of the paragraph, and the ex- 
planatory note on p. 98, Eng. tr. p. 107, of the Reden, which shows the 
sense in which Schleiermacher wishes his denial to be understood. 

3 P. 49, Eng. tr. p. 54. 

4 P. 51, Eng. tr. p. 56. Cf. p. 232, Eng. tr. p. 251, where he denies 
that Christianity desires to be the sole and universal religion. 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 165 

Are we then to conclude that there ought to be as 
many religions as there are men? In the sense that 
no individual religious experience can be the perfect 
reproduction of any other, this is true.^ But this is 
only one side of Schleiermacher's thought. Manifold 
as are the varieties of the religious feeling, they are 
not arbitrary, but follow certain definite laws.^ The 
individual experiences of men gather themselves into, 
groups according to certain specific principles, and so 
the positive religions are born.^ Whatever ought to 
be the case theoretically, practically religion, like every 
other fundamental human experience, is a social affair 
and propagates itself through contact.* Thus mediation 

1 Compare p. 210 sg.,Eng. tr. p. 225 sq., where Schleiermacher shows 
that this variety is possible within each historic religion. See also p. 99, 
Eng. tr. p. 108. 

2 P, 46, Eng. tr. p. 50. " Eeligion is certainly a system, if you mean 
that it is formed according to an inward and necessary connection. . . . 
Whatever occurs anywhere, whether among many or few, as a peculiar 
and distinct kind of feeling, is in itself complete, and by its nature 
necessary." Compare also p. 198, Eng. tr. p. 212, 

3 P. 202, Eng. tr. p. 217. "You will then find that the positive 
religions are just the definite forms in which religion must exhibit itself." 
Compare p. 49, Eng. tr. p. 53. 

It is interesting at this point to contrast Schleiermacher's view of 
religion with Kant's. To Kant there can be but one (true) religion, 
which he will construct you a priori, and which manifests itself more or 
less perfectly in a variety of different churches. To Schleiermacher, in 
the ideal, there should be but one church (p. 199, Eng. tr. p. 213), though 
there may be many religions. The positiveness which Kant regards as a 
weakness, he sees as the strength of religion (p. 200 sq., Eng. tr. p. 215), 
and bids his readers join some one of the many historical religions, sure 
that they will find room within it for the proper play of their own in- 
dividual feeling. Cf. p. 211, Eng. tr. p. 226. 

* Glaubenslehre, § 6 ; also Reden, chaps, iii. and iv, passim. Compare 
especially p. 115, Eng. tr. p. 123 (religion as embracing a mastership and 
a discipleship). 



166 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

becomes a familiar religious fact.^ This explains 
the stress laid in all the great historic religions upon 
their origin. ^ If, indeed, the relation of the religions 
to their founders were but an arbitrary one, based 
upon adventitious circumstances, and maintaining itself 
simply through external tradition, it would be a different 
matter. But this is not the case. At the root of every 
one of the great religions, there lies a spiritual affinity 
which was the original bond of union. In the founder 
or teacher, some one of the possible types of relationship 
to God for the first time found historic expression, ^ 
and it was this fact which drew to him his disciples, 
and which, so far as the religion is a living one, still 
holds them together. Hence in seeking to understand 
any great religion we must endeavor to discover what 
was the character of the primitive religious feeling from 
which it sprang, and what is the relation of this original 
feeling to its later manifestations.* 

1 Reden, pp. 7, 8, Eng. tr. pp. 6, 7. Compare also pp. 225, 226, 228- 
230, Eng. tr. pp. 242, 243, 246-248, especially p. 228, Eng. tr. p. 247, 
where we read that " all finite things require the mediation of a higher 
being." See also the definition of Christianity in the Glaubenslehre, § 11. 

'^ Reden, p. 219, Eng. tr. p. 236, " Religious men are throughout histori- 
cal." See also p. 218, Eng. tr. p. 234, "If a definite religion may not 
begin with an original fact, it cannot begin at all." 

3 P. 208, Eng. tr. p. 22259-. "Demmachbleibt, dass ich's kurz sage, 
kein anderer Weg iibrig, wie eine wirklich individuelle [Religion] kann zu 
Stande gebracht worden sein, als dadurch, dass irgendeines von den grossen 
Verhaltnissen der Menschheit in der Welt und zum hochsten Wesen auf 
eine bestimmte Art , , . zum Mittelpunkt der gesamraten Religion 
gemacht und alle iibrigen auf dieses eine bezogen worden." The English 
translation at this point is not wholly accurate. Cf. also p. 220, Eng. tr. 
p. 236. " You can easily imagine, then, how much more sacred still the 
moment must be in which this infinite intuition was first set up in the 
world as the foundation and centre of one peculiar religion." 

* This is indeed no easy process. There are many perils to be avoided 



THE DEFINITION OF SCBLEIERMACIIER 167 

We have lingered so long over Schleiermacher's 
conception of religion, because it is necessary for the 
understanding of his view of Christianity. No attempt 
to conceive of Christianity scientifically can be success- 
ful, which is not based upon a clear conception of the 
nature of religion. Here the influence of Schleier- 
macher is epoch making. It is, indeed, the fashion 
to-day to criticize his definition as inadequate and one- 
sided. Religion, we are told, is much more than feel- 
ing. It is an affair of the whole man, and includes 
intellect and will as well. Such criticism, however 
technically justified, rests upon a misapprehension of 
Schleiermacher's purpose. He is not attempting an 
exhaustive definition of religion. He is calling atten- 
tion to the fact, of which his contemporaries, both 
orthodox and rationalist, had lost sight, that religion 
is an integral element in human life, having its roots 
below all that is secondary and derived, in the recesses * 
of the emotional nature. God, who is the Absolute, 
is not outside of life, the conclusion of a syllogism, as 
the philosophers maintain, or even the object of a reve- 
lation, as the theologians contend. God is present as a 
factor in the most familiar experience. We cannot 
escape Him if we would. Because religion is so 
grounded in human nature, a scientific conception of 
any particular religion is possible. ^ 

on the way, and ScWeiermacher is half inclined to doubt whether some of 
his readers will succeed in finding it. Cf. p. 219 sq., Eng. tr. p. 235 sq.; 
and especially p. 221, Eng. tr. p. 238. But the end is worth the effort. 
Especially when it is a matter of understanding "the holiest in which the 
Universe in its highest unity and comprehensiveness is to he perceived " 
( {. e. Christianity), Schleiermacher " cannot be indifferent as to whether 
or not you find the right point of view." 

1 This is the root of Schleiermacher's well-known conception of 



168 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 



3. Schleiermacher'* s Definition of Christianity, 

Having laid this broad basis in the conception of 
religion, we are prepared to consider more in detail 
Schleiermacher's view of Christianity. Here the '' Glaub- 
enslehre " must be our chief source.^ 

By Christianity Schleiermacher understands that 
from of teleological monotheism in which everything is 
referred to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of 
Nazareth.2 This somewhat technical definition is based 
upon a preceding classification of religion which is as 
follows : — 

According to Schleiermacher, the differences between 

dogmatics as a historical discipline. Since each of the great religions is 
the expression of a certain characteristic type of feeling, the only way to 
understand it is to discover in each case what that feeling is, and to follow 
it out into all its relations and consequences. This involves not merely 
a study of the history of each religion in the past, but also a careful 
analysis of its present condition, as it expresses itself in the various 
utterances of the contemporary religious life. The last is the work of 
dogmatics, which, because it is not a purely speculative or theoretical 
study, but is tied to a particular subject-matter given in experience, is to 
be classed as a historical discipline. Cf. the Kurze Darstellung, § 97, Eng. 
tr. p. 130, and especially the celebrated definition in the Glaubenslehre, 
§ 15, "Christliche Glaubenssatze sind Auffassungen der christlich from- 
men Gemiithszustande in der Rede dargestellt." 

^ Cf. §§ 7-14. Beside the Glaubenslehre, the subject is discussed in 
the Reden. Cf. especially II. pp. 46 sq., Eng. tr. pp. 50-56, with note 8, 
p. 98, Eng. tr. p. 107; and V, p. 196 sq., Eng. tr. p. 211 sq., especially 
223-end, Eng. tr. p. 241-end. Cf. also Kurze Darstellung, §§ 32-36, Eng. 
tr. p. 104 sq. 

2 Glaubenslehre, § 11. **Das Christen thum ist eine der teleologischen 
Richtung der Frbmmigkeit angehorige monotheistische Glaubensweise, 
uud unterscheidet sich von andern solchen wesentlich dadurch, dass alle« 
in derselben bezogen wird auf die durch Jesum von Nazareth vollbrachte 
Erlosung." 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 169 

the historic religions are of two kinds. They are either 
distinct types, or more or less perfect developments of 
the same type.^ It follows from the nature of religion 
as the feeling of absolute dependence that, of its various 
forms, the monotheistic is the highest ; the one to 
which all the others are ultimately destined to conform. 2 
But monotheism alone is not a sufficiently definite prin-# 
ciple of classification. It is a necessary stage in the 
development of all religion, and contains within itself 
widely different types. These also we must learn to 
distinguish if we would attain to a scientific classifica- 
tion. Accordingly Schleiermacher further classifies 
religions as natural or moral, according to the relative 
stress which they give to considerations of the former 
or the latter class in their estimate of human affairs.^ 
By teleological religions Schleiermacher means such 
as make ethical considerations controlling,* whereas 
those in which the reverse is the case he designates as 
aesthetic.^ But abstract considerations alone cannot 
perfectly express the genius of a historical religion. 
If we would understand its spirit, we must take account 
of its origin. It is the union of a definite spiritual type 
with a concrete embodiment in some great historic per- 
sonality which gives its individuality to any particular 
religion.^ Applying these principles' to the definition 

1 Glaubenslehre, § 7, 1, p. 36 

2 § 8, I. p. 40. ^ § 9, I. p. 48. 
4 I. p. 50. 5 I, p. 51, 

6 § 10. *' Jede einzelne Gestaltung gemeinschaftlicher Frommigkeit 
ist eine theils ausserlich. als ein von einem bestimmten Anfang aus- 
gehendes geschichtlichstatiges, theils innerlich als eigenthiimliche Aban- 
derung alles dessen, was in jeder ausgebildeten Glaubensweise derselben 



170 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of Christianity, we find that it is both a teleological and 
a monotheistic religion, and that it differs from all 
others of its class in the fact that in it everything is 
referred to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of 
Nazareth.^ 

Art und Abstufung auch vorkommt, und aus beidem zusammengenom- 
men ist das eigenthiimliche Wesen einer jeden zu ersehen." Cf. also 
Reden p. 218, Eng. tr. p. 234. *' If a definite religion may not begin 
with an original fact, it cannot begin at all." 

1 Apart from the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher discusses the classifi- 
cation of religions in the Kurze DarsteUung, §§ 32-36, Eng. tr. p. 104 sq. 
and in the Reden, p. 203 sq. Eng. tr. p. 218 sq. He rejects all merely 
external classifications, which seek a quantitative determination of religion. 
Nor can such general divisions as that based upon chaos, system, and 
elemental multiplicity (p. 206, jene drei so oft angef iihrten Arten, des Seins 
und seiner Allheit inne zu werdeu ; als Chaos, als System, und in seiner 
elementarischen Vielheit), lead to a more satisfactory result. Even the 
difference between the personal and the pantheistic method of conceiving 
God is not sufficient to determine the individuality of a religion 
(p. 207, Eng. tr. p. 222). His conclusion is that the only way to obtain a 
truly individual religion is to select some one of the great relations of 
mankind to the Highest Being, and to make it the centre to which all 
the others are referred. This principle he applies in the Reden only to 
Judaism and Christianity. In the first he finds man's position in the 
universe, and his relation to the Eternal determined by " a relation of 
universal immediate retribution, of a peculiar reaction of the Infinite 
against every finite thing that can be regarded as proceeding from caprice " 
(p. 222, Eng. tr. p. 239). Christianity, on the other hand, has " a more 
glorious intuition". It is " the intuition of the universal resistance of 
finite things to the unity of the Whole, and of the way the Deity treats 
this resistance. [Christianity sees] how He reconciles this hostility to 
Himself, and sets bounds to the ever-increasing alienation by scattering 
points here and there over the whole that are at once finite and infinite, 
human and divine. Corruption and redemption, hostility and mediation, 
are the two indivisibly united, fundamental elements ( Grundheziehungen) 
of this type of feeling [Empjindungsweise), and by them the whole form 
of Christianity and the cast of all the religious matter contained in it are 
determined" (p. 223 sq. Eng. tr. p. 241). Christianity, then, to the Reden 
as to the Glaubenslehre, is the religion of redemption. Yet as compared 
to the Glaubenslehre, the relation of Christianity to its founder appears 
less close and intimate. 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 171 

The original feature in Schleiermacher's definition of 
Christianity is the combination of the speculative and 
the historic. Before his day it had been the fashion 
either to insist upon the acceptance of the contents of 
historic Christianity, in its traditional form, at what- 
ever cost to reason or the religious feeling; or else, by 
artificial and a priori methods, to construct a religion of 
nature and baptize it true Christianity, in spite of the 
fact that it possessed few, if any, points of contact with 
the historic religion of that name. Schleiermacher 
resisted the double temptation. Against traditionalists 
of all schools he insisted upon the necessity for distin- 
guishing between the essence of a religion and many of 
the forms in which historically it may have chanced to 
clothe itself.^ Against the rationalists he maintained 
that it is impossible to discover the genius of any great 
religion apart from a study of its genesis. True religion, 
he insisted, is not something outside of the historic 
religions. It realizes itself in them, and reveals itself 
through them. 2 All that we need is to have our eyes 
opened that we may see it. In thus uniting in his 
definition of Christianity the speculative and the his- 
toric he has made himself the father of modern scientific 
theology. 

It is true that in so doing he has laid himself open 

1 Reden, p. 219, Eng. tr. p. 236. "Above all, I beseech you, never 
forget the difference between the essence of a religion, in so far as it is a 
definite form and representation of religion in general, and its unity as a 
school." Also p. 220, Eng. tr. p. 237, "I beg you also not to regard 
everything found in the heroes of religion or in the sacred sources as 
religion." 

2 Pp. 213, 214, Eng. tr. pp. 229, 230. 



172 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

to criticism. 1 Like every great systematic genius, who 
has sought to combine in a single generalization ele- 
ments of truth hitherto deemed irreconcilable, he has 
exposed himself to attack both from the right hand 
and from the left. His theological contemporaries 
reproach him with having sacrificed much precious 
Christian truth to the exigencies of a philosophical 
theory. 2 The Christianity which he defends, they tell 
us, is only the mutilated torso of the true historic 
Christianity in the defence of which alone they are 
interested. By his philosophical brethren, on the other 
hand, he is accused of weakness in retaining in his 
system much to which his speculative principles give 
him no right. What is the need, they ask, in the 
universal religion of feeling, with its infinite variety of 
shading, of giving any one man the central place which 
as a matter of fact Schleiermacher assigns to Christ? 
Where is the place in a religion, whose essence is con- 
tact with the God who reveals Himself everywhere, of 

1 For a study of the early critics of Schleiermacher, cf. Gess, " Ueber- 
sicht iiber das theologische System Dr. Fr. Schleiermacher, und iiber die 
Beurtheilungen, welche dasselbe theils nach seinen eigenen Grundsdtzen, 
theils aus den Stand punkten des Supranaturalism, des Rationalism, der 
Fries'schen und der Hegel'schen Philosophic erhalten hat." 2d ed. Reut- 
lingen, 1837. 

2 Cf. the letter of Sack, referred to by Schleiermacher in his own of July 
1, 1801 (Rowan, I. p, 258), in which the former "proceeded to complain 
of my philosophical system, in doing which he attributed to me, in conse- 
quence of a perfect misunderstanding of some of my expressions, a system 
which he characterized as opposed to all religion, and which is in reality 
not at all my system." On the effect produced by the Reden, cf. Neander, 
quoted by Oman (p. vi.) : ** Men of the older generation, adherents of the 
ancient Christian supernaturalism or earnest rationalists whose living 
faith in a God above the world and a life beyond was a relic of it, rejected 
the pantheistic elements in the book with anger and detestation." 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 173 

a historic redemption once for all accomplished ? ^ It 
cannot be denied that there is a basis for both these 
criticisms. From the speculative principles of Schleier- 
macher it is not easy to justify the place which he 
assigns to Christ, and conversely, his interpretation 
of Christianity as a historical religion is often unduly 

1 These criticisms are well expressed by Dr. Julius Sclialler in his Vor- 
lesungen uber Schleiermacher of the year 1844. He complains of a lack of 
foundation for Schleiermacher's doctrine of redemption in his conception 
of religion (p. 290). The feeling in which Schleiermacher sees the essence 
of religion is essentially individual, and hence does not lend itself to the 
classification proposed by our author, whose theory requires a universal 
religion to which his principles give him no right (pp. 292-294). Schal- 
ler sums up his criticism in the conclusion (p. 332 sq.), that the indifference 
of Schleiermacher's conception of religion does not allow that practical 
differentiation of Christ from other men which we actually find in the 
Glauhenslehre. The only difference theoretically possible on such prin- 
ciples is a quantitative difference, and to this his distinction of the kinds of 
religion reduces at last (p. 332). 

A somewhat similar criticism is made by Pfleiderer {Development of 
Theology, p. 105), who traces the inadequacy of Schleiermacher's concep- 
tion of religion as dependence — a conception which only admits quanti- 
tative differences — to the influence of Spinoza. 

Cf. also Bender {Schleiermacher s Theologie, p. 274), who calls attention 
to the inconsistency of estimating religion according to the intensity of 
feeling, and at the same time regarding the monotheistic religions as 
higher in kind. 

Schmid takes special exception to the emphasis laid by Schleier- 
macher upon the redemptive work of Christ to the exclusion of other 
relations which history shows have been equally important (e. g. that of 
Teacher or Master or Example). To say, as Schleiermacher does (§ 14), 
that there is no way to become a Christian save by the acceptance of Jesus 
as Redeemer, is to exclude from Christian fellowship thousands of devout 
Christians whose experience does not lead them to recognize this as the 
central Christiail dogma {Ueher Schleiermachers Glauhenslehre, pp. 141- 
145). 

Lipsius {Jahr.fur prot. TheoL, 1875) thinks Schleiermacher's later iden- 
tification of the ideal and the historic a mistake, and for this reason 
prefers the view taken of Christ in the Reden to that of the Glauhenslehre 
(p. 284 sq.) He quotes with approval Schlegel's remark of the Christianity 



174 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

affected by his speculative presuppositions. ^ The sys- 
tematic genius by which he was able to blaze a way 
through forests hitherto untrodden now and again 
tempts him to generalizations for which the evidence 
is all too slight. Later students have been obliged to 
modify his positions at more than one point. His 
classification of religions has been found too abstract 
and a priori; unable adequately to express the con- 
creteness and variety of the historic. ^ But when all is 
said, it remains true that he stands forth as the greatest 

of the Reden (p. 288) : " Bei aller begeisterten Yerherrlichung der chriat- 
lichen Religion in dem letzten Abschnitte der Reden, bleibt es doch dabei 
dass es sich, wie Schlegel sagt, am Schlusse, sich annihilire." 

1 Notably in his view of the relation of Christianity to Judaism. Not 
only does he artificially separate it from Christianity (cf. Reden, p. 221, 
Eng. tr. p. 238), but he gives an entirely inadequate account of the ele- 
ments which it actually contributed to the preparation for Christ. He 
finds the fundamental religious intuition of Judaism one of reward and 
punishment {Reden, p. 222, Eng. tr. p. 239), and ignores the deeper, spir- 
itual elements which it has in common with Christianity. Cf. Glauhens- 
lehre, I. p. 52, and especially § 12 : " Das Christenthum steht zwar in einem 
besonderen geschichtlichen Zusammenhange mit dem Judenthum, was 
aber sein geschichtliches Dasein und seine Abzwekkung betrifft, so verhalt 
es sich zu Judenthum und Heidenthum gleich (especially p. 75). Cf. also 
the criticism of Schmid (op. cit. p. 151 sq.). 

2 In spite of the stress laid upon experience, §§ 8 and 9 of the Glau- 
benslehre give us a speculative deduction of Christianity, which in its 
a priori character reminds us of the dialectics of Kant or of Hegel. Even 
in the Reden we have traces of this tendency. We begin with the varieties 
of the religious feeling, all of which are supposed to be of equal worth. 
But feeling alone cannot give us a principle of classification. Hence we 
find Schleiermacher instinctively shifting his thought from the category 
of feeling to that of relation. It is the possible relations of man to the 
highest Being which give us our principle of classification (p. 208, Eng. 
tr, p. 223). Each great religion has at its base "some one universal 
religious relation," which is its fundamental intuition (p. 220, Eng. tr. 
p. 237). This is in substance the Hegelian method, and it is open to all the 
criticisms to which the system of Hegel is exposed. 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 175 

figure in the history of modern theology. None before 
him so clearly apprehended the fundamental problem of 
Christianity, or has more clearly marked out the lines 
within which the solution must lie. Like Origen 
among the older theologians, he sums up in his own 
person all the different tendencies which before him 
had existed only in opposition, and the genius by 
which he was able to reduce the clamorous hosts to 
order and unity has enabled him to present an ideal for 
the future, the importance of which no criticism in 
points of detail can obscure. 

It is not our purpose here to enter into a detailed 
criticism of Schleiermacher's conception of Christianity. 
It will be sufficient to indicate the elements of his 
thought which have passed over as a permanent con- 
tribution to the future. 

First and foremost we should put the renewed 
emphasis upon the distinctive character of Christianity 
as a historical religion. To Schleiermacher Christianity 
is one of the great family of the religions, and whatever 
dignity or excellence he may attribute to it above its 
brothers and sisters is consistent with a recognition of 
their relative independence and rights. This point of 
view has become so familiar to us to-day that it is diffi- 
cult for us to realize the significance which attaches to 
Schleiermacher' s thought. The identification of his- 
toric Christianity with all true religion to the exclu- 
sion of the recognition of differences of growth or of 
degree — an identification which, as we have seen, has 
been characteristic of historic Christian thought from 
Barnabas to Kant — is broken at last. The Pauline 



176 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

standpoint, so long lost sight of, is once more re- 
covered ; and Christianity, as the absolute religion, is 
contrasted with its predecessors, Jewish as well as 
Greek. ^ The religion of Israel, divinely revealed 
though it be, is seen to occupy a lower stage than that 
of Christ; and the question wherein consists the per- 
fection of Christianity, as distinct from the elder dis- 
pensation, is once more distinctly apprehended and 
clearly stated. 

A second conspicuous merit of Schleiermacher's 
definition is the intimate relation which it establishes 
between Christianity and its founder. Schleiermacher 
rightly sees that in the religion of Christ His person 
occupies a position which cannot be paralleled by that 
held by the founder of any other faith. ^ Whatever we 
may think of the account which he gives of the sig- 
nificance of Christ in detail, it cannot be denied that in 
emphasizing His central position in Christianity, he is 
true to the historic facts. This is all the more note- 
worthy because of the abstract conception from which 
he takes his departure. His definition of religion, it 
would seem, might more easily have led him to the 
conclusion of Barnabas than of Paul. But the sense of 
the originality and uniqueness of the Master overcomes 
him, and, first of modern theologians, he writes a defi- 
nition of Christianity in which the name of its founder 
occupies the central place. It was Schleiermacher, as 
Henry B. Smith has finely said, " who led the German 
Christianity, in its returning course, to our Lord. " ^ 

1 Cf. Glaubenslehre, § 12, especially p. 75 ; Eeden, p. 221, Eng. tr. p. 238. 

2 Glaubenslehre, I. pp. 70, 71 ; cf. § U. 
8 Faith and Philosophy, p. 37. 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 177 

The particular relation which Jesus holds to his dis- 
ciples is that of Redeemer. Through Him they are 
conscious that the obstacle which once separated them 
from God is removed, and they are once for all recon- 
ciled to Him. This insistence upon redemption as the 
central religious experience is peculiar to Christianity 
among religions.^ 

This is a point at which Schleiermacher's system has 
been much criticized. Redemption, we are told, is not 
a distinctive feature of Christianity. It is a character- 
istic of all religions which have reached a certain degree 
of development. Nor within Christianity, if history 
is to be believed, does it hold the central position 
which Schleiermacher assigns to it. Other relations of 
Christ have been equally emphasized at different periods 
of Christian history, as, for instance, that of Master, of 
Friend, of Teacher, of Example. In the exaggerated 
emphasis upon the redemptive aspect of Christ's work 
we have a new instance of the dogmatician trying to 
force history into the mold of his preconceived theory. ^ 

Whatever may be the relative justice of this criticism, 
it remains the fact that in emphasizing the redemptive 
character of Christianity, Schleiermacher has put into 
the foreground one of the central conceptions of apos- 
tolic thought. To Paul and his fellow Christians, 
Christianity was not simply doctrine, but power. 
Through Jesus its founder, there had entered into 
the world a new influence, lifting men out of their 
ignorance and sin; a power of God unto salvation, 

1 Glaubenslehre, I. p. 67 sq. 

2 Cf . Schmid, op. cit. 

12 



178 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

creating the new and higher life which it revealed. 
This note of power has been characteristic of the great 
Christian heroes and saints in all ages. In rescuing it 
from the oblivion into which it had fallen during the 
rationalistic period, and giving it a place in his defini- 
tion, Schleiermacher has pointed theology along a path 
upon which his successors have felt constrained to fol- 
low him. 

The Christian church, then, is the fellowship of those 
whose bond of union in the religious life is the con- 
sciousness of a common redemption through Christ. 
With the mention of the church we touch a new ele- 
ment in Schleiermacher's thought, his stress upon the 
social aspects of Christianity. 

Nowhere is the contrast between Schleiermacher and 
his predecessors sharper than at this point. To Kant 
and his contemporaries religion was almost exclusively 
an individual affair. So far as his relation to God is 
concerned, each man stands or falls on his own merits 
without regard to his fellow men. The church is simply 
an aggregation, larger or smaller, of a number of such 
independent units. To Schleiermacher, on the other 
hand, religion is essentially social, and mediation, as 
we have seen, a universal religious fact. Just because 
the religious life admits so many varieties, each man 
requires for his complete development the co-operation 
of his fellows. Thus in Schleiermacher's theology, the 
Pauline doctrine of the church, as an organic whole, 
having many members, each with a different function, 
receives a late, but none the less timely, restatement. 

Our estimate of Schleiermacher' s influence would be 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 179 

incomplete if we did not include a reference to his 
insistence upon the elements of change and progress 
which inhere in the nature of a historic religion. He 
is never weary of calling attention to the possibility, 
even to the necessity, of individual variations within 
each of the more general types. This is the meaning 
of his celebrated reference to the tolerance of Chris- 
tianity which scorns to be the sole and universal reli- 
gion. ^ He has abundantly shown that this doctrine 
was not due to any lack of faith in Christianity as 
perfect or final. On the contrary, it is the greatness 
and gloiy of Christianity which renders an equally 
clear apprehension of it impossible to all at the same 
time.^ Little by little, through varying experience, 
men must enter into the richness of the divine life, and 
no constraint should be put upon them to hamper them 
in their free development. 

Accordingly Schleiermacher finds it only natural that 
within historic Christianity there should be smaller 
groups characterized by special affinities of thought 

1 Reden, p. 232, Eng. tr. p. 251. Cf. p. 229, Eng. tr. p. 248. " (Christ) 
never maintained that He was the only mediator, the only one in whom 
His idea actualized itself. All who attach themselves to him and form 
His church should also be mediators with Him and through Him." 

2 Otto Ritschl criticizes Schleiermacher on the ground that his view of 
Christianity is so higli that ordinary people cannot attain to it, and have 
to make lower religions for themselves. This is really to rob it of its true 
universality (p. 101). He sums up his criticism of the Reden as follows : 
"Sis geben nicht das Christentum irgendeiner anderen wirklichen oder 
moglichen Eeligion preis, sondern sie behaupten vielmehr dessen Einzig- 
keit und Uniibertrefflichkeit im hochsten Grade. Aber indem dies geschiet, 
wird das Christentum in einer Weise zur Gnosis sublimiert, dass die Mog- 
lichkeit verloren geht, es als eine fiir alle Menschen zugangliche Religion 
aufrecht zu halten" (p. 106, Schleiermachers Stellung zur Christentum). 



180 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

and feeling. Such, for example, are Catholicism and 
Protestantism, and the smaller divisions within each. 
The distinction between these consists in the fact that 
in the first the relation of the individual to Christ is 
made to depend upon the church, whereas the second 
emphasizes the direct relationship between Christ and 
each believer. 1 Schleiermacher confesses himself a 
Protestant, and gives reasons for thinking this a truer 
and higher type of faith than Catholicism. ^ But the 
vastness of the Infinite is such that there is room within 
its bosom for many relations, and he will not quarrel 
with those who find their communion with God real- 
ized in another way. 

It will no doubt be asked whether this way of con- 
ceiving of Christianity is, as a matter of fact, consist- 
ent with its absoluteness. Many of Schleiermacher's 
critics maintain that on the basis of his theory of reli- 
gion each historic faith, even the highest, is but a pass- 
ing form, destined at the last to be superseded and 
outgrown. To this rule historic Christianity itself is 
no exception.^ Here it is sufficient to say that this was 

1 Glaubenslehre, § 24, 1, p. 125. " Sofern die Reform nicht nur Reinigung 
und Riikkehr von eingeschlichenen Missbrauchen war, sondern eine eigen- 
thiimliche Gestaltung der christlichen Gemeinschaft aus ihr hervorge- 
gangen ist, kann man den Gegensaz zwischea Protestantismus und Katho- 
lizismua vorlaiifig so fassen,dass ersterer das Verhaltniss des Einzelnen zu 
Christo abhangig macht von seinem Yerhaltniss zu Christo, der leztere 
aber umgekehrt das Verhaltniss des Einzelnen zu Christo abhangig macht 
von seinem Verhaltniss zur Kirche." 

2 See especially the Epilogue to the third edition of the Reden (1821), 
p. 247 sg. Eng. tr. p. 266 sq. 

3 So Schlegel, quoted by Lipsius, op. cit. p. 288. Cf. also Reden, 
p. 231 sq. Eng. tr. p. 251, "Christianity, exalted above them all, more 
historical and more humble in its glory, has expressly acknowledged this 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 181 

certainly not Schleiermacher*s own view. Even in the 
" Reden " he speaks of Christianity as destined to endure 
till the end of time,i and in the " Glaubenslehre " he 
definitely presents it as the final religion into which all 
lower forms are destined ultimately to pass over and be 
taken up.^ Not only is Jesus Christ presented as the 
central figure of history, a being wholly unique ; ^ but 

transitoriness of its temporal existence. A time will come, it says, when 
there shall no more be any mediator, but the Father shall be all in all." 

1 Reden, p. 231, Eng. tr. 250. "For why should it (Christianity) be 
overthrown ? The living spirit of it, indeed, slumbers oft and long. It 
withdraws itself into a torpid state — into the dead shell of the letter, but 
it ever awakes again as soon as the season in the spiritual world is favor- 
able for its revival, and sets its sap in motion." Cf . also p. 232, Eng. tr. 
p. 251, where he expresses his belief that the time when historic Christi- 
anity shall be superseded " lies beyond all time." 

2 Glaubenslehre, I. p. 39. The recognition of other forms of piety which 
stand on the same level of development with Christianity is not inconsis- 
tent with " der bei jedem Christen vorauszusezenden Ueberzeugung von 
der ausschliessenden Vortrefflichkeit des Christenthums. Denn auch auf 
dem Gebiet der Natur unterscheiden wir voUkommene und unvollkom- 
mene Thiere als gleichsam verschiedene Entwikklungsstufen des thie- 
rischen Lebens, und auf jeder von diesen wieder verschiedene Gattungen, 
die also als Ausdrukk derselben Stufe einander gleich sind ; dies aber 
hindert nicht, dass nicht dennoch auf einer niederen Stufe die eine sich 
mehr der hoheren nahert und in sofern voUkommner ist als die andern. 
Eben so nun kann auch das Christenthum, wenn gleich mehrere Gattungen 
der Frommigkeit dieselbe Stufe mit ihm einnehmen, doch vollkommner 
sein als irgend eine von ihnen." Cf. also p. 45, " Und so biirgt schon 
diese Vergleichung mit seines Gleichen dafiir, dass das Christenthum in 
der That die vollkommenste unter den am meisten entwikkelten Religions- 
formen ist." Cf. also § 12, p. 73 sq. 

^ Even in the Reden he speaks of Christ in the most exalted terms. 
" What," he asks, " did He see around Hira that was not finite and in need 
of mediation, and where was aught that could mediate but Himself ? * No 
man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall re- 
veal Him.' This consciousness of the singularity of His knowledge of 
God and of His existence in God, of the original way in which this knowl- 
edge was in Him, and of the power thereof to communicate itself and 



182 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the intuition which differentiates Christianity from 
other religions, so far from being but one among other 
partial expressions of the supreme religious relation, is 
itself, as has more than once been acutely pointed out, 
Schleiermacher's description of that relation in its com- 
pleteness. ^ While it is true that his principles prevent 
him from attempting a theoretical proof of the abso- 
luteness of Christianity ^ — that would be to do violence 

awaken religion, was at once the consciousness of His office as Mediator 
and of His divinity" (p. 229, Eng. tr. p. 247). This uniqueness is still 
further emphasized in the Glauhenslehre. It is the sense of the excep- 
tional position of Christ as the world's Redeemer which constitutes the 
bond of union of the Christian church (§ 14, p. 83 sq.). Cf. p. 70 : " Daher 
ist nun auch im Christenthum das Verhaltniss des Stifters zu den Glie- 
dern der Gemeinschaft ein ganz anderes als in jenen. Denn jene werden 
vorgestellt als aus dem Haufen gleicher oder wenig verschiedener 
Menschen gleichsam willkiirlich herausgehoben, und was sie als gottliche 
Lehre und Ordnung empfingen nicht minder fiir sich empfangend als fiir 
Andere. Wie denn auch nicht leicht ein Bekenner jener Glaubensweisen 
leugnen wird, Gott konne eben so gut das Gesetz durch eiuen Andern 
gegebeu haben als durch Moses, und die Offenbarung konnte eben so gut 
durch einen Andern gegeben worden sein als durch Muhamed. Christus 
aber als allein und fiir alle Erloser wird alien Anderen gegeniiber ge- 
stellt, und wird auf keine Weise selbst irgendwann als erlosungsbediirftig 
gedacht, daher auch, wie die allgemeine Stimme aussagt, urspriinglich 
von alien andern Menschen unterschieden und mit der erlosenden Kraft 
von seiner Geburt an ausgestattet." Cf. also pp. 71 and 75. 

1 E. g. by Bleek, Grundlagen der Christologie ScUeiermachers, pp. 130, 
131. "Was er hier als Grundanschauung des Christentums angiebt, ist 
eine zusammenstellung der Moraente der Religion, wie er sie in den ersten 
Rede ohne Riicksicht auf eine positive Religion geschildert hat. Als das 
Merkmal einer individuellen Religion hatte er hingestellt, dass irgend eine 
einzelne Anschauung zum Centralpunkt der ganzen Religion gemacht 
und alles auf sie bezogen werde. Das findet bei dem Christentum, wie 
er sie darstellt, nicht statt . . . Die einzelnen Religionen sind nur der StofF, 
den das Christentum fiir die Religion verarbeitet." Cf. also p. 133, "Es 
lasst sich, von dieser Seite gesehen, nicht behaupten, es sei Schleiermacher 
nicht gelungen das Christentum als absolute Religion nachzuweisen." 

2 Cf . Glauhenslehre, I. p. 73. " Auf jeden Beweis fiir die Wahrheit oder 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 183 

to the sovereignty of the religious feeling — his system 
gives us the materials from which such a proof might 
easily be constructed ; ^ and the only point at which the 
resulting structure would be open to attack would be 
upon the question whether as a matter of fact the ideal 
religion thus presented could be fairly identified with 
the historic faith, of whose contents the "Glaubens- 
lehre " claims to be the reproduction. Of the right of 
this identification we have seen that Schleiermacher has 
no doubt. Its exhibition and defence in detail he 
bequeaths as a problem to the future. ^ 

Nothwendigkeit des Christenthums verzichten wir vielmehr ganzlicti, 
and sezen dagegen voraus, dass jeder Christ, elier er sich irgend mit 
Untersuchungen dieser Art einlasst, schon die Gewissheit in sich selbst 
habe, dass seine Frommigkeit keine andere Gestalt annehmen konne als 
diese." 

1 As monotheistic, Christianity clearly recognizes the unique and all 
embracing character of the Being upon whom man depends ; as teleologi- 
cal, it extends this dependence to include the highest forms of life as well 
as the lowest. The Christian is a man who, not in outward things merely, 
but in his moral and spiritual life, has come to realize his complete 
dependence upon the one good and holy God who is the indwelling life 
of the universe. But this is to say that in Christianity the ideal of 
religion finds its complete realization. For there is no conceivable 
relation to God which cannot find adequate expression within the limits 
of this conception. 

2 The most brilliant attempt to give expression to the absoluteness of 
Christianity in accordance with the above principles is that of Alexander 
Schweizer, the well-known Swiss theologian (1808-1888). Defining 
Christianity with Schleiermacher as the religion of redemption, he sees 
in it the fulfilment of the ideal of religion itself, and looks for the day 
when, freed from all that is temporary and transient, it shall gather to 
itself all that is best and purest in the religious life of the race. For 
such a victory two things are necessary: 1, its agreement in essence with 
the ideal of the perfect religion ; and 2, its ability to bring this agreement 
to more and more perfect expression in history. Both of these qualities 
Schweizer finds united in Christianity. So far from development being 
inconsistent with the absoluteness of religion, as Strauss maintains, it 



184 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

To sum up: Christianity, according to Schleier- 
macher, is that historic religion, founded by Jesus of 

is in this way alone that the absoluteness of any religion can be es- 
tablished. For it is only thus that there can be clearly exhibited to men 
that agreement between the historic and the ideal, in which the truth of 
religion consists. Cf. his Christliche Glaubenslehre, 2d ed., 1877, §§ 32-36, 
pp. 116-136, especially pp. 123, 124. "Soil eine der historisch positiven 
Religioneu iiber die ganze Menschheit sich verbreiten und niemals 
vergehen, vielmehr alle andern friiher oder spater in sich aufnehmen 
und als die einzige bleiben bis an's Ende der Zeiten, so muss sie ihrem 
Wesen nach mit dem Begriff der vollendeten Religion selbst zusammen- 
fallen, ihra zur voUen Erscheinung und Verwirklichung verhelfen und 
alles diesem nicht Angehorige, somit alles local oder temporal Be- 
schrankte und in diesem Sinn bloss Positive als unwesentlich immer 
wieder beseitigen konnen. Das Christenthum muss entweder, wie Strauss 
es haben will, entwicklungslos sein und darum vergehen oder es muss 
jenes leisten, denn lebend bleibt es nur wenn es fiir immer die religiose 
Erziehung der Menschheit leitet, . . . Die christliche ist diejenige 
historische Religion in welcher der Religionsbegriff selbst sich, obschon 
niemals in einer einzelnen Periode sondern nur im Verlauf aller 
Perioden, vollstandig darstellt und verwirklicht, so dass einerseits alle 
andern Religionen sich als untergeordnete Vorstufen und geringere 
Arten zur christlichen verhalten, jedenfalls aber kein religioses Moment 
in sich tragen welches nicht voller und reiner im Christenthum enthalten 
ware, anderseits aber im vollendeten Begriff der Religion nichts ent- 
halten ist was nicht bis ans Ende der Zeiten im Christenthum sich 
verwirklichen konnte." Cf. p. 131, "Die unentbehrliche Regel fiir 
Ausmittlung des Wahren ist daher gerade nur in diesem Zusammentreffen 
des christlich historischen mit dem idealen zu suchen ; wo dieses un- 
erreichbar da ist kein Glaube sondern bloss eine Meinung." 

Of the other theologians who are most frequently mentioned as 
followers of Schleiermacher, Twesten and Nitzsch, the former only 
touches indirectly upon the problem which at present engages us 
(cf. his Vorlesungen iiber die Dogmatik, 3d ed. 1834, I. p. 19, where he 
finds the characteristic feature of Christianity in the new divine life 
which Jesus imparts). The latter, while following Schleiermacher in his 
conception of religion, parts company with him in his view of Christianity, 
finding its distinctive feature, after the fashion of the supernaturalists 
whom Schleiermacher had opposed, in the possession of special revelation, 
and emphasizing the intimate relation in which it stands to Judaism, as 
parts of one great economy of redemption and revelation {System der 
christlichen Lehre von Dr. C. I. Nitzsch, 4th ed. Bonn, 1839. Cf. especially 



THE DEFINITION OF SCHLEIERMACHER 185 

Nazareth, and having its bond of union in the re- 
demption mediated by Him, in which the true relation 
between God and man has for the first time found com- 
plete and adequate expression, and which, throughout 
all the changes of intellectual and social environment 
which the centuries have brought, still continues to 
maintain itself, as the religion best worthy of the 
allegiance of thoughtful and earnest men. 

§§30 and 31, where he contrasts the preparation of Judaism as positive 
with that of heathenism as purely negative). Julius Miiller, whom 
Pfleiderer reckons among the disciples of Schleiermacher {Development, 
p. 123), contributes nothing of importance to the solution of our problem, 
while Ullman, in his book on the Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des 
Christenthums, Hamburg, 3d ed. 1849) finds its distinctive feature, "not in 
its doctrine,'nor in its ethical law, nor even in its redemptive power, but 
in the peculiar constitution and moral and religious significance of its 
founder as the personality perfectly united with God, at once truly 
divine and truly human" (p. 86). 



CHAPTER VI 

HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 

1. The Hegelian System.^ 

While Schleiermacher was gathering crowds of 
students in his lecture room at Berlin, another man, 

1 From the extensive literature on Hegel, we cite the following : 

(a) Life. A convenient synopsis in Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. Eng. tr. 
II. p. 234 sq. Fuller accounts in the lives of Rosenkranz {Georg. Wilh. 
Friedrich Hegels Leben. Supplement zu Hegels Werken, Berlin, 1844), 
and of Haym {Hegel und seine Zeit. Vorlesungen uber Entstehung und 
Entwickelung, Wesen und Werth der Hegelschen Philosophie, Berlin, 1857). 
Also E. Caird, Hegel, in Blackwood^ s Philosophical Classics, London, 
1883. 

(6) Works. 19 volumes and supplement, ed. Rosenkranz, Berlin, 
1832-44. Eng. tr. of the Logic and of the Philosophy of Mind by Wallace, 
Oxford, 1894; of the Philosophy of History by Sibree, in Bohn's Library, 
1860; of the History of Philosophy by Haldane, 3 vols., London, 1892 
sq. ; of the Philosophy of Religion by Speirs and Sanderson, 3 vols. 
London, 1895 sq. 

(c) On the philosophy of Hegel in general, besides the relevant sections 
in the Histories of Philosophy, cf. Caird, op. cit. ; Stirling, Secret of 
Hegel (Edinburgh and New York, 1898) ; Rosenkranz, Hegel als deutscher 
Nationalphilosoph (Leipzig, 1870), Eng. tr. by Hall, Hegel as the National 
Philosopher of Germany (St. Louis, 1874); Harris, HegeVs Logic (Chicago, 
1890) ; also many articles in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy ; Wal- 
lace, Prolegomena to the Study of HegeVs Philosophy, and especially of his 
Logic (Oxford, 1894) ; Seth, Hegelianism and Personality (2d ed. Edin- 
burgh and London, 1893) ; Flint, Philosophy of History (1874), p. 496 sq. 

{d) Specially on Hegel's philosophy of religion, Baur, Die christliche 
Gnosis (Tiibingen, 1835), p. 668 sq.; Pfleiderer, Development of Theology 
in Germany and Great Britain (London, 1890), p. 68 sq.; Hoffding, 
History of Philosophy, II. p. 189 sq.; Wenley, Contemporary Theology 
and Theism (New York, 1897), p. 10 sq.; Fairbairn, Place of Christ in 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 187 

no less remarkable for dialectic genius, was laying the 
foundations of the greatest speculative system of 
modern times. ^ In Hegel the constructive wing of 
the Kantian movement reaches its culmination. ^ The 

Modern Theology, p. 213 sq. ; and especially Sterrett, Studies in Hegel's 
Philosophy of Religion (New York, 1890), and Piinjer, Religionsphiloso- 
phie, 11. p. 225 sg. 

1 George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born at Stuttgart, August 27, 
1770. His father was an officer of the ducal government. He studied 
at Tiibingen from 1788-1793, taking successively the philosophical and 
theological courses. Among his fellow-students was Schelling, with 
whom he afterwards became intimately associated. After leaving the 
university, where he does not seem to have achieved a distinguished 
success, he became tutor in a family at Berne. In 1795 he wrote a life of 
Jesus, in which, with Lessing, he distinguished between Jesus' own con- 
ception of religion, and the dogmas of the Christian church (cf. Ueherweg, 
II. p. 235, and ref.). After three years in Switzerland, he returned to 
Germany, and in 1797 became tutor in a family at Frankfort on the 
Main. In 1801 he removed to Jena, where he published his first philo- 
sophical work, a comparison between the systems of Fichte and Schelling, 
in which he expressed his agreement with the latter. Soon after he 
became instructor, and still later Professor at the University. In 1806 he 
published his Phenomenology of Spirit, in which the differences from 
Schelling, which had begun to show themselves since 1803, came to clear 
expression. Leaving Jena in 1806, he was for a time editor of the Bam- 
berger Zeitung. In November, 1808, he became director of the Aegidien 
Gymnasium in Nuremberg, a post which he retained till 1816. During 
this period he wrote his Philosophical Propcedeutic, as well as his Science 
of Logic. In 1816 he became Professor in Heidelberg. The next year 
appeared the first edition of his Encyclopaedia (2d ed. 1827 ; 3d ed. 1830). 
In 1818 he was called to Berlin, where he died on November 14, 1831, 
less than three years before Schleiermacher. In 1821, he published his 
Philosophy of Law. The Lectures on the Philosophy of History, of Arty 
and of Religion, as well as on the History of Philosophy, were published 
posthumously. 

2 On the relation of Hegel to Kant, cf. Weber, History of Philoso- 
phy, p. 473 sq., " Kant and German Idealism " ; Stirling, The Secret of 
Hegel, Edinburgh and New York, 1898 ; Wyneken, Hegels Kritih Kants, 
Greifswald, 1898. Stirling follows out the points of contact in great 
detail. See Secret of Hegel, pp. 20, 92, 98, 157, 167, and especially the 
quotation from the Practical Reason given on page 61. "Because we 



188 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Absolute whicli the master had denied to reason is 
reaffirmed in a more universal and uncompromising 
form than ever.^ The dualism of pre-Kantian philoso- 
phy with its antithesis of natural and supernatural; 
the dualism of Kant himself with his contrast between 
the noumenal and the phenomenal, gives place to a 
monism in which all that is is regarded as the manifes- 
tation of a single principle. ^ There is but one reality, 

consider here, in its practical function, pure Reason, which acts conse- 
quently on a priori principles, and not on empirical motives, the division 
of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason will necessarily resemble that 
of a Syllogism. That is, it will proceed from the universal in the Major 
(the moral principle) through a subsumption under the same, in the 
Minor, of possible (particular) acts (as good or bad) to the conclusion, 
namely, the subjective actualisation of Will (an interest in the practically 
possible good and the consequent Maxim). To him who follows with 
conviction the positions of the Analytic, such comparisons will prove 
pleasing ; for they countenance the expectation that we shall yet attain 
to a perception of the Unity of the entire business of pure Reason (the- 
oretical as well as practical), and be able to deduce all from a single 
principle, which is the inevitable demand of human reason ; for we can 
find full satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of all the posses- 
sions of our reason." Stirling finds the secret of Hegel in the fact that 
" as Aristotle, with considerable assistance from Plato, made explicit 
the abstract universal that was implicit in Socrates, so Hegel, with less 
considerable assistance from Fichte and Schelling, made explicit the 
concrete universal that was implicit in Kant " (p. xxii). 

1 Philosophie der Religion, I. p. 4, Eng. tr. I. p. 2. (The translation 
used is by Speirs and Sanderson, 3 vols., London, 1895.) In religion 
" the spirit relates itself no longer to something that is other than itself, 
and that is limited, but to the unlimited and infinite, and this is an 
infinite relation, a relation of freedom, and no longer of dependence. 
Here its consciousness is absolutely free, and is indeed true consciousness, 
because it is consciousness of absolute truth." Cf. I. p. 46, Eng. tr. I. 
p. 45, where he argues against the view that in religion we can know 
" only our relation to God, not what God Himself is." Cf. I. p. 93, 
Eng. tr. I. p. 95. " What we have before us is this one Absolute," 
etc. 

2 Hegel himself objects to the term Pantheism, as being misleading, 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 189 

who is the Absolute. God is not back of experience. 
He is in experience, everywhere and always. The 
entire life of the universe, with its ever more complex 
forms, is to be understood as a single mighty process 
whose substance is the coming to consciousness of the 
Absolute. 1 Human reason is but a mode of the infinite 
reason, and the sum of all finite consciousness is only 
another name for the mind of God.^ 

The thought thus expressed is not a new one. 
Monism is one of the most ancient of philosophies. 
Not to mention its Eastern forms, the Stoics had given 
it clear expression among the Greeks. And among the 
moderns, Spinoza, the God-intoxicated man, before 
Hegel had set forth the doctrine of the one absolute 
Substance with equal intellectual acuteness and reli- 

and seeming to imply an identification of God with " the infinite mani- 
foldness of single things " (I. p. 94, Eng. tr. I. p. 96). Historic Pan- 
theism, whether in its Oriental form or in Spinozism has never said 
" All is God," though it has taught that " in everything the divine is 
only the universal element of a content (das Allgemeine eines Inhalts), 
the Essence of things, while at the same time it is also represented as 
being the determined or specific Essence of the things." I. p. 94, Eng. 
tr. I. p. 97. Cf. also I. p. 208, Eng. tr. I. p. 214 ; Philosophy of Mind, 
p. 185 ; Piinjer, op. cit. 11. p. 231. 

1 I. p. 110, Eng. tr. I. p. 114. "The development of God in Himself 
is . . . the same logical necessity as that of the Universe, and this latter is 
only in so far inherently divine as it is at every stage the development of 
this form." Cf. also I. p. 79, Eng. tr. I. p. 79 ; I. p. 84, Eng. tr. I. p. 85, 
and in general the whole section beginning, I. p. 59, Eng. tr. I. p. 59. 

2 I. p. 34, Eng. tr. I. p. 33. " Human reason — the consciousness of 
one's being — is indeed reason ; it is the divine in man, and Spirit, in so 
far as it is the Spirit of God, is not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond the 
world. On the contrary, God is present, omnipresent, and exists as 
Spirit in all spirits." Cf. also I. p. 64 sq., Eng. tr. I. p. 64 sq., and 
especially I. p. 187 sq., Eng. tr. I. p. 193 sq. " The finite is therefore an 
essential moment of the infinite in the nature of God" (I. p. 193, Eng. 
tr. I. p. 198). 



190 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

gious fervor.^ Nor must we overlook Hegel's immedi- 
ate predecessors. Without Fichte^ and Schelling,^ the 
Encyclopaedia would have been impossible. In their 
writings we have foreshadowed that transition from the 
subjective to the objective, which is the characteristic 
feature of the Hegelian philosophy. To Schelling espe- 
cially Hegel was bound by ties of peculiar intimacy.* 

1 /. c. in his ethics. The teaching of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 
which has to do simply with popular religion, is, as we have seen, very 
different. 

2 On Fichte (1762-1814), cf., beside the relevant sections in the 
Histories of Philosophy, Zimmer, J. G. Fichtes Religionsphilosophie, 
Berlin, 1878; Piinjer, Geschichte der christlichen Religionsphilosophie, II. 
p. 60 sq. Fichte's views on religion may be learned from his Anweisung 
zum seligen Leben oder die Religionslehre (1806), Eng. tr. by Smith, The 
Doctrine of Religion. Cf. also his Speculative Theologie oder allgemeine 
Religionslehre (Vol. III. of his Grundzuge zum System der Philosophie, 
Heidelberg, 1846). Tor a list of his earlier and smaller works, see 
Piinjer, op. cit. 

3 On Schelling (1775-1854), cf. the monograph by Weber, Examen 
critique dela Philosophie religieuse de Schelling, Strasburg, 1860 ; Piinjer, 
op. cit. II. p. 84 sq. For Schelling's views on religion see his Philosophie 
und Religion (1804); and especially his Philosophie der Mythologie und 
Offenharung, published posthumously by his son (Vols. I.-IV. of the second 
series of his collected works, Stuttgart, 1856-1858). Three periods may be 
distinguished in Schelling's religious and philosophical development: 
1, that of the philosophy of Nature; 2, that of the philosophy of Identity, 
in which is affirmed the absolute identity of the ideal and the real ; and 
3, that of the so-called Positive philosophy, whose content may be repre- 
sented as " the history of the development of God from pure Being to 
absolute Spirit." Cf. Piinjer, II. p. 104. See also Plint, Philosophy of 
History, pp. 428, 433 sq. 

* See note 1, p. 187. Por some years the two men worked together 
as co-editors of the Critical Journal of Philosophy, a journal devoted to 
the propagation of the philosophy of identity. In spite of later diver- 
gences, we find many points of contact between the two. To both the 
several historic religions are moments in a single great process of 
revelation, culminating in Christianity, the absolute religion. Both 
conceive the Absolute as unfolding to full self-consciousness through a 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 191 

The originality of the latter is to be found less in the 
central thought of his philosophy than in the extraor- 
dinary skill and persistence with which he applies it to 
the solution of concrete problems. He not only affirms 
that history is but a form of the coming to conscious- 
ness of the Absolute; he tries to show how and why 
this is the case. With infinite detail, oyer the widest 
possible range of subjects; in psychology, in ethics, in 
politics, in philosophy, in religion, in art, he retraces 
the steps through which all things have assumed their 
present form, and sees in each new evidence for his 
general theme. Among modern philosophers Spencer 
alone is to be compared with him for this combination 
of broad generalization with detailed application. 

In the working out of the Hegelian scheme, as is 
well known, logical considerations are determining. ^ 
The process of human knowledge, with its alternate 
analysis and synthesis, is the type of the larger process 
of the universe. All progress is through distinction, 
and moves through the three steps of thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis. A simple truth, once discovered, is 
affirmed as if it were the whole. Presently a larger 
experience forces man to the recognition of its apparent 
opposite, only to be succeeded later by the reconciliation 

process of growth, and find the chief significance of the historic process 
which we see, in the fact that it is the obverse or counterpart of a 
development within God Himself. 

1 Philosophie der Religion I, p. 59, Eng. tr. I. p. 59. " There can be 
but one method in all science, since the method is the self-unfolding 
Notion (Begriff) and nothing else, and this latter is only one." Cf. also 
the following context. See also p. 73, Eng. tr. p. 73. " It is when God, 
the Notion, performs the act of judgment, and the category of deter- 
minateness enters, that we first come to have existing religion," etc. 



192 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of both in a higher unity. Given this simple formula, 
Hegel will build you the universe. Holding in his 
hand this single key, he will unlock for you all the 
mysteries of life.^ The imperfections which mar the 
symmetry and beauty of the universe; its strifes, its 
sufferings, its sins: these are but passing discords, 
presently to be resolved into a higher harmony; an- 
titheses due to man's limited point of view, soon to be 
transcended in a wider vision; steps in the one great 
process, through which, by stages slow, painful, but 
none the less sure, the Absolute is coming to full self- 
consciousness. ^ 

2. HegeVs View of ReligionJ^ 

Holding this key, it is not difficult to understand 
Hegel's view of religion. To Hegel the essence of 
religion is rational. As Schleiermacher had defined 

1 An excellent illustration^of the a priori character of his thought is 
to be found on p. 42, Eng. tr. p. 41, where he objects to the merely- 
historical treatment of dogmas, as the overlooking of "the absolute 
manner of the origin of these doctrines out of the depths of Spirit." 
Hegel is only interested in those truths whose necessity can be logically 
proved. Cf . p. 76, Eng. tr. p. 76, " That which is determined by means 
of the Notion must of necessity have existed, and the religions, as they 
have followed one upon another, have not arisen accidentally." 

2 Pkilosophie der Religion, II. p. 282, Eng. tr. III. p. 72. "The 
sorrow which the finite experiences in being thus annulled and absorbed, 
does not give pain, since it is by this means raised to the rank of a 
moment in the process of the Divine." Cf. also II. p. 257 sq., Eng. tr. 
Ill, p. 45 sq., where the problem of evil is discussed at length. See also 
Sterrett, op. cit. p. 292. 

3 With the fuller discussion of the Philosophic der Religion should be 
compared the relevant sections of the Phdnomenologie des Geistes (pp. 
509-593) and the Encyclopddie (Wallace's translation, Philosophy of 
Mind, p. 175 sq.). 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 193 

religion as absolute feeling, so Hegel defines it as 
absolute knowledge. ^ Religion is that function of the 
human spirit through which man comes to understand 
the true nature of things; or, what is the same thing 
in other words, through which the Absolute comes to 
full self -consciousness. 2 It is the union in thought of 
the infinite and the finite. ^ Beginning in its lower 
forms with symbols and pictures, slowly differentiating 
itself from the art which was its cradle,* in Chris- 
tianity, its highest form, it reveals its true nature and 
becomes practically identical with philosophy. 

Yet while thus emphasizing the rational character of 
religion, Hegel, as little as Schleiermacher, overlooks 

1 Phil d. Rel. I. p. 24, Eng, tr. I. p. 22. '« Keligion, then, is itself the 
standpoint of the consciousness of the True, which is in and for itself, 
and is consequently the stage of Spirit, at which the speculative content 
generally is object for consciousness. Eeligion is not consciousness of 
this or that truth in individual objects, but of the absolute truth, of truth 
as the Universal, the All-comprehending, outside of which lies nothing at 
all. Cf. pp. 4, 103, 241, Eng. tr. pp. 2, 106, 247, and especially p. 88, 
Eng. tr. p. 90. The conception of religion is " that God is the absolute 
Truth, the Truth of everything, and that religion alone is absolutely true 
knowledge." 

2 I. p. 200, Eng. tr. p. 205. " Religion is therefore a relation of the 
spirit to absolute Spirit ; thus only is Spirit as that which knows, also 
that which is known. This is not merely an attitude of the spirit towards 
absolute Spirit, but absolute Spirit itself is that which is the self -relating 
element, which brings itself into relation with that which we posited on 
the other side as the element of difference. Thus when we rise higher, 
religion is the Idea of the Spirit which relates itself to its own self — it is 
the self-consciousness of absolute Spirit. . . . Accordingly in the Idea in 
its highest form, religion is not a transaction of man, but is essentially the 
highest determination of the absolute Idea itself." 

^ Ihid. " Thus religion is the Divine Spirit's knowledge of itself 
through the mediation of finite spirit." Cf. also the whole discussion of 
the relation of finite and infinite, p. 172 sq. 

* Cf. Philosophy of Mind ^ p. 172 sq.; also Phanomenologie, p. 527 sq. 

13 



194 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the rights of the religious feeling. He expressly 
admits that " the standpoint of feeling " is included in 
religion as truly as the "standpoint of knowledge."^ 
" Feeling is the subjective element ; " that which 
belongs to the consciousness of the individual as an 
individual. So far, therefore, as God enters into the 
individuality of man, the place of feeling is assured. ^ 
Indeed, there is a sense in which feeling is primary in 
religion. Before God can become explicit to thought, 
he must be present implicitly in consciousness. And 
to Hegel, as to Schleiermacher, the fundamental form 
of consciousness is feeling. ^ In feeling are contained 
in germ all that we know later as perception QAn- 
schauung^ and thought (Vorstellungy Indeed, the 
difficulty with feeling is that it is too primary. Its 
universality makes it indefinite.'* It contains within 
itself the most contradictory elements, "the most 
debased as well as the highest and noblest."^ God 
Himself, when present in feeling, "has no advantage 
over the worst possible thing. "^ If, then, we wish to 

1 Philosophie der Religion, I. p. 55, Eng. tr. I, p. 54. 

2 Ibid. Eeeling is "that which belongs to me as this individual, 
and because of which it is to myself that I appeal. The standpoint of 
feeling, too, in so far as God gives Himself this ultimate individualisation 
of This one, of one who feels, has its place in the development of the 
conception of religion," etc. 

3 P. 115, Eng. tr. p. 118. 

* P. 115, Eng. tr. p. 119. The propositions that we have "immediate 
knowledge of God," and that feeling is the place where the divine being 
is thus known " are quite correct, and are not to be denied, but they are 
so trivial that it is not wortjb. while to speak of them here. If the science 
of religion is limited to these statements, it is not worth having, and it is 
not possible to understand why theology exists at all." 

6 P. 126, Eng. tr. p. 130. 

6 Ibid. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 195 

rise to a true determination of God, we must find some 
more definite principle than feeling, and this to Hegel 
can be no other than thought. 

This explains the prominent place given to dogma in 
the Hegelian conception of religion. Hegel more than 
once laments the current depreciation of dogmas, and 
declares that in them, if anywhere, the truth of religion 
is to be found. ^ So far from being the external and 
artificial things they are often represented to be; the 
creations of chance or of fraud, gaining their authority 
from tradition, and maintaining themselves by the 
appeal to supernatural sanction, ^ they are the forms 
in which the eternal truths of religion necessarily come 
to expression. 3 The study of these forms, and the 
discovery and interpretation of the truths which they 
contain, is the highest task of philosophy.* 

But interpretation there must be. The dogmas of 
religion are not themselves pure truth. They are pres- 
entations of truth in imaginative form (i, e. in the form 
of Vorstellungen, representative concepts),^ ideas won 

1 Philosophie der Religion, I. p. 39, Eng. tr. I. p. 38. 

2 On Hegel's view of miracles, see II. p. 323, Eng, tr. III., p. 116 sq. 
While not denying their possibility, he declares that " in and for them- 
selves they supply a merely relative verification, or a proof of a subordi- 
nate sort." 

3 I. p. 42, Eng. tr. p. 41. 

* II. p. 353, Eng. tr. III. p. 148. •* Philosophy has been reproached 
with setting itself above religion: this, however, is false as an actual 
matter of fact, for it possesses this particular content only and no other, 
though it presents it in the form of thought : it sets itself merely above the 
form of faith, the content is the same in both cases." Cf. p. 355, Eng. tr. 
p. 151. 

» On Hegel's doctrine of the Vorstellung, cf. Philosophie der Religion, I. 
p. 137 sq. Eng. tr. I. p. 142 sq. 



196 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

by a generalization from finite experience, and carrying 
with them necessarily that pictorial quality which is 
the inevitable accompaniment of such generalization. 
There clings to each something of the local, the tem- 
poral, the transient; in a word, the finite, without 
which the imagination, even in its highest and noblest 
uses, is unable to conceive of reality. For, as the artist, 
with brush or pen, presents truth in the form of a pic- 
ture, so the imagination presents truth in the spiritual 
picture of an idea (Vorstellung). It is the work of the 
philosopher to translate the ideas of religion {Vbrstel- 
lungeTi) into the forms of pure thought (^Begriffe), 
When this is done, man attains absolute truth, and 
religion becomes one with philosophy.^ 

We touch here one of the most difficult points in 
the Hegelian system, and one in which the abstract 
language which its author uses renders him most open 
to misunderstanding. 2 To Hegel this resolution of the 
Vorstellungeyi into the forms of pure thought is some- 
thing very different from that process of abstraction 
by which the earlier philosophy sought to obtain a 
knowledge of the Absolute. The Absolute of Hegel is 
not abstract, but concrete; indeed, the most concrete 
of all existences.^ He has no patience with the shallow 

1 I. p. 150, Eng. tr. p. 154. "And thus it is that idea (Vorstellung) 
melts into the form of thought, and it is this quality of form which phil- 
osophic knowledge imparts to truth." The translation of the later con- 
text is misleading, and should be corrected by reference to the original. 

2 Cf . Stirling, op. cit. p. 47. " He talks much of abstract and concrete ; 
but after all, did the concrete ever shine into him but through the abstrac- 
tions of books ? " 

^ According to Hegel, it is the function of the philosophy of religion 
to develop this concreteness in God. Cf. I. p. 88 sq. Eng. tr. p. 90 sq. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 197 

deism of the Aufkldrung^^ or even with the more 
thorough-going transcendence of the earlier pre-critical 
philosophy. The world of concrete finite experience is 
not outside of God, but a moment in His consciousness. 
History is not undivine, but a process within the infinite 
Spirit of God. To translate Vorstellung into Begriff is 
to take an idea, won from finite experience, and false 
or inadequate when considered merely as such, and to 
put it into its true place as an element in the infinite 
and all-embracing consciousness of God. To attain 
absolute truth, we must lift ourselves above our finite 
point of view and look at the world and life as it is seen 
with God's eyes.2 But, we repeat, this is not to be 
done by abstraction from the finite, which remains a 
moment in truth to the last, but rather by setting it in 
new relations, and looking at it from a new point of 
view. This higher viewpoint it is the aim of the 
Philosophy of Religion to furnish. 

But Hegel is not content simply to construct a general 
conception of religion. He attempts to apply it in 
detail to the interpretation of the facts of the religious 
life. If history be in truth the coming to consciousness 

especially p. 89, Eng. tr. p. 92. To Hegel the process of resolving 
Vorstellung into Begriff is one of concretion rather than of abstraction. 
For, according to the Hegelian logic, the Begriff is itself concrete, p. 150, 
Eng. tr. p. 154. On this aspect of the Hegelian thought, cf. Stirling pp. 
64, 92, 161. 

1 Philosophie der Religion, I. pp. 33, 154, Eng. tr. I. pp. 32, 158. 

2 I. p. 198, Eng. tr. p. 204. "Now, however, that the finite and the 
standpoint of reflection have annulled themselves, we have reached the 
standpoint of infinite observation, and of the speculative Notion, namely 
the sphere in which the true notion or conception of religion will unfold 
itself before us." 



198 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of the Absolute, and if it be religion in which this 
august process culminates, then it must be possible to 
classify the historic religions according to the part 
which each has played in the realization of this ideal. 
And this is, in fact, what Hegel undertakes to do. 
In this attempt, he makes use of the three principles 
of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. In the religious 
experience we may distinguish three elements; the 
idea of the infinite, or the universal element; the an- 
tithesis of the finite and the infinite, or the particular 
element; and the union of the two in the higher syn- 
thesis of worship. 1 This primary analysis leads to a 
second^ in which the conception of religion in general 
is contrasted with the particular or definite religions, in 
which its several moments come to more or less clear 
expression, only that both alike may find their union in 
the absolute or perfect religion. ^ It is in the sphere 
of the definite religions that Hegel meets the problem 
of classification. Here, as always, true to his ideal, he 
begins with an analysis of the idea into its elements, 
and then turns to history to find the verification of his 
analysis in experience.^ Passing over savage religion, 
in which the self-consciousness of man has not yet 
awakened,* we find on the one hand the pantheistic 
religions, in which the universal element in religion is 
emphasized to the exclusion of the individual. The 

1 Philosophie der Religion I. pp. 61-73, Eng. tr. pp. 60-73. This is 
worked out more in detail in pp. 87-252, Eng. tr. pp. 89-258. 

2 Pp. 73-84, Eng. tr. pp. 73-85. 

s Pp. 255-262, Eng. tr. pp. 261-269. 

* This primitive stage is discussed in pp. 263-308, Eng. tr. pp. 270- 
316. Its characteristic expression is magic. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 199 

chief representatives of this class are the religion of 
China, and the two Indian religions, Brahmanism and 
Buddhism. In these the individual, while distinguish- 
ing himself from God, feels himself as nothing com- 
pared with the Absolute.^ On the other hand are 
the religions of spirit, represented by Israel, Greece, 
and Rome. Here the individual comes to his rights. 
The subject feels himself lord over nature, which still 
remains, however, an alien substance,, foreign in nature 
to its master. Transcendence, in one form or another, 
is a common feature of all these religions. ^ Midway 
between the two, we find an intermediate stage, in 
which the awaking spirit clearly recognizes its separate- 
ness from nature, but without having yet discovered 
its lordship over it. This is the place of the dualistic 
religions of Persia, of Syria, and of Egypt. ^ Finally, 
the ideal of religion is realized in Christianity, which 
combines in a higher synthesis the elements of truth 
both in the religions of nature and of spirit. In Chris- 
tianity the spirit distinguishes itself from nature, only 
to find itself there in a different form, and to recognize 
in its unity with itself as immanent and transcendent 
at once the ultimate reality and the absolute truth.* 

1 I. pp. 308-338, Eng. tr. pp. 317-end; I. pp. 339-401, Eng. tr. IL 
pp. 1-65. 

2 IL pp. 1-188, Eng. tr. II. pp. 122-323. 
8 I. pp. 401-456, Eng. tr. II. pp. 65-122. 

* On Hegel's classification of religions, cf. Piinjer, op. cit. II. p. 241 sq, ; 
Sterrett, p. 233 sq. The classification of Weber {Hist, of Phil., p. 529 sq.) 
does not correspond with that given in the Philosophie der Religion, nor 
have I been able to find its source. "Weber makes Hegel contrast the 
pantheistic religions of the East, together with Mosaism, as religions of 
the infinite, with the religion of Greece, in which the finite comes to its 



200 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Whatever may be thought of the positive merits of 
this classification, one cannot deny that it stands for a 
great idea. Hegel's book is the first comprehensive 
treatment of comparative religion. In place of the 
vague generalizations which had hitherto served to 
cloak men's ignorance as to detail, we have an elaborate 
discussion, based upon the widest reading and research, 
and gathering up, in a form convenient for use, all 
the available knowledge of the time. With all recog- 
nition of the errors of fact, due to the artificial and 
a priori character of the construction, it remains true 
that Hegel's classification of the religions is an epoch- 
making achievement. Even those who criticize him 
most severely themselves stand upon his shoulders. ^ 

rights. This is not the division followed either in the Phanomenologte, 
the Encyclopddie, or the Philosophie der Religion. 

If we arrange the religions in tabular form we should have the follow- 
ing division : — 

I. Natural religion. 

1. Immediate sensuous religion (savage religion). 

2. Pantheistic religions. 

a. The religion of China, or of Measure. 

h. The religion of India, or of Imagination (Brahmanism). 

c. Buddhism, or the Religion of Being-in-itself. 

3. Transition from Nature to Spirit (Dualism). 

a. Parseeism or the religion of Light and Darkness. 
6. The Syrian religion, or the religion of Pain, 
c. The Egyptian religion, or the religion of Mysterj. 
II. Spiritual religion. 

1. The religion of Israel, or of Sublimity. 

2. The religion of Greece, or of Beauty. 

3. The religion of Rome, or of Utility. 

in. The Absolute or Revealed Religion, Christianity. 
1 De la Saussaye, quoted by Wenley, Contemporary Theology and 
TTieism, p. 12. " The fundamental principles of Kant's and Schleiermacher's 
systems supplied some foundation stones on which to erect a philosophy 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 201 

But our present concern is not so much with Hegel's 
view of religion in general, as with his conception of 
Christianity. It is time to consider this somewhat more 
in detail. 



3. Hegel's Conception of Christianity/, 

Hegel's conception of Christianity is most fully set 
forth in the latter part of his Philosophy of Religion. ^ 
Here he develops in detail the view of the absolute 
religion which he had already outlined in his Encyclo- 
psedia.^ True to his method, he begins with a specula- 
tive construction, which he then proceeds to verify by 
comparison with the historic facts. 

In the absolute religion we should expect to find the 
summing up of the entire process of the preceding reli- 
gious history; the unity, in a single conception, of the 
several moments which hitherto have existed only in 
their separateness.^ God must be known, not only in 
Himself, as the universal principle, complete in Himself 
and to Himself sufficient ; not only as the creator and 
revealer, the principle of differentiation and of free self- 

of religion. But we must recognize Hegel as its true founder, because he 
first carried out the vast idea of realizing, as a whole, the various modes 
of studying religion (metaphysical, psychological, and historical), and 
made us see the harmony between the idea and the realization of religion. 
No one approaches him in this respect. " See also Sterrett, p. 233 ; 
Plinjer, II. p. 241. 

1 Vol. II. p. 192 sq., Eng. tr. Vol. II. p. 327 sq. ; Vol. III. With this 
should be compared the discussion of Christianity in the Philosophie der 
Geschichte. 

2 Philosophy of Mind, p. 175 sq. Cf. also the Phanomenologie, p. 561 sq. 

3 Philosophie der Religion, I. p. 76 sq., Eng. tr., p. 76 sq. : " The essen- 
tial moments," etc. 



202 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

assertion, contrasting Himself with the world and mani- 
festing His will upon it; but as the unity of the two, 
at once immanent and transcendent, at once infinite and 
finite. This is what we find in historic Christianity. 
In the doctrine of the Trinity we have the union in a 
higher synthesis of all the moments which the previous 
historical process has given us in their isolation. God 
is revealed as the Father, the ultimate principle of the*^^ 
Godhead, existing in and for Himself from all eternity ; 
He is revealed as the Son, the principle of difference in 
the Godhead, separating Himself from the Father in 
creation only to return again in the higher synthesis of 
redemption ; He is revealed finally as the Holy Spirit, 
through whom Father and Son recognize Their unity, 
and God comes to His full self-consciousness as Spirit. ^ 
Such is Christianity, the absolute religion, in which 
the eternal dialectic which is immanent in the Being of 
God works itself out to full expression in history. 
Here at last we have clearly set forth the meaning of 
the entire process through which, from the beginning 
of time, the whole creation, with groanings unutterable, 
has been blindly laboring. This is what men mean 
when they call Christianity the revealed religion.^ Not 

1 On Hegel's view of Christianity, see Piinjer, II. p. 245 sq.; Sterrett, 
p. 268 sq. ; Stirling, pp. 100 sg. ; 176 sq. ; 721 sq. 

2 PhilosopJiie der Religion, II. p. 192 sq, Eng. tr. II. p. 328 sq. By call- 
ing Christianity a revealed religion, Hegel means two things : 1, That in 
Christianity God is no longer an external ohject, but is known as Himself 
coming to consciousness in the finite ego ; 2, That this knowledge is com- 
municated to man by God Himself, which constitutes Christianity in the 
narrower sense a revealed or positive religion. These two ideas are ex- 
pressed by the two German words " offenbar " and " geoff enbart," which 
we may perhaps render by the terms " manifest " and " revealed." Cf. 
Piinjer, II. p. 245. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 203 

as though we would assert that the other religions are 
false, and Christianity alone true, but that Christianity 
alone sees the elements of truth in their relation and 
proportion, looks out over the world process with a 
clear perception of its meaning, beholds things in their 
eternal reality, even as they appear to the eye of God. 

We need not follow Hegel through all the intricacies 
of his dialectic construction. The speculative discussion 
of the Philosophy of Religion should be supplemented 
by the more concrete treatment of the Philosophy of 
History.^ The latter sets Christianity in its environ- 
ment, as a fact of experience, to be described as well as 
explained. To Hegel, as truly as to Schleiermacher, 
Christianity centres in Jesus Christ. But in the his- 
tory, as in the philosophy, it is not so much the person 
of Jesus which interests him, as the doctrine of His 
person. In the Christian dogma of the incarnation we 
have the perfect union of the divine and the human; 
the revelation of the infinite in the form of the finite. 
This, as we have seen, is the ultimate truth which 
underlies all life ; the supreme insight, to give expression 
to which all the earlier religions were striving. Pos- 
sessing this, Christianity justifies its claim to be the 
perfect religion. 

Yet it would be a mistake to think that Hegel has 
no interest in the historical aspect of Christianity as 
such. He has no sympathy with the view which sees 
in Christianity simply an eternal truth, of which history 
is but the more or less perfect symbolical expression. 

1 Vorlesungen ilber die Philosophic der Geschichte, 2d ed., ed. Karl Hegel, 
Berlin, 1840, p. 387 sq., Eng. tr. by Sibree, p. 330 sq. 



204 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Christianity is fact as well as idea, or rather it is idea 
which has realized itself in fact. The unity between 
God and man which "exists in the first place simply 
for the thinking speculative consciousness " must also 
"exist for the sensuous representative consciousness. 
It must become an object in the world. It must a'ppear^ 
and that in the sensuous form appropriate to spirit, 
which is the human." ^ This is what has actually hap- 
pened in Christianity. " Christ has appeared ; a Man 
who is God ; God who is Man, and thereby peace and 
reconciliation have accrued to the world. ""^ If this be 
not true, Hegel is of all philosophers the most miserable. 
Christianity, then, is the supreme fact, as well as the 
ultimate truth; but this is a very different thing from 
saying that all that has come down to us under the 
name of Christianity is true. The great reality in 
which religion centres, while given once for all, is only 
gradually apprehended by man; and the process of this 
apprehension is attended with many dangers and mis- 
takes. The reconciliation which God has wrought in 
Christ needs to become the common property of Chris- 
tians, and this is possible only through the same dia- 
lectical process with which we have already been made 
familiar. This accounts for Hegel's great interest in 
the history of dogma. For it is this history, with its 
successive thesis and antithesis, excluding heresies on 
the right hand and on the left, shrinking from no con- 
clusions to which its dialectic seems to lead, however 
apparently contradictory they may appear ; it is this 
history, we repeat, in which the absolute truth, already 

1 Op. cit. p. 394, Eng. tr. p. 336. 2 Xbid. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 205 

implicitly given in Christ, is little by little made explicit 
to the Christian consciousness.^ Dogma of dogmas is 
the Trinity, to Hegel the articulus stantis aut cadentis 
ecclesiae. For it is the Trinity in which the entire 
dialectic of revelation is gathered to a head.^ Here we 
have — to be sure still in the form of Vorstellung^ and so 
needing the translation which philosophy alone can give 
— the quintessence of truth, the supreme insight, in 
which religion and philosophy are one. To grasp this 
in its completeness, and to state it in the terms of pure 
thought which no fires of criticism can dissolve is to 
establish beyond peradventure the absoluteness of 
Christianity. 

If we compare the definition of Hegel with that of 
Schleiermacher we find many points of resemblance. 
To both Christianity centres in the historic Christ, the 
unique mediator between God and man; the one 
through whom that reconciliation is made possible of 
which all future history is the successive appropriation. 
Both have a keen sense for the varieties in the historic 
religions. To both the Trinity, with its reconciliation 
of preceding differences, is the distinctive Christian 
dogma. ^ But side by side with these superficial resem- 

1 The application of this dialectic method in detail to the treatment of 
the history of doctrine was, as is well known, the work of Baur and his 
school. 

2 Philosophie der Religion, I. p. 40, Eng. tr. I. p. 39 ; II. p. 226 sg. Eng. 
tr. III. p. 9 sq. See especially II. p. 227, Eng. tr. III. p. 11 : " This eter- 
nal idea, accordingly, finds expression in the Christian religion under the 
name of the Holy Trinity, and this is God Himself, the eternal Triune God." 
Cf also Stirling, p. 722. 

3 Compare Hegel's construction of Christianity in the third volume of 
his Philosophie der Religion, with the trinitarian structure of Schleier- 
macher's Glaubenslehre. 



206 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

blances, we note differences of far-reaching importance. 
Far more significant than the contrast between the 
elements of feeling and of thought, in which the char- 
acteristic distinction between the two systems is often 
found, is the fundamental difference of viewpoint. 
Schleiermacher, for all his insistence upon the infinity 
of religion, approaches the problem from the point of 
view of the finite. If he affirms the absoluteness of 
religion, it is because he finds the Absolute given in 
the religious experience, as a matter of fact. But it 
never occurs to him to abandon his dependent position 
as finite, and to transport himself in thought into the 
Being of God. To Hegel, on the other hand, the sub- 
jective dialectic of thought is the revelation of objective 
realities. What takes place on a small scale, in my 
human experience, must reproduce itself on a large 
scale within the consciousness of God. And theology, 
like philosophy, seeking ultimate realities, must lift 
itself above the finite and see things with the eyes of 
God. To understand any historical phenomenon, 
therefore, we must look at it, as it were, from above, 
and find in it simply the verification in fact of that 
which we have already been able to construct a priori 
through the dialectic of thought. Christianity itself is 
simply the expression in time of a truth already clearly 
apprehended by the philosopher apart from all history. 
Here we have the deductive method carried to its 
farthest extreme. Not Thomas Aquinas himself is 
bolder in his ontology. 

The a priori and deductive character of Hegel's 
thought accounts for the historical errors into which 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 207 

he often falls. The man who starts with a complete 
construction of reality before he approaches the facts 
will be more than human if he does not sometimes 
stretch the facts to meet the necessities of his construc- 
tion. Hegel, philosopher though he was, was but 
human, and the criticisms which have been brought 
against his system by historians and students of com- 
parative religion are but too well justified in fact. But 
there is another side to the matter, which in justice to 
our philosopher we must not overlook. No one will 
long have patience to study a subject of the meaning- 
lessness of which he is convinced. In inspiring men 
with a belief in the rationality of history, Hegel not 
only revived an interest in history as a study which 
before him did not exist, but became the father of a 
method to which, in spite of all exaggerations, we owe 
some of the most fruitful results of modern times. 
This is especially true in connection with the study of 
Christianity. 

4. The Disciples of Hegel.^ 

In spite of the large place given to the subject in his 
writings, the definition of Christianity is to Hegel only 

^ On the earlier disciples of Hegel, Daub, Rosenkranz, Marheinecke, 
Goschel, Erdmann, Hasse, Schaller, etc. cf. Lichtenberger, Histoire des 
id^es religieuses en Allemagne depuis le XVIII^^ Steele jusqiCa nos jours, 
Paris, 1888, Vol. II. p. 315 sq., where the literature may be found in full ; 
also Piinjer, op. cit. II. p. 257 sq. On Daub cf. D. F. Strauss, Character- 
istiken und Kritiken, Leipzig, 1839 (" Schleierraacher und Daub, in ihrer 
Bedeutung f iir die Theologie unsrer Zeit"). For the Hegelian criticism 
of Schleierraacher, cf. the works of Rosenkranz, Schaller, and Gass, 
already referred to. 

The most influential of Hegel's disciples was F. C. Baur {Die christUche 



208 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

an incident in a larger scheme. As has already been 
sufficiently shown, the philosophical interest is control- 
ling with him, rather than the religious.^ Christianity 
is primarily truth, not power, and truth which does not 

Gnosis, Tubingen, 1835. Cf. also his Kirchengeschichte, and his various 
monographs on the history of Christian doctrine). Less conservative 
tendencies are represented by Strauss {Christliche Glaubenslehre, 2 vols. 
Tiibingen, 1840 ; Der alte und der neue Glaube, 4-th ed., Leipzig, 1873. On 
Strauss, cf. Hausrath, David Fr. Strauss und die Theologie seiner Zeit, 
2 vols. Heidelberg, 1876 ; Eck, David Friedrich Strauss, Stuttgart, 1899 ; 
Fairbairn, Place of Christ in Modern Theology, New York, 1893, p. 230 sq.) ; 
and Feuerbach {Das Wesen des Christenihums, 3d ed. Leipzig, 1849; Eng. 
tr. by Marian Evans, from the second German ed., 2d ed. Boston, 1881). 

Later thelogians usually classed as Hegelian are : Biedermann : ( Christ- 
liche Dogmatik, 2 vols. Berlin, 1884 sq.) and Pfleiderer [Religionsphiloso- 
phie, 1st ed. 1878, 3d ed. 1896 ; Gifford Lectures for 1894 on the Philosophy 
and Development of Religion; Grundriss der christlichen Glaubens- und 
Sittenlehre, 4th ed. Berlin, 1888; Evolution and Theology, London, 1900, 
especially p. 80 sq. on " The Essence of Christianity")- 

The chief representatives of Hegelianism in Great Britain are the 
brothers Caird. Cf. John Caird, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Religion, New York, 1880 ; The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, Gif- 
ford Lectures, 2 vols. Glasgow, 1899 ; Edward Caird, The Evolution of 
Religion, Gifford Lectures for 1890, 1891, New York, 1893, 2 vols. See 
also the works of Thomas Hill Green ; and among Americans, Sterrett, 
Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, New York, 1890, and the writ- 
ings of W. T. Harris, already referred to. 

i This appears most clearly in the closing paragraphs of his Philosophie 
der Religion, II. p. 355, Eng. tr. III. p. 131. "For us philosophical knowl- 
edge has harmonized this discord, and the aim of these lectures has been 
to reconcile reason and religion, to show how we know this latter to be in 
all its manifold forms necessary, and to rediscover in revealed religion the 
truth and the Idea. 

" But this reconciliation is itself merely a partial one without outward 
universality. Philosophy forms in this connection a sanctuary apart, and 
those who serve in it constitute an isolated order of priests, who must not 
mix with the world, and whose work is to protect the possession of Truth. 
How the actual present-day world is to find its way out of this state of dis- 
ruption, and what form it is to take, are questions which must be left to 
itself to settle, and to deal with them is not the immediate practical 
business and concern of philosophy." 



* 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 209 

differ in substance from that which is the subject of 
philosophy in general. But the new impulse thus 
received soon made itself felt in distinctly theological 
circles. Christian doctrine came to be studied with new 
enthusiasm in the light of the evolutionary principle. 
Baur and his school began to construct the history of 
Christianity according to the threefold principle of 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Judaism, Paulinism, 
and the reconciliation of both in the theology of John; 
Greek Catholicism, Roman Catholicism, and the over- 
coming of the antithesis in the higher religious insight 
of Protestantism: such thoughts as these became 
familiar ones in Christian circles. The problem of the 
definition of Christianity, first revived by Schleier- 
macher, was taken up again, in the light of the new 
ideas, and a circle of definitions was constructed, which, 
in spite of all differences in detail, may still be classed 
together as Hegelian. 

Two distinct tendencies of theological thought take 
their departure from Hegel. The first magnifies the 
abstract or a priori element in his teaching, tends to 
identify religion and philosophy, and, with the identifi- 
cation, becomes more and more critical of the distinc- 
tive features which have characterized Christianity as 
a historic religion. The other approaches more and 
more closely to the positions of the traditional Christian 
theology, sees in historic Christianity the result of a 
special divine revelation, and seeks through the prin- 
ciples of the Hegelian philosophy a rational defence of 
its distinctive doctrines. 

The early Hegelians were as a rule conservative in 

14 



210 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

their theological views. Like their master, they saw 
in the new philosophy the means of demonstrating the 
rationality of Christianity, and gave themselves to the 
task of showing this in detail with an industry and 
devotion beyond praise. Side by side with the more 
distinctly historical students, whose connection with 
the Tubingen movement has preserved their memory 
while that of their less fortunate colleagues is for- 
gotten, ^ there was a group of theologians, men like 
Daub, Marheinecke and others, whose names are less 
familiar, who saw in Christianity "the absolute syn- 
thesis of the finite and the infinite, "^ and in the 
incarnation the central reality of Christianity. To 
Marheinecke, for example, "the historic Christ is the 
realization of the divine ideal in a human individuality. 
In Him God knows Himself man, and man knows him- 
self God ; in Him the contradiction between the human 
and the divine, the ego and the Absolute no longer 
exists. Christ has not merely reconciled humanity with 
God, but He is Himself the reconciliation in His own 
person and in His life. ... In His person humanity 
arrives at the knowledge of its divinity."^ Truly it 
would seem as if Christian faith could ask no more. 
But the conservative elements in the Hegelian system 
were matched by others more radical. The dialectic, 
which its author had used for the defence of Christian 
dogma, proved equally effective for its destruction. 
The historical criticism, which Baur employed in good 
faith for the recovery of what he deemed to be essential 

1 E. g. Zeller, Schwegler, Hilgenfeld, Volkmar, Holsten, etc. 

2 Lichtenberger, op. cit. II. p. 337. ^ md. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 211 

Christianity, 1 had its counterpart in the "Leben Jesu " 
of Strauss, 2 in which the union between idea and history 
so essential to the Hegelian system in its purity is 
dissolved. What the " Leben Jesu " is to the central 
dogma of the incarnation, that the " Glaubenslehre " of 
Strauss is to the Christian system as a whole. ^ Here 
we find a criticism of the Hegelian theology which for 
acuteness and insight has not often been surpassed. 
Dogma, so far from being essential truth in pictorial 
form, is only the naive language of the uninitiated man, 
certain to be dissolved into its elements through the 
same historical process which created it.^ Still more 
negative is the outcome of his last book, " Der alte und 
der neue Glaube."^ Contrasting the modern view of 
the world with that of the older faith, Strauss raises 
the question whether any sense remains in which it is 
still possible for a modern man to call himself a Chris- 
tian, only to answer it flatly in the negative.^ 

1 On the constructive aspect of Baur's work, cf. Nash, History of the 
Higher Criticism of the New Testament, New York, 1900, p. 128 sq. p. 156. 
See also the article on Baur in Herzog, Real-Encyklopddie 3, and literature 
there cited. 

2 The Lehen Jesu appeared in 1835. Twenty- nine years later (1864) 
Strauss published his second Lehen Jesu fur das deutsche Volk bearbeitet." 

** Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im 
Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft," 2 vols. Tubingen, 1840. 

* Cf. especially I. p. 68 sq. : " Aufgabe der Dogmatik in unserer Zeit." 
In this section he expresses supreme contempt for all attempts to mediate 
between orthodoxy and scientific theology, and declares that a truly his- 
torical study of dogma means its dissolution. Cf. p. 71 : " Die wahre 
Kritik des Dogmas ist seine Geschichte." 

^ Der alte und der neue Glaube, Ein BeJr.enntniss, Leipzig, 1872. 

6 P. 90 : " Also meine Ueberzeugung ist : wenn wir nicht Ausfliichte 
suchen woUen, wenn wir nicht drehen und deuteln wollen, wenn wir nicht 
Ja Ja und Nein Nein bleiben lassen wollen, kurz wenn wir als ehrliche 



212 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

The clearest expression of the destructive tendency 
of the Hegelian movement is given in Ludwig Feuer- 
bach's "Essence of Christianity."^ He utterly re- 
nounces the absolute Mind of Hegel, ^ and takes his 
stand squarely within the experiences of the finite. 
Dialectic there is still, but its significance is purely 
subjective. Religion is "the disuniting of man from 
himself;" the contemplation by man, under the form 
of God, of what is really "only his own latent nature."^ 
There can be no theology distinct from psychology and 
anthropology.* To discover the essence of Christianity, 
therefore, we must learn what are the human desires 
and feelings of which the historic dogmas are the ex- 
pression. But this discovery is also their dissolution.^ 

aufrichtige Menschen sprechen, so miissen wir bekennen : wir sind keine 
Christen mehr." Even the question whether we still have a religion leads 
to doubtful results. It all depends on what you mean by religion (p. 143). 

1 Das Wesen des Christenthum, Leipzig, 1849, in his Sdmmtliche 
Werlce, Vol. VII. English tr. from the 2d Germ. ed. by Marian Evans, 
1855. We quote from the second American ed. of 1881. 

2 Preface, p. ix [VII. p. 12]. 

3 P. 33 [VII. p. 65]. Cf. p. 29 [VII p. 61]. "Man— this is the 
mystery of religion — projects his being into objectivity, and then again 
makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted 
into a subject." P. 181. "As God is noching else than the nature of 
man purified from that which to the human individual appears, whether 
in feeling or thought, a limitation, an evil," etc. Preface, p. x [VII. 
p. 13]. " It is not I, but religion, that worships man." 

* P. 230 [VII. p. 311.] " Only when we abandon a philosophy of reli- 
gion, or a theology, which is distinct from psychology and anthropology, 
and recognize anthropology as itself theology, do we attain to a true, 
self-satisfying identity of the divine and human being, the identity of the 
human being with itself. " 

5 Cf. p. 339 [VII. p. 437]. *' The reduction of the extrahuman, super- 
natural, and antirational nature of God to the natural, immanent, inborn 
nature of man, is therefore the liberation of Protestantism, of Christianity 
in general, from its fundamental contradiction.*' 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 213 

For in founding love (as does Christianity) upon a 
"special historical phenomenon," we contradict the 
nature of love "which endures no limits." ^ This un- 
christian limitation it is necessary for us to outgrow. 
The true Christian is the man who has turned his back 
upon historic Christianity. ^ 

Much more positive is the result reached by the last 
great representative of the Hegelian theology. In Bie- 
dermann's "Dogmatik," ^ we find the same distinction 
between Vorstellung and Begriff with which we have 
already been made familiar. But the translation of the 
pictorial representations of Christian dogma into the 
forms of pure thought, however negative its results 
may seem to be at the time, has as its final end a firmer 

1 p. 268 [VII. p. 358]. 

2 p. 269 [VII. p. 360]. " He therefore who loves man for the sake of 
man, who rises to the love of the species, to universal love, adequate to 
the nature of the species, he is a Christian, is Christ himself. He does 
what Christ did, what made Christ Christ. Thus, where there arises the 
consciousness of the species as a species, the idea of humanity as a whole, 
Christ disappears, without however his true nature disappearing ; for he 
was the substitute for the consciousness of the species, the image under 
which it was made present to the people, and became the law of the popu- 
lar life." 

Feuerbach has a very clear appreciation of the fact that Christianity 
as a historic religion centres in Christ. Cf. p. 150 [VII. p. 209] : " Christ, 
therefore, is the distinction of Christianity from heathenism"; p. 148 
[VII. p. 207] : " Christ alone is the personal God ; he is the real God of 
Christians, a truth which cannot be too often repeated. In Him alone is 
concentrated the Christian religion, the essence of religion in general." 
In yielding its place to the new religion of humanity, which Feuerbach 
advocates, Christianity is but submitting to the law of which its own 
criticism of Judaism is the most notable example. For " in relation to the 
Israelite, the Christian is an esprit fort, a free-thinker. Thus do things 
change. What yesterday was stiU religion is no longer such to-day ; and 
what to-day is atheism, to-morrow will be religion," p. 32 [VII. p. 64]. 

3 Christliche Dogmatik, 2d ed., 1884, 1885, 2 vols. 



214 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

grasp on objective reality. In religion we come to 
know God as He really is. Limited though he be as 
creature,^ as spirit, man is capable of union with God.^ 
This union comes to pass through religion, which is at 
once the self-revelation of the infinite Spirit to the 
finite, and at the same time the progressive self-realiza- 
tion of the Absolute in the world. ^ In the perfect har- 
mony of the finite spiritual life with that of God, the 
absolute Spirit, the ideal of humanity is realized.* 
This end is actually attained in Christianity, in which 
the ideal of divine sonship, revealed in Jesus Christ,^ 
presents itself as "the perfect union of the divine and 
the human in the unity of a personal spiritual life."^ 
It is true that in its historic statements, in the doctrines 
of the incarnation and of the person of Christ, the true 

1 § 743, II. p. 563. 

2 § 751, 11. p. 566. 

8 § 718, II. p. 547. "Der Geist ist actus purus ; der absolute Geist ist 
der actus purus, durch den der gesammte "Weltprocess ist. Dieser actus 
purus des absoluten Geistes hat drei nicht getrennte, aber wesentlich 
unterscheidbare und darum fiir unser von der Welt ausgebendes Bewusst- 
sein als verscbiedene Stufen erscbeinende Momenta : 1, das Setzen der 
Welt als Naturprocess ausser Gott ; 2, die Selbstoffenbarung an den 
endlichen Geist in der Welt, und 3, die Selbstverwirklicbung absoluten 
Seins im endlicben Geist auf dem Boden der Welt." 

* § 755, II. p. 567. " Das Ziel des Menschen, die Zweckerfiillung seiner 
creatiirlichen Gottebenbildlicbkeit, ist das wie formal so real wirklicbe 
Geist-sein des Ich, die selbstbewusste und selbstgewoUte subjective Ueber- 
einstimmung des actus purus seines endlichen Geisteslebens mit dem abso- 
luten Geist, die als Liebeeinheit mit Gott unmittelbare Wirklichkeit in 
ihm ist." 

5 § 789, II. p. 580. "Das in der religiosen Personlichkeit Jesu Christi 
als unmittelbare religiose Thatsache der Gotteskindschaft gestellte 
Problem der Gottmenschheit." 

6 § 795, II. p. 583. "Die reale Einigung des gottlichen und des 
menschlichen Wesens zur wirklichen Einheit personlichen Geisteslebens." 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 215 

significance of this principle is obscured. ^ Theology, 
failing to distinguish between principle and person, has 
affirmed of Jesus the man what is true only of His 
Gospel, with the result that it has become involved in 
a maze of contradictions from which it must be the first 
business of a Christian philosophy to deliver it. But 
this does not mean that the person of Christ is unessen- 
tial in Christianity. On the contrary, it is in the person 
of its founder that the principle has first received its 
clear expression. ^ In Christ there is really a perfect 
union of the infinite with the finite, and the filial spirit 
which He Himself uniquely embodied He is the means 
of creating in others. ^ Thus the relation between His 
person and His work which history discloses is grounded 
in permanent considerations.* He is indeed, as His 
disciples have rightly called Him, both Master and 
Saviour, 5 and the absolute religion, in which all pre- 

1 § 790, II. p. 580. " Als der Grundwiderspruch, an dem jede Losung 
des christologischen Problems scheitern musste, hat sich uns die in der 
historischen Genesis und Entwicklung des Dogmas natiirlich gegebene und 
bedingte Identification des christlichen Princips mit der Person Jesu 
Christi, seiner historisch-primitiven Verwirklicbung, herausgestellt," 

2 § 795, II. p. 583. " Dieses christliche Princip — das als solches erst 
in der religiosen Personlichkeit Jesu und im Glauben an diese tbatsachlich 
in die Menschheitsgeschichte eingetreten ist." 

2 § 815, II. p. 593. " Diese Thatsache {i. e.the fact that Jesus' personal 
religious life is the first self-realization of the Christian principle ' zu einer 
weltgeschichtlichen Personlichkeit') ist der Quellpunkt der Wirksamkeit 
discs Princips in der Geschichte." 

* Ibid. p. 592. " Das Verhaltniss der historichen Person Jesu zur 
Wirksamkeit des mit ihm in die Geschichte eingetretenen und von ihm 
geschichtlich ausgehenden christlichen Princips, und damit die Bedeutung 
Jesu fur das gesammte Christenthum, ist kein aiisserliches und accident- 
elles, sondern ein innerliches und bleibendes." 

6 § 816, n. p. 593. 



216 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

ceding and less perfect forms culminate, is rightly called 
by His name.^ 

5. Other Speculative Definitions*^ 

Our view of the Hegelian movement would be in- 
complete if it did not include some reference to the new 
impulse given by the philosophy of Hegel to men who 
cannot themselves be classed as belonging to his school. 

1 Among living theologians, Pfleiderer is often classed with Bieder- 
mann as a Hegelian (so by Piinjer, II. p. 297 — an opinion based upon 
the first edition of the Religionsphilosophie, 1878). It is doubtful, however, 
whether this position can be maintained. Pfleiderer himself distinctly 
rejects the absolute idealism of Hegel, and confines the task of the philo- 
sophy of religion to a gradual approach to truth [Religionsphilosophie, 2d 
ed. II. p. 648 sq.). Not only is his definition of religion more comprehen- 
sive than that of Hegel [Glauhenslehre, p. 12), but his conception of Chris- 
tianity is far less abstract and a priori. He defines it [Glauhenslehre, 
p. 35) as " die monotheistiche Erlosungsreligion, welche ihre Wurzeln in 
der Religion der hebraischen Propheten und ihren geschichtlichen 
Ursprung in der religiosen Persbnlichkeit Jesu von Nazareth hat." 
More specially " Das Wesen des Christentums besteht in dem durch 
Jesus in der Menschheit geAveckten Geist der Gotteskindschaft oder der 
kindlichen Gottesliebe und der briiderlichen Menschenliebe " (p. 36). 
Cf. also his Essay on the Essence of Christianity (in Evolution and Theol- 
ogy, p. %Osq.). 

2 Among the many theologians of other schools more or less influenced 
by the idealistic movement which culminated in Hegel may be mentioned : 

Weisse, Philosophische Dogmatih, 3 vols. Leipzig, 1855; Rothe, Theolo- 
gische Ethik, 5 vols. Wittenberg, 1 867 sq. ; Dorner, System der christ- 
lichen Glauhenslehre, 1867-1881, 2d ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1886, Eng. tr. by Cave 
and Banks, 4 vols. Edinburgh, 1880-1882 ; Martensen, Christliche Bog- 
matik, 3d ed. Leipzig, 1886, Eng. tr. by Urwick, Edinburgh, 1886; 
Lange, Philosophische Dogmatik, Heidelberg, 1849, 3 vols. ; Hofmann, 
Der Schriftbeweis, 2d ed. Nordlingen, 2 vols. ; Frank, System der 
christlischen Geweissheit, 2d ed., 2 vols., 1884; System der christlichen 
Wahrheit, 2d ed., 2 vols., 1885. Cf. also his general estimate of the newer 
speculative theology in his Geschichte und Kritik der neueren Theologie, 
Erlangen, 1898, chap. iii. pp. 162-196. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 217 

In the second and third quarters of the century we find 
a number of theologians who, while differing in other 
respects, are alike in this, that they all approach the 
study of Christianity from the speculative point of 
view. Not all apprehend our problem with equal clear- 
ness, nor are the philosophical premises from which they 
take their departure the same. Some, like Weisse and 
Rothe, are more closely allied in spirit to Schelling than 
to Hegel. ^ Others are eclectic, drawing their mate- 
rials, philosophical and theological, from many sources.^ 
Still others, standing well within the ranks of ecclesias- 
tical orthodoxy, draw from the arsenal of the Hegelian 
dialectic weapons with which to defend the faith once 
for all delivered to the saints.^ To follow all these 
different lines would carry us too far afield. It will be 
sufficient to select a single representative, by whose 
example we may illustrate the nature of the influence 
to which we refer. 

In Dorner's " Glaubenslehre " we have an excellent 
example of the application of the dialectic method to 
the problem of the definition of Christianity. Dorner 
is usually classed as an eclectic, and it is true that he 
unites in himself elements drawn from very different 
theological schools. But the way in which he sets up 
a general definition of religion, and then derives his 

1 Piinjer, II. p. 164. On Rothe, cf. also Holtzmann, R. Rothes 
speculatives System, Freiburg, 1899. More destructive tendencies are 
represented in the writings of Schopenhauer (cf. Piinjer, 11. p. 124) and 
Hartmann (cf. especially his Selbstersetzung des Christenthums und die 
Religion der Zukunfi, and his Die Krisis des Christenthums in der modernen 
Theologie, 1880; also Piinjer, II. p. 129 sq.). 

* E. g. Dorner, Martensen, Lange. 

3 E. g. Frank. 



218 THE ESSENCE OF CBRISTIANITY 

conception of Christianity as the absolute religion by 
analyzing this general idea into two antithetic elements 
of which Christianity is the higher synthesis, is truly 
Hegelian. To Dorner religion is the vital mutual rela- 
tion of man to God and of God to man.^ On God's 
side, it involves the self -revelation of His majesty and 
might as well as of His will; on man's the consciousness 
of his absolute dependence upon God and submission 
to His will. As on God's side the relationship consists 
in the impartation of God to man, so on man's it consists 
in a growing experience of the divine life in knowledge, 
freedom, and happiness. There are two great types of 
religion, the ethnic and the Jewish. The weakness of 
the former in all its forms is the failure to distinguish 
clearly between God and the world ; ^ of the latter the 
tendency to hold the two too far apart. ^ Yet the relig- 
ion of Israel, through prophecy and inspiration, con- 
tains anticipations of the truth, which heathenism lacks.* 
In Christianity, the less perfect ideals of earlier ages 
are transcended, and the antithesis between the two 
types finally overcome. "It is the higher unity and 
therefore the completion and end of both Judaism and 
heathenism alike. This is true because of what is at 
once its central idea and its fundamental fact, namely 
the absolute incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, and 
the resulting work of the Holy Ghost in the upbuilding 

1 Glaubenslehre, 2d ed. I. p. 551, § 47, Eng. tr. II. p. 114. "Die 
Religion ist lebendige gegenseitige Bezogenheit Gottes auf den Menschen 
und des Menschen auf Gott." 

2 § 66, I. p. 686, Eng. tr. II. p. 249. 
8 § 67, I. p. 696, Eng. tr. II. p. 259. 
* § 68, I. p. 702, Eng. tr. II. p. 264. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 219 

of the kingdom of God."^ In making Christianity 
centre in the incarnation Dorner is in agreement with 
many theologians both in Germany and across the sea.^ 

1 § 70, I. p. 718, Eng. tr. 11. p. 280. "Das Christenthum ist die 
hohere Einheit und dadurch das Ende von Heidenthum und Judenthum 
durch seine Grundidee und Grundthatsache, die absolute Menschwerdung 
Gottes in Jesus Christus und das vom Gottmenschen ausgehende Werk 
des Heiligen Geistes zur Verwirklichung des Eeiches Gottes." 

2 E. g, Lange, Martensen, Frank, Hofmann, Gore, and in America, H. 
B. Smith, and most recently George Gordon. 

Lange's definition of Christianity is found in § 66 of his Philosophische 
Dogmatik (I. p. 463). "Der Gottmensch in seiner Vollendung, oder in 
dem ewigen Abschluss seiner Lebensentwicklnng ist uns als die vollen- 
dete'Macht, der Menschheit das gottmenschliche Leben mitzutheilen, 
erschienen, darum als das Christenthum selber in personlicher Gestalt." 

Martensen {Dogmatik, 3d ed. p. 17, Eng. tr. p. 17). " Erst durch die 
Menschwerdung Gottes in Christo tritt der wahre Mittler in die Welt . . . 
Das Wesen des Christenthums ist daher nicht verschieden von Christo 
selber. Der Religionsstifter ist selber der Inhalt der Religion." 

Frank {Christliche Wahrheit, § 20, I. p. 286 ; § 27, II. p. 1 sq.). Frank 
regards the great process of the divine revelation to man as fulfilling itself 
through the three steps of generation, degeneration, and regeneration. 
The latter, the redemptive process, centres in the incarnation. 

Hofmann [Schriftheweis, I. p. 35, §§ 1-3). "Das Christenthum ist ein 
personliches Verhaltniss . . . Gottes und der Menschheit . . . Vermittelt 
ist die Liebesgemeinschaft Gottes und des Christen in dem Menschen 
Jesus Christus, nicht in irgend etwas von ihm, sondern in ihm selbst . . . 
Die so vermittelte Liebesgemeinschaft Gottes und des Christen hat zu 
ihrer Voraussetzung eine Gemeinschaft Gottes und Jesu Christi, welche 
. . . indem Verhaltniss Gottes zu dem Menschen Jesus, zugleich 
innergottliches Verhaltniss sein muss, als jenes geworden, als dieses 
ewig." 

H. B. Smith {Faith and Philosophy, p. 134). " The yearnings of Pagan- 
ism, the struggles of history, the contests of the schools, are but immature 
and anticipatory efforts to realize that idea of Mediation through an In- 
carnation, which came to its perfect embodiment in the Person of Christ. 
This is the archetypal idea by whose light alone we may read the spiritual 
history of our race." 

Gore {Bampton Lectures iov 1891 on The Incarnation, p. 1). "Chris- 
tianity is faith in a certain person Jesus Christ, and by faith in Him is 
meant such unreserved self-committal as is only possible because faith in 



220 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 



6. Neo-Hegelianism. John and Edward Caird?^ 

Nowhere has the Hegelian point of view been applied 
with greater originality and skill to the intrepretation 
of the religious life than by the two brothers Caird in 
Scotland. In the three volumes, "The Philosophy of 
Religion " by John Caird, the " Evolution of Religion " 
by Edward Caird, and the "Fundamental Ideas of 
Christianity " by John Caird, we have a discussion of 
the problem which now engages us, which for brilliancy 
and skill has not often been surpassed. ^ The funda- 
mental conception of religion is the same with which 
we have already been made familiar, the self -revelation 
of the infinite to the finite, the discovery by the finite 
of the infinite. Religion is conceived as a unity. The 
several historic religions are all more or less perfect 
forms of the one great religion of humanity, steps in 
the same evolutionary process which, however far it 

Jesus is understood to be faith in God, and union with Jesus union with 
God." 

Gordon {The New Epoch for Faith, Boston, 1901, p. 128). "The funda- 
mental idea of the Gospel may be stated in a sentence. The glad tidings 
consist in an ideal incarnation of God in the interest of a universal incar- 
nation." Cf. p. 169 : "The central truth of Christianity is the manifes- 
tation of God in Jesus Christ. The Gospel is essentially the Gospel of 
the incarnation." 

1 See note 1, p. 207, last paragraph. 

2 The three books fall naturally into place as members of a series. Tn 
the Philosophy of Religion by John Caird we have a discussion of the 
fundamental problems of religion ; in the Evolution of Religion by Edward 
Caird we have a study of the historical development of religion, while in 
the closing book, the Fundamental Ideas of Christianity , by John Caird, 
we have a development in detail of the chief conceptions of the final or 
absolute religion. 



HEGELIAN DEFINITIONS 221 

may seem to wander afield, in reality moves straight to 
a single goal.^ On the one hand are the objective re- 
ligions ;2 on the other hand the subjective religions. ^ 
Between them is Christianity, the absolute religion, in 
which the long historic process culminates.* "In 
Christianity religion has risen to its own true form : it, 
at last, is the consciousness of that spiritual principle 
which manifests itself in both subject and object alike, 
and which realizes its unity with itself through all their 
difference. God is now conceived of not, as in all 
objective religions, as a merely natural power, or as 
the unity of all natural powers; nor again is He con- 
ceived, as in subjective religion, as a spiritual being 
outside of nature and dominating over it. He is con- 
ceived as manifesting Himself alike in the whole process 
of nature, and in the process of spirit as it rises above 
nature."^ Because it possesses such a conception of 
God as this, at once immanent and transcendent, Chris- 
tianity is worthy to be called the perfect religion. 

Through all these various definitions one common 
principle runs. Christianity is the absolute religion, 
because the fulfilment of an ideal, already won from a 
study of religion as such, and brought as a standard to 
the interpretation and estimate of the several historic 
religions. Before a conception, however exalted, of 

1 Philosophy of Religion, p, 303 sq. The principles here briefly out- 
lined are applied in detail in the Evolution of Religion. 

2 E. g. the religion of Greece. Cf, Evolution of Religion, I. p. 260 sq. 

8 E. g. Buddhism and in another form, the religion of Israel. Ibid. I. 
p. 348 sq. ; p. 377 sq. 
* Ibid. 11. p. 115 s^. 

6 Ibid. u. -p.m. 



222 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

religion as natural, this religion, with its supernatural 
claims, is brought to bar; to be accepted, if at all, 
because it conforms, and only so far as it shall prove 
to conform, to principles already adopted by the phi- 
losopher as commending themselves to his reason and 
conscience. To the Hegelian, of whatever type, Chris- 
tianity is the crown of natural religion. 



CHAPTER VII 

BITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 

1. The Antecedents of the Theology of Bitschl.^ 

One of the most striking facts in the history of phi- 
losophy is the sudden downfall of the Hegelian system. 

1 The literature on Ritschl is large and constantly growing. Only 
a selection can be given here. 

(a) On the life of Ritschl, cf. the biography by his son, Otto Ritschl, 
Albrecht Ritschls Leben, 2 vols. Freiburg, 1892, 1896. 

(b) A full list of Ritschl's works is given in the Appendix to his biog- 
raphy. Those most important for our present purpose are the following : 
Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versohnung, 3 vols. Bonn, 
1870, 1874 (2d ed. 1882, 1883; 3d ed. 1888, 1889; 4th ed. 1895, reprint 
of Vol. III. from 3d ed. unchanged). Vols. I. and III. have been trans- 
lated into English, under the title The Christian Doctrine of Justification 
and Reconciliation (1872, 1900) ; Schleiermachers Reden iiber die Religion 
und ihre Nachwirkungen auf die evangelische Kirche Deutschlands, Bonn, 
1874; Ueber das Gewissen. Ein Vortrag, Bonn, 1876; Unterricht in der 
christlichen Religion, Bonn, 1875, 5th ed. 1895, Eng. tr. by Swing, in The 
Theology of Albrecht Ritschl, London and New York, 1901 ; Die Entstehung 
der altkatholischen Kirche, Bonn, 1850, 2d ed. 1857; Geschichte des Pie- 
tismus, 3 vols. 1880, 1884, 1886; Theologie und Metaphysik : zur Verstdndi- 
gung und Abwehr, 1881, 2d ed. 1887 ; Drei akademische Reden, Bonn, 1887 ; 
Die christliche Vollkommenheit, Gottingen, 1874, 2d ed. 1889, Eng. tr. by 
Craigmile in Bibliotheca Sacra for 1878. Fides implicita, Bonn, 1890. 
Many of his smaller works have been collected and published in two 
volumes under the title, Gesammelte Aufsdtze, Freiburg, 1893, 1896. 

(c) On the theology of Ritschl in general, cf. Ecke, Die theologische 
Schule A. Ritschls und die evang. Kirche der Gegenwari, I. Berlin, 1897; 
Nippold, Die theologische Einzelschule, im Verhdltniss zur evangelischen 
Kirche, Braunschweig, 1893 ; Schoen, Origines Historiques de la The- 
ologie de Ritschl, Paris, 1893; Kattenbusch, Von Schleiermacher zu 



224 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

From being the acknowledged leader of the intellectual 
forces of Europe, equally influential among theologians, 

Ritschl, 2d ed. Giessen, 1893; Wegener, A. Ritschls Idee des Reiches 
Gottes im Licht der Geschichie Jcritisch untersucht, Leipzig, 1895; Ber- 
trand, Une nouvelle conception de la Redemption, Paris, 1891; Heer, Der 
Religionshegriff A. Ritschls, Ziirich, 1874 ; Mielke, Das System A. Ritschls, 
Bonn, 1894 ; Kiigelgen, Die Dogmatih Alhrecht Ritschls, 1898 ; Wendland, 
Alhrecht Ritschl, und seine Schuler, im Verhdltnis zur Theologie, zur Philoso- 
phic und zur Frommigkeit unsrer Zeit, dargestellt und heurtheilt, Berlin, 
1899 ; Pfennigsdorf, Vergleich der dogmatischen Systeme von R. A. Lipsius 
und A. Ritschl, Gotha, 1896 ; Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology, Edinburgh, 
1899 ; Stuckenberg, The Theology of Alhrecht Ritschl, in American Journal 
of Theology, II. p. 268 sq. ; Schwab, A Plea for Ritschl, ibid. Vol. V. p. 18 
sq. ; Porter, in Andover Review of 1893, p. 440 sq. ; Swing, The Theology 
of Alhrecht Ritschl, London and New York, 1901 (with a convenient bibli- 
ography of recent periodical literature). 

(d) Criticisms of the Ritschlian system by Luthardt, in Zeitschrift fur 
Tcirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Lehen, 1881, p. 617 sq. ; 1886, 
p. 632 sq. ; Lipsius, Die ritschl'sche Theologie, in Jahr. fur prot. Theol. 
1888; Pfleiderer, Die Theologie der ritschl' schen Schule, etc. in Jahr. fur prot. 
Theol.' 1891. Cf . also his Development of Theology in Germany and Great 
Britain, p. 183; Frank, Zur Theologie A. Ritschls, Erlangen, 1891, 3d 
ed. ; Der Subjectivismus in der Theologie und sein Recht, in Dogmatische 
Studien, Leipzig, 1892, p. 27; Geschichte und Kritik der neueren Theologie, 
inshesondere der systematischen, seit Schleiermacher, Erlangen, 1898, p. 262 
sq. ; Orr, The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith, New York ; 
Denney, Studies in Tlieology, New York, 1895, chap. i. ; Bruce, Theolog- 
ical Agnosticism, in Amer. Journal of Theology, I. p. 1 sq. ; also frequent 
references in his Apologetics ; Wenley, Contemporary Theology and Theism, 
1897, p. 82 sq. ; specially on Ritschl's construction of the early history of 
Christianity, Bois, Le Dogme Grec. Paris, 1893. Cf. also the literature 
cited by Wendland, op. cit. p. 1. 

(e) On the philosophical basis of the theology of Ritschl, cf. Stahlin, 
Kant, Lotze, Alhrecht Ritschl, Leipzig, 1888, Eng. tr. by Simon, 1889 ; 
Eavre, Les Principes Philosophiques de la Theologie de Ritschl, Vevey, 
1894; Elugel, A. Ritschls philosophische und theologische Ansichten, 3d ed. 
Langensalza, 1895; Traub, Ritschls Erkenntnistheorie, in Zeitschrift fur 
Theol. und Kirche, IV. pp. 91-129 ; Mackintosh, The Ritschlian Doctrine 
of Theoretical and Religious Knowledge, in Amer. Journal of Theol. III., 
p. 23. Cf. also Steinbeck, Das Verhdltnis v. Theologie und Erkenntnis- 
theorie, Leipzig, 1898 ; Scheibe, Die Bedeutung der Werthurtheile fur das 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 225 

philosophers, economists, and historians, behold our 
philosopher in a single generation reduced to so low 
an estate that in the land of his birth it is hard to find 
any one who calls himself a Hegelian. Many causes 
contributed to so strange a result. However useful 
broad generalization may be to the student, history 
cannot be written from the a priori principle alone. 
Later scholars, taking up the work where Hegel had 
laid it down, found that the facts would not lie content 
on the orderly beds on which he had placed them. For 
the interpretation of life other principles are needed 
than the logical distinction between thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis. History is full of irregularities, in- 
equalities, new beginnings, faults in the rock. It 
constantly brings us face to face with phenomena 
which no a priori principle can predict, which we must 
simply accept as we find them, whether we can account 
for them or no, whatever havoc they may make with 
our philosophic schemes. Add to this the growth of 
sceptical tendencies nourished upon ever-renewed study 
of the "Critique." These noumena whose existence 
Kant had illogically affirmed ; things in themselves, real 
yet unattainable by reason; what are they, men began 
to ask, but figments of the mind, mere imaginations un- 
worthy of the name of reality? Experience, limited 
and phenomenal though it be — this is the true reality, 
and the only reality. To interpret life in terms of the 
Absolute, as Hegel professed to do, is but to pour new 
wine into old bottles. To speak of an evolution of the 

religiose Erhennen, Halle, 1893; Otto RitscM, Ueher WeHhurtheile, 1896 ; 
Reischle, Werihurtheile und Glauhensurtheile, Halle, 1900. 

15 



226 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Infinite, a self-realization of God, a manifestation of the 
divine to the human, a coming to consciousness of 
the Absolute, is to use words without meaning. Finite 
and infinite are mutually exclusive terms. Where one 
stops, the other begins. The Absolute can never be- 
come the object of knowledge; and to speak as if it 
could is to deceive oneself. Thus both theoretical and 
practical reasons combined to bring about the downfall 
of the Hegelian system, and upon the heels of an age 
of the most daring speculation followed a period of 
scepticism whose most characteristic expression is the 
positivism of Comte. 

As is well known, the characteristic feature of the 
philosophy known as positivism is the rejection of the 
idea of the Absolute in all its forms. Through the the- 
ological and metaphysical stages, with their symbolism, 
more or less crude, man passes to the ripe manhood of 
positivism. Instead of vainly pursuing transcendent 
realities, he confines himself strictly within the limits 
of experience, and regards science as having to do solely 
with the description and classification of facts. Where 
this tendency is dominant the problem with which this 
essay deals is no longer recognized. The several relig- 
ions are only passing phenomena of relative or tempo- 
rary value, to be studied and classified according to 
their several concrete manifestations, but whose claim 
to disclose ultimate truth or give an absolute sanction 
to conduct may be dismissed with a smile. Holding 
this point of view, one may indeed see in Christianity 
the choicest flower of the religious life, and may seek 
to discover its distinctive principle in order to under- 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 227 

stand wherein its superiority consists. He may find 
this in its more exalted conception of God as a single 
all-controlling principle, ruling the world in the interest 
of justice and truth ; or he may find it in its purer ethics, 
with their demand upon man for humility, self-sacrifice, 
and brotherly service ; or he may call attention to the 
character and life of its founder, seeing in Jesus Christ 
the purest and best of the sons of men, and tracing to 
His influence whatever of goodness or truth history may 
reveal in the lives of His followers. But whatever view 
he take ; whether, in determining his estimate, abstract 
or concrete considerations have greater weight, to the 
man who holds this general point of view Christianity 
can never be the absolute religion. 

It is in the light of a tendency such as this, prevail- 
ing far more widely and exerting an influence far more 
extensive than is commonly recognized, that the sig- 
nificance of Albrecht Ritschl is to be understood. In 
Ritschl we see the effort to reinstate Christianity upon 
the unique pedestal from which it has been cast down, 
without the aid of the principles used by Hegel, and by 
an appeal to considerations the force of which the posi- 
tivist himself must recognize. Instead of seeing in 
Christianity with Hegel the crown of a religion of 
nature more or less perfectly manifesting itself wher- 
ever the religious life exists at all, he calls attention 
to the uniqueness of Christianity as a phenomenon 
without parallel. Although he lays little stress on 
specific miracles, Christianity is to Ritschl in a true 
sense a supernatural religion, for which no adequate 
preparation or explanation can be found in prechris- 



228 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

tian history. But unlike the earlier supernaturalists 
of historic Christian theology, he tries to explain and 
defend this uniqueness by considerations truly scientific. 
The weapons of the Kantian philosophy which his oppo- 
nents had used for the overthrow of Christianity he 
attempts to turn against them for their own destruction. 
The characteristic note of the Ritschlian theology is to 
be found in the union of a strong apologetic purpose, 
with a scientific spirit equally uncompromising. 

Few men have had the advantage of a more thorough 
professional training than Ritschl.^ Born in Berlin in 
1822 as a minister's son — his father soon afterwards 
became Bishop of the Evangelical Church in Pomerania 
— his thoughts turned naturally to the study of the- 
ology. From Bonn, whither he had been attracted by 
the reputation of Nitzsch, he passed to Halle, and 
thence successively to Berlin, Heidelberg, and Tu- 
bingen. In the course of these years he was brought 
into contact with almost all the more important theo- 
logical and philosophical influences of the time. At 
Bonn, through the influence of a fellow-student, he 
came under the influence of Hengstenberg. At Halle 
he heard not only Tholuck and Julius Muller, but also 
the Hegelians, Erdmann and Schaller. At Heidelberg 
he made the acquaintance of Rothe, at Tubingen of 
Baur. The final result of his student years was to 

1 For the details of Ritschl's life, see the biography by his son, Otto 
Ritschl {Albrecht Ritschls Leben, Freiburg, 1892, 1896, 2 vols.). A brief 
account may be found in Orr's Ritschlian Theology, p. 12 sq. An inter- 
esting study of Ritschl's personal characteristics is given by Ecke, op. cit. 
I. p. 13 sq. 



RITSCUL AND HIS SCHOOL 229 

leave him a confirmed Hegelian, ^ and he began his 
work as Privat Docent at Bonn as the acknowledged 
disciple and friend of Baur.^ The first edition of his 
"History of the Old Catholic Church," published in 
1850, still shows traces of the Tubingen influence.^ 
But the relationship was destined to be a brief one. 
Ritschl was not a man who could be content long to 
call any man master. By 1855, his relations with Baur 
were already strained,* and with the publication of the 
second edition of his "Old Catholic Church," in 1857, 
the breach became a definitive one.^ From this time 
on he assumes an independent position, and, both as 

1 Cf. the interesting letter to his father, Leben, I. p. 76 sq. 

2 On his relations to Baur, cf. Leben, I. pp. 105, 112, 116, 124. His 
Tubingen experience proved somewhat disappointing, as his opportunities 
for contact with Baur proved less frequent than he had hoped. Yet at 
this time he reckoned himself a member of the school. Indeed he was 
led to apply for a position at Bonn rather than at Halle because of the 
difficulty experienced by men coming from Tiibingen in gaining a foot- 
hold at the Prussian universities. Cf. Lehen, p. 116. 

8 Especially in its conception of the problem. Ritschl, like Baur, rec- 
ognizes only two important factors to be considered in the origin of the 
Christian Church, Jewish Christianity and Paulinism. While he differs 
from Baur in the importance which he attaches to Paulinism, in which 
he sees the direct ancestor of the later Catholicism, the difference is no 
greater than that which separated other members of the school {e.g. 
Schwegler). Cf. Leben, I. p. 153 sg'., and especially p. 165. 

* Otto liitschl finds evidence of the growing separation as early as the 
first semester of his life at Bonn. Cf. Leben, I. pp. 122, 125, 127. The 
real breach came some years later. Cf. Leben, I. pp. 263-294, especially 
p. 275 sq. It was already complete before the second edition of the 
Altkatholischen Kirche appeared. 

fi Leben, I. p. 286 sq. The epoch-making advance in this edition con- 
sists in the fact that Ritschl here calls attention for the first time to the 
determining influence exerted upon the history of the early Christian 
church by a Gentile Christianity quite independent of Paulinism. Cf. 
Leben, I. p. 292 sq. 



230 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

teacher and writer, acquires a steadily increasing influ- 
ence. From Bonn, where he had been successively- 
promoted to be extraordinary and ordinary professor, 
he was called to Gottingen in 1868.^ Here he remained 
until his death, gathering about him a large and con- 
stantly increasing circle of students, ^ and giving to the 
world the works upon which his fame as a theologian 
rests. At Gottingen he was brought into personal 
intimacy with Lotze,^ whose influence, as well as that 
of a renewed study of Schleiermacher, appears in his 
later writings.* In 1870 appeared the first volume of 
his great work on " The Christian Doctrine of Justifi- 
cation and Reconciliation," to be followed four years 
later by the second and third. In 1874 he published 
an essay on Schleiermacher's " Reden " ; in the year fol- 
lowing, the "Unterricht in der christlichen Religion" 
— a work designed to present the results of the Ritsch- 
lian theology in concise form for use in catechetical 
instruction in the schools. In 1880 appeared the first 
volume of his last great work on the "History of 
Pietism," of which the second and third volumes fol- 
lowed in 1884 and 1886. In a brief monograph on 
"Theology and Metaphysics," which he published in 
1881, he explained his philosophical premises more 
fully, and defended himself against the attacks of 

1 Leben, I. p. 419. 

2 On Kitschl's method and success as a teacher, see Leben, II. pp. 56, 
141. In his early years his lectures were not largely attended (I. p. 268), 
but before his death no teacher in Germany had a larger or more enthusi- 
astic circle of pupils. Cf. II. p. 261. 

3 On his relations to Lotze, cf. Leben, II. p. 376. At an earlier time 
he had studied the Mihrokosmus with great delight {Leben, II. p. 20). 

4 Leben, II. p. 244 sq. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 231 

which he had already frequently been made the sub- 
ject. Other minor works, while amplifying and con- 
firming his position in detail, need not concern us 
here.^ He died in Gdttingen on the 20th of March, 
1889. 

In Ritschl German theology returns to the path 
which had been marked out for it by Schleiermacher, 
but from which it had been diverted for the time by 
the more ambitious programme of the Hegelian specu- 
lation. Ritschl himself speaks in differing terms of 
Schleiermacher, now acknowledging his greatness, and 
expressing his own personal indebtedness to him for 
suggestions as to method, ^ again referring to him dis- 
paragingly as a greatly overrated man.^ There can be 

1 See p. 223, note 1 (b). 

2 Theologie und Metaphysih, p. 54. " Nun ist die Thatsache die, dass 
Schleiermacher zwar diese aus seiner kerrnhutischen Vergangenheit ihm 
gelaiifigen Formeln {i. e. that of "eine personliche and dabei realen 
Geistesvereinigung zwischeu Gott und dem Glaubigen) gebraucht, sie aber 
auf die Wirhungen umdeutet, welche vom Erloser sich auf den Glaubigen 
in der Kirche erstrecken. Ferner analysirt Schleiermacher alle hier ein- 
schlagenden Verhaltnisse im Rahmen des subjectiven Lebeus. Er ist also 
in Hinsicht auf der Methode mein Vorganger ; ich habe meine Methode 
von ihm gelernt, zum andern Theil von Schneckenburger." Ritschl speaks 
with special approval of Schleiermacher's emphasis of the social elements in 
religion [Recht. und Vers. I, p. 488, Eng., tr. p. 444), and his application of 
the ethical conception of the " highest good " to theological problems 
{Leben, II. p. 84). In the latter his influence was epoch making, but un- 
fortunately Schleiermacher did not carry through his own idea consistently, 
and his followers have misunderstood him, and found the characteristic 
feature of his teaching in his emphasis upon the individual religious ex- 
perience. This mystical conception of religion is part of Schleiermacher's 
inheritance from Spinoza and the weakest part of his system {Leben, II. p. 
107). Cf. Recht. u. Ver&. III. p. 29, Eng. tr. p. 29. 

* In Vol. I. of the Rechtfertigung, p. 484 sq. he denies that Schleier- 
macher's influence in modern theology is really as far reaching as many 
assume. In matters of method (als Gesetzgeber) he is ready to grant that 



232 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

no doubt that the former estimate more justly represents 
the true relation between the two men. It is charac- 
teristic of Schleiermacher, as we have seen, that he 
takes his departure from the Christian experience, and 
seeks to understand Christianity as a historic phe- 
nomenon, from the point of view of the Christian 
church. To construct Christianity a priori^ or to prove 
its authority from grounds of universal reason is far 
from his intention. Such a procedure would be to do 
injustice to the sovereignty of the religious feeling, 
which is its own sufficient evidence. To Schleier- 
macher, therefore, theology is a positive science, as 
truly as physics or botany, having its subject-matter 
given to it in experience, and its only duty is to de- 
scribe exhaustively and define accurately what it finds. 
In this point of view Ritschl is in hearty accord with 
Schleiermacher. In rejecting the a priori dialectic of 
the Hegelian, and taking his stand within the Christian 
experience, he is conscious of dependence upon the 
older theologian, and his only quarrel with Schleier- 
macher is over the fact that the latter has not always 
been true to his own premises.^ 

his influence is dominant and that all must learn from him (p. 486), but so 
far as the positive content of his theology is concerned he denies that a 
new epoch begins with him. In a letter to Diestel {Leben, II. p. 83), he 
maintains that the first condition of understanding Schleiermacher is 
the cessation of the unreasoning admiration with which he has hitherto 
been regarded. Still later, writing to his son {Leben, II. p. 248) about a 
point in the interpretation of Schleiermacher on which they had differed, 
he admits that the latter is probably right, but adds that the recognition 
would only have increased " meine allgemeine Abgeneigtheit gegen 
Schleiermacher." Cf . II. p. 85, " der Abschnitt iiber Schleiermacher, 
den ich mit grossem Widerwillen ausgearbeitet habe," etc. 

1 Schleiermachers Reden, p. 46. *'Also in dem GemeinbegrifE der 



niTSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 233 

But if Ritschl agrees with Schleiermaclier in taking 
his departure from the Christian experience, he differs 
with him in his view of the nature of that experience. 
There is about Schleiermacher's doctrine a taint of 
subjectivism which is repugnant to the younger theo- 
logian. Ritschl comes to theology from the study of 
history, and this earlier training gives to his work as a 
theologian an ideal of objectivity which the theology 
of Schleiermacher lacks. To Ritschl, Christianity is 
not simply a matter of feelings and emotions, however 
exalted. It exists apart from the individual, as an 
objective reality in history, and the peculiar character- 
istic of the Christian experience, as distinct from that 
of the mystic, is that the former is called into being 
only through contact with this specific reality. The 
great duty of the theologian, therefore, is to discover, 
and to define as accurately as he can, what is the par- 
ticular fact in history which calls forth the distinctively 
Christian experience.^ This is the task which Ritschl 

Religion, welcheu Schleiermacher aufstellt, durchkreutzen sich in unver- 
traglicher Weise Elemente des Heidenthums und des Christenthums." 
Cf. Leben, II. p. 83, " die Handhabung der unterchristlichen Gedankeu- 
reihen ; " also Recht. und Vers. III. p. 9, Eng. tr. p. 9. His view of Chris- 
tianity is " constantly crossed by the neutral idea of religion by which he 
is guided." 

1 Kattenbusch, in his interesting comparison between Schleiermacher 
and Ritschl ( Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl, 2d ed. p. 72 sq.) finds the dis- 
tinctive feature (den springenden Punkt) in Ritschl's system in the fact 
that he takes his departure, not from the religious consciousness (vom 
frommen Bewusstsem) but from the Gospel. In this his method reverses 
that of Schleiermacher. " Die Dogmatik ist f iir ihn nicht Schilderung 
Oder Ausdeutung eines Thaibestandes von Frommigkeit innerhalb der 
christlichen Gemeinde, sondern Nachweis und moglichst voUstaudige Ent- 
faltung der Norm aller Frommigkeit in der christlichen Kirche. . . . Er 
ist regiert von dem Gedanken, dass es eine Glaubens^eAorsam giebt und 



234 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

sets himself in his "History of the Old Catholic 
Church," a work in which the reign of Hegelianism 
in church history was definitely broken, and Christianity 
presented for the first time in its historic uniqueness 
and originality, as distinct both from the non-Christian 
religions before it, and the Greek philosophical ideas 
with which it was later mistakenly confused. ^ 

But we have not fully expressed Ritschl's difference 
from Schleiermacher when we have called attention to 
the more objective nature of his construction of Chris- 
tianity. His conception of the Christian experience 

dass die Dograatik nach der Oflfenbarung Gottes in Christo angiebt, 
worauf sich der Glaubensgehorsam zu beziehen hat," etc. (p. 75). 

Cf. Keischle ("Der Streit/' etc. in. Zeitschrift fiir Tkeol. und Kircke, 
1897, p. 174): " Wenn wir uns aber fragen, wodurch vor allem uns einst 
seine Theologie gepackt, was uns eine Befreiung aus dem Bann einer 
Dograatik wie der Biedermannscben gebracht bat, so werden wir sagen 
miissen : es war ganz wesentlicb die energische Hinleitung auf die uns 
erkennbare, Vertrauen erweckende Personlichkeit Jesu Cbristi." 

On the other hand, Wendland {Albrecht Ritschl, etc. p. 77) objects that 
this judgment is wholly misleading, since as a matter of fact Ritschl's 
point of departure is just as subjective as that of Schleiermacher himself. 
It would have been a theological expression of Ritschl's theory of the 
Werthurtheil, had Ritschl declared that the subjective experience of the 
dogmatician were the highest dogmatic principle. " Denn diese bildet im 
Verein mit dem verniinftigen und sittlichen Beurtheilungsvermogen that- 
sachlich bei alien Dogmatikern und so auch bei Ritschl den kritischen 
Massstab, nach dem die biblische Verkiindigung gewertet wird," p. 78. 
Of. also Orr, op. cit. pp. 48, 49. 

The two views are not really inconsistent. Ritschl is at one with 
Schleiermacher in insisting that all theology has to do with subjective ex- 
periences. Cf . Theol. und Metaphysik, p. 54 ; Recht. und Vers. III. p. 1, Eng. 
tr. p. 1 . But he differs from him in the energy with which he emphasizes 
the fact that the Christian experience is called forth by a certain definite 
object, and the clearness with which he tries to define the nature of that 
object. This, as we shall see later, is the key to much that is otherwise 
difficult to understand in his theology. 

1 Leben, I. p. 292 sq. " Nun hat aber," etc. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 235 

itself is different. It is not so much an experience of 
dependence as of freedom. In contrast to the emotional 
elements emphasized by Schleiermacher, and the intel- 
lectual elements made prominent by Hegel, Ritschl, 
following Kant,^ insists upon the ethical elements in 
the Christian experience. ^ To be a Christian means to 
live a life of active devotion and service to God. This 
will appear more clearly as we consider his view of 
religion in detail. 

2. RitschVs View of Religion,^ 

To Ritschl, religion is above all a practical matter.* 
It is neither knowledge, nor feeling, but power. It is 

1 Recht. und Vers. I. p. 489, Eng. tr. p. 445. "Man kann also Schleier- 
macher als den Fiihrer der Theologie unseres Jahrhunderts nur so aner- 
kennen dass man zugleich Kant in dieselbe Stellung zulasst." Cf. also 
m. p. 11, Eng. tr. p. 11. 

2 We have already seen that Kitschl regards it as Schleiermacher's 
most valuable contribution to theology that he applied to theology the 
ethical concept of the " highest good," Leben, II. p. 84. Cf . Recht. und 
Vers. I. p. 490 sq., Eng. tr. p. 446 sq. His chief fault is to be found in the 
fact, that, having once grasped the true idea, he failed to carry it out con- 
sistently. " Obgleich nun Schleiermachers Definition des Christenthums 
diesen Gedanken {i. e. of the kingdom of God) andeutet, so is er schon 
dadurch verspielt, dass er sagt, dass aUes im Christenthura auf die Erlo- 
sung durch Christus bezogen ist, ohne zugleich zu sagen, dass diese wieder 
auf den Zweck des sittlichen Gottesreiches bezogen ist, und dies fehlt ja 
auch bekanntlich in der Durchfiihrung der Glaubenslehre ganzlich." Leben, 
II. p. 107. Cf. also Recht. und Vers. III. p. 11, Eng. tr. p. 11. " Kant was 
the first to perceive the supreme importance for ethics of the ' kingdom 
of God ' as an association of men bound together by laws of virtue. But 
it remained for Schleiermacher first to employ the true conception of the 
teleological nature of the kingdom of God to determine the idea of Chris- 
tianity. This service of his ought never to be forgotten, even if he failed 
to grasp the discovery with a firm hand." 

* For Ritschl's view of religion, cf. Recht. und Vers. III. p. 184 sq., Eng. 
tr. p. 193 sq. Cf. also p. 17 sq., Eng. tr. p. 17 sq. 

* Ibid. p. 186, Eng. tr. p. 195. "Now we have no difficulty in ascer- 



236 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the means through which man, bound under the iron 
law of nature, feeling himself, both in his inner and his 
outer life, a slave to forces from whose blind necessity 
he cannot escape, passions which he cannot control, 
mysteries which he cannot resolve, is delivered from 
this tyranny, and introduced into the realm of freedom 
where alone he can realize his true destiny. ^ To 
Ritschl as truly as to Paul a previous experience of 
helplessness and of guilt is a prerequisite to the under- 
standing of true religion. This is what he means by 
calling God a Werthurtheil, a judgment of worth. 2 

taining by an examination of all other religions, that the secular knowl- 
edge which they involve is not disinterestedly theoretical, but guided by 
practical ends." 

1 Ibid, p, 189, Eng. tr. p. 199. "In every religion what is sought, with 
the help of the supernatural spiritual power reverenced by man, is a solu- 
tion of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the 
world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature. 
For in the former r61e he is a part of nature, dependent upon her, subject 
to, and confined by other things ; but as spirit he is moved by the impulse 
to maintain his independence against them. In this juncture, religion 
springs up as faith in superhuman spiritual powers, by whose help the 
power which man possesses of himself is in some way supplemented, and 
elevated into a unity of its own kind which is a match for the pressure 
of the natural world." Cf. p. 17, Eng. tr. p. 17. " The religious view of 
the world, in all its species, rests on the fact that man in some degree dis- 
tinguishes himself in worth from the phenomena which surround him and 
from the influences of nature which press in upon him. All religion is 
equivalent to an explanation of the course of the world ... in the sense 
that the sublime spiritual powers (or the spiritual power) which rule in or 
over it, conserve and confirm to the personal spirit its claims and its inde- 
pendence over against the restrictions of nature and the natural effects of 
human society." 

2 Ibid. p. 202, Eng. tr. p. 212. "Knowledge of God can be demon- 
strated as religious knowledge only when He is conceived as securing to 
the believer such a position in the world as more than counterbalances 
its restrictions. Apart from this value- judgment of faith there exists no 
knowledge of God worthy of this content." 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 237 

Not, of course, as some careless critics have misinter- 
preted him to mean, as though God were a mere 
imagination, invented by man in his need to console 
himself with the dream of deliverance — of whatever 
faults Ritschl may be guilty, he is not the author of 
such shallowness as this ^ — but that the prime signifi- 
cance of God, as He reveals Himself in the religious 
life, lies in the fact that He, and He alone, has both 
the power and the will to provide the deliverance with- 
out which man must be helpless. God is not a mere 
philosophic conception, to whose truth or falsehood 
the religious man can be indifferent. He is a reality 
intensely practical ; a power making Himself felt in 
helpfulness, and who, if He did not so help, would not 
be God. The qualities which the philosophers have 
grouped together under the head of absoluteness, 
infinity, eternity, impassibility, aseity, incomprehensi- 
bility and the rest, are of all others the most indiffer- 
ent to the religious consciousness. Whether God be, 
metaphysical^ speaking, absolute or not is a matter of 
trifling importance, provided He delivers man from his 
sorrows and saves him from his sins.^ 

But we shall not fully understand Ritschl's view of 
religion till we take into account the nature of the life 
which is the result of this deliverance. It is a life 
which is intensely ethical. Salvation is in order to 
service. Men are not isolated individuals, existing 
apart from one another, so that their relationship to 

1 Cf. Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology, -p. 18657. ; P- 267. 
^ On Ritschl's view of the traditional conception of God, cf. Recht. und 
Vers. III. p. 215 sq., Eng. tr. p. 226 sq. 



238 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

God can be determined without regard to their relation- 
ship to one another. 1 They are members of society, 
brothered with their fellow men in duty and in responsi- 
bility. No small part of the misery of life comes from 
the fact that they fail to fulfil the duties involved in 
such relationship. It is the glory of religion that it 
lifts men above their weaknesses and limitations, and 
enables them to realize the ethical obligations imposed 
upon them by their station in life. 

Accordingly we find Ritschl laying stress upon the 
active elements in the religious life. The religious 
man is not merely the servant of God. He is the man 
who through God has obtained the mastery over the 
world. 2 Whereas once he felt himself too weak to 
withstand the forces which oppose him, now he is con- 
scious of power to overcome them, and through the 
divine strength to realize the ethical ideal which, 
apart from such help, had been impossible of attain- 

1 Recht. und Vers. III. p, 196, Eng. tr. p. 206. "An interest in salvation 
in the Christian sense, when rightly understood, is incompatible with 
egoism. Egoism is a revolt against the common tasks of action. Now, 
people might say that faith in God for onr salvation, and a dntiful public 
spirit towards our fellows, have nothing to do with one another, and that 
therefore there is no conceivable reason why religion, as a rule, should 
not be egoistic. But in Christianity precisely faith in God and moral 
duty within the kingdom of God are related to one another. As a rule, 
therefore, it is impossible that Christian faith in God should 'be egoistic." 
^ Ibid. p. 195, Eng. tr. p. 205. " Religious knowledge moves in independ- 
ent value-judgments, which relate to man's attitude to the world, and call 
forth feelings of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys the dominion 
over the world vouchsafed him by God, or feels grievously the lack of 
God's help to that end." Cf. p. 201, Eng. tr. p. 212 ; and especially p. 217, 
Eng. tr. p. 228, " God as a Person, who establishes the kingdom of God 
as the final end of the world, and in it assures to every one who trusts in 
Him supremacy over the world." 



EITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 239 

ment. Here we have the Kantian thought of religion 
as the practical postulate of the ethical life reaffirmed 
in a form less abstract and more true to the Christian 
experience.^ 

This combination of religion and ethics is determina- 
tive for Ritschl's thought of Christianity. It explains 
his definition and gives the framework in which it is 
cast. 2 It is indeed from a study of Christianity that he 
is led to adopt this particular view of religion. Unlike 
Schleiermacher and Hegel, who construct a general 
definition of religion on the basis of the universal relig- 
ious experience, and then endeavor more particularly 
to define Christianity as a particular species within the 
genus, he maintains that it is impossible to construct an 
adequate definition of religion apart from Christianity. ^ 

1 Ritschl resents the charge that he, " like Kant in his Religion within 
the Limits of Mere Reason, makes religion a subordinate appendix to 
morals." On the contrary, he maintains that "his mode of doctrine 
shows the very opposite.'' Recht. und Vers. III. p. 215, note, Eng. tr. 
p. 226. On his view of Kant, cf. Vol. I. §§ 56-58. 

2 Cf. the celebrated simile of the ellipse. Recht. und Vers. III. p. 11, 
Eng. tr. p. 11. "But Christianity, so to speak, resembles not a circle de- 
scribed from a single centre, but an ellipse which is determined by two 
foci {i. e. the religious conception of redemption, and the ethical concep- 
tion of the kingdom of God)." Elsewhere he mentions three points, 
God, man, and the world. Cf . Recht. und Vers. III. p. 29, Eng. tr. p. 29. 

On Ritschl's refusal to derive the dogmatic system from a single consti- 
tutive principle, cf. Otto Ritschl, Leben, II. p. 184. 

3 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 185, Eng. tr. p. 194. The task (of formulat- 
ing "a universal conception of religion under which all the particular 
species of religion may find their peculiar features determined) in- 
volves no slight difficulties, and contributes less to the understanding of 
Christianity than is often expected." Ritschl's own definition "makes 
jio claim to be a definition proper of the generic conception of religion. 
It is too definite for that. The ideas which it employs — God, world, 
blessedness — have so directly Christian a stamp that they apply to other 
religions only in comparative degree." 



240 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Christianity is not a species within a broader genus; 
it belongs to a class by itself. Instead of approaching 
Christianity with our preconceived notion of religion, 
we should study Christianity to find out what true 
religion is.^ Only after such study are we in a position 
to attempt a general definition, and then always with 
the qualification, that it represents rather the ideal to 
which man is some day to attain, than the description 
of that which, apart from Christianity, is actually 
his experience. 2 In defining religion as he does, 
Ritschl means to affirm that mastery over the world 
through dependence upon God is, as a matter of fact, 
the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian ex- 
perience.^ 

3. RitschVs Definition of Christianity. 

RitschPs fullest definition of Christianity is given in 
the introduction to the third volume of his " Justification 

1 To be sure he does not deny tliat a study of the history of religions 
may help us to the understanding of Christianity by establishing a stand- 
ard of comparison. On the contrary, such study is of the highest value. 
" The specifically peculiar nature of Christianity, which at every turn of 
theology must be kept intact, can be ascertained only by calling the gen- 
eral history of religion to our aid " {Recht. und Vers. III. p. 9, Eng. tr. p. 8. 
Cf. p. 186, Eng. tr. p. 196). But a general conception of religion must be 
used with the greatest care. It can have only regulative, not constitutive, 
value. If it make one " even for a moment neutral towards the Christian 
religion itself, in order to be able to deduce its meaning from the conditions 
of the general conception," the only effect will be "to undermine Chris- 
tian conviction" (p. 187). A regulative use, however, is attended by no 
such dangers. Cf. the whole passage, p. 186 sq., Eng. tr. p. 196 sq. 

2 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 185, Eng. tr. p. 195. To apply it properly, 
" we should have to specify at the same time the different modifications " 
which the distinctively Christian ideas undergo in other religions. 

3 Compare IIL p. 217, Eng. tr. p. 228, with pp. 195, 202, Eng. tr. pp. 
205, 212. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 241 

and Reconciliation."^ " Christianity, " he tells us, "is 
the monotheistic, completely spiritual, and ethical relig- 
ion, which, based on the life of its author as Redeemer 
and as founder of the kingdom of God, consists in the 
freedom of the children of God, involves the impulse to 
conduct from the motive of love, aims at the moral 
organization of mankind, and grounds blessedness on 
the relation of sonship to God, as well as on the 
kingdom of God." In this definition the influence of 
Schleiermacher is clearly evident. Like Schleiermacher, 
Ritschl sees in Christianity at once a monotheistic, a 
teleological (i. e. spiritual and ethical) and a redemptive 
religion; to him as to Schleiermacher its distinctive 
features centre about the person and work of its 

1 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 13, Eng. tr. p. 13. With this should be com- 
pared the definition in the Unterricht, § 2 " Das Christenthum ist von dem 
Anspruch erfiillt, die voUkommene Eeligion iiber den anderen Arten nnd 
Stufen derselben zu sein, welche dem Menschen dasjenige leistet, was in 
alien anderen Religionen zwar erstrebt wird, aber nur nndeutlich oder 
unvoUstandig vorschwebt. Diejenige Eeligion ist die vollkommene, in 
welche die vollkommene Erkenntniss Gottes moglich ist. Diese nun be- 
hauptet das Christenthum von sich, indem seine Gemeinde sich von'Jesus 
Christus ableitet, der als Gottes Sohn sich die vollkommene Erkenntniss 
seines Vaters zuschreibt, und indem sie ihre Erkenntniss Gottes aus dem- 
selben Geiste Gottes ableitet, in welchem Gott selbst sich erkennt. Diese 
Bedingungen des Bestandes der christlichen Religion sind angedeutet, 
indem wir getauft werden auf den Namen Gottes als des Vaters, des 
Sohnes, und des heiligen Geistes." 

In this passage Christianity is contrasted as the perfect religion with 
the various imperfect stages of which it claims to be the fulfilment. It is 
clear, therefore, that Ritschl's refusal to determine the nature of Christi- 
anity by a general conception of religion a priori, is not intended to deny 
a real teleological connection between Christianity and other less devel- 
oped forms of faith. His contention is merely that the true standard of 
comparison can only be gained as one takes his stand within the Christian 
community, and surveys the history of religion from this vantage ground. 
Of. Recht. und Vers. III. p. 186, Eng. tr. p. 196. 

16 



242 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

founder. But in the development of these ideas he 
differs from the elder theologian at several points. Not 
only does he include in his definition elements not 
present in that of Schleiermacher ^ (e. g, the kingdom 
of God; the ethical vocation of the Christian), but in 
his treatment of ideas which they hold in common he 
goes a way of his own. We may illustrate the points 
of difference by reference to the ideas of the kingdom 
of God, of redemption, and of Jesus Christ. 

1. Characteristic of Ritschl is his emphasis of the 
social aspect of Christianity. The object of Christ's 
salvation is not the deliverance of individuals merely, 
but the creation of a righteous society; the organiza- 
tion of humanity itself according to those principles of 
divine sonship and brotherly love which in His own 
person He had uniquely illustrated. ^ To Schleier- 
macher, also, Christianity is a social religion. He 
begins his " Glaubenslehre " with a definition of the 
religious society or the church. But the place occu- 
pied by this idea in the structure of his thought is less 
fundamental than is the case with Ritschl. To Schleier- 
macher the individual is primary, the society secondary. ^ 

1 Save as they are implied in the use of the word, teleological. 

2 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 10, Eng. tr. p. 10. "In Christianity, the 
kingdom of God is represented as the common end of God and the elect 
community, in such a way that it rises above the natural limits of nation- 
ality and becomes the moral society of nations." Cf. also Unterricht § 5, 
" Das Reich Gottes ist das von Gott gewahrleistete hochste Gut der durch 
seine Offenbarung in Christus gestifteten Gemeinde." 

3 Ritschl explains this as due to the mystic idea of religion which 
Schleiermacher shares with the older theology. In this conception the 
world occupies a subordinate place, and hence the ethical ideal of mastery 
over the world, which is an essentially social conception, does not receive 
the prominence it deserves, Cf. Recht und Vers. III. p. 29, Eng. tr. p. 29. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 243 

Religion is the outgrowth of the feeling of individual 
dependence upon God, and churches are simply groups 
of individuals who share similar experiences. ^ To 
Ritschl, on the other hand, the society is primary, the 
individual secondary.^ Christ came to found a church, 
in order that through it individuals might enter into an 
experience of salvation possible in no other way. Thus 
to Ritschl it is the kingdom as such, and not the units 
which compose it, which is the subject of the divine 
promises. It is the church which possesses forgiveness, 
justification, freedom, sonship. The only way for the 
individual to attain these graces is to become a member 
of the Christian community. ^ This explains the promi- 

" (Schleiermacher's) interpretation of religion as the feeling of absolute 
dependence on God, involves in its intention the complete neutrality of 
both factors towards the world. . . . Only in a secondary way is the 
world brought into relation to the religious faculty," etc. 

1 To be sure Schleiermacher recognizes clearly " dass das geistige, 
religiose, sittliche Leben, dessen individuelle Form er zugleich mit der 
genauesten Beobachtung festgestellt hat, iiberhaupt nicht ausser der ent- 
sprechenden Gemeinschaft gedacht werden kann, und dass in der Wech- 
selwirkung mit ihr das Individuum seine eigenthiimliche Entwickelung 
findet." Becht. und Vers. I. p. 487, Eng. tr. p. 443. But to Schleiermacher 
the nature and extent of a man's social relations are determined by his 
individual feeling and taste. The great conception of the organization 
of humanity as such for a single moral end does not appear in his Reden 
as a religious conception. It is this lack which Ritschl seeks to supply. 

2 This appears in the structure of his system. In the Unterricht, which 
is the nearest approach which we have to a systematic theology, he begins 
at once with the idea of the kingdom of God (§ 5). Cf. also Becht. und 
Vers. III. pp. 10, 30, Eng. tr. pp. 10, 30. 

3 Becht. und Vers. III. p. 132, Eng. tr. p. 139. "Justification or rec- 
onciliation, as positively connected with the historical manifestation and 
activity of Christ, is related in the first instance to the whole of the relig- 
ious community founded by Christ, which maintains the Gospel of God's 
grace in Christ as the direct means of its existence, and to individuals 
only as they attach themselves, by faith in the Gospel, to this community." 
Cf. pp. 104 sq., SO, 544, Eng. tr. pp. 108 sq., 30, 577. 



244 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

nent place given in Ritschl's theology to the kingdom 
of God. 

To Ritschl the kingdom of God has a double signifi- 
cance, at once religious and ethical. It is a religious 
conception, " since it is the summum honum which God 
realizes in men."^ It is an ethical conception, since it 
is at the same time the "common task" which God 
requires men to achieye through obedience. ^ The two 
meanings, while logically separable, are in fact "inter- 
dependent," and the Christian ideal realizes itself only 
through a union of the two. According to Ritschl, it 
is Schleiermacher's greatest fault that he failed to per- 
ceive this, and hence in his " Glaubenslehre " isolated 
such religious conceptions as justification and recon- 
ciliation from their proper social and ethical environ- 
ment.^ This fault Ritschl endeavors to correct in his 
great monograph on "Justification and Reconciliation." 
We need to remember this as we approach his doctrine 
of redemption.* 

2. We may express the difference between Schleier- 
macher and Ritschl at this point by saying that, 
whereas, to the former, redemption exhausts itself in 
bringing about the proper relation between the indi- 
vidual soul and God, to the latter, it is the means to a 
wider end, namely, the establishment of the ethical 

1 Reckt. und Vers. III. p. 30, Eng. tr. p. 30. 

2 Ibid. 

3 Cf . the detailed criticism of Schleiermacher's doctrine of redemption 
in Recht. und Vers. I. p. 518 sq., Eng. tr. p. 473, also the passage already 
cited from the Leben, II. p. 107. 

* On Ritschl's doctrine of redemption, cf. Recht. und Vers. III. chaps, 
i. ii. vii. viii. Unterricht, §§ 26-45. Here we are concerned only with the 
general outlines of the conception, not with its development in detail. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 245 

kingdom of God, which is the supreme object both for 
God and man. To Schleiermacher, the fundamental 
religious fact is the feeling of dependence upon God. 
Wherever that is found, there you have the essence of 
religion. Redemption is one particular form among 
others in which this dependence appears. The second- 
ary place assigned to the conception appears in the 
structure of the " Glaubenslehre, " which begins with 
man's dependence upon God as revealed in nature, and 
then passes on to consider the modifications of the 
religious feeling brought about by sin and by salvation. 
To Ritschl, on the other hand, redemption is the funda- 
mental religious fact. Without redemption — that is, 
deliverance from the evils to which man is exposed — 
you simply cannot have religion as he understands it. 
Schleiermacher is a monist, who sees God in every- 
thing, to whom evil is something relative, subsidiary, 
passing. Ritschl is a dualist, face to face with the fact 
of present evil, to whom unity is an ideal still to be 
realized, a task still to be achieved. By the extent of 
our present need, we measure the greatness of our obli- 
gation to Christ. 

3. With the mention of Christ we reach our third 
point of contrast. To both Ritschl and Schleiermacher 
Christ is the central figure of Christianity. To both, 
his person and work have fundamental importance. 
Apart from Him Christianity would never have existed. 
Nevertheless, in their estimate of what Christ actually 
does and is, they differ. To Ritschl the work of Christ 
appears a more unique and original thing than to 
Schleiermacher. We may express the difference be- 



246 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

tween the two by returning to our earlier contrast 
between Paul and the writer to the Hebrews. To 
Schleiermacher, as to the writer to the Hebrews, the 
significance of Christ consists in the fact that he com- 
pletes a work already begun, realizes an ideal already 
partially revealed. To Ritschl, as to Paul, Christ is 
the beginning of a new line of development, source of 
a power and influence entirely without parallel. ^ With 

1 Unterricht § 19. "Die Aufgabe der sittlichen Yerbiiidung aller 
Menschen als Menschen konnte als praktischer Grundsatz nur wirksam 
werden, indera sie aus dem religiosen Beweggrunde der besondern christ- 
lichen Gemeinde erzeugt worden ist. Da ferner jene Aufgabe iiber alle 
natiirlich bedingten sittlichen Motive sich erhebt, so findet ihre Geltung in 
der christlichen Gemeinde ihren nothwendigen Massstaban dem in §§11-18 
entwickelten Gedanken des iibernaturlicheu Gottes. Nun ist aber auch 
die besondere Thatsache der Gemeinde, welche sich zu der Verwirklich- 
ung jener allgemeinen Aufgabe als des Reiches Gottes bestimmt, nicht 
naturgemass gegeben, sondern dieselbe ist in ihrer Art immer nur als 
die positive Stiftung Christi begreiflich. Deshalb ist es zum Verstand- 
niss dieser Gemeinde und fiir unsere richtige Theilnahme an derselben 
nothwendig, das bleibendes Verhaltniss anzuerkennen und zu verstehen, 
welches zwischen der Gemeinde des Reiches Gottes und ihrem Stifter 
Jesus Christus obwaltet." 

After speaking of the relation in which Christ stands to the Old Testa- 
ment prophets, he goes on to speak of the qualities which fit Him for His 
work. These are first, His fitness in character for the work to which He 
was called (§ 21) ; secondly. His adoption as His own of God's plan for 
the world (§ 22) ; and thirdly. His actual mastery over the world as a 
result of His tmion with the supermundane God (§ 23). These qualities 
we express in the confession of the divinity of Christ, which is to be 
understood not theoretically, as a metaphysical judgment, but as a Werth- 
urtheil, expressive of the experience which we have actually enjoyed of 
Christ's deliverance. Cf. Recht. und Vers. III. p. 376, Eng. tr. p. 398. 

The unique place held by Christ in the Christian religion is most 
clearly expressed in the Christian name of God, which, according to 
Ritschl, is " the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ " ( Unterricht, 
§ 11). Cf. also his criticism of the attempts to write the life of Jesus, on 
the ground that the " very undertaking involves the surrender of the con- 
victiou that Jesus, as the founder of the perfect moral and spiritual relig- 



RITSCBL AND HIS SCHOOL 24T 

the single exception of the Old Testament, which so 
belongs with Christianity that Ritschl practically iden- 
tifies it with it,^ the religious preparation of the world 
before Christ came was almost wholly negative. Re- 
demption, as the Christian knows it, as the church 
exemplifies it, was unknown before Christ. Thus to 
Ritschl, Christianity stands forth as a phenomenon 
without parallel; a religion truly supernatural in the 
midst of a world elsewhere the subject of uniform law. 

We touch here a point which is characteristic of 
Ritschl's theology, namely, his rejection of natural 
theology in every form.^ Ritschl has small respect 
for the efforts to prepare the way for Christianity by 
reference to a preceding religion of nature. He sees in 
them simply relics of a paganism from which it is the 
first duty of the Christian theologian to free himself. 
In this view he had been anticipated by Schleiermacher, 
who devotes more than one page of his "Reden" to 
clever satire of the so-called religion of nature, which 
has its existence only in the brains of certain rational- 
istic philosophers and theologians.^ But it is not merely 
such artificial and exotic plants that Ritschl has in 

ion, belongs to a higher order than all other men " {Recht. und Vers. III. 
p. 3, Eng. tr. p. 3). He is unique, not merely a parte ante, but a parte 
post. 

The view thus briefly indicated is fully developed in Recht. und Vers. 
in, chap. vi. 

^ See below, p. 249. 

2 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 8, Eng. tr. p. 8. " If any one builds Chris- 
tian theology on a substructure of pretended natural theology ... he 
thereby takes his stand outside the sphere of regeneration, which is 
coterminous with the community of believers." 

8 Cf. p. 164, note 2. 



248 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

mind. His antagonism extends to every attempt to lay 
a rational basis for Christianity in considerations that 
are independent of the distinctively Christian experi- 
ence. While it is true that " the theological exposition 
of Christianity" is complete only "when it has been 
demonstrated that the Christian ideal of life, and no 
other, satisfies the claims of the human spirit to knowl- 
edge of things universally,"^ it is also true that this 
demonstration is impossible on purely speculative 
grounds. The true proof of Christianity, and the only 
one that can claim scientific validity, is the Christian 
experience.^ This explains Ritschl's rejection of the 
famous arguments for the being of God.^ These are 
as unsatisfactory religiously as they are scientifically. 
Taking their departure outside of the Christian experi- 
ence, they are unable to lead to the desired conclusion. 
The God they prove is not the God in whom Christians 
believe. Even the study of comparative religion falls 
short of scientific demonstration.* How will you prove 
to a Mohammedan or a Buddhist who knows not Christ 
the superiority of the Christian religion?^ He lacks 

1 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 25, Eng. tr. p. 25. 

2 Ibid. p. 24, Eng. tr. p. 24. " The scientific proof for the truth of 
Christianity ought only to be sought in the line of the thought already 
singled out by Spener : " Whosoever willeth to do the will of God will 
know that the doctrine of Christ is true." 

3 Ibid. p. 201, Eng.tr. p. 211 sq. The only argument to which Ritschl 
grants any validity is the moral argument. To this, when properly 
stated, he attributes great weight. Cf. p. 208 sq., Eng. tr. p. 219 sq. 

* Ibid. p. 186 sq., Eng. tr. p. 196 sq. 

s Ibid. p. 187 sq., Eng. tr. p. 197. " It is aimless and impracticable to 
attempt to prove the universal validity of the view that religions can be 
arranged in an ascending series. Do people expect to discover thus a 
way of demonstrating scientifically to a Mohammedan or a Buddhist that 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 249 

the premise on which your argument rests. Thus 
natural theology, in both its great historic forms, 
breaks down. Christianity is something wholly sui 
generis, and the attempt to prepare the way for its 
understanding by an appeal to general considerations 
outside of itself is bound to fail. 

In view of this attitude toward natural theology, it 
is all the more striking that we find our author taking 
such conservative ground as to the Old Testament 
religion. 1 For all his sense of the uniqueness and 
originality of Christ, he cannot conceal from himself 
the fact that Christianity is deeply embedded in the soil 
of the religion of Israel. He blames Schleiermacher 
for exaggerating the contrast between Christianity and 
Judaism. 2 They are not two separate religions, but 
different parts of one and the same religion. Chris- 
tianity is the flower of which the religion of Israel is 
the root.^ Christ Himself professed to be the Messiah 
ol whom the prophets spake, and fed His spirit upon 
the devotional literature in which His disciples later 
found His own experiences anticipated.* In binding 

the Christian religion, and not theirs, occupies the highest rank? In 
carrying out the task we hare indicated, we have no such aim." 

1 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 10, Eng. tr. p. 9. " In the Old Testament, 
no less (than in Christianity), the concrete conception of the one, super- 
natural, omnipotent God is bound up with the final end of the kingdom 
of God and with the idea of a redemption." 

2 Ibid. Schleiermacher was impeded in his estimate of Christianity 
" by his underestimate of the religion of the Old Testament, which, as the 
stage prefatory to Christianity, is possessed of characteristics analogous 
to those of Christianity itself." 

'^ Ibid. p. 10, Eng. tr. p. 10. In Christianity we have " a culmination 
of the monotheistic, spiritual, and teleological religion of the Bible in the 
idea of the perfected spiritual and moral religion." 

* Unterricht, § 20. 



250 THIE JSSSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

up the Old Testament with the New as parts of a single 
volume of revelation the church has followed a sound 
instinct, which modern critical study only tends to 
confirm.^ 

But Ritschl is not merely anxious to establish the 
originality and distinctness of Christianity as a historic 
religion, as compared with the so-called religions of 
nature. He is also careful to discriminate it from the 
various forces and influences with which in its later 
history it has been wrongly identified. ^ Foremost 
among these is Greek philosophy, with its conception 
of God as absolute Substance instead of loving Father, 
and its substitution, for the historic Christ, of the 
Logos of the Alexandrine schools.^ The translation 
of Christian truth into the technical language of the 
philosophers, and the substitution for personal faith in 
Christ of the acceptance of certain abstruse metaphysical 
dogmas, was a corruption of Christianity which was 
none the less unfortunate because it was inevitable. 
Christianity is life, not dogma. It is deliverance from 
the bondage of the world into the freedom of sonship 
through the redemption of Christ. Any theological 
statement which obscures this simple fact of experience 
is to be deprecated. One of the most important tasks 

1 Unterricht, § 3. 

2 Ihid. § 3. " Weil aber itn Laufe der Geschiclite," etc. 

3 This view, suggested by Ritschl in his Altkatholischen Kirche, 
has been most fully developed by Kaftan and Harnack. Ritschl himself 
accepts the Johannine designation of Christ as the Logos, though giving 
it a religious rather than a metaphysical interpretation {Recht. und Vers. 
III. p. 382, Eng. tr. p. 404). His fullest criticism of the idea of the 
Absolute is given in Theol. und Metaphysik, p. 17 sg. Cf. Recht. und Vers. 
III. p. 215, Eng. tr. p. 226. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 251 

for any age is to recover the core of essential Chris- 
tianity from the heap of rubbish, ecclesiastical and 
intellectual, under which it has been buried. 

While thus seeking to recover the core of historic 
Christianity, its Gospel as distinct from its theologies 
and its dogmas, Ritschl is far from ignoring the ex- 
perience of the church. Unlike some later theologians, 
whose cry, "Back to Christ," means the rejection of 
historic Christianity in all its forms, for the impossible 
effort to reproduce the conditions which prevailed dur- 
ing the life of its founder, he recognizes clearly that we 
can know Christ only through the effects which He 
produces upon men. Hence the experience of those 
who testify to having been redeemed through Christ 
becomes of the highest value. ^ We learn of Christ 

1 Recht. und Vers. III. pp. 1-3, Eng. tr. pp. 1-3. "Now it is not 
sufficient for my purpose to bring out what Jesus has said about the for- 
giveness of sins attached to His person and His death. For even if His 
statements might seem perfectly clear, their significance becomes com- 
pletely intelligible only when we see how they are reflected in the con- 
sciousness of those who believe in Him, and how the members of the 
Christian community trace back their consciousness of pardon to the 
person and the action and passion of Jesus. . . . We can discover the full 
compass of His historical actuality solely from the faith of the Christian 
community. Not even His purpose to found the community can be quite 
understood historically save by one who, as a member of it, subordinates 
himself to His Person. 

" Hence it follows . . . that the material of the theological doctrines of 
forgiveness, justification, and reconciliation is to be sought not so much 
directly in the words of Christ, as in the correlative representations of the 
original consciousness of the community. The immediate object of theo- 
logical cognition is the community's faith that it stands to God in a rela- 
tion essentially conditioned by the forgiveness of sins. . . . Such being 
the position of affairs, we have now a basis for the practice of theology in 
attaching its terminology dii'ectly to the apostolic circle of ideas. It 
would be a mistaken purism were any one, in this respect, to prefer 
the less developed statements of Jesus to the forms of apostolic thought." 



252 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

through Paul and through Augustine quite as truly as 
through Matthew and through Mark. Especially im- 
portant are the books of the New Testament, since in 
them we see the effects of Christ upon human life, set 
forth for the first time in their purity. To the original 
experience of redemption thus recorded, later experience 
adds nothing essential, though it confirms the early 
record by the testimony of a great and ever-increasing 
crowd of witnesses.^ Hence to Ritschl, for all his free- 
dom of criticism, the New Testament has normative 
significance in determining the answer to our question, 
What is Christianity ? ^ 

To sum up : Christianity is the religion of redemption, 
foreshadowed in the Old Testament, revealed by Christ, 
who is at once the Saviour from sin, and the founder of 
that kingdom of brotherly service, in which the ethical 
ideal of humanity is for the first time realized, and into 
which, as the centuries go on, it is God's plan to gather 
more and more of the sons of men. 

From what has been said, the contrast between 

1 Reckt. und Vers. p. 8, Eng.tr. p. 8. The idea of the Christian religion 
" is reached by an orderly reproduction of the thought of Christ and the 
apostles ; it is confirmed by being compared with other species and stages 
of religion.'* 

2 Unterricht, § 3. " Das Verstandniss des Christenthums wird nur dann 
dem Anspruch desselben auf Vollkommenheit gerecht werden, wenn es 
vom Standpunkte der christlichen Gemeinde aus unternommen wird. 
Weil aber im Laufe der Geschichte derselbe mannigfach verschoben und 
der Gesichtskreis der Gemeinde durch fremde Einfliisse getriibt worden 
ist, so gilt als Grundsatz der evangelischen Kirche, dass man die christ- 
liche Lehre allein aus der heiligen Schrift schopfe. Dieser Grundsatz 
bezieht sich direct auf die im Neuen Testament gesammelten Urkunden 
des Christenthums, zu welchen sich die Urkunden der hebraischen Relig- 
ion im Alten Testaments als unumgangliche Hilfsmittel des Verstand- 
nisses verhalten." 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 253 

Ritschl's view and that of Hegel is clear. To Hegel, 
Christianity is simply the crown of natural religion ; the 
particular historic form in which the eternal principles 
of the religious life were bound, sooner or later, to 
express themselves. To Ritschl, Christianity is the 
supernatural religion; not to be accounted for by the 
preceding development, having its uniqueness in this, 
that it lifts man above the law of necessity to which he 
were else subject, into the spiritual realm which is the 
sphere of freedom. To the one, Christ is simply the 
most perfect illustration of a principle rationally dedu- 
cible without Him ; to the other. He is the creator of a 
new life, which without Him could never have been. 

4. The Ritsehlian Apologetic.^ 

But it may be asked, Wherein consists the scientific 
value of this view of religion? How does it differ 

1 It may seem strange to speak of a Ritsehlian apologetic in view of 
Ritschl's dislike to everything which savored of this nature (cf. his dis- 
claimer of any desire to demonstrate the truth of Christianity scientifically, 
Recht. und Vers. III. p. 187, Eng. tr. p. 197). Otto Ritschl {Lehen, II. p. 167) 
declares that " every apologetic tendency was foreign " to his father's 
theology. To his mind, this was a matter for the preacher and the mis- 
sionary, with which the dogmatic theologian, writing to convinced 
Christians, had no concern. None the less is it true that in seeking for 
the intelligent Christian a view of his religion which, from his own point 
of view, shall be scientifically defensible, he is serving an apologetic pur- 
pose. He seeks to establish Christian faith upon a ground in which it 
shall be independent of the fluctuations of the changing Weltanschauung 
of contemporary thought. Indeed, in some passages he goes even further, 
declaring that the theological exposition of Christianity is complete only 
" when it has been demonstrated that the Christian ideal of life, and no 
other, satisfies the claims of the human spirit to knowledge of things 
universally" {Recht. und Vers. III. p. 25, Eng. tr. p. 25). This apolo- 
getic suggestion has been much more fully developed by later members 



254 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

from those earlier conceptions against which the defini- 
tions of Schleiermacher and of Hegel came as protests ? 
Other theologians beside Ritschl have affirmed the 
supernatural character of Christianity, but they have 
failed to justify their claim at the bar of reason. Can 
Ritschl do better ? To answer this we need to spend a 
moment or two over Ritschl's doctrine of Werthurtheile.^ 

All judgments, according to Ritschl, may be divided 
into two classes, theoretical judgments, which are con- 
cerned with the cause of sensations, as realities objec- 
tively given, and judgments of value (Werthurtheile)^ 
which estimate them in their relation to the subject, 
according to the pleasure or pain which they produce. ^ 
The former are the objects of science and philosophy; 
the latter of ethics and of aesthetics. It is true that 
value-judgments enter into scientific knowledge also, 
since without interest (i, e. value) science could not 
be. But their function is subordinate. They are con- 
comitant rather than independent. ^ In ethics, however, 
we have to do with independent value-judgments; 
judgments, that is to say, whose distinguishing feature 
is to be found in their practical bearing upon our life.* 

It is with such independent value-judgments that 

of the school (e. g. Hermann, Die Religion im Verhaltniss zum Welterkennen 
und zur Sittlichkeit, p. 270 sq. ; Schultz, Apologetik ; Kaftan, Die Wahr- 
heit der christlichen Religion; Harnack, Das Wesen des Christentums). 

1 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 193 sq., Eng. tr. p. 203 sq. Cf. Garvie, op. cit. 
p. 161 sq.; Orr, op. cit. p. 61 sq., and the literature cited p. 224, note (e). 

2 Recht und Vers. III. p. 194, Eng. tr. p. 204. 

3 Ibid. p. 195, Eng. tr. p. 204. 

4 Ibid. p. 195, Eng. tr. p. 205. Eitschl admits that it is not altogether 
easy to distinguish the independent value-judgments of ethics from thooe 
of religion. Neyertheless he thinks with care it can be done. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 255 

religion has to do.^ What things are in themselves is 
indifferent to it. It deals with them only in their prac- 
tical bearing upon the life of man. Thus to the 
religious man, as religious, it is a matter of no im- 
portance how the world came to be what it is ; whether 
through evolution, special creation, or any other of the 
various methods which have been proposed. What he 
wants to know is the meaning of the world to-day, so 
far as it affects his own religious life ; the significance 
of the sufferings and sins with which it afflicts him; 
and how he may be delivered from both. So of God. 
The questions which philosophers have discussed as to 
the nature of God's consciousness and the like do not 
interest the Christian, whose sole desire is to know 
God's will for him.^ Not Comte himself could be more 
uncompromising in his attacks upon the idea of the 

1 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 195, Eng. tr. p. 205, " Religious knowledge 
moves in independent value- judgments, which relate to man's attitude to 
the world, and call forth feelings of pleasure and pain, in which man 
either enjoys the dominion over the world vouchsafed him by God, or 
feels grievously the lack of God's help to that end." 

2 Ritschl is far from denying that the Christian man should seek a 
connected view of the world and of life. Such a view has a very practi- 
cal bearing on his personal conduct, since it assures him that the God in 
whom he trusts is really master of the universe and hence able to bring 
His purpose to accomplishment within it. Indeed Ritschl contends that 
in seeking such a connected and unified view of the world philosophy 
deserts its proper scientific function^ and " betrays rather an impulse re- 
ligious in its nature, which philosophers ought to have distinguished from 
the cognitive methods they follow." For, he goes on to say, " in all 
philosophical systems the affirmation of a supreme law of existence, from 
which they undertake to deduce the world as a whole, is a departure from 
the strict application of the philosophic method, and betrays itself as 
being quite as much an object of the intuitive imagination as God and 
the world are for religious thought" {Recht. und Vers. III. p. 197 sq., Eng. 
tr. p. 207). 



256 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Absolute, which plays so prominent a part in religious 
discussions. To Ritschl absoluteness is an inheritance 
from the Greek philosophy, full of misleading associa- 
tions ; an abstraction on which the religious nature 
tries in vain to feed.^ The Christian conception of God 
is not abstract, but concrete. It is warm, personal, 
individual, definite. The Christian sees God in the 
face of Jesus Christ. ^ His characteristic attribute is 
love, and his appropriate name is Father.^ 

But while banishing \h.Q Absolute as a theoretical 
conception from religion, Ritschl, like Kant, retains its 
practical equivalent in other ways. What the theoreti- 
cal reason cannot afford, the conscience and the religious 
experience provide. In Christianity we do actually 
experience a power which delivers us from our weak- 
ness, our ignorance and our sin, and transfers us into 
the glorious freedom of the children of God. This is a 
matter of experience, not to be denied, as positive a 
fact as any of those which enter into the catalogue of 

1 Of the term "■ Absolute" he writes (Theol. und Metaphysik, p. 18) : 
" Das Absolute ! wie erhebend das klingt ! Ich erinnere mich uur noch dun- 
kel, dass das Wort mich in meiner Jugend beschaf tigt hat, als die Hegelsche 
Terminologie auch mich in ihren Strudel zu ziehen drohte. Es ist lange 
her, und das Wort ist mir in dem Masse fremd geworden, als ich keinen 
weitreichenden Gedanken in demselben bezeichnet finde. Denn wortlich 
bedeutet es das, was abgelost ist, was in keinen Beziehungen zu anderen 
steht, und Frank versteht es ebenso, da er dafiir die Ausdriicke Diirch- 
sichselbstsein, Insichselbstsein, Seinselbstsein einsetzt." 

2 Recht. und Vers. III. p. 259 sq., Eng. tr. p. 272 sq.\ 

3 Ibid. p. 281, Eng. tr. p. 296 sq. In asserting that the fundamental 
attribute of God is love, Eitschl is careful to avoid all appearance of sen- 
timentality. As Ecke has shown [op. cit. p. 24) there was nothing which 
he abhorred more. To Ritschl love is an ethical conception through and 
through, as appears from his identification of the grace of God with His 
righteousness {Unterricht, § 16). 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 257 

the positivist philosopher. In bringing us into contact 
with such a God, religion makes us acquainted with the 
ultimate reality. ^ 

The Ritschlian apologetic for Christianity consists in 
the attempt, by the distinction just described, to lay a 
scientific basis for such a reality. If knowledge in- 
cludes Werthurtheile as well as theoretical judgments, 
then there is no reason why the utterances of the reli- 
gious consciousness should not be accepted as giving us 
a knowledge as valid in its place as that of physics 
and of biology. The reality which is the object of a 
Werthurtheile properly understood and defined, is just 
as real as that which is the object of a theoretical judg- 
ment. Nay, God as Saviour is a reality for which far 
more experimental evidence can be brought than for the 
Absolute of which philosophy talks so learnedly. Na 
apologetic, it is true, can take the place of the Chris- 
tian experience. If it could, its object would not be 
real, as modern thought understands reality. But to 
one who shares this experience, it is possible to defend 
its legitimacy by such considerations as we have indi- 
cated. And even to him who has it not, the position 

1 Taking the Absolute in the broad sense, as meaning the ultimate 
reality, no theologian of our day has a stronger sense of the absoluteness 
of Christianity than Ritschl. In rejecting the idea of the Absolute, he 
is contending against a particular metaphysical conception which he is 
careful to define, and which, when so defined, would be admitted by most 
theologians to be unchristian. Here, as always, attention to Ritschl's 
definitions is a necessary condition of understanding his thought, and 
failure to observe this elementary precaution is responsible for many 
current misconceptions. Similar examples might be given in his use of 
the terms Metaphysics and Mysticism, both of which he understands in a 
sense more r.arrow than that commonly employed in theological 
terminology. 

17 



258 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

of the Christian may be made to commend itself as one 
not unworthy of an educated man. Along such lines 
as this Ritschl attempts to parry the positivist attack, 
and to win respect for his view of Christianity as scien- 
tifically valid. 

This is the point at which the Ritschlian theology 
has been most persistently attacked. Theologians who 
on all other questions stand at sword's point forget their 
differences for the time in order to join hands against 
the common foe. Pileiderer^ and Frank, ^ Luthardt^ 
and Lipsius * find in opposition to Ritschl an unexpected 
bond of union. By the orthodox Lutheran of the school 
of Frank, he is accused of rationalism in abandoning to 
the tender mercies of a hostile criticism facts in the 
Gospel record of vital importance to the Christian faith. ^ 
By the speculative theologian of Hegelian sympathies 
he is charged with agnosticism in that he is content to 
found his theology upon the purely subjective basis of 

1 Die Theologie der ritschl' schen Schule {Jahr.fur prot. Theol. 1891); 
also Development of Theology, etc. p. 183 sq. 

2 Zur Theologie A. Ritschls, 1891, 3d ed. ; Der Subjectivismus in der 
Theologie und sein Recht, iu Dogmatische Studien, 1892, p. 27 ; Geschichte 
und Kritik der neueren Theologie, etc. 1898, p. 262 sq. 

3 Zeitschrift fur kirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben, 1881, p. 
617 sq.; 1886, p. 632 sq. 

^ Die ritschVsche Theologie (Jahr. fur prot. Theol. 1888; also sepa- 
rately printed). 

^ E. g. the personal pre-existence of Christ (c£. Frank, Zur Theologie 
A. Ritschls, p. 29). Ritschl himself accepts the Johannine doctrine, hut 
gives it a moral interpretation. In this he has not been followed by his 
scholars, many of whom frankly reject the doctrine, seeing in it a result 
of the inflaence of Greek metaphysics. Cf. Erank, Geschichte, p. 317, 
" Man sieht, Ritschl kommt hier (^. e. in his interpretation of John) an 
jene Grenze an, welche seine Schiiler, z. B. Ad. Harnack, bereits und 
zwar mit voUem Bewusstsein iiberschritten haben." 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 259 

a Werthurtheil, and denies the possibility of any rational 
proof of the great religious verities.^ Thus while some 
tax him with trusting reason too little, others quarrel 
with him for relying upon it too much,^ and in the din 
of the controversy there is no slight danger that his dis- 
tinctive contribution to theology may be underestimated, 
if not altogether overlooked. 

It must be frankly confessed that the charge of sub- 
jectivism brought against the theology of Ritschl is not 
without a certain justification in fact. It is one of the 
curiosities of history that the theologian, who, among 
the moderns, is most conspicuous for the bitterness and 
persistence of his attack upon mysticism in every form, 
should be himself before all the theologian of the indi- 
vidual religious experience. Like the mystics, Ritschl 
finds the ultimate authority in religion in the immediate 
experience of the individual soul, as distinct from 
rational argument or ecclesiastical authority. His 
insistence upon the place of the historic Christ in every 

1 Pfleiderer, Development^ p. 183. " On a closer inspection his 
(Ritschl's) famous theory of cognition is seen to be only a dilettante con- 
fusion of the irreconcilable views of subjective idealism, which resolves 
things into phenomena of consciousness, and common-sense realism, 
which looks upon the phenomena of consciousness as things themselves, 
admitting no distinction between phenomena as perceived by us and the 
being of things in themselves ; a confusion to which the nearest parallel 
is the semi-idealistic, semi-materialistic theory of the Neo-Kantian 
Lange, author of the Geschichte des Mater ialismus, which enjoyed a 
brief celebrity as having supplied, it was thought, a justification of the 
sceptical tendencies of the time." Of the later editions of the "Justifica- 
tion " the same author adds that they show " an increasing advance in 
the direction of speculative scepticism and historical dogmatism'' (Ibid.). 

^ Lipsius combines both charges. He maintains that the standpoint 
of Ritschl is formally positivism, materially rationalism (Die ritschl'sche 
Theologie, p. 22). 



260 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

true religious experience ; his polemic against the Neo- 
platonic doctrine of an immediate contact of the soul 
with God, in which the former is raised above the 
limits of the finite ; his emphasis upon the part played 
by historic facts, and particularly by the Christian 
community in mediating religious truth, show his keen 
sense of the dangers to which mysticism in the techni- 
cal sense is exposed. ^ But they do not alter the fact 
that the ultimate basis of Eitschl's faith in Christ and 
of his acceptance of the Christian religion is an experi- 
ence as individual as that of the Pietists he condemns. 
Ritschl believes Christ to be God because in Him he is 
conscious of a power lifting him above himself into a 
new world of peace and strength. Why this should be 
he cannot tell, nor can he give any answer to the man 
who asks him for an explanation than the fact of his 
experience. Enough that he point to Christ as the one 

1 Eitschl defines mysticism as follows : " Mystik ist — zunachst die 
durch den areopagitischen Gottesbegriff geleitete Andacht, in welcher die 
Ueberschreitung aller Vermittlungen bis zum Aufgehen des bestimmten 
Bewusstseins in das unterschiedslose Wesen Gottes, als etwas schon in der 
irdischen Gegenwart Erreichbares erstrebt wird." {Recht. und Vers. I. p. 
113, 1st ed. quoted by Reischle, Ein Wort zur Controverse, etc. p. 6.) In 
this sense of course, Eitscbl has nothing in common with mysticism. 
Reischle, in his excellent study, Ein Wort zur Controverse iiber die Mystik 
in der Theologie (Freiburg, 1 886), thinks that Ritschl is justified in his 
definition, and that his polemic against mysticism, as he defines it, is well 
taken. A similar view is taken by Hermann, in his well-known book, 
The Communion of the Christian with God, in which he contrasts the 
Catholic type of piety, as mystic in the narrow sense, with the Protestant, 
in which the relation of the soul to God is mediated in every case by the 
historic Christ. But, taking mysticism in a wider sense to denote the in- 
communicable elements in the Christian experience, both these writers 
admit its legitimacy, and make place for it in their theology. This is 
particularly true of Hermann. On the legitimacy of such a wider use of 
the term, cf . Kaftan, Das Wesen der christlichen Religion, p. 262, note. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 261 

through whom he has received deliverance, leaving it 
to the other to make the test, and try the experiment 
for himself. 1 

This explains his indifference to the results of critical 
study of the Scriptures. Since his faith in Christ does 
not rest upon any particular fact connected with His 
life, but upon the total impression of His person, it 
cannot be affected by the shifting results of critical 
processes. Let criticism do its worst, it cannot alter 
the fact that acceptance of Christ as Saviour and 
Master has made of Ritschl a new man. In like 
manner of the rational arguments by which men have 
sought to support faith in Christ. However useful 
these may be in their place, they fall short of produc- 
ing genuine conviction. What argument has built 

1 To be sure Ritschl calls attention to the fact that in Christ we find 
one who perfectly fulfils his earthly vocation, and for our admiration 
for whom, therefore, we can give rational grounds. But it is not upon 
such grounds that Christian faith rests. Christ is not merely Example but 
Saviour. Indeed, He is so far above us, that Ritschl denies that the 
Christian life can properly be stated in terms of the imitation of Christ. 
Christian faith rests upon the fact that contact with Christ, as presented 
to us through His church — how Ritschl cannot explain — actually gives 
us new power and transforms us into new men. It is upon this indi- 
vidual experience of salvation that his whole theology rests. That is what 
he means by calling the divinity of Christ a Werthurtheil. It is the ex- 
pression of the value which Christ has for each individual who trusts 
Him. 

It is a well-known fact that many of the later scholars of Ritschl have 
emphasized the immediate elements in the Christian experience to a 
much greater extent than Ritschl himself (e.g. Kaftan, Scholz, Gottschick, 
Bornemann). Scholz even goes so far as to admit that mysticism in the 
technical sense has its relative right (cf. Ecke, p. 299). Ecke regards this 
as a correction of the Ritschlian theology. We are inclined to think it 
is rather the recognition and clearer statement of elements already con- 
tained implicitly within Ritschl 's own teaching. 



262 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

up, argument may overthrow. No syllogism is strong 
enough to bridge the gap between the finite and the 
infinite. What is needed here is not argument but 
experience. "Whereas once I was blind, now I see." 
To Ritschl, as to the blind man, contact with Christ 
means sight. To him whose eyes have been opened, 
there is no need of many words. To him who is still 
in darkness the most eloquent description is worse than 
useless. 

We cannot but agree with Ecke in his opinion that it 
was a great misfortune that Ritschl' s polemic against 
Pietism should have been based upon so slight an 
acquaintance with its living representatives. ^ Not 
only might a closer contact have led him to mitigate 
the severity of his criticism as he gained a new insight 
into the truly Christlike character of many of those 
whom he had been led in good faith to oppose, but 
on the other side a better understanding of the real 
meaning and purpose of his theology would certainly 
have removed many needless misunderstandings, and 
opened the way for the reception of his message in 
quarters which are now too often closed against it. 

For that Ritschl has a message for the church of 
to-day no one who has made a careful study of his 
theology can doubt. It is most unfortunate that atten- 
tion should have been concentrated so exclusively upon 
the mere outworks and approaches of his theology. 
Ritschl was not a great philosopher, and his theory of 
knowledge is generally admitted to be the least satis- 
factory part of his system. To this day scholars are 

1 Op. c'lt. p. 27 sq. 



niTSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 263 

not agreed as to exactly what it is.^ The really epoch- 
making achievement of Ritschl lies along other lines. 
It is found in his effort to determine with a clearness 
not attained by his predecessors what is the distinctive 
feature in the Christian experience ; to discover, on the 
basis of a scientific study of Christian history, what 
were the new elements which entered into the world 
with Christ; and thus to gain a standard for distin- 
guishing what is truly Christian from all that falsely 
usurps the name : in a word, to discover and define the 
essence of Christianity as a historic religion, in order 
to make possible the more effective preaching of its 

^ On the Erkenntnisstheorie of RitscM, cf. Ecke, op. cit. p. 46 sq. ; Wend- 
land, p. 37 sq. ; Garvie, op. cit. p. 39 sq. ; Orr. op. cit. p. 57 sq. ; Wenley, 
Contemporary Theology and Theism, p. 87 sq. and the literature cited p. 224. 

Traub {Zeitschrift Jur Theol. und Kirche, 1894, p. 97) regards Ritschl as 
a critical idealist, reproducing the Kantian theory of knowledge ; Stahlin 
(Kant, Lotze, Alhrecht Ritschl, p. 134 sq. especially p. 144) finds in him a 
subjective idealist • Garvie {op. cit. p. 45), a vulgar (as distinguished from a 
philosophical) realist ; Pfleiderer {Development, p. 183) holds that his 
theory of knowledge is " a dilettante confusion of the irreconcilable views 
of subjective idealism, which resolves things into phenomena of conscious- 
ness, and common-sense realism which looks upon the phenomena of 
consciousness as things themselves." All admit that his view is far from 
clear, and that he is not consistent with himself (cf . especially Wendland, 
op. cit. p. 39). 

Ritschl himself tells us that he learned his theory of knowledge from 
Lotze, and is apparently not conscious of any difference between his view 
and that of this philosopher. According to Ritschl there are three great 
theories of knowledge, the Platonic-Scholastic, the Kantian, and that 
of Lotze, which he himself adopts. The latter holds " that in the phenom- 
ena which in a definite space exhibit changes to a limited extent and 
in a determinate order, we cognize the thing as the cause of the qualities 
operating upon us, as the end which things serve as means, as the law of 
their constant changes" {Recht. und Vers. III. p. 20, Eng. tr. p. 19). The 
fullest statement and defence of Ritschl's own position is given in his 
Theologie und Metaphysik. 



264 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Gospel to men. This problem, which he grasped with 
a clearness, and followed with a persistence beyond all 
praise, may be said to have formed the subject of his 
life work from first to last, and it is this which he be- 
queaths as his chief heritage to the future. 



5. The School of Bitschl^ 

The influence of Ritschl is the central fact which the 
student of present theological movements must face. 
It is felt not only in Germany, where the most active 

1 On the school of Ritschl, cf. Ecke, Die theologische Schule Albrecht 
Ritschls und die evangelische Kirche der Gegenwart, Vol. I. p. 67 sq. ; Otto 
Ritschl, Albrecht Ritschls Leben, II. p. 236 sq. and the works of Nippold, 
Wendland, Garvie, and Orr, already referred to. See also the files of the 
Zeitschrift Jur Theologie und Kirche (cited below as Z. Th. K.), the organ 
of the school, and Die christliche Welt, a more popular paper representing 
the same spirit. The extensive literature in connection with the recent 
controversy about the use of the Apostles' Creed may also be consulted. 

The limits of the so-called Ritschlian school are very indefinite. Among 
the theologians who are usually classed among its members are Kaftan, 
Hermann, Harnack, Reischle, H. Schultz, Bornemann, Bender, O. Ritschl, 
J. "Weiss, Wendt, Haring, Gottschick, Loofs, Nitzsch, Lobstein, Katten- 
busch, Rade, Drews, Scholz, Troeltsch. But many of these depart very 
widely from the positions of Ritschl. Ecke distinguishes three periods in 
the history of the school: 1, from 1874-1880, that of the founding of the 
school, and its development along lines of thought genuinely characteristic 
of Ritschl, his scholars remaining in essential agreement with him (p. 74 
sq.) ; 2, from 1880-1889, beginning with the accession of Haring and 
Kaftan, who represent different points of view, and maintain their own 
independence of Ritschl. This is the period of transition, in which the bond 
of union is no longer specific agreement in opinion, but the common 
employment of a certain theological method (p. 76) ; 3, 1889 to the present, 
the further development of the school under Harnack's leadership and the 
gradual breaking down of the barriers which separate the school of Ritschl, 
on the one side from the speculative, on the other from the orthodox or 
ecclesiastical schools. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 265 

and progressive of the younger writers own him as 
master, but also in increasing degree in England, 

Among the writings of the individual members of the school, we may 
cite the following : 

Kaftan : Das Wesen der chnstlichen Religion, 1881, 2d ed. Basel, 1888; 
Die Wahrheit der ckristlichen Religion, Basel, 1888, Eng. tr. by Ferries, The 
Truth of the Christian Religion, Edinburgh, 2 vols. 1894 ; Glaube und Dogma, 
Bielefeld, 1889; Brauchen wir ein neues Dogma? Bielefeld, 1890; Das 
Christenthum und die Philosophie, Leipzig, 1895; Die Selhstdndigkeit des 
Christenthums, in Z. Th. K. 1896, p. 373; Dogmatik, Freiburg, 1897. 

Hermann: Die Metaphysih in der llieologie, Halle, 1876 ; Die Religion 
im Verhdltniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit, Halle, 1879 ; Der Ver- 
kehr des Christen mit Gott. 2d ed. Stuttgart, 1892, Eng. tr. by Stanyon, 
The Communion of the Christian with God, London, 1895 ; Der Begriff der 
Offenharung, Giessen, 1887 ; Warum bedarf unser Glaube geschichtlicher 
Thatsachen? Halle, 1892; Die Gewissheit des Glaubens und die Freiheit 
der Theologie, 2d ed. Freiburg, 1889 ; Der evangelische Glaube und die 
Theologie Albrecht Ritschls, Marburg, 1890 ; Der geschichtliche Christus, der 
Grund unseres Glaubens, in Z. Th. K. 1892, p. 232 sq. 

Harnack: Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3 vols. 3d ed. 1894 sq., 
Eng. tr. by Buchanan, History of Dogma, Boston, 1895-1900, 7 vols. ; Das 
Christentum und die Geschichte, Leipzig, 1895, Eng. tr. by Saunders, Chris- 
tianity and History, Jjondon, 1896; Das Wesen des Christentums, Leipzig, 
1900, Eng. tr. by Saunders, What is Christianity ? London and New York, 
1901. 

Reischle: Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Religion, Freiburg, 1889; 
Der Glaube an Jesum Christum und die geschichtliche Erforschung seines 
Lebens, in Hefte zur christl. Welt, No. 12, Leipzig, 1893 ; Christentum und 
Entwicklungsgedanke, Ibid. No. 31, Leipzig, 1898; Ein Wort zur Contro- 
verse uber die Mystik in der Theologie, Freiburg, 1886 ; Der Streit uber die 
Bergriindung des Glaubens auf den geschichtlichen Jesus Christus, in Z. Th. 
K. 1897 ; Werthurtheile und Glaubensurtheile, Halle, 1900. Leitsdtze fiir 
eine akademische Vorlesung uber die christliche Glaubenslehre, Halle, 1899. 

H. Schultz : Die Lehre von der Gottheit Christi, Gotha, 1881 ; Grund- 
riss der evang. Apologetik, Gottingen, 1894 ; Grundriss der evang. Dogma- 
tik, 2d ed. Gottingen, 1892 ; Alttestamentliche Theologie, 5th ed. Gottingen, 
1896, Eng. tr. from the 4th ed. by Paterson, 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1892. 

W. Bornemann : Unterricht im Christentum, 3d ed. Gottingen, 1893. 

W. Bender : Das Wesen der Religion, 4th ed. Bonn, 1888. 

J. Weiss: Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes, Gottingen, 1892, 2d 
ed. 1900 ; Die Nachfolge Christi und die Predigt der Gegenwart, Gottingen, 
1895. 

H. H. Wendt: Die Lehre Jesu, 2 vols. Gottingen, 1886, 1890, Eng. 



266 THB ESSENCE OP CHRISTIAJStlTr 

France, and America as well. Unmagnetic in person, 
obscure and unattractive in style, haying left no single 
work which adequately presents the principles for 
which he stands, it is yet the fact that this Gottingen 
professor has exerted an influence which in range and 
intensity is paralleled only by that of Hegel. Unlike 
the latter, the secret of his power consists, not in the 

tr. by Wilson, The Teaching of Jesus, 2 vols. New York, 1892 ; Die Auf- 
gdbe der systematischen Theologie, Gottingen, 1894; Der Erfahrungsheweis 
fur die Wahrheit des Christentums, Gottingen, 1897 ; Die Norm des echten 
Christentums in Hefte zur christl. Welt, No. 5, Leipzig, 1893 ; Die Lehre 
des Paulus verglichen mit der Lehre Jesu, in Z. Th. K. 1894, p. 1 sq. 

Th. Haring : Ueher das hleihende im Glauhen an Christus, Stuttgart, 
1880; Zur Versohnungslehre, eine dogmatische Untersuchung, Gottingen, 
1893 ; Die Lebensfrage der systematischen Theologie, die Lebensfrage des 
christlichen Glaubens, Tiibingen, 1895; Gehort die Auferstehung zum 
Glaubensgrund ? in Z. Th. K. 1897, p. 332; Zur Verstdndigung in der 
systematischen Theologie, in Z. Th. K. 1899, p. 97. 

Troeltsch: Die christliche Weltanschauung und die wissenschaftliche 
Gegenstromungen, in Z. Th. K. 1893, p. 493 ; 1894, p. 3 67 ; Die Selbstandig- 
keit der Religion, in Z. Th. K. 1895, p. 361 sq.; 1896, pp. 71 and 167; 
Geschichte und Metaphysik, in Z. Th. K. 1898, p. 1 ; Die Absolutheit des 
Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte, Tiibingen, 1902. 

Otto Ritschl: Albrecht Ritschls Leben, 2 vols. Ereiburg, 1892; Ueber 
Werthurtheile, 1895; Der geschichtliche Christus, der christliebe Glaube und 
die theologische Wissenschaft, in Z. Th. K. 1893, p. 371. 

Kattenbusch: Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl, 2d ed. Giessen, 1893; 
Lehrbuch d. vergleichenden Confessionskunde, Vol. I. Freiburg, 1892. 

Lobstein : Introduction a la Dogmatique Protestante, Paris, 1 896, 
German tr. by Maas, Ereiburg, 1897. See also his Etudes christologiques, 
Paris, 1891, 1892, etc. 

Nitzsch: Lehrbuch der evang. Dogmatik, Ereiburg, 1892, 2d ed. 1896. 

Loofs: Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, Halle, 1890, 3d 
ed. 1893 ; Symbolik, Vol. I. Ereiburg, 1902. 

Rade : Die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion, Tiibingen, 1900 ; Reiiie 
Lehre, in Hefe zur chrisU. Welt, No. 43, Tubingen, 1900. 

Schwab: The Kingdom of God, 'New York, 1897. In general sym- 
pathy with the Ritschlian point of view are the Essays collected in Faith 
and Criticism, New York, 1893. Cf. especially p. 97 sq., Revelation and 
the Person of Christ, by P. T. Forsyth. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 267 

unity and symmetry of his system (although he is 
before all things the systematic theologian) but in the 
wealth of suggestion which his writings contain, and the 
multitude of new viewpoints which he has opened up, 
leaving their further exploration and development to 
the industry of his disciples. If one were asked to 
state wherein consists the unity of the so-called Ritschl 
school, it would be difficult to give an answer. Apart 
from a common sense of gratitude to the master for 
stimulus, spiritual and intellectual, and the abiding 
conviction that the uniqueness of Christianity, as a 
historic religion, is to be found in the person of its 
founder, scarcely a point could be named upon which 
all agree. Among so-called Ritschlians are to be found 
tendencies conservative and radical; individuals who 
follow closely the lines laid down by Ritschl himself 
and others who depart widely from his teaching. Yet 
in all its branches the school is characterized by one 
consuming interest: the desire to know what is the 
essence of Christianity, as distinct from its accidents; 
to grasp the central principle which gives unity and 
consistence to the widely varying forms in which his- 
torically it has manifested itself. Nowhere, it may 
be said with confidence, has the problem which now 
engages us received more constant and persistent atten* 
tion than at the hands of those whose first impulse to 
theological study has been received from Ritschl. 

And it is not only among his disciples in the narrow 
sense that the influence of Ritschl is felt.^ All parties 

1 Among the independent theologians more or less influenced by the 
Ritschlian movement, we may mention R. A. Lipsius {Philosophie und JSe- 



268 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

in the church have been affected by the new influences 
which he has set in motion. The speculative theolo- 
gians have been recalled from their lofty heights 
to the consideration of the historical questions upon 
the right solution of which all sound speculation 
depends.^ The conservative churchmen have been 
forced anew to give an account of their faith. 2 If 
Ritschl be not right in his description of the essentials 
of Christianity, all the more reason that those who 
hold a fuller and sounder faith should bear their 
testimony. Thus on every side and from the most 
varied quarters, we find men of all schools and of 

ligion, Leipzig, 1885; Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestant. Dogmatik, 5d 
ed. Braunschweig, 1893. Cf. also the literature cited by Wendland, 
op. cit. p. iii.) ; M. Kahler (Dogmatische Zeitfragen, Leipzig, 1898, 2 vols. ; 
Die Wissenschafl der christUchen Lehre, 2d ed. Leipzig, 1893; Der soge- 
nannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche hihlische Christus, 2d ed. Leip- 
zig, 1896) ; J. Kostlin {Religion nach dem neuen Testament^ in Studien und 
Kritihen, 1888, p. 7 sq.; Der Glaube und seine Bedeutungjur Erkenntniss, 
Lehen und Kirche, Devlin, 1895 ; Die Begriindung unserer sittlich-religiosen 
Ueberzeugung, Berlin, 1893, etc.). 

1 A good illustration of the way in which Ritschl's influence has made 
itself felt upon men who have been trained in a very different school is 
to be found in the recent Dogmengeschichte of A. Dorner (Berlin, 1899). 
Of early Christianity he says (p. 34) : *' Der gemeinsame Glaubenssatz, 
durch den das Christenthum als neue Religion auftritt, ist die Ueberzeug- 
ung dass die Siindenvergebung in dem von Christus begriindeten Reiche 
mit der Gotteskindschaf t gegeben und ein neuer ethischer Lebensimpuls 
universaler Liebe hiermit verbunden sei, der eine Erf iillung der sittlichen 
Aufgaben aus der Gesinning heraus ermoglicht." Cf. p. 622, "Das 
Wesen des Christenthums besteht darin, dass die Gottesgemeinschaft, 
welche alle Religion anstrebt, in den ethisch bestiramten Personlichkeiten 
als universal-ethische Gottmenschheit realisirt wird ; damit ist einmal dor 
Werth der Personlichkeit in das Unendliche gesteigert ; es ist aber zu- 
gleich ein ethischer Universalismus eingeleitet, der in der Idee des Beiches 
Gottes seinen Ausdruck findet," etc. 

2 Ecke, op. cit. p. 318. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 269 

no school addressing themselves to the question, What 
is Christianity? 

To rehearse all the definitions which have been the 
outcome of this discussion would carry us too far afield.^ 
It is sufficient to state that among the followers of 
Ritschl we note the same two tendencies, to which we 
have already so often called attention: the tendency 
to magnify the uniqueness of Christianity — its contrast 
with and separation from all preceding forms of relig- 
ion; and the tendency to emphasize its points of 
similarity with other faiths, — to see in Christianity the 
fulfilment and completion of a religious, ideal, founded 
in the nature of man as such, and even before Christ, 
more or less clearly revealed. "We may take as repre- 
senting these two tendencies Julius Kaftan and E. 
Troeltsch. 

In his books, "Das Wesen der christlichen Religion," 
and "Die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion," Pro- 
fessor Kaftan has given the most exhaustive study of 

1 Besides the definitions considered below, we may mention those of 
Nitzsch {Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, Freiburg, 1892, p. 208) : " Das Christen- 
thum ist diejenige ethische, monotheistiscbe und universalistische 
Religion, in welche als hochstes Gut und als Heilsgut die Theilnahme an 
dem durch Jesus von Nazareth verwirklichten, Gotteskindschaft und 
Liebe, mit beiden aber ewiges (gottliches) Leben einschliessenden Reiche 
Gottes gilt," and of Schultz {Dogmatik, p. 18) : "Als die religiose Gruud- 
iiberzeugung, von welcher aus das evangelische Christeuthum dogmatiach 
verstanden sein will, ergiebt sich aus der gesammten heiligen Schrift die 
Ueberzeugung von dem in Christus verwirklichten Reiche Gottes^ desseu 
Glieder wir im Glauben werden, und in dessen Gemeinschaft wir der 
Vaterliebe Gottes gewiss sind, also das Evangelium im Sinne unserer 
Kirche." Cf . Apologetik, p. 84 : " Ks liegt im tiefsten Wesen des Christen- 
thums begriindet das sein Stifter auch sein religioser Mittelpunkt, ja sein 
wesentlicher Inhalt, sein muss." Cf. also Bornemann, Unterricht im 
Christentum, 3d ed. S§ 3-7. 



270 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the nature of Christianity which has thus far appeared 
in print. The results to which he comes are contained 
in the definition which we extract from the earlier pages 
of his recently published "Dogmatik.''^ "The nature 
of the Christian Eeligion " — so we read — "is deter- 
mined by the two thoughts of the kingdom of God and 
of redemption. In the kingdom of God which Jesus 
Christ preached, the Christian recognizes his eternal 
end, lying above the world in God, but to which the 
only way leads through moral development in the world. 
By means of the reconciliation with God which Jesus 
Christ has brought to pass he knows himself, in spite 
of his sin, as bidden into this kingdom. In these 
two elements, mutually related to and conditioning 
each other, the experieace of the Christian religion 
consists. "2 

The similarity of this definition to that of Ritschl is 
manifest. As by Ritschl, so here, the ideas of redemp- 
tion and of the kingdom are united as the two foci of 
the Christian ellipse. But in the working out of his 
conception, Kaftan lays more stress upon the transcend- 
ent elements in religion. In the kingdom of God the 
Christian recognizes his eternal end, which lies above 
the world in God. Unlike Ritschl, he is unwilling to 
restrict religion to the narrow sphere of the Werthur- 
theile within which the former would confine it. The 
judgments of religion are based upon Werthurtheile, 
But they go on from these to express positive convic- 
tions concerning the nature of things. They are 

1 Freiburg, 1897. 

2 § 2, p. 8. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 271 

Seinsurtheile based upon Werthurtheile ^ — judgments of 
existence, based upon judgments of value. For ex- 
ample, we know God only through His influence upon 
us, but, once known, we cannot but think of him as 
really existing, even apart from us. Here we have the 
ontological conception which Ritschl sought so hard to 
banish, slipping back into the teaching of the most 
prominent systematic theologian of his school. The 
Absolute so dreaded by Ritschl has no terrors for 
Kaftan. To him the sentence, God is the Absolute, 
gives the formula for the knowledge of God in Chris- 
tianity, as well as in every spiritual religion. ^ Only 
we must be careful to define it rightly and to guard it 
against misapprehensions. Rightly understood, it is 
the most positive of conceptions, full of ethical and 
spiritual meaning. It denotes the being, who is "the 

i Dogmatih, § 3, p. 29. " Wenn Ritschl selbst sich so ausdriickte : 
die religiose Weltanschauung verlauf t in Werthurtheilen, so war das min- 
destens missverstandlich. Die religiose Weltanschauung verlauft viel- 
mehr in Seinsurtheilen, ist Erkenntniss im eingentlichen Sinn, folgend aus 
der Erkenntniss, dass Gott ist und was Gott ist. Aber sie steht in 
anderen inneren Beziehungen als sonst das theoretische Erkennen. 
Nicht objektive Auffassung der Welt und denkende Verarbeitung der 
80 gewonnenen Eindriicke, sondern eine in Werthurtheilen verlaufende 
innere Erfahrung liegt ihr zu Grunde." For his application of this to 
the doctrine of God cf. § 17, p. 169 sq. 

2 Dogmatik, § 1 6, p. 161. " Der Satz, dass Gott das Absolute ist, bezeich- 
net das Schema der Gotteserkenntniss in der christlichen wie in jeder 
geistigen Religion. Er bedeutet, dass wir unter Gott — dem Subjekt 
aller der Satze, in denen die Gotteserkenntniss ausgesprochen wird — das 
absolute Ziel alles menschlichen Strebens und die absolute Macht iiber 
alles Wirkliche verstehn. Nicht was Gott ist, sondern welche Stelle die 
Gotteserkenntniss in unserera geistigen Leben einnimmt, kommt dariu 
zum Ausdruck. Es sind aber die Beziehungen des Willens und des 
personlichen Lebens, in denen der Satz verstandlich ist, wahrend er als 
theoretischer Verstandessatz genommea unbestimmt und leer bleibt." 



272 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

ultimate end of all human striving, and the supreme 
power over all reality."^ In such sentences as these 
we have a doctrine of God, which in its metaphysics 
approaches closely to that of traditional theology.^ 

But if Kaftan departs from Ritschl in his doctrine of 
Werthurtheile, and in his consequent view of the rela- 
tion between theology and philosophy, he follows him 
in his strict supernaturalism.^ Christianity is to Kaf- 
tan essentially a supernatural religion,* sharply contrasted 
as such with all natural religion,^ and having its only 

* Dogmatih, § 16, p. 161. 

2 Note especially Kaftan's treatment of those attributes which express 
the supermundane character of God, his " independence of the limitations 
of space and time," his eternity, his transcendence, i. e. separateness 
from the world. Cf. § 17, 4. On Ritschl's view of the eternity of God, 
of. Recht. und Vers. ILL p. 281 sq., Eng. tr. p. 296 sq. 

3 Kaftan's views on this point are most fully brought out in two arti- 
cles in the Zeitschrift fur J'heologie und Kirche. The first, which appeared 
in Vol. VI. p. 373 sq. and is entitled " Die Selbstandigkeit des Christen- 
thums," is a criticism of a preceding series of articles by Troeltsch, en- 
titled " Die Selbstandigkeit der Religion." In these Troeltsch attacks the 
position of the Ritschl school, and specially of Kaftan, whom he accuses 
of applying the principle of supernatural revelation to Christianity, but 
treating all other religions in the spirit of the positivism of Feuerbach 
(V. p. 375). The second ("Erwiederung," VIII. p. 70) is an answer to a 
further article by Troeltsch, entitled, "Geschichte und Metaphysik" 
(VIII. p. 1 sq.), in which he attacks Kaftan's supernaturalism. 

* Z. Th. K. VIII. p. 82. " Der eigentliche Gegensatz zwischen Troeltsch 
und mir ist seiner Meinung nach der, dass ich den wesentlich supra- 
naturalen Charakter des Christenthums und der ihm zu Grunde liegenden 
Gottesoffenbarung vertrete, wahrend er es fiir die in der Gegenwart ge- 
stellte Aufgabe halt, das Christenthum aus dieser ihm nicht wesentlichen 
Schale loszulosen. ... In der That liegt hier nach allem, was er 
ausfiihrt, eine wesentliche Differenz zwischen uns." Cf. p. 71, "den 
Supranaturalismus . . . der fur mich integrirender Bestandtheil meiner 
christlichen Glaubensiiberzeugung ist." 

5 Ibid. pp. 87, 88. Kaftan admits that he makes the contrast, but 
denies that it is founded on prejudice. He is willing enough to recognize 



niTSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 273 

adequate explanation in a special divine revelation of 
wholly exceptional character.^ Between Christianity 
and the ethnic religions there is a great gulf fixed, 
and the efforts made by the science of Comparative 
Religion to bridge this gulf are unavailing. ^ In Chris- 
tianity we have a new beginning, a miracle in the strict 
sense. ^ The only way to understand it is to experience 
it, and any proof which ignores this fact is bound to 
fail.^ 

This is the point against which the criticism of 
Troeltsch directs itself.^ He utterly rejects the super- 
supernatural revelation outside of Christianity, if any one will show it to 
him, but as a matter of fact it is impossible to compare such religions as 
Brahmanism and Buddhism with Christianity in this respect. *' Denn die 
Unterschiede zwischen den grossen geistigen Religionen der Menschheit 
sind so ungebeure, dass beides sich nicht mit einander vertragt.'' (p. 89). 

^ Ibid. p. 91. " Aber freilich, damit soil nicht geleugnet werden, dass 
die Offenbarung in Christus und was damit zusammenhangt, mir etwas 
spezifisch Anderes ist, als was wir sonst als Offenbarung kennen, ein Her- 
eintreten Gottes selbst in die Welt der Schopfung, das nur einmal da ist 
und vorkommt, sich vom naturlichen (d. h. gewohnlichen) Lauf der Dinge 
schlechthin abhebt. Und meine Behauptung ist nun die, dass das Chris- 
tenthum an diesen Oj^enbaruugsglauben gebunden ist und mit ihm steht 
Oder fallt." Cf. p. 92 : " Ohne den supranaturalistischen Offenbarungs- 
glauben hat das Christenthum keinen Bestand." 

2 Die Selhstdndigkeit des Christenthuins, pp. 377, 378. Here he con- 
tends that one of the few points on which the adherents of the so-called 
school of Ritschl have remained true to the views of their founder is in 
their maintenance of the independence of Christianity as over against the 
philosophy of religion in every form. 

3 Erwiederung, p, 89. " Er, timer Herr, unser Heiland ist die Offen- 
barung Gottes schlechtweg. Wir heben diese Offenbarung and was 
nnmittelbar mit ihr zusammenhangt, aus allem Uebrigen heraus. Von 
ihr gilt auch, dass sie die iibernatiirliche Offenbarung im besondern Sinn 
des Wortes ist." Cf. also the passages cited above. 

* Ibid. p. 88, where he founds his conviction that the revelation of 
Christianity is wholly exceptional upon inner experience. 
5 In the articles referred to above. See p. 272, note 3, ' '-" 

18 



274 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

naturalism of Kaftan.^ However extraordinary Chris- 
tianity may be — and Troeltsch is tlie first to admit its 
uniqueness ^ — it is yet but a chapter in a larger reli- 
gious history. It is the fulfilment of a religious ideal 
founded in the nature of man as such, and therefore 
manifesting itself more or less perfectly in all the 
existing religions.^ True religion did not begin with 
Christianity, though it completely expresses itself only 
in Christianity. On the contrary, it is as wide as 
human life. So far from such a position detracting 
from the supremacy of Christianity, it is the only one 
from which that supremacy can be rationally estab- 
lished.^ To talk of Christianity as the absolute religion, 
implies the presence of a standard universally admitted, 

1 Geschichte und Melaphysik, p. 9. " Aus religionsgeschichtlichen 
Studien hervorgehende Erwagungen dieser Art haben mich, so gut wie die 
ungeheure Mehrzahl der auf diesem Gebiet arbeiteten Forscher, schliess- 
lich genotigt, jeden Rest von Supranaturalismus aufzugeben, der dem 
Christenturn zum voraus eine gauz andersartige Stellung innerhalb der 
Religionsgeschichte ausmacht." Cf. pp. 5, 25. 

2 Selbstdndigkeit der Religion, VI., p. 211. " So istalso das Christenturn 
doch als die absolute Religion anzuerkennen ? AUerdings. Nur um diesen 
Preis ist es zn erleben und zu erfahren." 

3 Geschichte und Metaphijsih, p. 8. "Wer iiberhaupt in der Religion 
eine wirkliche Beziehung auf die iibersinuliche Welt glauben zu diir- 
fen gewiss ist, wird in alledem die allgemeine Uebernatiirlichkeit und 
Erlosungskraft der Religion anerkennen, einen iiberall wirksamen Trieb 
zur Erreichung des Zieles, das wir im Christenturn erreicht sehen und 
dessen Erreichung bei jenen durch verschiedenen Grunde verhindert wor- 
den ist." Cf. also pp. 3, 4, where he contends that in all religion there is 
a supernatural element. 

* Geschichte, p. 25. "Wir konnen das Christenturn nicht als etwaa 
toto genere von den nichtchristlichen Religionen Verschiedenes voraus- 
setzen und beweisen. So sind wir daran gewiesen, von der Gesammter- 
scheinung der Religion aus die Erage nach Stellung und Wahrheit des 
Christenthums zu erheben. Dag ist aber nichts anderes als Religiona- 
philosophie." 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 275 

by which it can be measured. That standard must be 
found, if anywhere, in the religious nature of man as 
such. The true apologist, therefore, is the student of 
Comparative Religion.^ With such thoughts as this 
we find Troeltsch turning back from the position of 
Ritschl to the earlier viewpoint of Schleiermacher and 
of Hegel. 2 

Much the same criticism is brought against the 
method of Ritschl by Lipsius,^ the theologian, who, of 
all his contemporaries, stands on the whole closest to 
him. In his able review of the Ritschlian theology,* 
he refers unfavorably to the extent to which Ritschl 
carries his opposition to natural theology,^ and declares 
that in denying the significance of the common relig- 
ious life apart from Christianity, he in effect reduces 
Christianity to the level of natural religion, and so 

1 Selhstdndigkeit, p. 217. "Die christliche Idee erscheint als die 
einfache, von aller natioiialen Besouderheit und aller Naturreligion be- 
freite Konsequenz der religiosen Grundanlage iiberhaupt. Dass sie deshalb 
die absolute Religion sei, ist damit nicbt. im strengen Sinne zu beweisen, 
aber es erscheint doch als etwas Naheliegendes imd Wahrscheinliches." 
The study of religion shows what are the needs and desires of the religious 
nature, and hence makes it improbable that any other religion will arise to 
take the place of Christianity. Thus it affords a rational basis for Chris- 
tian confidence. 

* This connection he himself recognizes, Cf. Geschichte, pp. 27, 43. 
8 On Lipsius, cf. the literature cited above, p. 267, note 1. 

* Die ritschl'sche Theologie, in Jahr.fUr prot. TheoL, 1888. 

5 P. 3, Here he shows that Ritschl not only agrees with Schleier- 
macher in rejecting natural theology in the sense of " einer Summe reli- 
gioser Erkenntnisse, die alien Menschen von Haus aus gemein seien," but 
also goes so far as to attack " das Streben, das allgemein Religiose in alien 
geschichtlichen Religiousformen aufzusucben und das Christliche nur als 
hochste Steigerung der allgeraeinen Gottesoffenbaruug zu betrachten." 
According to Ritschl, there is no general revelation of God, but only 
special revelation in Christ and in the Scriptures. 



276 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

destroys the uniqueness he desires to magnify. ^ Lip- 
sius maintains that the peculiar religious relation- 
ship of Christianity includes and takes for granted the 
general religious relationship, and holds it to be the 
first duty of the theologian to undertake an investigation 
of the nature, the origin, and the history of the religious 
consciousness as such.^ Only after this preliminary 
investigation is completed is it possible to approach 
the problem of the definition of Christianity with any 
hope of success. 3 

But the discussions which have been set in motion 
by Ritschl have to do not only with such general ques- 
tions as the philosophical basis of Christianity, and its 
relation to other forms of faith, but also and more par- 
ticularly with the problem of historic Christianity itself. 

1 ** Hier ist nun der Punkt, wo es klar wird, dass mit der Abweisung 
des allgemein Eeligiosen, well nicht aus der Offenbarung in Christas 
geschopft, zugleich das specifisch Christliche auf das allgemein Religiose 
reducirt wird. Gottvertrauen, Berufstreue, und allgemeine Menschen- 
liebe — das ist eine ungleich armere, diirftigere Trias als die des alten 
Rationalismus : Gott, Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit " (p. 11). 

2 Dogmatik, § 16. 

3 On Lipsius' view of Christianity, cf. his Dogmatik^ §§ 140-162. "Das 
Christenthum als geschichtliche Religion ist der Glaube an die geschicht- 
liche Offenbarung in Jesus Christus, dem Sohne Gottes und Erloser der 
Menschen. . . . Seinem geistigen Gehalte nach ist dieser Glaube die Ge- 
wissheit, dass das voUkommene religiose Verhaltniss in Jesus Christus 
thatsachlich offenbart, und durch ihn ebensowol f iir die Gemeinschaf t, als 
fiir den einzelnen Glaubigen vermittelt sei" (§§ 140, 142). 

" Das religiose Princip des Christenthums ist daher das in Jesu person- 
lichem Selbstbewusstsein thatsachlich verwirklichte, mittelst des Glaubens 
an ihn als Thatsache des gemeinsamen und individuellen Bewusstseins 
sich beurkundende religiose Verhaltniss der Sohnschaft bei Gott, ia 
welchem an die Stelle des Gegensatzes zwischen Gott und Mensch die 
Lebensgemeinschaft des Menschen mit Gott in ihrem wahrhaft geistigen 
Sinne, als unmittelbar personliche Gegenwart des gottlichen Geistes ira 
Menschengeiste, getreten ist" (§ 144). 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 277 

To Ritschl, as we have seen, Christianity centres in 
Christ. And by Christ he means the historic Christ — 
the person who lived and walked and taught in Pales- 
tine nineteen centuries ago, in distinction from the 
abstract metaphysical being with which, for good or 
for evil, later ages have identified him. The purity of 
a man's Christianity is to be tested by the extent of his 
loyalty to the revelation of the historic Christ. It is 
their failure to meet this test which draws down upon 
the mystics so severe a censure. 

Unfortunately, however, when closely examined, the 
test proves to be less explicit than might be desired. 
The term "historic Christ" is itself ambiguous. It may 
be more or less broadly defined. Is it to be reduced 
to the picture of Jesus Christ constructed by modern 
critical study, when all the supernatural elements in 
the traditional view have been eliminated? Or does 
it include such facts as the virgin birth, the miracles, 
and the resurrection ? Is the historic Christ the Christ 
of the Gospels, or of modern criticism, or a peculiar 
something midway between the two? To such ques- 
tions Ritschl himself gives us no very explicit answer. 
While his Biblical principle would incline him to the 
former view, his freedom of criticism points rather to 
the latter, and it is not strange therefore that different 
members of his school should have been led to different 
conclusions. Thus while Wendt finds in the teaching 
of Jesus the norm of true Christianity,^ and contrasts 

1 Die Norm des echten Christentums, pp. 30, 37, 43, 44, and especially 
41. " Ich meine die rechte Antwort auf diese Fragen schon dadurch 
gegeben zu haben, dass ich von Anfang an gesagt habe, die religionstift- 



278 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Jesus and Paul to the great disadvantage of the latter,^ 
Harnack includes in his idea of the Gospel the effects 
produced by Christ upon the life of His folio wers,^ and 
finds in Paul that one of the disciples who is truest to 
the teaching of his Master.^ J. Weiss* thinks that the 

ende oder die offenbarende Lehre Jesu sei die von uns gesuchte Norm. 
Genauer konnte icli mich ausdriicken: die aus der religionstiftenden 
Absicht Jesu hervorgegangene, von ihm selbst als gottliche Offenbarung 
beurtheilte, in Worten und indirekt in Thaten gegebene Verkiindigung 
Jesa vom Eeicbe Gottes ist die rechte Norm der christlichen Lelire." 

1 Ibid. p. 30. The theme is more fully developed in an article in Zeit- 
schriftfur Theol. und Kirche, 1894, pp. 1-78. See especially the concluding 
paragraph, in which, after speaking of the wealth and richness of Paul's 
thought, and his great services to Christian missions, to Christian doctrine, 
and especially to the development of Protestantism, he goes on as follows : 
" Aber diese Anerkennung darf uns doch nicht abhalten von der Erkennt- 
niss, dass die Lehre Jesu an einfache Grosse, Klarheit und Wahrheit der 
Lehre des Paulus noch iiberlegen ist. Sie besitzt eine innere Einheitlich- 
keit, wie sie der des Paulus abgeht. Die letztere ist uns menschlich inter- 
essanter, eben wegen der verschiedenartigen Elemente, die sie einschliesst. 
Aber dies, was sie interessant macht, ist zugleich ihre Schwache. Wir 
konnen gewiss sein, dass die Lehre Jesu, wenn sie nur in ihrem urspriing- 
lichen Bestande und Sinne aufgefasst und gepredigt wird, in noch viel 
hoherem Masse belebende und lauternde Einwirkungen auf die weitere 
Entwicklung das Christenthums ausiiben kann und will, als wie sie je von 
der Lehre des Paulus ausgegangen sind." 

2 Das Wesen des Christentums, p. 6., Eng. tr. p. 10. " Deshalb ist 
es unmoglich eine vollstandige Antwort auf die Frage : Was ist christ- 
lich 1 zu gewinnen, wenn man sich lediglich auf die Predigt Jesu Christi 
beschrankt. Wir miissen die erste Generation seiner Jiinger — die, die 
mit ihm gegessen und getrunken haben — hinzunehmen, und von ihnen 
horen, was sie an ihm erlebt haben." Nay more, we must take in the con- 
tribution of all later ages, for that with which we have here to do, is not 
so much a teaching as a life, which " ever kindled anew, burns now with 
its own flame " (p. 7, Eng. tr. p. 11), 

2 Ibid. p. 110, Eng. tr. p. 176. "Die grosse Mehrzahl derer, die ihm 
nahe getreten sind, bezeugt, dass es in Wahrheit derjenige gewesen sei, 
der den Meister verstanden und sein Werk fortgesetzt hat. Dieses Urteil 
besteht zu Recht." 

* Die Nachfolge Christi und die Predigt der Gegenwart, Gottingen, 
1895. 



niTSCHL AND BIS SCHOOL 279 

true dogmatic formula for the present time is the " Imi- 
tation of Christ, "1 but holds himself entirely free to 
remove from the picture of the Christ to be imitated 
whatever elements are out of keeping with the spirit of 
our modern life.^ Kahler,^ on the other hand, attacks 
modern study of the life of Christ, as subjective and 
unscientific; sees in the Jesus of criticism a mere fig- 
ment of the imagination without any basis in fact ; and 
declares that the true historical Jesus, and the only 
one, is the Biblical Christ.* Between these extremes 
stands a group of moderate men like Reischle^ and 

1 P. 117. "In alien diesen Beziehimgen schien mir die Formel 'der 
Nachfolge Christi ' geeignet, als zentraler Ausdruck fur den christlichen 
Heilsstand zu dienen." Cf. pp. 181, 143. In the latter passage he objects 
to Hermann's phrase, " das Ueberwaltigt werden vom Bilde Christi," as 
making the gate of entrance to the Christian life too narrow. 

2 Especially in all that concerns the apocalyptic and eschatological. Ibid, 
p. 168. "Indem wir so den Gedanken der Nachfolge Christi in den Rah- 
men der Reichgottesidee einfiigen, verwenden wir diese Idee nicht in dem 
Wortsinne der Evangelien, sondern in der bedeutenten Abwandlung des- 
selben, den er m der modernen Theologie empfaugen hat. In der Sprache 
und Denkweise Jesu sind "Welt und Reich Gottes absolut unvereinbare 
Gegensatze : die Welt muss vergehen, um dem Reiche Gottes Platz zu 
machen. In der modernen Theologie dagegen wird der Gedanke so 
gewandt, dass innerhalb der Menschenwelt eine Bundesgemeinschaft 
zwischen Gott und einen Telle dieser Menschheit und wieder unter diesen 
Menschen sich gebildet hat eben durch das "Wirken Jesu — ein Bund, 
welcher dazu bestimmt ist allmahlich die ganze Welt zu umfassen, bis er 
dereinst in volkommener Weise in Jenseits sich erneuern wird." This 
contrast is further developed in his book, Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche 
Gottes (2d ed. Gottingen, 1900). 

^ Kahler is sometimes reckoned as a Ritschlian (so by Orr, op. cit. 
p. 27). As a matter of fact, he occupies an independent position and is 
really to be counted one of the most influential opponents of the school. 
On his work, see the literature cited above, p. 267, note 1. 

* See his remarkable little book, Der sogenannte liistorische Jesus und der 
geschichtUche, hihlische Christus, 2d ed. Leipzig, 1896. 

^ On Reischle, see the literature cited above, p. 265. 



280 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Haring,^ recognizing the rights both of criticism and 
of faith, and striving, by a careful investigation of the 
experiences of the religious life, to discover what facts 
in the Biblical picture of Christ are really of vital 
importance for Christian faith. ^ 

The results of recent discussions upon this and simi- 
lar points are gathered to a head in Harnack's brilliant 
lectures on "The Essence of Christianity."^ Delivered 
before an audience of some six hundred students, and 
taken down stenographically by one of their number, 
they have been received with a favor which is little less 
than extraordinary, and are already accepted by leading 
members of the Ritschl school as giving the most ade- 
quate statement of the results of modern critical study 
which has yet appeared.* We cannot better bring our 

1 On Haring, see the literature cited above, p. 266. 

* The discussion has centred about such points as the virgin birth 
and the resurrection. From the extensive literature we may cite the fol- 
lowing : In the Zeitschrift fur Theol. und Kirche, Hermann : Der geschicht- 
liche Christus, der Grund unseres Glaubens (1892, p. 232) ; Lobstein : Der 
evangelische Heilsglauhe an die Auferstehung Jesu Christi (1892, p. 343); 
Hering : Die dogmatische Bedeutung und der religiose Werth der iiber- 
naturliche Geburt Christi (1895, p. 58) ; Reischle : Der Streit iiber die Be- 
grilndung des Glaubens auf den geschichtlichen Jesus Christus (1897, p. 171) ; 
Haring: Gehort die Auferstehung zum Glaubensgrund ? Amica exegese 2U 
Professor D. M. Reischles Der Streit, etc. (1897, p. 331); Haring und 
Eeischle : Glaubensgrund und Auferstehung. Ein gemeinschaftliches Schluss- 
wort (1898, p. 129) ; Vischer : Die geschichtliche Gewissheit und der Glaube 
an Jesus Christus (1898, p. 195) ; Sell : Zwei Thesenreihen iiber geschicht-^ 
liche Gewissheit und Glauben (1898, p. 261); Haring: Gdbe es Gewissheit 
des christlichen Glaubens wenn es geschichtliche Gewissheit von der Unge- 
schichtlichJceit der Geschichte Jesu Christi gdbe ? (1898, p. 468). Also in the 
Hefe zur christlichen Welt, Nos. 11, 32, 33, 48, by Reischle, Eck, Loofs, 
and Sulze. 

3 Das Wesen des Christentums, Leipzig, 1900, Eng. tr. by Saunders, 
" What is Christianity ? " London and New York, 1 901 . 

* Cf. Bousset, in Theol. Rundschau, for March, 1901, and references 
there given. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 281 

review to a close than by a brief summary of their more 
important conclusions. "We may sum these up under 
the three heads of the novelty of Christianity, its adapt- 
ability, its universality. 

And first the novelty of Christianity. Harnack is 
not less convinced than Ritschl of the uniqueness and 
originality of Jesus Christ. If- we ask where we are to 
find the essence of Christianity, Harnack answers in a 
word, In Jesus Christ and in His Gospel.^ It is Christ 
who is the creator of Christianity; and to understand 
Christianity means to know Christ. For this insight 
no lengthy studies are necessary; no profound re- 
searches in comparative religion; no deep delving into 
the mysteries of Erhenntnisstheorie ; not even an accu- 
rate knowledge of contemporary history, however wel- 
come the help which it may bring. 2 The Gospel of 
Jesus is at once so simple and so original that even 
without elaborate instructions the plain man may find 
his way to it. Whoever has an open eye for what is 
living and a true feeling for what is really great cannot 
fail to see it, and to distinguish it from its contemporary 
dress.^ The Gospel of Jesus? It is "eternal life in the 

1 P. 6, Eng. tr. p. 10. 

2 p. 10,Eiig. tr. pp. 15, 16. " Selbst davon werden wir absehen und ab- 
seben diirfen, einleitend uns iiber das Judentum und seine aussere und 
innere Lage zu verbreiten und iiber die griechisch-romiscbe Welt uns auszu- 
sprecben. Selbstverstandlicb werden -wir nie unsern Blick ibnen gegen- 
iiber verscbliessen diirfen — sie miissen uns yielmehr immer im Sinne 
sein — aber weitscbicbtige Darlegungen sind bier nicbt notig. ... So 
oft ich die Evangelien -wieder lese und iiberscblage, um so mebr treten 
mir die zeitgescbicbtlichen Spannungen, in denen das Evangelium ge- 
standen hat und aus denen es hervorgetreten ist, zuriick." 

3 P. 9, Eng. tr. p. 14. 



282 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

midst of time, in the strength and before the eyes of 
God."^ It is "divine sonship spread out over the 
whole of life, an inner harmony with God's kingdom, 
and a joyful certainty in the possession of eternal goods, 
and in confidence of protection from evil."^ It is all 
this, not as theory merely, but as experience, realizing 
itself first of all in the life of Jesus, and afterwards in 
all those who, through Him, have been brought to know 
themselves as at once sons of God and servants of their 
fellow-men. If it be objected that the ideas of Jesus 
may all be paralleled within the Old Testament, Har- 
nack is willing to grant you the fact. In monotheism 
it is difficult to discover any new ideas. But the sepa- 
ration of the truth from its misleading associations, its 
simplification and purification, and above all its trans- 
lation into life, — ,this is the unique achievement of 
Jesus ; and it is in this that His originality consists. ^ 
For the Gospel, we repeat, is not merely truth but 
power. It is a living thing, and as living, growing — 
capable of indefinite expansion and adaptation, as it is 

1 P. 5, Eng. tr. p. 8. " Ewiges Leben, mitten in der Zeit, in der Kraft 
und vor den Augen Gottes." 

2 P. 42, Eng. tr. p. 65. " Gotteskindschaft ausgedehnt iiber das ganze 
Leben, ein innerer ZusammenscMuss mit Gottes Willen und Gottes Reich 
und eine freudige Gewissbeit im Besitz ewiger Giiter und in Bezug auf 
den Schutz vor dem Uebel." 

3 P. 31, Eng. tr, pp. 47 and 48. " Nun fragen Sie nocb einmal : * Was 
war denn das Neue ? ' In der monotheistiscben Religion ist diese Frage 
nicbt am Platze. Fragen Sie vielmebr. ' War es rein und war es kraftvoU, 
was bier verkiindet wurde 1 ' Icb antworte : Suchen Sie in der ganzen 
Religionsgescbicbte des Volkes Israel, sucben Sie in der Geschicbte iiber- 
baupt, wo eine Botscbaf t von Gott und vom Guten so rein und so ernst — 
denn Reinheit und Ernst geboren zusammen — gewesen ist, wie wir sie 
hier boren und lesen ! " 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 283 

brought into contact with the ever changing environ- 
ment. This is the second point to note in Harnack's 
view of Christianity. There are but two possibilities. 
"Either the Gospel is in all points identical with its 
first form, in which case it is a transient phenomenon, 
appearing in time only to pass away again, or else it 
presents eternal truth in historically changing forms." ^ 
The latter is the true view. If we would understand 
the nature of Christianity, we must not stop with the 
teaching of Jesus, nor even with the experiences of the 
apostles. We must follow Christianity throughout all 
its changing historic forms, in order that in the great 
school of time we may learn what is the permanent 
principle in the midst of its variations, the abiding truth 
which outlives all change. ^ Having found the common 
element in all these varying appearances, we must test 
it by the Gospel ; and conversely, we must bring the 
principles of the Gospel to the test of history. ^ Neither 
alone is sufficient. Both together will give us the truth. 
In such sentences, we find the disciple of Ritschl making 
room for the truth for which Hegelianism stands. 

To follow Harnack in his application of this method 
in detail would carry us too far. Beginning with a 
study of the Gospel of Jesus, ^ which he finds may 
be summed up in the three phrases, the kingdom of 

1 P. 8 sq., Eng. tr. p. 13 sq. 

2 Pp. 6-9, Eng. tr. p. \0 sq. 

* P. 10, Einxg. tr. p. 15. "Das Gemeinsame in alien diesen Erschein- 
ungen, kontrolliert an dem Evangelium, und wiederum die Grundziige 
des Evangeliums, kontrolliert an der Geschichte, werden uns, so diirfen 
wir hoffen, dem Kerne der Sache nahe bringen." 

* Pp. 32-50, Eng. tr. p. 49 sq. 



284 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

God and its coming ; the Fatherhood of God and the 
worth of the individual human soul ; the better right- 
eousness and the law of love, he follows its fortunes 
through the changing centuries: in the Apostolic 
church; through the rise of the old Catholic church, 
to the more developed forms of Catholicism, Greek, and 
Roman; and, finally, in its latest dress, in Protestant- 
ism. In spite of all the corruptions and misunder- 
standings to which it has been exposed, intellectual, 
ethical, ecclesiastical, he finds that it still maintains its 
vitality and power. There has never been a day, even 
in the darkest period of the Middle Ages, or in the 
most superstitious age of Greek Catholicism, when the 
Gospel of Christ has not had its witnesses and its con- 
fessors,^ and the variety of their outward condition and 
of their intellectual environment has but served to make 
more impressive the unity of the Christian experience. 
Christ's message to the men of the nineteenth century 
is in substance the same as that to the men of the first. 
He speaks to the same needs, satisfies the same long- 
ings, answers the same questions, and the net outcome 
of the historic process is to set His supremacy in a 
clearer light and to establish it on a firmer footing than 
ever before. ^ 

This leads us to the last point in Harnack's charac- 
terization of Christianity — its universality. It is true 
that he speaks somewhat disparagingly of apologetic 
presentations,^ nor does he think that comparative 

1 p. 187, Eng. tr. p. 298. 

2 Pp. 188, 189, Eng. tr. p. 300 sq. 

8 P. 4 sq.y Eng. tr. p. 6 sq. Harnack objects to most apologetic pres- 
entations that they have not adequately recognized the simplicity of the 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 285 

religion in its present form has any very considerable 
contribution to make to the solution of our problem.^ 
He contents himself with the more modest task of 
studying Christianity historically in order that he may 
learn its own answer to our question as to its nature. ^ 
But the rejection of apologetics is only in appearance. 
As Ritschl rejects the absoluteness of a false philosophy 
that he may present the authority of Christianity more 
effectively in his own way, so Harnack dispenses with 
an inadequate apologetic that he may replace it with a 
better one. There is more apology in Harnack's history 
than in twenty volumes of the Bridge water treatises. 
No presentation of Christianity, he tells us, is true to 
history, which ignores the life experiences of its adher- 
ents.^ And it is as one of these that Harnack writes. 
The historian becomes unconsciously a pleader, and the 
sentences in which he describes the Gospel glow with 
the fire of a personal testimony. Here is a man who 
believes that he has found the key which unlocks the 
mystery of life and who invites his fellow-men to share 
with him his glad discovery.* 

Christianity, the religion for man as man — this is 
the conclusion to which all Harnack's studies lead. In 

Gospel, the fact that Christianity is " Etwas Hohes, Einfaches und auf 
einen Punkt Bezogenes," p. 5, Eng. tr. p. 8. 

1 P. 5 sq., Eng. tr. p. 8 sq. 

2 P. 4, Eng. tr. p. 6. "Was ist Christentum ? — lediglich im histor- 
ischen Sinn wollen wir diese Erage hier zu beantworten versuchen." Cf. 
p. 6, Eng. tr. p. 10. 

3 P. 4, Eng. tr. p. 6. " Der Lebenserfahrung die aus erlebter Geschichte 
erworben ist." 

* Cf. the beautiful passage, p. 188, Eng. tr. p. 300, beginning "Dass 
ich einmal von meiner eigenen Erfahrung spreche." 



286 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the Gospel of Jesus, we have the perfect expression of 
that for which all men, more or less consciously, seek ; 
the complete attainment of that toward which from 
the beginning the race has been blindly groping. ^ 
Harnack recognizes the difficulty of making a general 
conception of religion. He can understand the posi- 
tion of those to whom the word denotes simply "an 
empty spot within us, which each man fills out in his 
own way, and some do not even recognize at all.'"^ 
But this is not his own view. He is convinced that in 
the deepest depths of humanity there is something com- 
mon, which, out of division and obscurity, has little by 
little struggled up throughout the course of history to 
unity and clearness. He believes Augustine in the 
right when he cries, " Thou, Lord, hast created us for 
Thee, and our heart is restless till it finds rest in 
Thee."^ This longing Christ satisfies and thereby 
shows Himself not merely the Saviour of the individ- 
ual,* but the centre of the religious history of the race.^ 
Here we must bring our historical survey to a close. 
"With this recognition of the anima naturaliter Chris- 
tiana^ of a preparation for Christianity within the very 
nature of man, we find Harnack, even while insisting 
with Ritschl upon the originality of Christianity, ad- 



1 P. 11, Eng. tr. p. 17. "Ich zweifle nicht, dass schon der Stifter den 
Menschen ins Auge gefasst hat, in welcher ausseren Lage er sich auch 
immer befinden mochte — den Menschen, der im Grunde immer derselbe 
bleibt." Cf. p. 44, Eng. tr. p. 69. 

2 P. 6, Eng. tr. p. 9. 
8 Ibid. 

4 Pp. 43, 44, Eng. tr. p. 67 sq. 

5 P. 189, Eng. tr. p. 301. 



RITSCHL AND HIS SCHOOL 287 

mitting the complementary truth for which the specula- 
tive school contend. This admission, with its promise 
of a better understanding between the two opposing 
parties, may serve as a convenient introduction to our 
concluding chapter. 



CHAPTER VIII 

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 

1. Present State of the Question, 

As we look back over the history of Christian thought, 
we are struck by the persistence of two contrasted 
tendencies. On the one hand, there is the disposition 
to emphasize the supernatural character of Christianity, 
and to magnify the contrast between it and other 
religions ; on the other, the tendency to lay stress upon 
the points of resemblance between Christianity and the 
ethnic faiths, and to ground the supremacy of the former 
in the fact that it realizes a universal ideal. 

These two tendencies find clear expression in the 
history of definition. Taking the definitions which we 
have passed in review, it would be easy to divide them 
into two classes, according to the relative prominence 
which they give to the natural or the supernatural in 
their estimate of Christianity. The antithesis is not 
confined to any particular age or period of Christian 
thought. It runs through them all. Justin is matched 
by Marcion ; Abelard by Thomas Aquinas ; Kant by 
Butler ; Hegel by Ritschl. Men who have little else in 
common find here an unexpected bond of union, and 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 289 

theologians otherwise in sympathy part company at 
this point. 

And yet the contrast may easily be exaggerated. 
Each point of view is too deeply rooted in experience to 
make it possible for its advocates wholly to overlook 
the other. The schoolman declares that the being of 
God surpasses the power of human reason to compre- 
hend, only to make place for a natural theology in which 
he attempts a rational demonstration of the existence of 
the Absolute. Kant is persuaded that religion should 
contain nothing but what each individual should be able 
to attain through the light of his own reason, apart 
from all historic mediation. Yet he admits that there 
has been but one Christ, and hails Him as founder of 
the universal church. Ritschl ridicules the attempt to 
gain a conception of the nature of rehgion from a com- 
parison of the ethnic faiths, but he does not deny that 
in Christianity^ when it is found, we have the revelation 
of the universal religious ideal. Biedermann bids us 
distinguish in Christianity between principle and person, 
yet does not doubt that in the person of the Christ the 
principle of true religion has for the first time found 
perfect expression. Thus while the advocates of the 
extraordinary in Christianity recognize its intimate con- 
nection with the facts of common life, those whose 
search is for laws of universal validity are the first to 
admit its uniqueness. 

The problem of the definition of Christianity is at 
bottom the problem of the reconciliation of these two 
divergent elements. What is wanted is a conception 
which shaU be at once supernatural and natui'al, or, to 

19 



290 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

put the matter less teclmically, which shall exhibit the 
distinctive features of Christianity in their universal 
relations and significance. 

The history of Christian thought has shown a steady 
progress both in the apprehension of this problem and 
in its solution. The two parties have been gradually 
drawing closer to each other, until to-day the difference 
is rather one of emphasis and of proportion than of 
fundamental conviction. It will be our object in this 
closing chapter to indicate wherein this growing con- 
sensus consists, and to consider its bearing upon the task 
immediately before us. We shall inquire in the first 
place, what modern thought has to tell us of the con- 
ditions of the problem, and secondly, what steps have 
been taken in its solution. The first is a matter of 
philosophy, the second of history. 

2. The Contribution of Philosophy. Christianity as the 
Absolute Religion the Croal of Religious Progress. 

If we ask what contribution modern philosophy has 
to make to the definition of Christianity, the answer can 
be very simply given. It is the conception of the 
Absolute as the goal of progress. What may be called 
the static conception of the Absolute has had its day. 
Whatever else the ultimate reality may be, it is not 
dead. The God of modern philosophy is a living God. 
The world is the scene of change, growth, progress. 
Development is the law of life, and the way to learn 
the nature of the mysterious power who is at the heart 
of the process is to discover the end to which the 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 291 

process tends. The true meaning of the Absolute is 
teleological. 

The bearing of this upon our problem is plain. If 
Christianity is to make good its claim to be the absolute 
religion, it must be able to show that it is the goal of 
religious progress. That is to say, it must be able to 
show that the ideals which it reveals, the motives to 
which it appeals, and the forces which its sets in 
motion, are such as to promote that type of the religious 
life toward which, so far as we are able to judge, 
religious progress is tending. This is the meaning 
which modern thought puts into the phrase, the absolute 
religion. 

When Ritschl criticizes those who seek to discover 
the nature of true religion by taking elements indis- 
criminately from all the historic faiths, in order to com- 
bine them into an artificial unity which they are pleased 
to call the absolute religion, he is entirely in the right. 
The problem is too complex and the issues too fine, to 
admit of so simple a solution. But it does not follow 
that religion has no unity, and that the effort to relate 
Christianity to earher forms of the religious life is vain. 
A river may have many tributaries, and they differ, not 
only in the volume of water they carry, but in the 
number and extent of the obstacles they encounter. 
Some are broad, others narrow ; some are rapid, others 
sluggish ; some are choked with rubbish and fouled with 
decaying leaves; others run free and are crystal clear. 
Some bear great ships upon their bosom ; others contain 
scarce enough to quench the thirst of a single man. 
But the water in each comes from the same sky, and 



292 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the goal to which all are bound is the open sea. So the 
different faiths, diverse as they seem, are forms of the 
same religious life, obey the same unchanging laws, 
and aspire to the same unseen goal. We may illustrate 
this along several different lines. And first in connec- 
tion with the idea of God. 

If we retrace the religious history of humanity, we 
find a gradual movement toward the recognition of one 
supreme Deity. From the early animism which can 
scarcely be said to possess a god at all, we pass to 
henotheism,^ the stage where one or another of the local 
gods is raised above his fellows and made the object of 
supreme worship. Through the combination of many 
such local gods arises polytheism, with its Pantheon of 
alhed and related deities. As man grows in civiHzation, 
and becomes more conscious of the unity of the world, 
such external and artificial devices prove unsatisfactory, 
and we find an increasing tendency to believe in a 
single all-controlling God, who is Lord of the entire 
universe, and whom theological thought tends to identify 
with the Absolute of philosophy. In its doctrine of 
one supreme God, the Creator and Ruler of the entire 
universe, Christianity gathers to a head the results of 
this earlier development, and shows itself fitted to 
satisfy the deepest religious needs of man. 

1 The word " henotheism " was originally used by Max Miiller, to 
denote " a successive belief in single supreme gods," as distinguished 
from polytheism, where many gods are worshipped side by side (see 
his Origin and Development of Religion, New York, 1879, p. 261). It is, 
however, often used by writers on religion in a broader sense to denote 
a form of religion in which worship of a single god coexists with the 
recognition, but not the worship, of others. 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 293 

We note a similar progress in respect to the ethical 
character of religion. At first religion and ethics are 
independent. The god is but one of many beings with 
whom man stands in relation. And if he faithfully 
perform his religious duties of sacrifice or prayer, it is 
a matter of indifference, so far as religion is concerned, 
how he deals with his fellow-men. But with the dis- 
covery of the unity of God, this early dualism dis- 
appears. The Deity is seen to control all of life, and 
the ethical codes which govern man's relations to his 
fellows receive a religious sanction, and are put under 
religious control. The law of God includes my duty to 
my brother, and if I am at fault in my dealing with 
him, I sin against God. This morahzation of religion 
may be studied in many different fields — most clearly 
of all in the religion of Israel. In Christianity it reaches 
its culmination. Here religion and ethics have become 
so completely one, that it is impossible, even in thought, 
to separate them. 

Further evidence of progress appears in connection 
with the objects sought in religion. At first these are 
almost entirely external, such as wealth, success, re- 
covery from sickness, victory in battle. But, with a 
deeper insight into the inner life, and a juster estimate 
of spiritual values, other interests arise. Man's great 
enemy is seen to be himself, and his supreme need, the 
renewal and purification of the inner life. So redemp- 
tion comes to include deliverance from spiritual evils 
as well as from external calamities. Religions as widely 
separated as Buddhism and the religion of Israel bear 
witness to this transformation of the redemptive idea. 



294 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

Cliristiaiiity, entering into the heritage of Israel, sees in 
God one who looks upon the heart, and declares that 
even the man dead in trespasses and sins is not beyond 
the reach of his redemptive grace. 

Finally, we note in the religious history of mankind a 
tendency to pass from the local and the limited to the 
universal. Religion, which is at first an affair of the 
family, the tribe, or the nation, breaks the narrow bonds 
which have confined it, and is seen to be an affair of 
humanity as a whole. As there is but one true God, so 
there can be but one true religion, and he who has 
attained to a knowledge of this religion is in duty bound 
to share his experience with his fellow-men. So we 
have the birth of the missionary impulse, and before 
the growing propaganda of the larger faiths, the local 
religions which have hitherto sufficed prove unable to 
maintain themselves. The outward expansion has its 
complement within, as the religious estimate spreads 
itself over all of life, and endeavors to make its own 
the territory which had hitherto been regarded as the 
exclusive domain of art or ethics or philosophy. Nothing 
less than a complete control over the whole of human 
life is able to satisfy the religious aspiration. Even the 
barrier of the grave proves insufficient, and in the hope 
of immortality the way is opened for the development 
of an ideal which is strictly speaking universal.^ 

. 1 We are well aware of the danger of generalization in a field as 
rast and complex as that of the history of religion. Yet, without 
generalization of some kind, progress in knowledge is impossible. What 
it is here intended to assert is simply that so far as we find evidence of 
progress at all in the history of religion (and in the greater religions, 
whose history we are able to follow for a long period of time, some prog- 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 295 

It is the merit of the Hegelian philosophy of religion 
that it so clearly exhibits the universal relationships of 
Christianity. Hegel conceived of Christianity as the 
culmination of the movement of humanity as a whole 
toward God. This is his permanent contribution to 
religious thought. Thoughtful Christians to-day are 
persuaded that if their religion is to prove its right to 
universal authority, it must take up into itself the 
elements of truth in all the historic faiths, while at the 
same time giving them something peculiar to itself 
which they lack. The only difference of opinion is as 
to the method in which the distinctive contribution of 
Christianity can most effectively be shown. 

But we have lingered long enough on the threshold. 
From the conditions of the problem, we must pass to 
steps which have been taken in its solution. This will 
be the subject of our next inquiry. 

3. The Contribution of History. Christianity as a His- 
toric Religion^ the Progressive Realization of the 
Supremacy of Christ, 

It is one thing to assert that Christianity is the 
absolute religion. It is another to point out in detail 

ress can hardly be denied), it" is along the lines here suggested. The 
fact that there are wide areas of religious history in which stagnation, or 
even retrogression, is the rule, is no more argument against the truth of 
our conclusion, than the presence of similar areas in secular history is a 
legitimate reason for losing faith in the progress of humanity as a whole. 
In the one case as in the other we have to do with a judgment of faith. 
We bring our own ideals with us to the history we would interpret, and 
all that can fairly be asked of us is { 1 ) that we do not ignore or mis- 
read the facts we see, and (2) that the evidence be sufficient to make 
our faith a reasonable one. 



296 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the qualities which justify the claim. Here the real 
difficulty of definition begins. Is Christianity monothe- 
istic ? So is Mohammedanism. Does it present a lofty 
ethical standard ? The same is true of Confucianism. 
Does it offer salvation to the sinful and needy. Judaism 
also is a religion of redemption. Does it assert a uni- 
versal authority. The claim of Buddhism is no less 
sweeping. Why not as legitimately make these facts 
a basis for the admission of their absoluteness? If 
attention is called to the imperfections of the ethnic 
faiths, is it not the fact that Christianity itself has 
realized its own ideal in very unequal degree ? Its 
monotheism has often been obscured by the worship of 
saints, of the Virgin Mary, even of Jesus Christ Him- 
self, and in some extreme forms of trinitarian statement 
is scarcely to be distinguished from tritheism. Its 
ethics have lost the simplicity which characterized the 
teaching of its founder, and through the casuistical 
distinctions of many of its moralists, the commonest 
principles of right and wrong have been turned upside 
down. As a religion of redemption it has no doubt 
done great things, but it is not fair to take account of 
its successes and ignore its failures, and the presence of 
many in Christian countries living in misery and sin 
would seem to show that there are limits even to Christ's 
power to help. As for its universalism, that remains 
after all only a claim, which is still disputed by Mo- 
hammedanism and Buddhism, In view of these patent 
facts, the question is a fair one what Christianity offers 
which the other religions do not which justifies us in 
giving to it an absolute character which we deny to them. 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 297 

Here modern scholarship, which has raised the ques- 
tion, brings us unexpected help in its answer. From 
the many imperfect and conflicting forms which history- 
discloses, it points us back to the unique personality 
from whom the Christian religion takes its name. 
Granted that Christianity has no exclusive possession 
of the qualities which we have passed in review ; granted 
that it does not realize them equally in all its historic 
manifestations, it is yet a fact that it embodies them 
in an object at once so definite and so enduring as both 
to satisfy the highest religious needs of the individual, 
and to provide a standard by which, according to the 
common agreement of the best and wisest of mankind, 
the religious progress of humanity is to be tested. This 
object is Jesus of Nazareth. He is the distinctive 
feature of the Christian religion. In restoring Him to 
His rightful place in Christian thought and life, modern 
scholarship has taken the greatest single step in the 
direction of a scientific definition of Christianity. 

This fact is not always as clearly perceived as its 
importance deserves. In the minute investigations with 
which modern criticism has to do, it is easy to lose one's 
sense of proportion. Questions of literary analysis and 
of historical dependence admit a variety of answer which 
seems to preclude certainty. Each logical possibility 
has its advocate, and the discrepancy of the critics 
forms a fruitful theme for conservative satire. Even 
sober students like Kahler ^ ask in all good faith whether 
there is any consensus, and whether the Jesus of crit- 

1 In his book, "Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche 
hiblische Christus." 



298 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

icism is not at least as fictitious a figure as the Christ 
of faith. But such a judgment is superficial ; it is the 
result of too close contact. When one withdraws a 
a moment from the details of critical study and asks 
what is the outcome of the labor of the last fifty years, 
the result is reassuring. We have time to touch on a 
few only of the more important points. 

And first of all, the humanity of Christ has recovered 
its rightful place in Christian thinking. We are no 
longer content to assert it as a doctrine ; we wish to 
realize it as a fact. Through the mists of dogma and of 
tradition under which He has so long been hidden, the 
gracious figure of the Man of Galilee begins again 
to be seen; and, as the outlines take on greater and 
ever greater distinctness, we are brought more and 
more under the spell of His simplicity, His originality. 
His greatness. We see the environment in which He 
lived, the quiet home at Nazareth, the simple life in the 
synagogue and at the carpenter's bench. We recon- 
struct the conditions of the time, political, social, ec- 
clesiastical. We enter the world of thought in which 
His contemporaries lived. Instead of massing chief 
priests and Pharisees and scribes together in one common 
category of prejudice and evil, we understand the various 
elements which entered into the making of the com- 
plex national life. We see the hard, practical common- 
sense of the Sadducee, and that the Pharisee, bigoted as 
he was, was yet often honest and sincere, and in his 
own way kept alive the religious aspiration to which 
Jesus appealed. Instead of regarding the Eoman world 
as one unrelieved mass of corruption, we distinguish 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 299 

between its evil and its good. We see its festering 
sores, its cruelty, its selfishness ; but, at the same time, 
we feel its great, dumb longing for the better life which 
was so soon to dawn. In this human world we see 
Jesus walking as a man among men ; growing in knowl- 
edge with growing experience; deepening His sym- 
pathies through contact with suffering ; winning men by 
the charm of a personality of unexampled frankness 
and simplicity; clothing His teaching with familiar 
imagery taken from the scenes of daily life ; going at 
last to a death which was the inevitable result of the 
clash of two great ideals, only to appear again to the 
faith and love of His disciples, and to carry on through 
their devotion a work a thousand-fold greater than it 
had been given Him to do within the narrow limits of 
His earthly life. 

We have a better understanding of the Gospel of 
Jesus. The Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of 
man, the worth of the individual human soul, greatness 
through service, salvation through sacrifice, the kingdom 
of God as the goal of humanity, — these truths, so inex- 
haustible in their richness and freshness, are seen to be 
His peculiar contribution to the religious thought of the 
race. Not that they were without preparation in the 
past — no truth comes unheralded — but that they found 
in Him a clearness of conception, and received through 
Him a definiteness of expression, which after nineteen 
centuries is still unsurpassed. To-day, as in each pre- 
ceding generation, men turn to Him with wonder and 
reverence as the supreme religious teacher of the world. 
The more we know of the environment in which He 



300 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

moved, the more convincing becomes the proof of the 
originality of His Gospel. To appreciate His doctrine 
of the Fatherhood of God, we need to set it over against 
the transcendent Deity of contemporary Judaism; to 
understand His doctrine of the brotherhood of man, we 
must realize the national limitations which hampered 
the men of His day in their social aspirations. No one 
can measure what it means that Jesus should have 
eaten and drunk with publicans and sinners, till he has 
entered the world of thought in which salvation seemed 
the peculiar prerogative of the righteous. All previous 
estimates are reversed by the new teacher. For the 
desire to rule we are given the privilege of service ; the 
greatest becomes the minister ; and the path to sov- 
ereignty leads by way of the cross. 

Greater than His teaching is the character of Jesus. 
Here, too, Christian thought owes a great debt to 
modern scholarship. When Christ is conceived from 
the side of the Absolute, it is impossible to appreciate 
His moral greatness. But look upon Him as a man of 
like passions and temptations with ourselves, and the 
full majesty of His character makes itself felt. A man 
who could live in His world and do what He did is 
unique. Where did He get His insight? What ex- 
plains that self-mastery unexampled ? This only is 
clear that the Gospel and the character of Jesus belong 
together. He could speak of God as He did because He 
had had experience of God in His own soul, and knew 
whereof He affirmed. He could transform the Jewish 
ideal of earthly glory and dominion into the Christian 
kingdom of service because He had learned in His own 
life that the things which are unseen are eternal. 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 301 

The same causes which have led to a new apprecia- 
tion of the character of Jesus have given us a new 
insight into the significance of His claim. Here again a 
frank recognition of the true humanity of Jesus is the 
necessary condition of realizing His uniqueness. Humble 
and lowly as He was, clear-eyed and just in His per- 
ception of moral values, frank to recognize the rights of 
the least of His brethren to the same access to God 
which He claimed for Himself, He was yet conscious of 
a unique relation to the Father and a unique function 
in mediating Him to men. He recognized in Himself 
the centre of human history, and looked for a day when 
all men should be gathered into the kingdom of which 
He was the head. This is what the Messiahship of 
Jesus means, an authority spiritualized, transformed, 
reborn, but authority none the less. In proclaiming Jesus 
as Lord the Christian Church has made no departure 
from the Gospel of Jesus. 

Thus it is in Jesus Christ, understanding by the 
term all that we have here passed in review — life, 
character, authority, Gospel, that we find the distinc- 
tive mark of Christianity. With His supremacy in the 
religious life of humanity, its claim to be the final 
religion stands or falls. 

But this raises at once a new and perplexing question. 
When we apply this test to the study of historic Chris- 
tianity we find a startling discrepancy. The religion 
which goes by the name of Christ seems widely to 
depart from the principles of its founder, both in teach- 
ing and practice. Sometimes the variation is greater, 
sometimes less, but variation of some kind and to some 



302 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

degree can hardly be denied. Other ideals are rec- 
ognized ; other forces dominant. The very name Christ 
has taken on a new meaning. Instead of suggesting 
the gracious human figure whose traits we have tried 
to describe, it has come to denote certain abstract 
philosophical conceptions, such as Logos or Absolute, 
the meaning of which varies from age to age and as to 
the exact significance of which the wisest theologians 
disagree. We have already traced the process by which 
the Christianity of Christ was replaced by the religion 
we call Catholicism, and seen that the result has been 
to empty the term Christianity of its original meaning 
and to open it to a series of changes which seem to 
elude all possibility of scientific control. 

What shall be done in view of such a situation? 
Shall we continue uncritically to apply the same word 
to phenomena which have really nothing in common? 
Shall we deny the right of historic Christianity to the 
name it has borne so long because it contains elements 
foreign to the religion of Jesus? Or is there some 
better way ; some principle running through the entire 
process, which, when once perceived, enables us to 
relate the later developments to the original fact from 
which they took their rise ? It is the latter conclusion 
toward which modern scholarship seems to be tending. 

To understand Christianity, it tells us, we must follow 
the Gospel of Jesus throughout its entire history, and 
note the different forms which it has assumed as it has 
passed from one environment to another through the 
changing centuries. We have not exhausted the sig- 
nificance of Christ when we have studied His life and 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 303 

recorded His teaching. The greatest fact still remains 
to be reckoned with, and that is His influence in the 
world. Through all the centuries He has been drawing 
men to Himself. His disciples have come out of the 
most various surroundings, national, intellectual, ethical. 
Not all have understood Him equally, or been equally- 
true to that which they have understood. Often His 
Gospel has had to fight its way in an alien environ- 
ment. Always it has had to clothe itself in such forms 
as were given by the thought of the time. To the 
philosopher it has assumed a philosophic dress. From 
Plato it has borrowed his ideas ; from Kant his criticism. 
Nor have its practical variations been less striking. To 
the statesman it has been a law ; to the moralist a disci- 
pline ; to the saint a passion. Among its prophets are 
to be found types as diverse as Francis and Hildebrand, 
Luther and Loyola, Edwards and Paton. Thus chang- 
ing with the changing centuries, it is not to be identified 
with any of its passing forms. Yet it is not therefore 
vague or indefinite. Wherever men have been touched 
by the spirit of Jesus, and live for the ends for which 
He gave Himself, there it is to be found. It is itself 
the spirit of Jesus made incarnate in human lives. In 
every age this spirit has been the life of the church. 
Abiding as the permanent element in Christian history, 
it gives the unity for which else we search in vain. 
Would we express in a sentence what makes out the 
genius of Christianity as a historic religion we cannot 
do so better than by saying that it is the progressive 
realization, in thought as in life, of the supremacy of 
Christ. 



304 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

In this idea the two great conceptions of Christianity 
whose conflict has so largely engaged us find their recon- 
ciliation. Hegel is right when he conceives of Chris- 
tianity as a universal process in which all things minister 
to a single end. But it is a process more complex and 
less uniform than his philosophy allows. For the logi- 
cal unfolding of the immanent idea we need to substitute 
the struggle of a spiritual principle with a resisting, 
and often hostile, environment. To understand Chris- 
tianity means to discover that principle and to follow it 
in its victorious, yet often painful and always laborious 
course. We are not obliged to find all things in 
Christian history good. Evil has its place, and error, 
and dull, stolid indifference. It is not strange that in 
the first reaction from Hegel's exaggerated optimism 
these aspects of Christian history should have received 
undue emphasis. It is not strange that men, when 
weary with the shallowness and artificiality of much so- 
called Christianity, should have turned their backs upon 
it in disgust, in order to bathe their spirits again in the 
perennial spring in which all that is truly Christian has 
its source. In comparison with the beauty and simplic- 
ity of the Gospel of Jesus, how could the later dogmatic 
Christianity seem other than a usurper ? To-day a 
juster estimate is possible. The attempt to destroy 
dogmatic Christianity is giving place to the more fruit- 
ful effort to understand it. We see the good which it 
contains as well as the evil, and recognize that in the 
development of Christian thought even those parts 
which seem to us less honorable have a necessary part 
to play. Ideas in themselves indifferent or even hostile 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 305 

may be so transformed by the spirit of Christ as to 
serve for generations as the vehicles of His Gospel. 
What is needed is not denunciation, but insight; not 
polemic, but sympathy. To discover under the formulae, 
which seem so dead and lifeless, the spiritual realities 
for which they stand ; to distinguish, within the inex- 
haustible heritage of the past, those utterances which 
have really had their day from those which possess 
permanent value and meaning ; to break up the deposit 
of Catholic doctrine into its elements that we may win 
from the indefiniteness of its official teaching a clear 
vision of the forces which animate and inspire its 
spiritual life ; in short, to find the Christ in Christian- 
ity, — this is the present task of Christian scholarship. 

Take, for example, the idea of the Logos, which for so 
many generations furnished the framework for the 
Christian confession of the divinity of Christ. When 
one considers the changes wrought by this idea in 
Christian faith ; how, under its influence, the historic 
Jesus was all but forgotten, and His place taken by an 
abstract philosophic conception, coming out of a world 
of thought which had little or nothing in common with 
Christianity, it is easy to become impatient, and to see 
in the dogmatic movement of the third and following 
centuries something wholly foreign to the genius of the 
religion of Jesus. But a careful study leads to a juster 
estimate. We see in this philosophy the mode of think- 
ing natural to the time, the form in which the Chris- 
tian faith must express itself, if it were to gain the 
allegiance of the cultivated men of the day. To the 
Greek the Logos was the principle of divine revelation, 

20 



306 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

the means through which a God, otherwise remote and 
inaccessible, gained access to and contact with His 
world. But the Logos was but a principle, an idea, 
an abstraction remote from common life and thought. 
The Christian found this principle incarnate in the 
man Jesus, and proclaimed Him as the Saviour for a 
world in need. Thus He gained a hearing for His 
Gospel from men who would otherwise have turned a 
deaf ear to His appeal. Reading the life story of a 
Justin, an Athanasius, and an Augustine, we see how 
this idea, which to us seems so alien, lent itself naturally 
to the expression of the Christian spirit, and, in spite 
of all differences of viewpoint, see in them Christian 
brothers, leading the same divine life, and serving the 
same divine master as ourselves. 

Or to take an illustration from the world of practice : 
To our modern view, with its keen sense of the sanctity 
of all life, monasticism seems a phenomenon hard to 
reconcile with the spirit of Christianity. It is difficult 
to imagine a greater contrast than that between Jesus 
of Nazareth, touching life on all its sides, spending His 
days in the familiar haunts of men, companion of the 
fishermen in their boats, welcome guest at the marriage 
feast; and the lonely hermit, practising fasting and 
self-laceration in the desert, or the scarcely less lonely 
monk, turning his back on his duties as citizen and 
patriot, in order to find in the solitude of his cell un- 
broken leisure for the cultivation of his own spiritual 
life. But here again, a better acquaintance with the 
facts leads to a revision of this hasty judgment. When 
we understand the conditions out of which monasticism 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 307 

was born, we recognize that it was the natural channel 
through which, in earlier centuries, the more earnest 
spirit, seeking to protest against the worldliness and 
corruption of a political Christianity, should utter itself. 
And when we follow its history, and note the great 
work which it has done for civilization and learning; 
when we see the Benedictines hewing forests, and turn- 
ing desert places into gardens ; when we recall the great 
reformation which had its impulse in Clugny ; when we 
see the Dominican reviving the preaching office, and 
the Franciscan ministering to the poor ; when we con- 
sider what treasures would have been lost to the world 
if it had not been for the labors of the lonely scribes 
whose ceaseless vigils kept the lamp of knowledge 
burning through the dark ages ; when we remember that 
the teachers of Europe for centuries were monks, and 
that without their help the universities could not have 
done their work ; above all, when we rehearse the role 
of great characters who have worn the religious habit, 
from Benedict in the sixth century to M^re Angelique 
and her nuns of Port Royal in the seventeenth, we grow 
impatient of any definition of Christianity which has 
not a place of honor for men and women like these. 

Even the great antithesis which runs through Chris- 
tian history, that between the Catholic and the Prot- 
estant spirit, proves less intractable when looked at 
from this point of view. We would not seek to mini- 
mize the importance of this difference. It is not easy to 
exaggerate the contrast between the man who finds the 
essence of religion in unquestioned obedience to ex- 
ternal authority, whatever its commands, and the man 



308 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

who believes that God deals with men as sons, and 
therefore gives them a message such that each can 
understand it for himself. Where a church claims to 
decide, as of divine right, how each man shall approach 
God, and what he shall believe concerning Him, there 
can be no doubt that it has broken with the spirit of 
Christianity, if the teaching and practice of Jesus sheds 
any light as to what Christianity is. 

But because the Catholic spirit, when pushed to -its 
logical extreme, may easily become unchristian, it does 
not follow that this is true of all its manifestations. 
Catholicism is the outgrowth of permanent human ten- 
dencies, and fulfils a necessary function in the life of 
man. Without its conservatism, much precious truth 
might have been lost, and energies, needed to perform 
some great task for God and for humanity, have been 
dissipated in the ineffective rivalries of individualism. 
Not all men, or all ages, are equally mature. Many 
are unable to stand alone. For such the tradition of 
the church proves a help, not a hindrance ; a staff, by 
whose aid they are able to walk more rapidly and more 
surely along the pathway of Christian service. History 
shows that within the capacious bosom of the church 
CathoHc room has been found for every one of the 
Christian graces. It has been the mother of the great 
reformers. Protestantism itself is its child. 

Discrimination, then, is needed, here most of all. 
Christianity is the monopoly of no church and of no 
creed. Whatever the ecclesiastical name, each great 
division of Christendom shows the same struggle between 
the conservative and the radical ; the traditionalist and 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 309 

the man of present prophetic insight. Historic Prot- 
estantism has its Catholics, and the church Catholic 
its Protestants. We need to put away all party spirit ; 
all pride of sect, or name, or opinion ; that in all the 
churches, as among those who stand outside of all, we 
may find the men who have been touched by the spirit 
of Jesus, and in the forms natural to their day and 
place, strive to reahze the ends for which He gave His 
life. When we have done this, we shall have found the 
essence of Christianity. 

To sum up : Christianity, as modern Christian thought 
understands it, is the religion of divine sonship and 
human brotherhood revealed and realized through Jesus 
Christ. As such it is the fulfilment and completion of all 
earlier forms of religion, and the appointed means for the 
redemption of mankind through the realization of the 
kingdom of Grod. Its central figure is Jesus Christ, 
who is not only the revelation of the divine ideal for man, 
hut alsOy through the transforming influence which He 
exerts over His followers, the most powerful means of 
realizing that ideal among men. The possession in Christ 
of the supreme revelation of God^s love and power con- 
stitutes the distinctive mark of Christianity, and justifies 
its claim to he the final religion. 



4. Conclusion, Significance of the Results Attained. 

We have reached the end of our journey. It only 
remains in conclusion to ask. What is the value of the 
results attained ? 



310 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

There are three distinct standpoints from which a 
definition of Christianity may be judged, that of philoso- 
phy, that of science, and that of practical life. For 
each it has its value, but the value is not the same for 
each. Let us see if we can discriminate between them. 

(a.) From the point of view of philosophy the abso- 
luteness of Christianity is a hypothesis, like any other 
philosophic theory, which must be tested by its ability 
to explain all the facts, and as to the truth or falsehood 
of which the final decision belongs to the future. 
The significance of a scientific definition of Christianity 
from this standpoint is that it states the Christian 
position with such clearness and precision as enables 
the test to be made. It shows us what Christianity 
claims to be, on what it relies to justify its claim, and 
hence enables us to indicate the conditions through the 
fulfilment of which alone the final proof is possible. 

We have already seen what these conditions are, and 
need not here repeat them. We have seen how much 
more complex and intricate are the issues involved 
than was apparent to the uncritical view of an earlier 
and less discriminating philosophy. The proof of 
Christianity is to us no longer simply a theoretical 
matter, to be tested by logical argument or rational 
demonstration, as in the case of a problem of algebra 
or a theorem of geometry. We have seen that religion 
is a part of life, and that the only way for Christianity 
to prove itself the final religion is to show itself supreme 
in life. It must lay hold of men both as individuals 
and in the mass ; it must win them to its faith by 
kindling their enthusiasm. Amid the strife of values 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 311 

and of ideals which make up the marvellous unity we 
call life, it must show that there is nothing to be com- 
pared with Jesus Christ; that the answer which He 
gives to the problem of existence is still the most 
satisfactory answer; that the motives by which He 
appeals to the conscience and lays hold upon the will 
are still the most powerful motives ; that the emotions 
which He stirs and the passions which He kindles still 
burn with an intenser fire than any others which are 
known to men. This is the only possible, the only con- 
vincing apology. To demonstrate the truth of Chris- 
tianity as a philosophic theory means to show that this 
is the outcome to which the entire process of the 
universe tends. 

This indicates to us what must be the real task of 
the Christian apologist. Not to attempt the impossible 
by seeking a demonstration of the absoluteness of 
Christianity which shall need no further correction or 
supplement — to each age belongs its own apologetic — 
but to vindicate the supremacy of Christ for our time 
by showing His adequacy to supply our present need. 
It is to set Him forth in His beauty and His simplicitj^, 
cleared of the misconceptions by which His personahty 
has been so often obscured, that in our day as in the 
days that are past men may be led to reverence His 
greatness and to give themselves to His discipleship. It 
is to restate the principles of His kingdom, freed from 
the local setting, Jewish or Greek, in which earlier ages 
have clothed them, that they may be seen to be of a 
truth the social gospel needed for our age. It is to 
enter sympathetically into the real meaning of the 



312 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

teachers who still hold aloof from Christianity, recog- : 
nizing the truth for which each stands, and showing 
that in Christ alone it finds its most complete and ■ 
adequate expression. It is to recognize the spirit of 
Jesus wherever it is found, among those called by His 
name as among those who profess they know Him not, 
that from a study of the progress of His kingdom and 
the ever-growing acceptance of His principles we may 
win new confidence in His ultimate supremacy, and 
gain new enthusiasm for service in His cause. 

(b.) From philosophy we pass to science. Here too 
our definition has a value of its own. 

From the point of view of science, the definition of 
Christianity is a report of progress in the understand- 
ing of Christ. If Christianity be in truth what we 
have called it, the progressive realization of the suprem- 
acy of Christ, it is most important for each gen- 
eration to compare its own Christianity with that of its 
predecessors, that it may take account of the gain 
which has been made. True progress is never wantonly 
destructive. It has its roots in the past, and draws its 
nourishment from the stores of supply which have been 
laid up for it through the ages. The function of the 
definition of Christianity is to gather to a head the new 
truth which has come to each age from its own study 
of Christ, and to apply it to the interpretation of what 
has gone before. 

So we find men in all the schools seeking to make 
earnest with the Christological principle ; taking the 
new insight which has come to them through modern 
study of the life of Christ and applying it to the 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 313 

traditional doctrines, to see how they stand the test. 
Sometimes consciously and deliberately, with a full 
realization of the significance of the step ; often by a 
process of unconscious reinterpretation, old doctrines 
are being restated, and forgotten truths brought out 
into the light. 

Under this influence the thought of God is being 

transformed. We still see in God with the Greek 

theologians the ultimate reality of the universe, the 

Absolute in whom thought rests, and toward whom 

aspiration strives. We still confess with Calvin that 

the will of God is the supreme law, back of which no 

man can press. But we have learned from Christ to 

call this Supreme Being Father, and to see in His will 

the expression of a character like that of Jesus Christ. 

For the abstract Absolute of philosophy we substitute 

i the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. When 

I we confess His sovereignty, we mean that the principles 

I of Jesus are some day to dominate the world. When 

we speak of the incarnation, we mean that in the life 

of Jesus of Nazareth, simple, human, brotherly as we 

j have learned to see it, God is revealing to all who have 

[ eyes to" see what He Himself is like, and what He 

would fain have all men become. 

With the change in our idea of God, our thought of 
man is correspondingly altered. Sonship takes on a 
larger meaning, as we realize more clearly the character 
of our Father. We still recognize man's dependence, 
his littleness and helplessness apart from God ; but the 
recognition loses its terrors as in Christ we perceive 
what man may become. The friendly and intimate 



314 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

relationships of the religious life receive new significance, 
as we realize that God deals with men as sons, able to 
understand in a measure the great work which He has \ 
set for Himself, and through free self-consecration to 
make it their own. We see Him through all the cen- 
turies training men for Himself, speaking to them in 
tones clearer and ever clearer, through prophet and 
seer, through statesman and law-giver, through priest 
and king, till at last in His own Son He has given the 
perfect revelation of His will, and set as the goal •, 
the transformation of humanity into the likeness of 
Jesus Christ. 

In the light of these fundamental truths, the special 
theological doctrines fall easily into place. The Bible 
is seen to be the record of God's progressive self -revela- 
tion, having its unity in the Christ to whom it points, 
and of whom it witnesses. The church is the company 
of all those in every age who are joined to Christ in 
faith and love, and who labor for the ends which He 
seeks. Sin is any lack of conformity to the spirit of 
Christ. Salvation is the establishment of right relations 
with God through the renewal of the filial spirit, and 
the creation of Christlike character. 

Thus all along the line, we find the distinctive 
elements in the Christian experience receiving fresh 
emphasis. Instead of the abstract terms of the older 
theology, drawn from metaphysics or logic or law, we 
see men seeking a more concrete, a more ethical, in a 
word, a more personal expression of Christianity. 

It is important to realize that the theological recon- 
struction thus alluded to is not simply a matter of 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 315 

individual interest or significance: it has a distinct 
scientific value. It witnesses to the new forces which 
are moving in Christian history, and the new ideals by 
which the church is animated. In a word, it indicates 
the exact point to which the church has come in its 
effort to understand Christ.^ This new insight the 
definition of Christianity gathers to a head. In such a 
definition we state with such clearness as we can the 
conception of Christ to which our experience has led 
us, and in so doing, not merely serve the practical 
interests with which we are more immediately con- 
cerned, but also contribute our quota to the evidence by 
which our Master's claim to universal supremacy must 
finally be tested. 

(c.) A word finally as to the bearing of our defini- 
tion upon the practical work of the church. 

From the point of view of the church, the supremacy 
of Christ is an ideal to be realized by the devotion and 
loyalty of His followers. The definition of Christianity 
indicates the church's conception of that ideal, and so 
of the task to the accomplishment of which its energies 
must be directed. Such a statement is of the highest 
practical value. 

It is of value for the church, in giving definiteness to 
its thought and direction to its activity. Without such 

1 This is the truth in Schleiermacher's much criticized saying that 
Systematic Theology is not a philosophical but a historical discipline. 
By this he means that it deals not simply with theory, but with facts. It 
studies things as they are, in order to report what it finds. Its subject- 
matter is the Christian consciousness, or, to put it more exactly, it is 
Christian truth, as apprehended by the church under a particular intel- 
lectual environment and on the basis of a specific religious experience. 



316 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

guidance, its energies are in danger of being dissipated 
in efforts that are useless, if not positively harmful. If 
preaching is to be effective. Christian nurture intelligent, 
and missionary enterprise successful, the church must 
know what is the end which these things are designed 
to secure. The issues at stake are too important for 
careless or haphazard methods. The church which 
expects to win the world to Christ must know what 
Christ wants of the world, and what He is able to do 
for it. 

It is of value also for the world. It shows those who 
are not Christians what things the church really re- 
gards as important, and so simplifies the issue and 
hastens decision. It makes it possible to distinguish 
between the thousand subordinate and unimportant 
things, and the great essentials in which the Christian 
life consists, and with which it stands or falls. It helps 
to discover to those who are following Christ, although 
unconsciously, what is the real meaning of their life, 
and so to break down the barriers which separate them 
from those to whom they are spiritually akin. It 
transfers the final decision from the sphere of theory to 
that of practice, and concentrates attention upon the 
ethical and religious values which alone are of supreme 
importance. 

For these reasons we look for a speedy revival of 
interest in theology. One of the serious obstacles to 
Christian progress is the fact that our technical state- 
ments of belief so imperfectly represent living issues. 
Much good work has been done, and many useful con- 
tributions made; but they are hidden in monographs, 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 317 

and scattered in review articles, and their results have 
not yet been put into form accessible to the general 
reader. We need statements which shall be at once 
comprehensive and simple ; presenting the essentials of 
Christianity, freed from the mass of detail with which 
they have often been encumbered ; statements written 
out of \ genuine sympathy with the past, and an in- 
telligent understanding of its contribution to Christian 
progress, but with a clear understanding of the distinc- 
tive needs of our own day, and of the special answer 
of Christ to those needs. We need some new Schleier- 
macher, not so much to create, as to interpret the 
deeper feeling of the age ; to vindicate to the earnest 
men of our day their right to their Christian heritage, 
even as he vindicated to the men of his the dignity of 
the religious life of which Christianity is the noblest 
flower. 

What the theology of the future will be like in its 
details it is too soon to predict. But of one thing we 
may be sure. It will be a theology for the people. It 
will have its roots deep in life, and will utter its message 
in language so simple and direct that the layman as well 
as the theologian can understand it. It will address 
itself to permanent human interests, and present Christ 
as the Lord and the light of all life. Believing in a 
present God, it will find evidences of His presence in 
the movements of the time, and will take up into its 
catalogue of sanctities the familiar experiences and 
duties now too frequently relegated to a lower sphere. 
Like its Master, it will seek to hallow all of life by 
carrying into everything the Christian spirit. Above 



318 THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 

all, it will emphasize service as the true bond of union 
between God and man, — the pathway along which every- 
one must walk who would know the joy which God has 
reserved for those who love Him. 

For such a theology, when it comes, there is a great 
work in store. To the church it will reinterpret its 
faith, and give it a fresh consciousness of the Gospel 
which it is its mission to preach. For the world, 
it will clear away the misunderstandings and con- 
fusion which have often obscured the Christian mes- 
sage, and will concentrate attention upon the simple 
yet momentous decision upon which all turns at the 
last. 

For the real question between Christianity and its 
opponents, it cannot be too often insisted, is not prima- 
rily theoretical, but practical. It is a question of the 
power which is supreme in the universe. This is not a 
matter which is to be settled in the closet of the philos- 
opher, but in the forum and on the market-place. What 
gives plausibility to the philosophic objection to Chris- 
tianity is the fact that so many still reject the appeal of 
Christ and live for ends which He disapproves. To 
rob these arguments of their force it is only necessary 
to show that the power of Christ is really strong enough 
to conquer selfishness, and to establish the kingdom of 
righteousness, of joy, and of peace among men. This is 
an issue simple enough for the merest child to under- 
stand ; lofty and far-reaching enough to call forth the 
enthusiasm of the strongest and the wisest. It is an issue 
to the right decision of which every loyal life may con- 
tribute, and in which no smallest self-sacrifice is with- 



RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 319 

out its value. If we may venture to vary the ancient 
proverb, we may say that where it is a matter of winning 
men to Christ laborare est prohare. Deeds count for 
more than words. In the world's high debate concern- 
ing Christianity, the missionary is the true apologist. 



INDEX 



21 



INDEX 



AbelaIid, Peter, 76, 77, 82, 83, 
288 ; his definition of Chris- 
tianity, 77 sq. 
Abraham, 49, 64, 95. 
Absolute, the, 13-18, 25, 29, 32, 
35-38, 41, 57, 73, 109, 119, 
120, 122, ]67, 187-189, 190- 
193, 196, 198, 199, 206, 210, 
214, 225, 226, 256, 257, 271, 
290-292, 300, 302, 313. 
historic conceptions of, 13 sq. 
definition of, 14. 
ontological conception of, 15 

sq., 18 sq. 
mathematical conception of, 1 6, 

33 sq. 
psychological conception of, 

16 sq., 38 sq. 
its knowability, 34, 37. 
philosophy, the search for, 37. 
Calvin's conception of, 109 ; 
Kant's, 119; Schleier- 
macher's, 167, 206; Hegel's, 
122, 188, 189, 196; Ritschl's, 
256, 257; Kaftan's, 271, 
Spencer's, 37. 
as the goal of progress, 290 sq. 
Absolute religion, 39 sq., 290 sq. ; 
possibility of, 39; how 
proved, 39; the goal of re- 
ligious progress, 290 sq. 
Absoluteness of Christianity, 18, 20, 
22, 29, 33, 39, 42, 180, 202, 
290 sq. 
Adam, 64, 89, 92, 107, 145. 
JEsthetic religions, 169. 
Alexandrianism, 60, 135, 250. 



Ames, 107. 

Anabaptist view of Christianity, 
102, 106, 108. 

Anaxagoras, 37. 

Anselm, 75, 115. 

Antioch Christology, 70. 

Apologetic of Catholicism, 23; of 
Protestantism, 24, 25 ; the 
Ritschlian, 253 sq. ; the task 
of modern, 311 sq. 

Apologists, 60, 61, 63, 64. 

Aquinas, Thomas, 74, 114, 115, 
206, 288. 

Aristides, 63. 

Arminius, his conception of Jesus, 
108 ; of Christianity, 108. 

Articuli puri et mixti, 75. 

Athanasius, 70, 73. 

Aufkldrung, 197. 

Augustine, 30, 60, 68, 69, 71, 72, 
74, 112, 113, 114, 115, 252, 
286 ; his conception of Chris- 
tianity, 68 sq. ; his services 
to Erkenntnisstheorie, 113. 

Averroeism, 76. 



Bacon, Roger, 79. 

Ball, 107. 

Barnabas, 47, 54 sq., 59, 62, 68, 87, 
90, 93, 110, 175, 176; litera- 
ture on, 54 ; view of the re- 
lation of Christianity to 
Judaism, 54 sq. ; conception 
of Christianity, 55; Alexan- 
drianism of, 58. 

Basil, 73. 



324 



INDEX 



Baur, 127, 205, 207, 210, 211, 229 ; 
Ritschl's relation to, 229. 

Begriff, Hegel's conception of, 196, 
197 ; Biedermann's concep- 
tion of, 213. 

Bellarmine, 100. 

Bender, 265 ; his criticism of 
Schleiermaclier, 173. 

Bible, its place in traditional Prot- 
estant theology, 20. 

Biblical criticism, 127. 

Biblical principle, its influence on 
the definition of Christianity, 
109, 110. 

Biedermann, 208, 213, 214, 216; 
his conception of Christian- 
ity, 214; of Christ, 215. 

Bornemann, 261, 265, 269. 

Brahmanism, 199, 200, 273. 

Brenz, on the antiquity of Chris- 
tianity, 100. 

Brooks, Phillips, on orthodoxy, 29. 

Browne, Sir Thomas, 141. 

Buddhism, 4, 199, 200, 221, 273, 
296. 

Butler, 131, 143, 160, 288. 

Caied, Edward, 112, 113, 208, 220. 

Caird, John, 208, 220. 

Calov, 100. 

Calvin, John, 100 sq., 105, 112, 113, 
114, 115, 116; his definition 
of Christianity, 100 sq.; his 
conception of the Absolute, 
109; of God, 116. 

Calvinism, 28. 

Cart Wright, 107. 

Catholic Church, rise of, 59 sq. ; 
recognition of development 
by, 127. 

Catholic definition of Christianity, 
19, 59 sq. 

Catholicism, 19, 25, 86, 109, 180, 
307 sq. ; Protestant contro- 
versy with, 86. 

Chemnitz, on the Incarnation, 105. 

Chiliasm, 60. 



Christ, religious preparation of 
the world for, 49; historic, 
48, 60, 75, 91, 99, 210, 277, 
297. 

Paul's view of, 48 ; view of the 
writer to the Hebrews, 53 ; 
Barnabas' view of, 56 ; Jus- 
tin's, 62 ; Irenseus', 65 ; 
Origen's, 66 ; in Catholicism, 
72 ; in the Middle Ages, 75 ; 
Abelard's view of, 78 ; 
Zwingli's, 90, 91 ; Voltaire's, 
134; Kant's, 138; Schleier- 
macher's, 172, 176 sq., 181 
sq. ; Hegel's, 203-205 ; Mar- 
heinecke's, 210; Bieder- 
mann's, 215; Ritschl's, 245, 
246, 260, 261 ; Wendt's, 277 ; 
Harnack's, 281 ; J. Weiss', 
278 ; Kahler's, 279. 

Gospel of, 283, 299 sq. ; char- 
acter of, 300; authority of, 
301 ; Messiahship of, 44, 141, 
145, 146, 301. 

Christianity the progressive 
recognition of the supremacy 
of, 295 sq. 
Christianity, definition of, see Defi- 
nition. 

absoluteness of, 18, 20, 22, 29, 
33, 39, 42, 180, 202, 290 sq. 

relation to Judaism, see Juda- 
ism. 

Catholic conception of, 19, 59 
sq. ; conception of, in the 
Greek Church, 70; in the 
Roman Church, 71; in 
the Middle Ages, 74 sq. ; in 
the early Protestant Theol- 
ogy, 94 sq. ; in the writers of 
the 18th century, 130 sq. 

as the absolute religion, the 
goal of progress, 290 sq. ; 
as a historic religion, the 
progressive realization of the 
supremacy of Christ, 295 sq. 
See also under Definition. 



INDEX 



825 



Christian experience, place of, 

in a scientific definition of 

Christianity, 10. 
Chubb, Thomas, 142. 
Classification of religions, 168, 170, 

198, 199; Schleiermacher's, 

168, 170; Hegel's, 198, 199. 
Coccejas, 105, 107. 
Comparative religion, 87, 128, 248, 

273. 
Comte, 122, 123, 226, 255; his 

Erkenntnisstheorie, 123. 
Confucianism, 296. 
Conybeare, 143. 
Covenants, Westminster doctrine 

of, 107. 
Covenant theology, 105-107 ; need 

of an adequate account of 

origin and history of, 107. 
Critical philosophy, rise of, 112 sq., 

119. 

Daub, 207, 210. 

Definition, object of, 1 ; subjective 
character of all, 6 ; imprac- 
ticability of an exhaustive, 
6 ; nature of a scientific, 7. 
Definition of Christianity. 

nature and importance of a 
scientific, 1-7. 

difiiculty of, 2. 

Christian experience indispens- 
able in forming, 9 sq. 

traditional Catholic, 19; tradi- 
tional Protestant, 20. 

criticism of dogmatic, 26 sq. 

new form taken by the ques- 
tion at the Keformation, 86. 

influence of Biblical principle 
on, 109, 110. 

contrasted tendencies in, 288 
sq. 

present state of the question, 
288 sq. 

contribution of modern philos- 
ophy to, 290 ; of modern 
scholarship to, 297. 



concluding definition, 309. 

significance of, from the point 
of view of philosophy, 310 
sq. ; of science, 312 ; of the 
church, 315 sq. 

in the ancient church, 43 sq. ; 
view of the early disciples, 
44 ; of Paul, 47 sq. ; of the 
writer to the Hebrews, 51 sq. ; 
of John, 53 ; of Barnabas, 
53 sq. ; of Marcion and the 
Gnostics, 61 ; Justin, 62, 63; 
the Epistle to Diognetus, 
63; Tatian, 63; Theophilus, 
63 ; Aristides, 63 ; Irenaeus, 
64, 65 ; Ignatius, 65 ; Origen, 
66-68; Augustine, 68, 69; 
Abelard, 77 sq. ; William of 
Auvergne, 79 sq. ; Nicholas 
of Cusa, 82 sq. ; Joachim of 
Floris, 77. 

at the Keformation, 85 sq. ; 
view of Zwingli, 87 sq. ; of 
Luther, 94 sq. ; Melanchthon, 
97 sq. ; John Gerhard, 99 ; 
Brenz, 100; Calov, 100; 
Calvin, 100 sq. ; Coccejus, 
105 sq. ; Turrettine, 106 ; 
Servetus, 108 ; Socinians, 
108; Anabaptists, 108; Ar- 
minius, 108. 

in modern theology, 112 sq. ; 
view of Voltaire, 134 sq. ; 
Kant, 136 sq. ; the deists, 
140 sq. ; Sir Thomas Browne, 
141 ; Hobbes, 141 ; Toland, 
141 ; Shaftesbury, 142 ; 
Tindal, 142; Chubb, 142; 
Morgan, 143; Butler, 143. 
Leibnitz, 142; Spinoza, 143; 
Locke, 144 sq. ; Lcssing, 
149 sq. ; Schleiermacher, 
168 sq. ; Schweizer, 183 sq. ; 
C. L Nitzsch, 184 ; Twesten, 
184; UUmann, 185; Hegel, 
201 sq.; Daub, 210; Mar- 
heinecke, 210; Strauss, 211; 



326 



INDEX 



Feuerbach, 212; Bieder- 
mann, 214; Pfleiderer, 216; 
J. Dorner, 217 sq. ; Lange, 
219 ; Martensen, 219 ; Frank, 
219; Hofmann, 219; H. B. 
Smith, 219; Gore, 219; 
Gordon, 220; John and 
Edward Caird, 220 sq. ; 
Ritschl, 240 sq. ; A. Dorner, 
268 sq.; F. Nitzsch, 269; 
Schultz, 269 ; Bornemann, 
269; Kaftan, 269 sq. ; 
Troeltsch, 274 ; Lipsius, 275 ; 
Wendt, 277; J. Weiss, 278; 
Kahler, 279; Eeischle, 279; 
Haring, 280; Harnack, 280 
sq. 

Deism, 76, 77, 130, 140, 143, 197; 
Piinjer's definition of, 140 ; 
periods in the history of, 
140 ; literature on, 143. 

De la Saussaye on Hegel's phi- 
losophy of religion, 200. 

Demiurge, 61. 

Descartes, 119, 121, 125. 

Diognetus, the Epistle to, 63. 

Dogma, 110, 161, 195; place in 
Hegel's view of religion, 195. 

Dogmatics : Lutheran, 99 ; re- 
formed, 100 ; Schleier- 
macher's view of, 167 sq. 

Dohna, Count, 157. 

Dorner, A., 268. 

Dorner, J., 216-219; his definition 
of Christianity, 217 sq. 

Dualism, 188. 

Dualistic religions, 199. 

Duns Scotus, 115. 



EcKE, 256, 261, 262. 

Eden, 107. 

Engelhardt, 58, 62, 63 ; on Justin's 

conception of Christ, 62. 
Epicureans, 113. 
Erkenntnisstheorie, 113, 117, 123, 

281; literature on, 113; 



theory of Locke, Hume, 
Kant, 117; Comte, 123. 
External evidence in Catholic 
apologetic, 22 ; in Protestant 
apologetic, 24. 

Faith, Catholic definition of, 20. 

Federal theology, 105. 

Feuerbach, 208, 212. 

Fichte, 190. 

Flint on the beginnings of a philo- 
sophical conception of his- 
tory, 124, 125. 

Frank, 216, 217, 219, 258 ; his criti- 
cism of Ritschl, 258 ; his defi- 
nition of Christianity, 219. 

Gallic, 44. 

Gautama, 4. 

Gerhard, John, 99, 100. 

Claubenslehre, Schleiermacher's, 
158, 159, 161, 164, 165, 166, 
168, 170, 173, 174, 176, 177, 
180, 181, 182, 183, 184; re- 
lation to Reden according to 
Otto Ritschl, 159 ; to Strauss, 
159; to Lipsius, 159. 

Gnosticism, 61, 66, 67. 

Gordon, 220. 

Gore, 219. 

Gospel of Jesus, 283, 299 sq. See 
also under Law. 

Gottschick, 261. 

Gregories, the, 73. 

Grenzhegriff, 118. 

Griinow, Eleanore, 157. 



Haring, Th., 266, 280. 
Harnack, 56, 60, 250, 254, 265, 278, 
280, 281, 283, 284. 
his view of apologetic, 284, 
285 ; of Christianity, 280 sq. 
Hartmann, 217. 

Hebrews, letter to, 51, 60, 92; 
literature on, 51 ; theology of. 



INDEX 



827 



51 ; view of Christianity in, 
51. 
Hegel, 186-222; his life, 186, 187; 
literature on, 186 sq. ; his 
works, 186 ; relation to Kant, 
187; conception of the Ab- 
solute, 187-189; relation to 
Schelling, 190 ; place of logic 
in the Hegelian system, 191, 
192. 
his view of religion, 192; ra- 
tional character of, 1 92 ; 
place of religious feeling in, 
194 ; place of dogma in, 195 ; 
Vorstellung and Begriff in, 
195-197. 
interpretation of historic re- 
ligions, 197 sq. 
classification of religions, 198 

sq. 
conception of Christianity, 201 
sq. ; of the Trinity, 202, 205 ; 
of Jesus Christ, 203. 
Christianity the absolute re- 
ligion, 202 ; the revealed re- 
ligion, 202. 
view of the history of dogma, 

204. 
his definition of Christianity 
compared with that of 
Schleiermacher, 205. 
disciples of, 207 sq. 
different tendencies taking 
their departure from, 209. 
Henotheism, 292. 
Herbert of Cherbury, 133, 141. 
Herder, 125, 127, 133, 152. 
Herrmann, 254, 260, 265. 
Higher criticism, history of,l27,211. 
Historic Christ, 53, 68, 70, 71, 75, 
91, 99, 210, 259, 277 sq., 
297. 
Augustine's view of, 68; in 
mediaeval mystics, 75 ; 
Zwingli's view of, 91 ; Mar- 
heinecke's view of, 210 ; 
Kitschl's view of, 259. 



ambiguity of term, 277 ; recent 

discussions on, 277. 
central in Christianity, 297. 
See also under Christ. 
Historic religions, Hegel's interpre- 
tation of, 197. 
Historical spirit, the awakening of, 
1 24 ; influence on study of 
religion, 126. 
Hobbes, Thos., 141 ; view of the 

Messiahship of Jesus, 146. 
Hofmann, 216, 219. 
Hogan, 127. 

Holy Spirit, 22, 24, 25, 88, 113. 
place of witness of in Catholic 
apologetic, 22 ; in Protestant 
apologetic, 24. 
Calvin on, 113. 
Howie, 107. 
Hume, 117, 121, 123, 132, 143. 



Ignatius, 65, 70. 
Imitation of Christ, 75. 
Immutability of God, 104. 
Indulgences, 72. 
Inerrancy of the Bible, 20. 
Infinite, 16, 34, 163, 180, 226. 

Schleiermacher's view of, 163. 

See also under Absolute. 
Internal evidence in Catholicism, 

22 ; in Protestantism, 25. 
Iren£Bus, 60, 61, 64-66, 68. 

his view of Christianity, 64. 

compared with Paul, 65. 
Islam, 80. 



Jacobt, 159. 

James, 6, 123. 

JefFerey, 131, 143. 

Jesus, 44-46 ; His attitude toward 
the Jewish law, 44 ; founder 
of the universal religion, 
45 ; His view of the future of 
His Gospel, 45; His rela- 
tion to Judaism, 45; litera- 



328 



INDEX 



ture on, 46; recovered by 
modern scholarship, 297. 
See also under Christ. 

Joachim of Floris, 67, 77. 

Johannine conception of Christian- 
ity, 53, 54, 258. 

John of Damascus, 71. 

Judaism, 44-47, 51, 54, 57, 60, 61, 
80, 81, 85, 90, 92,94, 97, 101, 
106, 132, 138, 148, 151, 170, 
174, 209, 213, 249, 300. 
its relation to Christianity, 44, 
54, 60, 61, 90, 92, 96, 97, 101 
sq., 132, 300. 
Paul's view of, 47, 49, 92 ; view 
of the writer to the Hebrews, 
51 sq., 92; Barnabas' view 
of, 54 sq. ; in the writers of 
the 2d, 3d, and 4th centuries, 
Marcion and the Gnostics, 
Justin and the apologists, 
Irenaeus, Origen, Augustine, 
60 sq. ; William of Au- 
vergne's view of, 81 ; Zwin- 
gli's, 90 ; Luther's, 94 sq. ; 
Melanchthon's, 97 sq. ; Cal- 
vin's, 101 sq. ; Kant's, 138 ; 
Locke's, 148 ; Lessing's, 
151; Schleiermacher's, 170; 
Ritschl's, 249. 

Justin, 60-62, 68, 288. 



Kaftan, 14, 250, 254, 260, 261, 
265, 269, 270, 272. 
his definition of Christianity, 
269 sqo ; compared with 
Ritschl, 270 ; doctrine of 
Werthurtheile, 270; view of 
the Absolute, 272 ; of com- 
parative religion, 272, 273. 

Kahler, 268, 279, 297. 

Kant, 112, 116-127, 130, 132, 133, 

136-140, 149, 151-1.53, 165, 

174, 175, 225, 235, 288, 

289. 

life of, 116 ; literature on, 116 ; 



view of Noumena, 117; of 
Space and Time, 118; of the 
Absolute, 119, 120, 188; 
doctrine of the practical 
reason, 120; ethical theory, 
120; tendencies taking de- 
parture from, 122 ; influence 
on modern psychology, 123 ; 
unhistorical views of, 124. 
his view of Christianity, 136 
sq. ; his treatise on " Religion 
within the bounds of mere 
Reason," 137 ; his view of the 
Atonement and of Original 
Sin, 137; of Judaism, 138; 
of Jesus, 138, 139; Caird's 
criticism of, 112, 139; 
Ritschl's view of, 235. 

Kattenbusch, 266 ; on Schleier- 
macher and Ritschl, 233. 

Kostlin, J., 268. 



Ladd on Augustine, 113. 

Lange, 216, 219 ; his view of Chris- 
tianity, 219. 

Law and Gospel, according to 
Luther, 96 sq. ; Melanch- 
thon, 97 ; Calvin, 101 sq. 

Leibnitz, 77, 121, 130, 132, 141, 
142 ; his view of Christian- 
ity, 142. 

Lessing, 67, 76, 84, 125, 127, 132, 
149-152. 
literature on, 151 ; his "Edu- 
cation of the Human Race," 
84, 125, 127, 132; his view 
of Judaism, 151; of Chris- 
tianity, 149 sq. 

Lipsius, 159, 173, 267, 275, 276; his 
view of Christianity, 275 ; 
his criticism of Ritschl, 275. 

Lobstein, 266. 

Locke, 117, 121, 123, 130, 131, 133, 
141, 144, 145-149. 
his view of Christianity, 144 
sq. ; of Judaism, 148 ; of the 



INDEX 



329 



Messiahship of Jesus, US- 
US. 

Logos, 53, 63, 67, 113, 250, 302, 
305, 306. 

Loofs, 266. 

Lotze, 230. 

Luther, 85, 94, 113 ; literature on, 
94 ; his view of Christianity, 
94. 

Lutheran dogmatics, literature on, 
99. 



Mansel, Dean, 25. 

Marcion, 61, 288; his view of 
Christianity, 61. 

Marheinecke, 207, 210; his view of 
Christianity, 210. 

Mariolatry, 73. 

Martensen, 216, 217, 219 ; his defi- 
nition of Christianity, 219. 

Mathematical conception of the 
Absolute, 15, 16. 

Melanchthon, 94, 97, 98, 101 ; his 
view of Christianity, 97 sq. ; 
literature on, 97. 

Messiahship of Jesus, 44, 141, 145, 
146, 301. 
importance of in Locke's defi- 
nition of Christianity, 145, 
146 ; in Hobbes' definition of 
Christianity, 141, 146. 

Metaphysics, 161, 257. 

Miracles, 22, 25; Hegel's view of, 
195 ; Eitschl's view of, 227 ; 
Kaftan's, 273. 

Mohammedanism, 4, 76, 77, 80, 81, 
125, 296. 

Monasticism, 306 sq. 

Monism, 189. 

Morgan, 143. 

Miiller, Julius, 185. 

Miiller, Max, 292. 

Mysticism, 73, 140, 143, 257, 267 ; 
Ritschl's view of, 260. 



Natural religion, 164, 171, 222. 

Natural theology, 128, 247, 249; 
ambiguity of the term, 128; 
Ritschl's rejection of, 247 sq. 

Neo-Hegelianism, 220. 

Neo-Kantianism, 122. 

Neoplatonism, 260. 

Neronian persecution, 45. 

Newman, Cardinal, 30, 31, 127; 
views on Transubstantiation, 
31. 

New Testament, 44, 46, 47, 51, 53, 
62, 63, 64, 97, 98, 99, 100, 
102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 
127, 133, 145, 148, 150, 211, 
250, 252. 

Nicholas of Cusa, 82, 83; antici- 
pates the Parliament of Re- 
ligions, 82 ; distinguishes 
four stages of religious de- 
velopment, 83. 

Nitzsch, C. I., 184. 

Nitzsch, F., 266, 269. 

Nominalism, 114. 

Noumenon, Kant's doctrine of, 118, 
225. 

Old Testament, 45, 53, 55, 56, 59, 
61-64, 66, 68, 69, 77, 80, 83, 
90, 91, 94-99, 102, 103, 104, 
106, 107, 108, 110, 127, 131, 
247, 249, 250, 252, 282. 
Barnabas' view of, 55 ; Justin's, 
63 ; Ritschl's, 249. 

Ontological conception of the Ab- 
solute, 15, 25; of God, 115. 

Origen, 61, 66, 84, 175; literature 
on, 66; his conception of 
Christianity, 61, 66. 

Pantheism, Schleiermacher's dis- 
claimer of, 162 ; Hegel's, 188. 

Pantheistic religions, 198. 

Paradise, 96. 

Paul, 44, 47-49, 60, 83, 92, 93, 107, 
176, 177, 252, 278. 



830 



INDEX 



his attitude toward Judaism, 
44, 47, 92; his view of 
Christianity, 47 ; of the re- 
ligious preparation of the 
world for Christ, 49 ; litera- 
ture on, 48. 

Pfleiderer, his criticism of Schleier- 
macher, 173 ; of Ritschl, 258, 
263 ; his definition of Chris- 
tianity, 216. 

Philosophy, the search for the Abso- 
lute, 37 ; difference between 
ancient and modern, 38 ; rise 
of the critical, 112; contri- 
bution to the definition of 
Christianity, 312. 

Philosophy of religion, Hegel's 
view of, 197 ; Hegel's contri- 
bution to, 200. 

Pietists, 260, 262. 

Plato, 115, 303. 

Pliny, 45. 

Polytheism, 292. 

Positivism, 122. 

Progress, laws of religious, 292 sq. 

Prophecy, the argument from, 22. 

Protestantism, 19, 24, 25, 86, 94, 
109, 111, 180, 212, 308, 309. 
literature on, 94; its apolo- 
getic, 24 ; a new type of re- 
ligious life, 86 ; a reaffirma- 
tion of the elements distinc- 
tive of Christianity, 111. 

Psychological conception of the 
Absolute, 15, 16, 18, 36, 
38. 

Piinjer on Zwingli, 92; on Pflei- 
derer, 216. 



Eacovian Catechism, 108. 

Eade, 266. 

Rationalism in the Middle Ages, 

75 sq. ; in the 18th century, 

152. 
Raymond of LuUy, 79. 
Realism, 32, 114. 



Reformation, the, 25, 43, 85 sq., 
125. 

Reformed dogmatics, literature 
on, 100. 

Reischle, 234, 260, 265, 279; on 
Ritschl's influence, 234. 

Religion, Zwingli's view of, 87 sq. ; 
Schleiermacher's view of, 
159; Hegel's view of, 192; 
Ritschl's view of, 253. 
Comparative Religion, its rise, 
128 sq. ; Hegel's contribu- 
tion to, 200. 
Absolute religion, its possi- 
bility, 93; method of its 
proof, 39 sq. 

Religions, aesthetic, 169; dualis- 
tic, 199; historic, 169, 173, 
174, 184, 198; monotheistic, 
169, 170, 183; pantheistic, 
198; teleological, 169, 170. 

Religious progress, its laws, 292 sq. 

Remonstrants, 106. 

Ritschl, A., 223-287, literature on, 
223 sq. ; his life, 228 sq.; 
his works, 223, 230; con- 
trasted with Hegel, 227 ; his 
relation to Baur, 229 ; as a 
teacher, 230; relation to 
Schleiermacher, 231, 232, 
233, 234, 241 sq., 249; to 
Kant, 235 ; to Lotze, 263 ; his 
theology, 231 ; his conception 
of Christian experience, 234, 
235 ; his view of religion, 
235 sq. ; his conception of 
God, 238 ; his distrust of com- 
parative religion, 239, 240; 
his definition of Christianity, 
240 sq. ; his view of the king- 
dom of God, 244 ; of redemp- 
tion, 244, 245; of Christ, 
245 ; of the Old Testament, 
247 ; his rejection of natural 
theology, 248, 249; of the 
arguments for the being of 
God, 248; his message for 



INDEX 



331 



the church, 262 ; his Erhennt- 
nisstheorie, 263 ; his influence, 
264 sq. 

Ritschl, school of, 264 sq. ; litera- 
ture on, 264; tendencies in, 
267. 

Ritschl, Otto, 179, 253, 266. 

Rothe, 216, 217. 

Rousseau, 77. 



Sabatier, 47. 

Sack, 172. 

Sceptics, 113. 

Schaller, his criticism of Schleier- 
macher, 173. 

Schelling, 187, 190, 217. 

Schlegel, 157, 173. 

Schleiermacher, 154-185, 231 sq., 
233, 249, 315. 
literature on, 154 sq. ; life of, 
154 sq, ; his Reden, 158-166, 
170, 171, 172, 174, 179, 181, 
182; Otto Ritschl's view of, 
159 ; his Glaubenslehre, 158, 
159 (see Glaubenslehre) ; his 
view of systematic theology, 
167, 315; of religion, stress 
laid on feeling, 161; not 
absorption in the Infinite, 
163 ; variety of religious 
experience, 163 ; denial of 
one true religion, 164; social 
character of religion, 165 ; 
place of mediation in reli- 
gion, 165; compared with 
Kant, 165 ; view of posi- 
tive religions, 1 65 ; classifica- 
tion of religions, 168-170; 
refutation of the charge of 
Pantheism, 162; view of the 
Infinite, 163; of the relation 
of Judaism to Christianity, 
174 sq. ; his definition of 
Christianity, 168 sq. ; his 
view of Christ, 176; of re- 
demption, 177; of the Church, 



178; recognition of change 
in Christianity, 179; of the 
absoluteness of Christianity, 
180; criticism of, 171 sq., 
180; by Schaller, 173; 
Pfleiderer, 173 ; Bender, 173 ; 
Schmid, 173 ; Lipsius, 173 ; 
Ritschl, 231 sq., 233, 249. 

Schmid, his criticism of Schleier- 
macher, 173. 

Scholz, 261. 

Schopenhauer, 217. 

Schultz, 254, 269 ; his definition of 
Christianity, 269 sq. 

Schumann, 157. 

Schwab, 266. 

Schweizer, 106, 183; on the re- 
formed theology, 106; his 
criticism of Schleiermacher, 
106; his definition of Chris- 
tianity, 183 sq. 

Scotus, see Duns. 

Seinsurtheile, 271. 

Servetus, his view of Christianity, 
108. 

Shaftesbury, 133, 142. 

Simon of Tournay, 76. 

Smith, Henry B., 176, 219. 

Socinian view of Christianity, 106, 
108. 

Socrates, 62. 

Spencer, 14, 34, 37, 191. 

Spener, 248. 

Spinoza, 121, 130, 143, 144, 173, 189, 
231 ; his view of Christianity, 
143 sq. 

Stirling, on the secret of Hegel, 
188. 

Stoics, 113, 189. 

Strauss, 208, 211; his view of 
dogma, 211. 

Suetonius, 45. 

Supernatural, 19, 20, 21, 29, 47, 
71, 73, 82, 131, 153, 188, 
195,] 236, 253, 272, 277, 
288. 



332 



INDEX 



Tacitus, 45, 63. 

Tatian, 63. 

Teleological religions, 169. 

Tertullian, 60. 

Theophilus, 63. 

Theology of the future, its char- 
acter, 317; its opportunity, 
318. 

Tindal, 133, 142. 

Toland, 141. 

Traub, 263. 

Trinity, 31, 96, 202, 205. 

Troeltsch, 266, 269, 273, 274; his 
criticism of Kaftan, 273 sq. 

Turrettine, 106. 

Twesten, 184. 



Ullman, 185. 
Ussher, 107. 



Vatican Council, 22, 24, 25. 

Veit, Dorothea, 157. 

Voltaire, 123, 125, 130, 134 sq. ; 
literature on, 1 34 ; his con- 
ception of Christianity, 134 
sq.; his view of Jesus, 134, 
135. 



Vorstellung, Hegel's view of, 194, 
195, 196, 197; Biedermann's 
view of, 213. 



Weiss, J., 265, 278. 

Weisse, 216, 217. 

Wendland on Ritschl's criticism of 

Schleiermacher, 234. 
Wendt, H. H., 265, 277. 
Werihurtheile, Ritschl's doctrine of, 

236, 254; Kaftan's doctrine 

of, 270, 271. 
Westminster Confession, 21, 24, 25, 

30, 105, 107, 113, 115. 
Westminster doctrine of the Cove- 
nants, 107. 
William of Auvergne, 77, 79 sq., 

82 ; his view of Christianity, 

79. 
Willich, Henriette von, 158. 



ZwiNGLi, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93 ; 
literature on, 87 ; his De 
Vera et Falsa Religione, 87- 
93; his view of religion, 
88; of Christianity, 88; of 
Christ, 90. 



31^77 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date; April 2005 

PreservatfonTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



'il •> :!■;<■' 






LIBRARY 



.1-1 
. 1.. 










it: 



HliiiWiiai" 



Sill" 



:4^;:,:.S;.-ai||l 



• » •' I ■ 






1 






i '^^ '■ '',"-; ■■■v. '■• ■■''^^t'' i i' iJ P 




